







THE  
HISTORY  
OF  
G R E E C E.

BY WILLIAM MITFORD, Esq.

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THE SIXTH VOLUME.

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## CONTENTS

OF THE

## SIXTH VOLUME.



### CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of GREECE, and Transactions of the GREEKS in ASIA, from the Establishment of the GENERAL CONFEDERACY against LACEDÆMON, to the TREATY between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA, and the Reëstablishment of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER in GREECE, through the General PEACE dictated in the KING of PERSIA's Name, commonly called the PEACE of ANTALCIDAS.

SECT. I. *Confederacy in Greece against Lacedæmon: Recall of Agesilaus from Asia: Proposed Invasion of Laconia: Battle of Corinth: March of Agesilaus to Greece. Summary view of the history of Cyprus: Evagoras, Prince of Salamis: Connection of Salamis with Athens. Combination in Asia against Lacedæmon: Fleet under Conon: Defeat of the Lacedæmonian Fleet near Cnidus. Victory of Agesilaus near Coroneia. Successes of Pharnabazus and Conon, and Downfall of the Lacedæmonian dominion in Asia - - - - page 1.*

SECT. II. *Evils of the Grecian Political System. Sedition of Corinth. Singular union of Corinth with Argos. Successes of the Lacedæmonian General, Praxitas, near Corinth, p. 25.*

SECT. III. *Invasion of Laconia by Pharnabazus and Conon. Restoration of the long walls of Athens. Sea-fight in the Corinthian Gulph - - - - - p. 37.*

SECT. IV. *Improvement of the Grecian art of war by the Athenian General Iphicrates. Affairs of Phlius. Causes of failing energy of Lacedæmon. Successes of Iphicrates in Peloponnesus. Antalcidas Ambassador from Lacedæmon,*

<i>and Conon from Athens, to the Satrap of Lydia. Expeditions of Agesilaus into Argolis and Corinthia. Isthmian Games. Slaughter of a Lacedæmonian mora. Farther successes of Iphicrates</i>	- - - - - p. 42.
<b>SECT. V. Unsteddiness of the Persian Government: War renewed by Lacedæmon against Persia: Thimbron Commander-in-chief. Expedition into Acarnania under Agesilaus; into Argolis under Agesipolis</b>	- - - - - p. 60.
<b>SECT. VI. Affairs of Rhodes: Diphridas Commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia; succeeded by Telcutias. An Athenian Fleet sent to Asia under Thrasybulus: Asiatic and Thracian Dominion recovered to Athens. Death of Thrasybulus and Conon. Anaxibius Commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia, Iphicrates of the Athenians: Defeat and Death of Anaxibius</b>	- - - - - p. 69.
<b>SECT. VII. Freebooting War of the Æginetans against Attica: Siege of Ægina. Lacedæmonian Public Revenue. Connection of Athens with Cyprus. Telcutias Commander on the Grecian coast: Antalcidas Commander in Asia, and again Ambassador from Lacedæmon to the Satrap of Lydia. Able conduct of Antalcidas, in military command and in negotiation. Treaty concluded between Lacedæmon and Persia, and Peace dictated to Greece by the Lacedæmonian Government, in the King of Persia's name, commonly called the Peace of Antalcidas</b>	- - - - - p. 81.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

Affairs of GREECE, from the PEACE of ANTALCIDAS till the Depression of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER, and the Elevation of THEBES to Supremacy among the GRECIAN REPUBLICS, by the Battle of LEUCTRA.

<b>SECT. I. Despotism of Lacedæmon: Punishment of Mantinea: Restoration of Phliasian Exiles</b>	- - - - - p. 99.
<b>SECT. II. Uncommon Tranquility in Greece. New Political Phenomenon in Greece: Inconveniencie of the Grecian Political System: Growing Power of Olynthus: War resolved against Olynthus by the Congress of the Lacedæmonian Confederacy</b>	- - - - - p. 105.
<b>SECT. III.</b>	

SIXTH VOLUME. ▼

SECT. III. *Sedition of Thebes: Prevalence of the Lacedæmonian Party, and Subjection of Thebes to Lacedæmon. Trial of Ismenias, Polemarc of Thebes. Teleutias Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Defeat and Death of Teleutias* - p. 113.

SECT. IV. *Agesipolis Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Rebellion in Phlius against Lacedæmon: Agesilaus Commander against Phlius: Delphion, demagogue of Phlius: Surrender of Phlius. Death of Agesipolis: Polybiades Commander-in-chief against Olynthus: Reduction of Olynthus* - - - - - p. 125.

SECT. V. *Apparent Confirmation and real Instability of the Lacedæmonian Supremacy in Greece. Conspiracy and Revolution in Thebes* - - - - - p. 135.

SECT. VI. *Motives, at Lacedæmon, for lenient Conduct toward Thebes. Command in War against Thebes, declined by Agesilaus, committed to Cleombrotus. Uncommon Storm. Change in Athenian Politics, adverse to Thebes* - p. 145.

SECT. VII. *Motives of the Theban Leaders for persevering in opposition to Lacedæmon: Pelopidas, Epameinondas. Corruption of the Lacedæmonian General Sphodrias: Weak Concession of Agesilaus: Renewal of Alliance between Athens and Thebes. Agesilaus Commander against Thebes. State of the smaller Republics of Greece. The Thebaid ravaged: Winter Campaign. Second Invasion of the Thebaid under Agesilaus: Sedition at Thespia* - - - - - p. 153.

SECT. VIII. *Distress and Exertions of Thebes: Naval assistance obtained from Athens; Timotheus Commander. Pressure upon Lacedæmon, and Successes of Thebes. Accommodation and Breach again between Lacedæmon and Athens: Siege of Corcyra by the Lacedæmonians: Successes of the Athenians under Iphicrates* - - - - - p. 164.

SECT. IX. *Tyranny of Thebes in success: Dissatisfaction of Athens: General Peace negotiated by Athens: Refusal of Thebes to accede to the Terms of the Treaty* - - p. 183.

SECT. X. *Independency of the Boæotian Towns, asserted by the Lacedæmonians, resisted by the Thebans: Battle of Leuctra* - - - - - - - - - - - p. 192.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Elevation of THEBES, by the Battle of LEUCTRA, to the Failure of the Attempt to extend the THEBAN SUPREMACY over GREECE, through Support from PERSIA.

SECT. I. Reception of News of the Battle of Leuctra, at Lacedæmon; at Athens. Jason of Phœre in Thessaly; Polydamas of Pharsalus: Jason elected Tagus of Thessaly: Power and great Views of Jason: Mediation of Jason between the Lacedæmonians and Thebans: Magnificent Preparation of Jason for the Pythian Festival: Death and Successors of Jason: Fall of the Thessalian Power - - - - p. 202.

SECT. II. Partiality, among the Peloponnesians, for the Lacedæmonian Supremacy. Congress at Athens: Cessation of Jealousy of Persia: Opposition of Elis to the proposal for the universal Independency of Grecian Cities. Irritating Conduct of the Democratical Party in Mantinea toward Lacedæmon. Evils resulting from the separate Independency of Cities. Liberal Project of the Tegeans for a Union of the Arcadian Cities illiberally executed: Violent Interference of the Mantineians: Arbitrary assumption of Authority by the Lacedæmonians: Union of Arcadia accomplished, and Megalopolis founded - - - - - p. 215.

SECT. III. Invasion of Arcadia under Agesilaus: Superior Conduct of the Theban Leaders: Invasion of Laconia by the Army of the Theban Confederacy, under Epameinondas: Resolution of the Athenians to support Lacedæmon: Retreat of Epameinondas from Peloponnesus: Restoration of the Messenians: Distress of Sparta - - - - p. 230.

SECT. IV. Bad arrangement of Military Command by the Popular Assembly of Athens: Second Invasion of Peloponnesus by the Thebans under Epameinondas. Lycomedes of Mantinea: Alienation of Arcadia from the Theban interest: Military merit of the Arcadians. Quarrel of Arcadia with Elis - - - - - p. 245.

SECT. V. Congress at Delphi assembled at the instance of a Minister of the Satrap of Bithynia. The Tearless Battle, won by Archidamus son of Agesilaus. Expedition of the Thebans

*Thebans into Thessaly, under Pelopidas. Embassies from the principal Grecian Republics to the Persian Court. Able and successful conduct of Pelopidas, Ambassador from Thebes: Congress at Thebes: Attempt of Thebes to acquire the Supremacy of Greece, through the support of Persia, defeated* - - - - - p. 253.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Failure of the Attempt to establish the SUPREMACY of THEBES over the GRECIAN REPUBLICS, through the Support of PERSIA, till the Depression together of the ARISTOCRATICAL and DEMOCRATICAL Interests, and the Dissolution of the antient System of GRECIAN CONFEDERACY, through the event of the Battle of MANTINEIA.

SECT. I. *Difficult Circumstances of the Theban Administration. Affairs of Achaia: Advantageous Constitution of Achaia, and advantageous Character of its People: Interference of Thebes: Generous Policy of Epameinondas: Impolitic Illiberality of the Theban Confederacy. Miseries, Virtues, and Injoyments of the People of the smaller Republics, exemplified in the History of Phlius* - - - - - p. 266.

SECT. II. *Affairs of Sicyon: Euphron Tyrant of Sicyon: Liberal Despotism of Æneas, General of Arcadia: Principles of Grecian Law of Nations and of Theban Civil Jurisprudence, illustrated: Public Honors to the memory of Euphron* - - - - - p. 281.

SECT. III. *Affairs of Athens: Athenian Exiles: Progress of change in Grecian Politics adverse to Theban Supremacy: Alliance of Arcadia with Athens: Insecurity of person in Greece: Alienation of Corinth from Athens: New pressure upon Lacedæmon: Magnanimity of Lacedæmon: Uprightness of Corinth: Partial Peace: Injustice of Argos* - p. 293.

SECT. IV. *Considerations on which the conduct of Lacedæmon was founded: Disposition of Athens: Narrow views of the Grecian*

*Grecian Politicians: Advantage of the measures of Agesilaus: Progress of Dissension among the Peloponnesian Confederates of Thebes: War of Arcadia and Elis. Danger of Thebes from Sedition; Cruelty of the Thebans. War of Thebes in Thessaly; Death of Pelopidas* - - - - - p. 304.

**SECT. V.** *Invasion of Eleia by the Arcadians, of Arcadia by the Lacedæmonians: Arcadian Eparites, or select Militia: Liberality in Grecian Law of War. Interference of the Arcadians in the Presidency of the Olympian Festival; Battle of Olympia* - - - - - p. 315.

**SECT. VI.** *Sacrilegious Robbery of the Olympian Treasury, by the Democratical Administration of Arcadia: Opposition of Mantinea to the Sacrilege: Support solicited from Thebes by the Perpetrators: Remonstrance against Interference from Thebes by the Arcadian sovereign Assembly: Congress at Tegea: Violence of the Theban Commissioner; supported by Epameinondas: Reunion of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, in alliance with Lacedæmon* - - - - - p. 324.

**SECT. VII.** *Principles of Grecian Politics. Fourth Expedition of the Thebans, under Epameinondas, into Peloponnesus; Second Invasion of Laconia; Battle of Mantinea* - p. 336.

**SECT. VIII.** *General Pacification; Lacedæmon excluded: Troubles in Arcadia; Interference of Thebes: Views of Agesilaus. Affairs of the East: War of Evagoras with Persia: Rebellion of the Persian Maritime Provinces. Expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt: Death of Agesilaus: Distraction together of the Aristocratical and Democratical Interests in Greece, and Dissolution of the antient System of Grecian Confederacy* - - - - - p. 359.

**SECT. IX.** *Illustration of the state of Greece: Seditions, in Argos, Phialeiu, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Thessaly: Prosperity, of Megara, Cos, Sicyon, Rhodes, the Asiatic Cities: Circumstances promoting the cultivation of Science, Arts, and Commerce: Prosperity of Athens: Memorials of Xenophon* - - - - - p. 380.

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CHAPTER XXV.

Affairs of GREECE, and Transactions of the GREEKS in ASIA, from the Establishment of the GENERAL CONFEDERACY against LACEDÆMON, to the TREATY between LACEDÆMON and PERSIA, and the Reëstablishment of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER in GREECE, through the General PEACE dictated in the KING of PERSIA's Name, commonly called the PEACE of ANTALCIDAS.

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SECTION I.

*Confederacy in Greece against Lacedæmon: Recall of Agesilaus from Asia: Proposed Invasion of Laconia: Battle of Corinth: March of Agesilaus to Greece. Summary view of the history of Cyprus: Evagoras prince of Salamis: Connection of Salamis with Athens. Combination in Asia against Lacedæmon: Fleet under Conon: Defeat of the Lacedæmonian Fleet near Cnidus. Victory of Agesilaus near Coroneia. Successes of Pharnabazus and Conon, and downfall of the Lacedæmonian dominion in Asia.*

WHILE the Lacedæmonian king was thus busied in preparation for enterprize in Asia, seeming to give fair promise of conquest the most glorious, and a revolution among the greatest

B.C. 394.  
Ol. 96. 3.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 2. s. 1.  
Diodorus.  
l. 14. c. 83.

C H A P.

XXV.

known in the annals of the world, a storm gathered within Greece, threatening to overwhelm Lacedæmon itself. The accession of Athens to the Bœotian alliance was but the beginning of a confederacy, more formidable than had yet been formed, of Grecian powers against a Grecian power. Athens led Argos into it, and Argos Corinth, now, under sway of the democratical party, closely connected with Argos. The influence of Athens and Corinth together then ingaged Acarnania, Ambracia, Leucadia, part of Thessaly, all Eubœa, and the populous towns of Chalcidicë in Thrace. Body, and form, and means of energy, were given to the confederacy by the establishment of a congress, of deputies from every state, at Corinth<sup>1</sup>. Instead of allowing, according to the old system, the dangerous supremacy of any one republic, it seems to have been proposed that such a congress of deputies, from all, should regulate the common concerns of the Greek nation. The ideâ was good, but the detail of the plan was deficient. A combination of numerous republics, not inforced by some one power pervading the whole, but dependent upon the varying interests of parties in the moment prevailing in each, was far too frail to be lasting; and, not committing even executive government to one person, or one

simply

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus here has a merit, which I have pleasure in noticing. He has been fortunate in the selection of his author, whoever he was, from whom he has given a clear tho succinct account of the forming of this confederacy, which Xenophon's Hellenics, evidently in many respects an unfinished work, would not readily furnish; and yet the account of Diodorus not only is in perfect consonance with Xenophon's, but, in almost every particular, somewhere confirmed by it.

simply constituted council, its energy would be SECT.  
very uncertain. It was nevertheless, in the I.  
moment, highly formidable to Lacedæmon. The Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 2. s. 1.  
alarm was heightened by the rumors circulated, of Persian money distributed among men of most influence in the hostile states, and the expectation, that, while Persia was pressed by the Lacedæmonian arms, that kind of assistance, which Persia could best give and the Greeks most needed, would not be wanting to the new confederacy. Not only the supremacy of Lacedæmon, so in appearance established over Greece by the event of the Peloponnesian war, was pressingly threatened, but, by the connection of two of the most powerful states of Peloponnesus itself with the hostile confederacy, even the security of Laconia was indangered. Nor had the superior abilities, which such a crisis required, been anywhere conspicuous in Sparta, since the loss of Lysander. Those, who now directed public affairs, tottered in their lofty situation: at the head of the politics of Greece, where they should have held the balance of surrounding nations, they were unable to hold that of their own commonwealth. Feeling urgently the need of both support and guidance, they dispatched a requisition for Agesilaus to return, with the utmost speed, to relieve his threatened country.

Agesilaus was injoying, in Asia, honors and power, and hope of glory, such as had never fallen to the lot of any Greek. Added to the great authority of a Lacedæmonian king in forein command,

CHAP.  
XXV.  
Xen. Ages.  
c. 1. s. 37.

command, his popularity, among the Asiatic Grecian cities, was beyond anything before known ; for, having found them, says Xenophon, all miserably distracted by parties, he composed the differences of all, and established everywhere peace, and at least the present effect of concord, without executions or expulsions. He was then at the head of an army, such as no Greek had ever commanded out of Greece ; and he had before him a field, the most inviting that human ambition could easily imagine. Nothing therefore could be more mortifying than the summons to quit this splendid situation, with all the alluring views attending, to return to the condition of a Lacedæmonian king at home, under the immediate control of the ephors. It is implied, even by his panegyrist, that all his united patriotism and magnanimity were wanting, for the resolution to obey. Immediately, however, assembling the allies, he explained his country's and his own necessities, adding assurances that he should never forget his obligations to the Asian Greeks ; and that, should the event in Europe be prosperous, he would not fail to return, and use his best ability in the prosecution of those measures, which might most conduce to their welfare. Affection for the chief whom they were going to lose, coöoperating with the change from high hopes to the fear of a great reverse, threw the assembly into tears. They proceeded however immediately to a unanimous vote, that succours for Lacedæmon, from all the Asian Greek cities, should attend Agesilaus into Europe ;

Ibid. &c  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 2. s. 2.

Europe; and that, should the hoped-for success follow, those troops should return under his command to prosecute the war in Asia.

Two cares principally ingaged Agesilaus, before his departure; to provide security for the Asian Greeks in his absence, and to have a numerous and well-appointed army to lead into Greece. For the former purpose, naming Euxenus to preside, with the title of harmost, he placed a body of four thousand men under his orders. With the latter view, he proposed prizes for the cities which should furnish the best troops, and for commanders of mercenaries, horse, heavy-armed, bow-men, and targeteers, whose bands should be the best chosen, best appointed, and best disciplined. The prizes were mostly arms, elegantly wrought; but, for higher merit, or the merit of those of higher rank, there were some golden crowns; and Xenophon mentions it, as a large sum for the occasion, that the expence amounted to four talents, less than a thousand pounds sterling. Three Lacedæmonians, with one officer from each Asiatic city, were named for judges; but the decision, or the declaration of it, was judiciously referred to the arrival of the army in the Thracian Chersonese.

Unable as the leading men in the Lacedæmonian administration were, either to conduct a war against the powerful confederacy formed against them, or, upon any tolerable terms, to prevent it, the recall of Agesilaus seems to have been a necessary measure. The army, assembled by <sup>s. 10.</sup> their enemies, was such as had not often been

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 2. s. 5, 4.

**CHAP.** seen in wars within Greece. Argus furnished  
XXV. seven thousand heavy-armed; Athens had already recovered strength to send six thousand, and add six hundred horse; Bœotia, Corinth, Eubœa, and Locris, made the whole of the army twenty-four thousand heavy-armed, with above fifteen hundred cavalry; to which was added a large body of the best light-armed of Greece, Acarnanians, Ozolian Locrians, and Malians. The fighting men of all descriptions must have amounted to fifty thousand. The avowed purpose was to invade Laconia. ‘The Lacedæmonian state,’ said the Corinthian Timolaus, in a debate on the plan of operations, ‘resembles a river, which, ‘near the source, is easily forded; but the farther ‘it flows, other streams joining, the depth and ‘power of the current increases. Thus the ‘Lacedæmonians always march from home with ‘their own troops only; but as they proceed, ‘being reënforced from other cities, their army ‘swells and grows formidable. I hold it therefore advisable to attack them, if possible, in ‘Lacedæmon itself; otherwise, the nearer to ‘Lacedæmon the better.’

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 2. s. 7.

s. 6.

s. 9.

Against so powerful a league, the allies, whom the Lacedæmonians could now command, were principally from the smaller Grecian cities, and none beyond Peloponnesus. Marching themselves six thousand foot and six hundred horse, and being joined by the Mantineians and Tegeans, whose numbers are not reported, they were farther reënforced by no more than seven thousand five hundred heavy-armed, from Epidaurus, Hermionë, Trœzen,

Trœzen, Sicyon, Achaia, and Eleia. Aristodemus, SECT. I.  
of the blood royal, commanded, as regent, for the king, Agesipolis, yet a boy.

Circumstances commonly occur to render confederate armies less efficacious, in proportion to their strength, than those under a single authority. A dispute about the command-in-chief, with some difference of opinion about their order of battle, some of the generals being for deeper, others for more extended phalanges, gave opportunity for the Lacedæmonians to collect their forces, and march far beyond their own frontier, so as to meet the enemy near Corinth. In the account of the preparatory sacrifices, there drops from Xenophon a remarkable confession, that those ceremonies were sometimes engines of policy. While the Boeotians, he says, held the left of their army, they were in no haste to engage; but, as soon as they had prevailed to have their situation in the line changed, so that the Athenians would be opposed to the Lacedæmonians, and themselves to the Achaians, then they declared that the symptoms of the victims were favorable. They saved themselves perhaps some slaughter by this disingenuous artifice. In the battle which ensued, the Achaians fled, and all the allies of Lacedæmon equally yielded to those opposed to them. But the Athenians were defeated with considerable slaughter; and the superior discipline of the Lacedæmonians so prevailed against superior numbers, that, with the loss of only eight of their own body, they remained finally masters of the field; in which, if we may

B.C. 394.  
Ol. 96. ¶.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 2. s. 7.

s. 11.

,CHAP.

XXV.

Xenoph.

Hel. I. 4.

c. 3. s. 1.

trust Xenophon's panegyric of Agesilaus, for what he has omitted to state in his general history, no less than ten thousand of the confederate army fell. Probably however, tho the Lacedæmonians themselves suffered little, their allies suffered much; for the victory seems to have been little farther decisive than to prevent the invasion of Peloponnesus.

Meanwhile Agesilaus was hastening his march from Asia. He crossed the Hellespont about the middle of July. At Amphipolis he met Dercyllidas, who had been sent to inform him of the victory obtained near Corinth. Immediately he forwarded that able and popular officer into Asia, to communicate the grateful news among the Grecian cities there, and to prepare them for his early return, of which now there seemed fair promise.

Through Thrace and Macedonia, the country was friendly, or feared to avow hostility. Thessaly inimically disposed, and powerful through population and wealth, resulting from the natural productiveness of the soil, was however too ill-governed to give any systematical opposition. The defiles of the mountains against Macedonia, where a small force might efficaciously oppose a large one, seem to have been left open. But the influence of the principal towns, Larissa, Cranonë, Scotusa, and Pharsalus, in close alliance with the Boeotians, decided the rest, and as the Lacedæmonian army crossed the plain, a body of horse, raised from the whole province, infested the march. It was singularly gratifying to Agesilaus, that, with his horse, promiscuously collected, and intirely formed

Dodwell.  
Chron.Xen.Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 3. s. 2.

formed by himself, supporting it judiciously with his infantry, he defeated and dispersed the Thessalian, the most celebrated cavalry of Greece.

SECT.  
I.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 3. s. 3, 4.

On the day after this success, he reached the highlands of Phthia; and thence the country was friendly, quite to the borders of Bœotia. But there news met him, unwelcome for the public, unwelcome on his private account, and such as instantly almost to blot out his once bright prospect, which, as the historian, his friend and the companion of his march, shows, he had thus far been fondly cherishing, of conquest in Asia, and glory over the world. While the misconduct of the Lacedæmonian administration had excited a confederacy within Greece, which proposed to overwhelm Lacedæmon by superiority of landforce; and, with that view, to carry war directly into Laconia, a hostile navy had arisen in another quarter, powerful enough to have already deprived her, by one blow, of her new dominion of the sea. The train of circumstances which had produced this event, tho' memorials fail for a complete investigation of it, will require some attention.

We have seen Cyprus; at a very early age, from a Phenician, become a Grecian island, and Salamis the first Grecian city founded there. We have then observed the Cyprian Greeks yielding to the Persian power, which the greatest kingdoms around them had been resisting in vain; and yet, not long after, a petty prince of Salamis, incited by the revolt of the Greeks of Asia Minor, and encouraged by the advantage of insular situation and

Ch. 5. s. of this Hist.

Ch. 6. s. 2.

Ch. 7. s. 2.

CHAP. and the inexperience of the Persians in maritime  
XXV. affairs, rebelling against the Persian dominion,  
and extending his authority over almost all Cyprus.  
With the reduction of the Asian Greeks, however,  
Cyprus fell again under Persian sovereignty ; and then probably the Phenician interest in the island  
would receive countenance, in opposition to the  
Greek. Nevertheless a Grecian prince of Salamis  
Ch. 8. s. 4.  
of this Hist. sent his tributary squadron to swell the immense  
armament of Xerxes, intended for the conquest  
of Europe ; and his brother was among the  
prisoners made by the confederated Greeks, in  
their first action with the Persian fleet.

The ruin of the marine, the inertness of the court, and the distraction in the councils of Persia, which followed, would afford opportunity and temptation for the Cypriots, beyond other subjects of the empire, again to revolt ; and the Persian, and the Greek, and the Phenician, and the tyrannic, and the oligarchal, and the democratical interests in the island, would be likely to fall into various contest. Such, as far as may be gathered, was the state of things which first invited Athenian ambition to direct its view to Cyprus ;  
Ch. 12. s. 2. when the Athenian navy, rising on the ruins of the Persian, was extending dominion for Athens on all sides, under the first administration of Pericles. This view, quickly diverted to other objects, was, however, after a change in the Athenian administration, resumed ; and Cimon, as we have seen, died in command in Cyprus. The policy of Athens would of course propose to hold dominion, there as elsewhere, through support  
s. 4.

support given to the democratical interest. But after the death of Cimon, wars in Greece so SECT.  
L. ingaged the Athenian government, as to prevent the extension of any considerable exertion to such a distance; and the Cyprian cities were mostly governed by their several princes or tyrants<sup>2</sup>, under the paramount sovereignty of Persia.

The liberal policy however of the Persian government did not yet deny princely honors and power, in small dominions within its empire, even to Greeks. Toward the beginning<sup>3</sup> of the Peloponnesian war, a Greek was reigning in Salamis. But the inhabitants of that city being a mixed people, opportunity was open for the ambition of Phenicians, who would be not unlikely to win favor with the satraps, or even with the court, against the Greeks. A Tyrian thus finding means to expel the Grecian prince, obtained the patronage of the Persian government in the dominion which he seized. After some years however a conspiracy, among his own people, ended his reign and life together. His successor, also a Tyrian, proposed to secure himself by the severities common in such revolutions. Numbers were banished, or fled to avoid greater evil; and the Tyrian's oppression was such that a large proportion, even of the Phenician citizens, became adverse to him. Among the fugitive Greeks was Evagoras, a youth who claimed descent from the antient princes of Salamis, of the race of Teucer.

Informed

<sup>2</sup> Κατὰ πόλεις ἐτυγχανοῦσθο ἡ Κύπροι. Strab. l. 14. p. 684.

<sup>3</sup> The time is so far decided by the circumstance, mentioned by Isocrates, that it was before the birth of Evagoras, afterward prince of Salamis. Isocr. Evag. p. 282. t. 2.

CHAP.

XXV.

*Isochr. Evag.*  
p. 286. 288.  
& 290.

Informed of the state of things, this young man formed the bold resolution, with only about fifty fellow-sufferers in exile, devoted to his cause, to attempt the recovery of what he claimed as his paternal principality. From Soli in Cilicia, their place of refuge, they passed to the Cyprian shore, and proceeded to Salamis by night. Knowing the place well, they forced a small gate, probably as in peace, unguarded, marched directly to the palace, and, after a severe conflict, overcoming the tyrant's guard, while the people mostly kept aloof, they remained masters of the city, and Evagoras assumed the sovereignty.

This little revolution, in a distant island, became, through a chain of events out of all human foresight, a principal source of great revolutions in Greece. How Evagoras obtained the favor or obviated the resentment of Persia; whether he was ever acknowledged by the court; or by what satrap, careless of the administration of the head of the empire, he may have been patronized, we have no information. His character has been

*Isochr. Evag.* transmitted, in elegant panegyric, as among the most perfect known to history, but of his conduct little remains recorded. Evidently however his situation, in his new eminence, was precarious. Protection from the Persian court to its most faithful, or even its most favorite, distant vassals, was little to be depended upon. The welfare of a prince of Salamis must rest on his own energies, accommodated to circumstances more immediately about him; in his own city, in the other cities of his island, in the nearest

satrapies of the continent, and in the more powerful republics of the nation of which he boasted to be, and of which his city was a colony.

SECT.  
I.

In this state of things it was a great advantage, for Evagoras, that friendly communication was of standing beyond memory between his city and Athens; whether maintained from the original founding of the colony, or produced by the necessities or advantages of commerce, and only assisted by the idea of fellowship in blood between the people. The facility however for supplies of corn which Cyprus could furnish was a benefit, resulting from alliance with its principal city, to which the Athenian Many would readily attribute value; and, on the other hand, alliance with the most powerful maritime state of the age was highly important for Evagoras. Hence an extraordinary intimacy grew between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis (for that was the title which Evagoras commonly bore among the Greeks) insomuch that the tyrant was associated among the Athenian citizens<sup>4</sup>. Nevertheless while his able policy enabled him to hold the favor of the Athenian Many, he did not scruple to cherish those of their best citizens whom they expelled from their community. Exiles, from any part of Greece, but especially from Athens, bringing character and means of livelihood, or talents which might make them

Isocr. Evag.  
p. 30z.

<sup>4</sup> It is remarkable enough that Isocrates, living under a democracy, and the eulogist of democracy, mentions it, to the praise of Evagoras, that he acquired the TYRANNY, Τύραννος αὐτὸν τὴν πόλεων κατίσπου, and presently after, that he acquired it righteously, ἀτησάμενος ὅσιας.

CHAP. them worth their livelihood, found certain favor  
XXV. at Salamis. So it appears from Isocrates; and  
Andoc. de myst. & de red. we have corresponding testimony from Andocides,  
the companion in youth of Alcibiades, who  
experienced himself in banishment the friendly  
hospitality of Evagoras.

Such nearly is the amount of what may be gathered concerning the state of the Salaminian principality, when, in the ruin of Athens, impending from the defeat of Aigospotami, Conon fled thither with eight triremes, saved from the general destruction of the fleet. Conon had previous acquaintance with Evagoras; and eight triremes at his orders, equipped and ably manned, would inable him, in seeking refuge, to offer important service. Nor were naval force and military science all that he carried with him: versed in political business, he was moreover practised in communication with Persian satraps; whence he was peculiarly qualified for a service perhaps beyond all others important to Evagoras. Congenial character then and mutual need produced that friendship between Evagoras and Conon, which Isocrates has celebrated. The Athenian refugee became the most confidential minister of the Cyprian prince, or rather his associate in enterprize. Undertaking negotiation with Pharnabazus, he conciliated that satrap's friendship for Evagoras; which so availed him that he would procure without resentment from the court, or opposition from other satraps, to add several towns of his island to his dominion. Some he gained by negotiation and the credit of his just administration:

administration : but against some he used arms. SECT.  
I.  
 Meanwhile he greatly improved the city of Salamis itself : forming a port and wharfs ; inviting commerce and population, and providing security by new fortifications. To his territory at the same time he gave increased value by encouragement to cultivation, and he added to the public strength by building ships of war, and establishing discipline among his people<sup>5</sup>.

While Agesilaus was threatening the conquest of Asia, and Pharnabazus, having obtained, in a manner from his generosity and mercy, a respite from the pressure upon himself, was nevertheless apprehensive that his satrapy, separated from the body of the empire, might become dependent upon the Lacedæmonian commonwealth, Conon suggested that the progress of the Lacedæmonian arms, which seemed irresistible by land, would be most readily and efficaciously checked by a diversion by sea. A considerable fleet of Phenician ships was at the satrap's orders : Evagoras had a fleet which might coöperate with it; the Athenian interest, still considerable in the island and Asiatic

*Isochr. Evag.  
p. 304. 306.*

Grecian

\* Nepos and Diodorus report that Conon went to the Persian court, where he managed negotiation with great ability and success, according to one, for Pharnabazus, according to the other, for Evagoras. Whether those writers have taken some loose expressions of earlier authors concerning negotiation with Persia, as indicating that Conon went to the residence of the great king, Babylon or Susa, the omission of both the cotemporary historian, and the cotemporary orator, the panegyrist of Evagoras and Conon, to make any mention of so remarkable and important a fact, cannot but excite at least a doubt if Conon went any further to negotiate than the court of the satrap Pharnabazus.

**CHAP.** Grecian cities, would favor the purpose; and  
**XXV.** Conon himself had consideration among those cities, and especially among their seamen. Even before Agesilaus left Asia, a project, founded on these suggestions, seems to have been in forwardness. Soon after his departure, through the combined exertions of Pharnabazus, Evagoras and Conon, a fleet very superior to the Lacedæmonian was assembled; and the generous Pharnabazus formed the resolution, extraordinary for a Persian satrap, to take the nominal command in person, having the good sense apparently to leave the effective command to the superior abilities and experience of Conon. Near Cnidus they fell in with the Lacedæmonian fleet, and the brave but inexperienced Peisander, brother-in-law of Agesilaus, would not avoid a battle. Conon and Evagoras led the Grecian force against him: Pharnabazus took the particular command of the Phenician, forming a second line. The Grecian force alone, according to report, tho Xenophon does not speak of it as certain<sup>6</sup>, outnumbered the Lacedæmonian fleet. The allies in the left of the Lacedæmonian line, alarmed at the view of the enemy's great superiority, presently fled. Peisander was then quickly overpowered. His galley being driven on the Cnidian shore, the crew mostly escaped; but, refusing

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 4. s. 6.

Xen. ut sup.  
Isocr. Evag.  
p. 306.

<sup>6</sup> According to Diodorus, the whole force under Pharnabazus, Evagoras, and Conon, little exceeded ninety triremes, and the Lacedæmonian fleet was of eighty-five. We commonly find cotemporary, and especially military writers, speaking with most diffidence of the strength of armies, and even of the strength of fleets, which is far more easily ascertained.

refusing himself to quit his ship, he was killed SECT. I.  
 about . The victory of Conon was complete: Diod. I. 14.  
p. 441.  
 according to Diodorus fifty ships were taken<sup>7</sup>.

Such was the disastrous event, the news of which met Agesilaus on his arrival on the confines of Bœotia. The first information struck him with extreme anguish and dejection. Presently however the consideration occurring, how disadvantageous in the existing circumstances, the communication of it might be, he had command enough of himself to check all appearance of his feelings. His army consisted mostly of volunteers, attached indeed to his character, but more to his good fortune; and bound, as by no necessity, so by no very firm principle, to partake in expected distress. With such an army he was to meet, within a few days, the combined forces of one of the most powerful confederacies ever formed in Greece. To support, or, if possible, raise, the confidence and zeal of his troops, tho by a device whose efficacy would be of short duration, might be of great importance. Je therefore directed report to be authoritatively circulated, that Peisander had gained a complete victory, tho at the expence of his life; and, to give sanction to the story, he caused the ceremony of the evangelian sacrifice to be performed, and distributed the offered oxen among the soldiers.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 3 s. 9.

### Resuming

<sup>7</sup> Diodorus, or perhaps rather his transcriber, calls the Lacedæmonian commander Periarchus. Xenophon was too much in the way of things to be misinformed of the commander's name on so remarkable an occasion, and the correctness of his transcriber is confirmed by our copies of Plutarch. Vit. Agesil. p. 1102. t. 2. H. Steph.

• C H A P .

XXV.

Resuming then his march, in the vale of Coroneia he met the confederate army, consisting of the flower of the Boeotian, Athenian, Argian, Corinthian, Eubœan, Locrian, and Ænian forces. Expecting this formidable assemblage, he had been attentive to acquire such addition to his own strength as opportunity offered for. He had gained some from the Grecian towns on his march through Thrace. On the Boeotian border, he was joined by the strength of Phocis, and of the Boeotian Orchomenus, always inimical to Thebes, with a Lacedæmonian mora, sent from Peloponnesus purposely to reinforce him, and half a mora which had been in garrison in Orchomenus. The numbers of the two armies were thus nearly equal: but the Asiatic Grecian troops, which made a large part of that under Agesilaus, were reckoned very inferior to the European. It was in the spirit of the institutions of Lycurgus, that Agesilaus, otherwise simple, even as a Spartan, in his dress and manner, paid much attention to ‘the pomp and circumstance of war,’ as our great dramatic poet phrases it; aware how much it attaches the general mind, gives the soldier to be satisfied with himself, and binds his fancy to the service he is ingaged in. Scarlet or crimson appears to have been a common uniform of the Greeks, and the army of Agesilaus appeared, in Xenophon’s phrase, all brass and scarlet.

According to the usual manner of war among the Greeks, when the armies approached, a battle soon followed. Both quitted advantageous ground; Agesilaus moving from the bank of the Cephissus, and

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 3. s. 8.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 9 &  
10.

and the confederates from the roots of Helicon, to meet in a plain. Perfect silence was observed by both armies, till within nearly a furlong of each other, when the confederates gave the military shout, and advanced running. At a somewhat smaller distance the opposite army ran to meet the charge. The Lacedæmonians, on its right, where Agesilaus took post, instantly overthrew the Argians on the left of the confederate army, who, scarcely waiting the assault, fled toward Helicon. The Cyreians supported in Greece the reputation they had acquired in Asia, and were so emulated by the Ionians, Æolians, and Hellenes, from whom less was expected, that, all coming to push of spear together, they compelled the center of the confederate army to retreat. The victory seemed so decided, that some of the Asiatics were for paying Agesilaus the usual compliment of . 11. crowning on the occasion; when information was brought him, that the Thebans had routed the Orchomenians, who held the extreme of his left wing, and had penetrated to the baggage. Immediately changing his front, he proceeded toward them. The Thebans perceived they were cut off from their allies, who had already fled far from the field. It was a common practice of the Thebans to charge in column, directing their assault, not against the whole, but a chosen point of the enemy's line. Thus they had gained the battle of Delium against the Athénians, in the eighth year of the Peloponnesian war. To such a formation their able leaders had recourse now; resolving upon the bold attempt to pierce

SECT. •

I.

Xenoph.

Hel. I. 4.

c. 3. s. 9, 10,

Ch. 16. s. 5.  
of this Hist.

## C H A P.

XXV.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 3.  
c. 4. s. 12.

the line of the conquering Lacedæmonians ; not any longer with the hope of victory, but with the view to join their defeated allies in retreat. Xenophon praises the bravery, evidently not without meaning some reflection on the judgement of Agesilaus, who chose to ingage them, he says, front to front, when, if he had opened his line and given them passage, their flanks and rear would have been exposed to him<sup>8</sup>. A most fierce conflict insued. Shield pressed against shield, stroke was returned for stroke ; amid wounds and death no clamor was heard ; neither, says the historian who accompanied the Spartan king, was there complete silence, for the mutterings of rage were mixed with the din of weapons<sup>9</sup>. The perseverance, the discipline, and the skill in arms of the Thebans were such, and such the force of their solid column, that, after many had fallen, a part actually pierced the Lacedæmonian line, and reached the highlands of Helicon ; but the greater part, compelled to retreat, were mostly put to the sword.

s. 13.

In this obstinate action Agesilaus was severely wounded. His attendants were bearing him from the field, when a party of horse came to ask orders concering about eighty Thebans, who, with their arms, had reached a temple. Mindful amid his suffering, of respect due to the deity, he commanded that

<sup>8</sup> So even in his Agesilaus : c. 2. s. 12.

<sup>9</sup> It is implied in the account of Xenophon, that he was present, tho, perhaps for political reasons, he avoids speaking of himself. Plutarch expressly says that he was in the action—*παρεῖν αὐτῷ, τῷ Αγησιλάῳ συναγωνισάμενος.* Agesil. v. 2. p. 1106.

that liberty should be granted them to pass unhurt, SECT. I.  
 whithersoever they pleased. In the philosopher-historian's manner of relating this anecdote is implied, that among the Greeks, in such circumstances, revenge would have prompted an ordinary mind ; and, even in Agesilaus, the generous action is attributed, not to humanity but to superstition ; not to an opinion of the deity's regard for mercy and charity among men, but to the fear, unless it were rather the desire of inculcating the fear, of his resentment for any want of respectful attention to himself. When pursuit ended, the victorious army anxiously employed itself in Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 15.  
 dragging the enemy's slain within its own lines : a remarkable testimony, from the same great writer, to the prevalence still, in a degree that may surprise us, of that barbarism in war, which in Homer's description is striking, tho in his age less a matter for wonder.

Next morning early, the troops were ordered to Xenoph.  
Hel. 1. 4.  
c. 3. s. 14.  
 parade with arms, all wearing chaplets. Agesilaus himself being unable to attend, the polemarc Gylis commanded at the ceremony of raising the trophy; which was performed with all the music of the army playing, and every circumstance of pomp, that might most inspire, among the soldiery, alacrity and self-satisfaction. Why then no measures were taken to profit from the advantages, which victory apparently should have laid open, is not shown. The Thebans sending, in usual form, for permission to bury their dead, a truce was granted them, evidently for a longer time than, for that purpose alone, could be wanted.

CHAP.  
XXV.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian army withdrew into Phocis, a country friendly or neutral, to perform a ceremony, to which Grecian superstition indeed attached much importance, the dedication of the tenth of the spoil, collected by Agesilaus in his Asiatic command. It amounted to a hundred talents; perhaps something more than twenty thousand pounds.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 3.  
s. 15, 16.

After this second triumphal rite, the army, committed to the orders of Gylis, proceeded into the neighboring hostile province of Ozolian Locris, where the object however seems to have been little more than to collect plunder, which, according to the Grecian manner, might serve the soldiers instead of pay. Corn, goods, whatever the rapacious troops could find in the villages, were taken. The Locrians, unable to prevent the injury, did nevertheless what they best could to revenge it. Occupying the defiles which, in returning into Phocis, were necessarily to be repassed, they gave such annoyance, that Gylis was provoked to take the command of a select body in pursuit of them. Intangled among the mountains, he was himself killed, and the whole party would have been cut off, but for the precaution of the officers left with the command of the main body, who brought seasonable relief. Agesilaus, still from his wounds unfit for fatigue, passed by sea to Lyconia, and the army was distributed in quarters.

c. 4. s. 1.

If any other writer gave any authority for the supposition, we might suspect that Xenophon's account of the battle of Coroneia was written under

the influence of partiality for his friend and patron, SECT.  
L. and that the victory was less complete than he has described it<sup>10</sup>. Yet we are not without information of circumstances which may have given occasion to the line of conduct which he pursued. The defeat of Cnidus produced a great and rapid revolution in Asiatic Greece. The small islands of Cos and Nisyra obeyed the first summons of the victors. The news alone sufficed to diffuse instant ferment over the rich and populous island of Chios. The democratical party took arms; the Lacedæmonian troops were expelled; and a message was sent to Conon, proposing a renewal of the old alliance with Athens. In Lesbos, the powerful city of Mitylenë, and, on the continent, Erythræ, with the still more important city of Ephesus, followed the example. Pharnabazus and Conon did not neglect incouragement to a disposition so favorable. Coasting northward, they sent, as they passed, to the Greek cities, both of the continent and the islands, requiring that the Lacedæmonian governors should be sent away, but promising, at the same time, that no citadels should be fortified to awe them, nor any violence put upon their municipal government. The liberal characters of the Persian satrap and the Athenian admiral procuring credit to the promises, the requisition was obeyed with alacrity; and the fabric

Diodorus.  
1 14. c. 85.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 1, 2.

<sup>10</sup> Plutarch is warm in zeal for the fame of his fellowcountrymen the Boëtians, yet he admits the victory of Agesilaus; and indeed it seems pretty evident that he had no account to follow but Xenophon's, or none more to his purpose; unless for some circumstances little important, for which he quotes no authority, and which are of very doubtful aspect.

CHAP. fabric of the Lacedæmonian empire, seemingly so  
 • XXV. established by the event of the Peloponnesian war,  
 and since so extended by the ability of the com-  
 mending officers in Asia, was in large propor-  
 tion almost instantly overthrown. Most of the  
 principal officers, and many inferior men, in the  
 numerous Asiatic troops under Agesilaus, would be  
 deeply interested in this revolution. The princi-  
 pal sources of pay for all would cease; and hence  
 the plain of Coroneia seems to have been the last  
 field of fame for the Cyreians. We find no men-  
 tion of them afterwards from Xenophon: apparent  
 proof that their following fortunes were not brilliant,  
 not such as he could have any satisfaction in  
 reporting. Probably they dispersed, some to  
 their homes, some to seek new service, and never  
 more assembled.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 4, 5.

One superior man, Dercyllidas, preserved yet  
 a relic of the Lacedæmonian empire in Asia. He  
 was in Abydus, when Pharnabazus and Conon  
 passed along the coast; and the Abydenes,  
 attached by his popular manners, and confident  
 in his integrity and ability, were to be shaken  
 neither by threats nor promises. Abydus became  
 in consequence the refuge of the expelled governors  
 and their partizans. Strength thus collected, and  
 credit gained, enabled Dercyllidas to prevent a  
 meditated revolt in the neighboring city of Sestus,  
 on the Europeän shore. But he could not preserve  
 the other towns of the Chersonese, or give secu-  
 rity to the colonists, who had settled in that  
 fruitful country under the authority of the Lace-  
 dæmonian government. All were compelled to  
 abandon

abandon their lands ; and it was only within the walls of Sestus and Abydus that he could give present security to their persons and effects, with some faint hope of a settlement somewhere, at some future time, under Lacedæmonian protection. The satrap and the Athenian admiral endeavored, by threats, by waste of lands, and by interception of maritime commerce, to bring Abydus to submission ; but winter approaching, and the Abydenes continuing firm, they gave up the point, and directed their attention to increase their naval force for the operations of the following spring.

SECT.

I.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4  
c. 8. s. 6.

## SECTION II.

*Evils of the Grecian Political System. Sedition of Corinth. Singular union of Corinth with Argos. Successes of the Lacedæmonian General, Praxitas, near Corinth.*

THE event of the Peloponnesian war, which placed the Lacedæmonian state decidedly at the head of the affairs of Greece, gave also, in the moment, a decided superiority to the aristocratical cause throughout the nation. But in the very establishment of that reign of aristocracy, the materials of a new revolution seem to have been prepared. Almost immediately the democratical interest gained the superiority in Thebes, where, for a long course of years, it had been held in subjection. Silent, and unnoticed by historians, as that revolution in Thebes has been, it was nevertheless the leading step to some of the most important occurrences in Grecian history. The establishment

SECT.

II

CHAP.  
XXV.

establishment of democracy there, gave the first means for the restoration of democracy, which quickly followed in Athens. Corinth had long been closely connected with Thebes ; and the growing jealousy of the Lacedæmonian power, not only tightened the bonds of friendship, but led both states to a connection with Athens, to which they had lately been such virulent enemies. Argos, always democratical, and the most antient, most constant, and most determined of all the enemies of Lacedæmon, had for those very reasons commonly been the ally of Athens, and had always held communication with the democratical parties in Thebes and Corinth : so that, when Thebes and Corinth became democratical, the political connection of Thebes, Corinth, Athens, and Argos, was, in a manner, already formed. Thus, within a very short time after the triumph of the aristocratical interest, which the event of the Peloponnesian war produced, democracy was again approaching to preponderancy among the Grecian republics.

We have already had too many occasions to observe, that, while Greece afforded the most sublime instances of virtue in individuals, extensive patriotism, political virtue pervading a people, was not more common there than elsewhere ; but, on the contrary, political crimes, most atrocious crimes, abounded ; the unavoidable consequences of a political system, in which through want of a just gradation of ranks, and amalgamation of interests, one portion of the people was, by political necessity, the enemy of another, and party-spirit

party-spirit was stimulated by those all-involving interests and dangers, which allowed none either to chuse privacy, or to be, in a public situation, assured of the next day's fate. Notwithstanding that well-poized constitution and equal law, or, in the expressive language of Greece, that eunomy of the Corinthian state, which Pindar has, apparently with justice, celebrated, Corinth was not secure against those effects of sedition, under which, during ages of her own prosperity, she had seen so many other Grecian cities suffering the direst calamities. Indeed no small state, the territory of a single city, can have the security of a large one, like the modern European kingdoms, against sedition within, any more than against war from without. In extensive territory, distance gives leisure and opportunity for virtue and prudence, in one part, to obviate the measures of villainy or madness in another. But, in a small state, a spark excited, if not extinguished in a moment, will, in the next moment, involve all in flame. Hence arose a supposed necessity, a most unfortunate necessity could it be real, for not only indulgence, but encouragement, to individuals to assume public justice into their own hands, and assassination became dignified with the title of tyrannicide: a resource in its nature so repugnant to all civil security, that, if it be allowed upon principle, any momentary good which it may possibly produce, cannot fail to be followed by far greater and more lasting evil.

The Corinthian constitution, tho. evidently one of the best of Greece, if the ease of its subjects, and

SECT.  
II.

Pindar.  
Ol. 13.  
ch 5. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

CHAP. and security of person and property, be the test of  
XXV. merit, neither excited the attention of foreigners, like  
the Lacedæmonian, by its pointed singularities,  
nor was blazoned, like the Athenian, through the  
superior talents of its own historians and orators.  
Corinth figured as an important member of the  
Grecian political system, but its particular history  
little engaged curiosity; and thus we remain unin-  
formed of, what may have deserved to be known,-  
the circumstances of that revolution, by which the  
supreme power passed from the aristocracy,  
which had held it so long, and generally exercised  
it so ably. It seems very soon to have followed  
the revolution of the same kind in Thebes; the  
particulars of which are equally unknown to us.  
Possibly a general jealousy of Lacedæmon may  
have forced the leading men to consent to a con-  
nection of the republic with the democratical states  
of Argos, Thebes, and Athens; and then that  
connection itself would tend to give the democratical  
party the superiority against them.

Events adverse for the public are always favor-  
able for the party in opposition to the existing  
administration. The defeat at Coroneia would  
shake the democratical leaders in Corinth. A  
momentary relief would then come to them from  
the dismission of the army of Agesilaus, which  
insued. But presently new difficulties occurred.  
Sicyon remaining attached to Lacedæmon, a  
Lacedæmonian force was stationed there, with the  
double purpose, of protecting the place and its  
territory, and keeping the war distant from  
Laconia. On the other hand, possession of the  
isthmus

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 4. s. 1.

isthmus being a great point for both parties, SECT.  
troops were sent from Athens, Bœotia, and Argos,  
II. to assist the Corinthians in holding it. Thus the Corinthian territory became the seat of a winter war, which not a little pressed the Corinthian people, while their allies were quiet in their homes. Under these circumstances, it became easy for the aristocratical chiefs to persuade the multitude that they had been misled; that their true interest would have kept them steady in their old alliance, the alliance of their forefathers, with Lacedæmon. Such is the nature of confederacies: each member, as it becomes pressed, grows regardless of the common good, and attentive only to its own.

The democratical leaders were aware of their danger, and not scrupulous about means of prevention. Xenophon, upon this occasion, does not spare his fellowcountrymen; he accuses the Athenian administration, together with the Bœotian and Argian, of being accomplices in the horrid plot. A time appropriated to religious solemnity, when it is esteemed decent, says the historian, to avoid the execution even of condemned malefactors, the last day of the Eucleian festival, was chosen for a massacre; because then, all the people of all ranks being assembled in places of public resort, the business might be more readily and completely performed. A signal was given, and, in the agora, the execution began.

Xenopl.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 4. s. 2.

BC. 394<sup>11</sup>.  
Ol. 96. 3.  
End of Au-  
tumn or be-  
ginning of  
Winter.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 4. s. 3.

Many

" Xenophon has by no means clearly marked this date. The mention of a Corinthian festival has principally furnished the clue, for the industrious acuteness of Dodwell, in the investigation of it.

CHAP.  
XXV

Many were put to death before they had the least apprehension of danger; some in circle conversing, some engaged with the spectacles of the theater some even sitting in the office of judges. The rest fled to the nearest altars and images of the gods; but the assailing party, regardless of those salutary laws of superstition, which even philosophy would approve, as a check upon ruthless violence, killed them even in the most sacred places; so that, amid the carnage, a scene of impiety and scandal was exhibited, uncommon even in the fury of Greek sedition.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 4. s. 4.

c. 4. s. 5.

Those who fell, in this massacre, were mostly elders, of the principal families. Pasimelus, one of the chiefs of the youth, having some suspicion of what was intended, had assembled the younger of the aristocratical party in another part of the city. Surprized there by the outcry, and presently farther alarmed by the sight of some flying toward them for refuge, all ran to the Acrocorinthus; and overthrowing a body of Argians, who, with a few Corinthians, opposed them, got possession of the fortress. Fortune could scarcely have given them a more desirable possession: yet an accident, the most insignificant, induced them presently to abandon it. They were consulting on measures to be taken, when, from a column near them, the capital fell; and, the cause of the accident not being obvious, it was taken for a portentous prodigy. Recourse was immediately had to sacrifice; and the augurs, from observation of the entrails, declared it advisable to quit the place. Political wisdom evidently was

was not upon this occasion the moving spring. *SECT. II.*  
A Themistocles, a Lysander, perhaps a Xenophon,  
would have proved the augurs mistaken. Utterly  
at a loss what to do and where to go, the fugitives,  
obedient to the expounders of occult science,  
hastened down the mountain, without any other  
hope than to find safety in exile. Dismay had  
sped them beyond the Corinthian border, when  
the lamentations of their mothers, the persuasions  
of their friends, and assurances of personal safety,  
given upon oath by some of the chiefs of the  
democratical party, induced them to return into  
the city.

The democratical leaders had now taken mea-  
sures, which they thought might suffice, without  
more murder, to establish the interest of their.  
party. They had united their state in one  
commonwealth with Argos; thrown down the  
boundary-stones which marked the separation of  
the territories, abolished the Corinthian assem-  
blies and every characteristic of a distinct govern-  
ment, annulled even the name of Corinthians,  
and declared by law, solemnly decreed and pro-  
claimed, that the two people were thenceforward  
to be all Argians. This is a singular phenomenon  
in Grecian history. A league between two cities,  
so close as to establish a kind of fraternity, we  
may have observed elsewhere <sup>12</sup>: the removal of  
the people of one town to establish them as citizens  
of

<sup>12</sup> Such a league, we learn, existed between the neighbouring cities of Chalcis and Eretria, in Eubœa; and something of the same kind between towns so far distant from each other as the Asiatic and the Italian and Sicilian Greek.

CHAP.  
XXV.

of another, we have also seen practised; but a union, such that one was lost in the other, or even that two should form but one state, with one republican government common to both, has not before occurred. To judge of the merit of the plan, our information of particulars is too defective; nor have we the opinion of Xenophon delivered in a manner at all satisfactory. Justly indignant at the crimes of those who carried the measure, feeling perhaps for persons known to him, who perished by it, and not totally free from the prejudices of party, as a political project he has altogether slighted it; and it was too transitory to afford proof of its merit in practice.

The returned fugitives found their persons indeed safe, but their condition very much lowered. Their opponents held the sovereign power<sup>13</sup>: they were themselves lost, in a city which, says the historian, was no longer Corinth but Argos. They were allowed the privileges of Argian citizens, or rather they were obliged to become members of the Argian commonwealth; a privilege which they were very far from desiring; for with it they found themselves of less consideration, in their altered country, than many foreigners. In the true spirit of Grecian patriotism, narrow but ardent, they thought life, continues the historian, contemptible upon such terms; and they resolved (for, tho frightened by the falling of a stone, they were brave men) that, at any risk, their country, which had

<sup>13</sup> The expression of Xenophon is remarkable, 'Οὐαρτος οὐ τοὺς τυπανίστελας, n. τ. i. and the whole passage is in terms not to be exactly rendered in modern language.

had been Corinth from earliest times, should still be Corinth<sup>14</sup>. In the true spirit of Grecian love of liberty, they resolved that Corinth should again be free. Personal freedom, as far as appears, themselves with all Corinthian citizens enjoyed ; but Xenophon, swayed by party-prejudice, seems to have thought, with them, that association in civil rights, with the people of another free commonwealth, was a freedom not to be indured. To purify the city from the pollution of murderers, another of their resolutions, would have been of less questionable rectitude, had the means by which they proposed to accomplish it been unexceptionable. With all these ideas together, their minds were highly heated : insomuch, that, in their doubt of being able to accomplish their purpose, they could find gratification in the thought, as the cotemporary historian assures us, that, ‘ should their best endevors fail, yet, in pursuit of the greatest blessings, they should obtain the most glorious of deaths.’

Thus prepared for bold exertion, Pasimclus and Alcimenes, young men of the first consideration in their party, undertook to communicate with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander at Sicyon. To avoid observation and inquiry from the guards at the gates, they made their way out of the city by a gully, the course of a winter torrent, which interrupted the continuity of the wall ; and they proposed

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 4.  
c. 4. s. 7.

<sup>την πατρίδα, ὡσαντον τοι καὶ οἴδεχνος, Κόρινθος</sup>  
<sup>ποιῶσας, κ. τ. ε.</sup> It is difficult, in rendering this passage in modern language, to avoid an air of ridicule, which however Xenophon has certainly not intended.

• C H A P. proposed to Praxitas to introduce a body of troops  
XXV. within that fortification, which, like the famous  
long walls of Athens, secured the communication  
of Corinth with its port of Lechæum. For the  
execution of their purpose, they chose a night on  
which they were intrusted, by the existing admini-  
stration of their country, with the guard of one  
of the gates of the long walls. Praxitas, at the  
head of a Lacedæmonian mora, with the whole  
strength of Sicyon and about a hundred and fifty  
Corinthian refugees, entered without opposition.  
Expecting however to be quickly attacked by  
superior numbers, he set immediately to raise  
works, which might inable him to maintain his  
ground till reinforcement could reach him: for,  
on one side, Corinth was filled with a military  
people, strengthened by a body of mercenaries;  
and, on the other, Lechæum was held by a  
Bœotian garrison; nor was it doubted but the  
force of Argos would hasten to relieve the new  
member of the Argian commonwealth.

That day, however, and the next, Praxitas held  
his situation unmolested; but, on the following  
morning, a body of Argians being arrived, Corinth  
poured out its force to attack him. We learn  
from Thucydides, that, in his time, the general  
reputation of the Peloponnesian troops was supe-  
rior to that of any others known. This reputation,  
it appears, was not lost, when Cyrus raised his  
army to march against Artaxerxes. In the wars  
however which arose within Greece, after the  
conclusion of that distinguished by the name of  
the Peloponnesian, we find very great difference  
among

among the Peloponnesian troops; a difference which could arise only from the different attention given to military discipline and military exercises, and the different manner in which such attention was enforced by the political institutions of the several republics. The Sicyonians, long allies of Lacedæmon, and continually serving with the Lacedæmonian forces, could not want means to know the Lacedæmonian discipline; yet their military was nevertheless held in contempt; and, in the battle within the long walls of Corinth, they proved the justice of the general opinion. Being attacked by the Argians, they yielded to the first onset; and, flying through their own intrenched camp, excepting those who fell by the swords of the pursuing enemy, they were stopped only by the sea. Pasimachus, who commanded a small force of Lacedæmonian cavalry, was witness to this defeat. Either the nature of the ground forbade, or, through his ignorance of a service less cultivated by the Lacedæmonians, he saw no opportunity for bringing horse into action; and yet, indignant at the defeat of his friends, he resolved to act. Dismounting, he persuaded, for it seems he could not command, some of his cavalry to follow him. The method of our dragoons not being within their practice, they fastened their horses to some trees which happened to be near, and the small shields they carried on horseback not being fit for ingaging with heavy-armed infantry, they supplied themselves with those of the slain and flying Sicyonians. Thus accoutred, they marched against the Argians, who, seeing

SECT.  
II.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 4. s. 10.

CHAP. the Sicyonian mark, an ess, on their shields, little  
XXV. regarded their approach. Pasimachus, observing this, is reported to have said, using the common Lacedæmonian oath, ‘ By the twin-gods, Argians, ‘ these esses shall deceive you.’ With the valor of a true Spartan soldier, but not with the just discretion of an officer, rushing then to the assault of numbers too superior, he was killed with most of his band <sup>15</sup>.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 4. s. 10.

Meanwhile the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed, having defeated the Corinthians and mercenaries, and committed pursuit to the Corinthian refugees; turned to ingage the Argians. These, who so despised the Sicyonians, were so alarmed, in the midst of victory, by the approach of the Lacedæmonians, that to regain communication with the city, as the means of support and shelter, they lost all other consideration. Hastening to pass that dreaded enemy, they exposed their right flank ; of all things, in the antient practice of war, the most dangerous ; because the shield, so important for the soldier’s protection, became inefficient. The Lacedæmonians did not neglect the advantageous opportunity. The Argians, suffering in their defenceless flank, still pushed for the city-gate ; but

<sup>15</sup> The speech of Pasimachus, in the original, forces itself the more upon notice by something of a whimsical effect, arising from the Lacedæmonian dialect, in which it is reported: Ναι τὸ σῶ, Αργεῖοι, φίνσι ὑμι τὰ σίγματα ταῦτα. Beside the general peculiarities of the Doric dialect, the Lacedæmonians, as appears fully in the *Lysistrata* of Aristophanes, commonly pronounced Σ for Θ. The effect altogether would perhaps be most nearly imitated in English, by giving the speech in the Lowland Scottish dialect, and adding the change of S for Th: ‘ By se twain-gods, Aurgians, ‘ sese esses,’ &c.

but before they could reach it, were met by the Corinthian refugees, returning from pursuit. This checked their way, and completed their consternation. The Corinthians in the city, fearing to open a gate, afforded them no other refuge than by ladders let down from the walls. The slaughter insuing was such, that, says the historian, as corn, or billets, or stones, are often seen, so the bodies lay in heaps. Praxitas then led his victorious troops to the assault of Lechæum, and added the Boeotian garrison there to the number slain.

SECT.  
II. •

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 4. s. 12.

The success of the Lacedæmonian arms was <sup>s. 13.</sup> thus complete, and the dead, with the usual ceremonies, already restored, when the forces of the Peloponnesian allies of Lacedæmon arrived. Praxitas employed them in making a breach in the Corinthian long walls, sufficient for the convenient passage of an army : he then assaulted and took Sidus and Crommyon off the isthmus, and he fortified Epieicia. Placing garrisons in all those places, by which he secured the command of the isthmus, he dismissed the rest of his army, and returned himself to Lacedæmon.

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### SECTION III.

*Incasion of Laconia by Pharnabazus and Conon. Restoration of the long walls of Athens. Seasight in the Corinthian Gulph.*

By the victories of Corinth and Coroneia the force SECT.  
III. of the formidable confederacy, formed against Lacedæmon, had been broken ; and, by the recent successes of Praxitas, the command of the isthmus

CHAP. being recovered, means were again open for carrying war against the enemies of Lacedæmon beyond the peninsula. Instead therefore of any longer dreading invasion at home, Lacedæmon should have been again formidable to her enemies. But that policy, by which she had profited in the latter years of the Peloponnesian war, was now turned against herself; the wealth of Persia supported her foes; the command of the sea was already gone; and her armies, which should have carried her vengeance against her most distant foes, were necessary at home, and yet unequal, to the protection of her own coast.

Whatever personal esteem Pharnabazus might have for Agesilaus, he was highly exasperated against the Lacedæmonian government. Of a temper to feel the disgrace of the condition of a fugitive, to which, in the sight of all his dependants, and to the knowlege of the Persian court, he had been reduced, he was anxious to recover his honor, not less than he had been to vindicate his property. During winter therefore he was diligent in adding to the number of his ships, and in raising a force of Grecian mercenaries; the only troops that could be effectually opposed to Greeks; and he resolved to carry war, in person, to the coast of Laconia, where no Persian had ever yet appeared in arms.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 6, 7.

B. C. 393.  
Ol. 96. 3.

In pursuance of this resolution, imbarcking, in spring, with the Athenian Conon for his vice-admiral, he sailed among the islands of the Ægean; and, from the Ionian shore to Melos, all submitted to him. Proceeding then directly to

the Laconian coast, he had the satisfaction to make good his landing on it, near Pheræ, and to ravage unresisted the country around. Re-imbarking before the Lacedæmonians could come in force against him, he repeated his debarkations, in various parts, for plunder, and always with success. Under the able advice of Conon, he did not loiter on a coast where rocks and tempests and want were to be apprehended not less than an enemy, whom he well knew to be formidable. He crossed to the island of Cythera, which in the early part of the Peloponnesian war, had been conquered by the unfortunate Nicias. Being without strong places, it yielded without resistance; and, in the idea that it might be made a useful acquisition, a garrison was placed there, under Nicophebus, an Athenian. The satrap then directed his course to the Corinthian isthmus, where the congress of the confederacy was assembled. There he had opportunity to communicate with the leading men, with whom he concerted measures for the prosecution of the war against Lacedæmon; and, leaving a sum of money for its support, returned with his fleet to Asia.

While the impression of satisfaction with his successful expedition, in which he had earned a glory so new to a Persian satrap, was fresh upon the mind of Pharnabazus, Conon took the favoring opportunity for obtaining some most important advantages for his country. A man of courage and honor, the satrap was no deep politician. He felt keenly the injuries he had suffered

SECT.  
III.

CHAP. from the overbearing power of Lacedæmon, com-

XXV. manding at once the naval and military force of  
Greece: but the expence of maintaining the  
fleet, by which he had delivered, and in some  
degree revenged, himself, pressed upon his trea-

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
e. 8. s. 9, 10.  
Diod. l. 14.

sury. It was therefore a grateful proposal, which  
Conon made, to transfer a large share of that  
burthen to the Athenian commonwealth; urging,

however, that to inable Athens to bear it, two  
things were necessary; first, that the tribute from  
the islands, by which Athens had formerly main-  
tained her navy, should be restored, the combined  
fleet inforsing regular payment; and then, that  
her long walls, so essential to her security against  
the overbearing ambition of Lacedæmon, should  
be rebuilt. The liberality of Pharnabazus granted  
all that Conon demanded. He allowed the fleet  
to be employed in reëstablishing the claim of  
Athens to contributions for the support of her  
navy; he allowed the crews to be employed in  
working upon the long walls; he gave a large sum  
of money toward the expence, and he sent masons  
and mechanics to assist in the work. Neigh-  
boring states, which had the democratical interest  
at heart, added their voluntary aid; and it is  
remarkable that, among the most zealous and  
liberal, were the Bœotians, lately the most vehe-  
ment enemies of Athens, remorselessly urgent for  
its destruction. But so it was, among the warring  
interests of parties, in the little republics of  
Greece: walls, connecting the capital with its  
ports, were esteemed the bulwark of the demo-  
cratical, and the bane of the oligarchical cause.

From

From the moment, therefore, when the revolution in Boeotian politics took place, whereby the democratical became the ruling interest, it became most the object of the leading men to restore, what their predecessors in administration thought they had the greatest interest in destroying.

SECT.

III.

Thus Conon, thirteen years after his flight from his country's ruin, had the singular good fortune and glory to return, with the present of a fleet and fortifications, in short, of dignity, power, and dominion in his hand. The gratitude of the Athenian people was shown in honors, we are told, of the highest kind, conferred upon Conon, and his friend and patron the virtuous tyrant of Salamis; of which, however we find nothing specified but their portraits in marble, placed by the side of the statue of the Preserving Jupiter; in memorial, says the cotemporary rhetorician, of the greatness of their services, and of their friendship for one-another. Of any gratitude shown by the Athenian people to the generous satrap, we have no information. Possibly the prejudices of the age would not allow them, of the same kind, to a barbarian, of whatever merit, as to Evagoras; who, tho a tyrant, was a Greek, and an Athenian citizen.

*Isocr. Evng.  
enc. t. 2.  
p. 306.*

While the satrap's money thus laid anew the foundation of naval power for the Athenian commonwealth, it enabled the Corinthians to maintain a fleet for the security of their own gulph. Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians, utterly unable to oppose the fleet which, under Conon, commanded the eastern seas, equipped however a squadron to dispute

*Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 11.*

**CHAP.** dispute the western with the Corinthians, and  
**XXV.** give protection to the Achaians and others, their  
 allies in those parts. Coming to action with  
 the Corinthian fleet, the Lacedæmonian ad-  
 miral, Polemarchus, was killed, and Pollis, the  
 next officer, wounded; but Taleutias, brother of  
 Agesilaus, arriving with a reinforcement, the Co-  
 rinthians avoided farther action, and the Lace-  
 dæmonians commanded the gulph.

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## SECTION IV.

*Improvement of the Grecian art of war by the Athenian General Iphicrates. Affairs of Phlius. Causes of failing energy of Lacedæmon. Successes of Iphicrates in Peloponnesus. Antalcidas Ambassador from Lacedæmon, and Conon from Athens, to the Satrap of Lydia. Expeditions of Agesilaus into Argolis and Corinthia. Isthmian Games. Slaughter of a Lacedæmonian mora. Farther successes of Iphicrates.*

THE Athenians, tho' their forces had shared in the loss of two great battles, and in one of them had suffered considerably, nevertheless held their country still unhurt by the war. But, the Lacedæmonians commanding both the isthmus and the gulph of Corinth, the passage to Attica was easy to them; and while the restoration of the long walls would of course excite their jealousy, the ravage of Laconia by Conon could not but have excited a desire of revenge. It was therefore much an object for the Athenians to keep the Lacedæmonians employed within their own peninsula. After the victories of Agesilaus and Praxitas, it might indeed appear rash to send a landforce

a landforce to make war in Peloponnesus : but Athens, fertile in great talents, had a general formed for the peculiar circumstances of the existing occasion.

SECT.  
IV.

Iphicrates was the author of a system of tactics, new among the Greeks. The phalanx, almost irresistible where it could exert its force, was cumbersome in evolution, unfit for mountainous or woody countries, incapable of rapid motion, either in pursuit or retreat. Its character is marked in a saying reported of Iphicrates. Comparing an army with the human body, the general, he said, was as the head, the light-armed as the hands, the cavalry as the feet, and the phalanx as the chest and shoulders. Of course he considered the Peloponnesian army, notwithstanding the general superiority of the heavy-armed, as extremely defective ; for its light-armed were mere untrained or ill-trained slaves ; and the cavalry generally deficient, both in number and in discipline. Indeed, among the Greeks, cavalry was of little use but in pursuit, except against the light-armed ; no body of horse daring to charge a phalanx ; and hence the cavalry was compared to the feet. Under this view of things, Iphicrates directed his attention to improve what he called the hands of the army. Athens had always had bowmen superior to the Peloponnesian, and had often profited from that superiority. Iphicrates conceived that great advantage might be drawn from an improved discipline of the middle-armed, or targeteers, who, to the agility of the light-armed, might unite some degree of the force of

Plut.  
Pelopid.  
p. 507.

the

**CHAP.** the phalanx. Indeed how much practice was  
**XXV.** necessary to excellence, in any of the three styles  
 of discipline, we may gather in some degree from  
**Xen. Mem.** Xenophon ; where he observes that even a Spartan  
**Socr.** would not, with target and dart, ingage a Thracian  
 armed in the same manner, any more than the  
 Thracian would, with shield and spear, ingage  
 any Greek practised in the discipline of the  
 heavy-armed.

**Xenoph.**  
 Hel. l. 4.  
 c. 4. s. 15.

Circumstances which brought forward for historical notice the little republic of Phlius, hitherto obscure among the complicated politics and wars of Greece, opened also the first field of fame for Iphicrates and his new system. Phlius was a member of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, when the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party were expelled. According to the general course of things in Greece, it was to be expected that Phlius would then renounce the Lacedæmonian alliance, and ingage in the new confederacy of Bœotia, Athens, and Argos. But an inveterate hatred, a kind of horror of the Argians, pervaded all parties in Phlius : insomuch that it was resolved, with all the forbidding circumstances attending, to endeavor to preserve the connection of the commonwealth with Lacedæmon. In other times probably, spurning at the proposal, the Lacedæmonian government would have commanded those who ruled in Phlius to restore the exiles : but, in the existing situation of affairs, Lacedæmon no longer held her former imperious tone ; and, tho the Phliasians carried their avowal of jealousy so far as to refuse, in any case, to admit Lacedæmonian

Lacedæmonian troops within their walls, their offered friendship was not slighted.

SECT. IV.

The preference, given by a democratical party, to the Lacedæmonian alliance, was a disappointment to the democratical confederacy, that excited revenge; and the central situation of Phlius, between Argolis, Corinthia, Sicyonia, and Arcadia, gave that little state an importance that urged attention. Accordingly Iphicrates led his targeteers into Phliasia, and marked his way with ravage. His purpose was to provoke pursuit, and lead the Phliasians into an ambuscade. He succeeded; and so large a proportion of their small force of heavy-armed fell, that the survivors thought themselves unequal, not only to the protection of their fields, but even to the defence of their walls. Pressed then by distress and danger, they were induced so far to remit their former jealousy, as to request from Lacedæmon a protecting force, and even to put their citadel into the power of a Spartan governor. The trust was executed with fidelity, and even with scrupulous delicacy; for, when the Phliasians, after arranging their affairs, thought themselves again equal to their own protection, the Lacedæmonian government, in withdrawing the garrison, avoided even to mention a restoration of the exiles. The conduct was liberal and wise; worthy of Agesilaus, if he was the mover; but we cannot give the Lacedæmonian administration quite so much credit for it, as if they had been less under the pressure of difficult circumstances.

B.C. 393.  
Ol. 96. 4.

After

CHAP. After his success in Phliasia, Iphicrates overran

XXV.

Xenoph.

H. l. 4.

c. 4. s. 16.

great part of Arcadia ; and, such was the new terror of his targeteers, that even the Arcadian heavy-armed feared to quit their towns. The Lacedæmonians however were not to be so daunted. Iphicrates falling in with a body of them, his targeteers, according to their usual method, after throwing their javelins, retreated to avoid stationary action. But the Lacedæmonians pursuing, such was the practised vigor of some of their younger men, with their full armor, they overtook and killed some of the targeteers, and made some prisoners. After this experience, it was with difficulty that the targeteers could be led within dart's throw of any Lacedæmonian forces. Iphicrates nevertheless taught them still to support their reputation against other troops ; insomuch that, near Lechæum, he defeated a body of Mantineian heavy-armed. Thus, says the cotemporary historian, the Lacedæmonians who held the targeteers in contempt, found reason to hold their own allies in still greater contempt ; and it became a common sarcasm among them, that the allies were afraid of the targeteers, as children of hobgoblins.

17.

▲ 18. Notwithstanding the employment thus found for the Lacedæmonians by Iphicrates, the Athenians were still uneasy under the apprehension of a renewal of those evils, which had been experienced in the frequent invasions of their country, during the Peloponnesian war. They were therefore anxious to deprive the Lacedæmonians of the command

command of the isthmus, and with this view it was resolved to restore the long walls of Corinth. Accordingly the whole force of the commonwealth marched to support a body of workmen, so numerous that the restoration of the western wall was completed in a few days. A good defence being thus gained on the side of Sicyon, the enemy's principal garrison in those parts, they proceeded with the eastern wall more leisurely.

In tracing, with the able cotemporary historian, the events which followed the return of Agesilaus from Asia and his victory in Bœotia, some wonder is apt to arise at the little exertion or little means, at the confined action and narrow views, of that seemingly formidable commonwealth, which, after the Peloponnesian war, completely commanded Greece, and not only threatened Persia, but was actually carrying conquest far into Asia. To her landforce no misfortune had happened. On the contrary, a victory had checked the exertions of her enemies in Greece, before Agesilaus returned. He brought to her assistance a powerful army of veterans, formed in various service, and gained a victory on his arrival. This was followed by success under Praxitas, which secured the way for carrying invasion into the territories of any of the hostile republics. No use appears to have been made of these advantages. One defeat at sea had deprived Lacedæmon of her transmarine dominion, and three victories by land did not give her quiet within her own peninsula. From the course of Xenophon's narrative, however, may be gathered that, for this apparent inertness and

CHAP. and real inefficiency, two powerful causes existed ;  
XXV. the diminution of pecuniary resources, through  
the loss of the Asiatic dominion, and the dis-  
affection of the Laconian subjects to the Spartan  
government. Means failed for putting the Asiatic  
army any more in action, and the measures of  
government for external exertion were cramped  
by the necessity of watching the disposition to  
revolt at home. On both subjects Xenophon, on  
account of his connection with the Spartan  
government, has spoken always with delicacy and  
reserve, yet he has not wholly omitted to throw  
light on them.

Humbled then and distressed, pressed by land  
and by sea, abroad and at home, and at a loss  
for measures, while the Athenians were recovering  
extensive dominion, the Lacedæmonians turned  
their thoughts to a reconciliation with Persia.  
They had experienced the advantage of the Persian  
alliance, when they possessed it ; they now felt its  
pressure against them ; and they perceived that,  
contemptible as the military of the empire was  
become, yet, in the divided state of Greece, the  
Persian king, or even a satrap, by the force of  
money alone, employing Greeks against Greeks,  
could decide the balance between their republics.  
They had moreover had large opportunity to  
know, that the councils of the Persian empire  
had scarcely more energy than its arms ; so that,  
in the looseness of the connection of the distant  
members, with the head, and with one another,  
means for negotiation and intrigue were almost  
always open. In the present moment, Pharnabazus  
was

was highly incensed against them, and his resentment had afforded opportunity for the able admiral and minister of Athens to attach him to the Athenian interest. But the new satrap of Lydia, Teribazus, had no cause of personal animosity, perhaps no principle of political enmity toward them ; and, to judge from past experience, the very attachment of one satrap to the Athenian, might incline the other to the Lacedæmonian cause.

These considerations urging, Antalcidas was sent ambassador to Sardis. The Athenians, alarmed at this, sent also an embassy, at the head of which was Conon, accompanied by ministers from Bœotia, Corinth, and Argos. Antalcidas represented ‘ that the support, given <sup>B.C. 393.</sup> <sub>s. 18.</sub> by Pharnabazus to the Athenians, went far beyond what a just consideration of the interest of the Persian empire would allow : that, on the contrary, the terms of peace which, on the part of Lacedæmon, he was commissioned to propose, could not fail of being agreeable to the king. The Lacedæmonians would no longer dispute the king’s sovereignty over the Grecian cities in Asia ; and, for the islands and the European Greek cities, they only desired complete independency. If then no sovereignty of one Grecian city over another were allowed, it would be impossible for any to carry hostilities with any efficacy against the king ; so that the expence of maintaining a fleet for the Athenians, and of making war upon the Lacedæmonians, might be equally spared.’

CHAP.

XXV.

Xen. Hell.  
l. 4. c. 8.  
s. 15.

Teribazus was pleased with this proposal, but the Athenian, Boeotian, and Argian ministers could not be brought to consent to a peace upon such terms. Under the stipulation for the independency of all Grecian states, the Athenians feared to lose the islands of Lemnos, Imbrus, and Scirus, their antient possession; the Thebans their command over the Boeotian cities; and the Argians their new connection with Corinth. As far therefore as peace was the object, the negotiation failed. But Antalcidas nevertheless carried a great point for his country, for he gained Teribazus. Scrupling to conclude an alliance with Lacedæmon, without express authority from his court, the satrap however secretly furnished money for the equipment of a Lacedæmonian fleet; imprisoned Conon on pretence of injurious conduct toward the king; and went himself to Susa, to solicit authority for the measures he desired to pursue.

s. 19.

While Antalcidas was thus successfully negotiating at Sardis, the Lacedæmonian administration, stimulated by the depredations of Iphicrates in various parts of Peloponnesus, and alarmed by the restoration of the long walls of Corinth, resolved at length to put Agesilaus again at the head of an army, and appoint his brother Teleutias to coöperate with him in naval command. Quickly all Argolis was ravaged; and, the attention of the confederates being thus called to that country, Agesilaus suddenly crossed the mountains, while Teleutias conducted a squadron of twelve ships up the Saronic gulph, and the

unfinished

unfinished long walls, and the Corinthian naval SECT.  
arsenal, were taken. The expedition was ably IV.  
conducted, and the success important; but the blow  
was not followed: the forces of the allies were Xen. ibid.  
& Agesil.  
c. 2. s. 17.  
dismissed, and Agesilaus led the Lacedæmonians  
home to celebrate the Hyacinthian festival.

In the whole conduct of this war we find nothing like that greatness of design, which might have been expected if Agesilaus could have directed measures. It was evidently a war of the ephors, and the king was merely the general, acting under their orders. In the insuing spring he was directed B.C. 392.  
Ol. 97. 4.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 5.  
s. 1.  
again to put himself at the head of the army<sup>16</sup>. The refugee Corinthians had communicated information, that Corinth was principally subsisted from a stock of cattle, collected at an obscure port within the Corinthian territory, on the Saronic gulph, of the same name with the celebrated harbour of Athens, Peiræus. To deprive the enemy of that supply, was thought an object for an expedition, which the king should command. After events more adapted to ingage and fill the mind, these little transactions are apt to appear uninteresting. They are nevertheless important, as they are connected with great revolutions that followed, links in the great chain of events; and sometimes as they afford information, the clearest and the most impressive, of the religion,

<sup>16</sup> Neither season nor year is specified here by Xenophon; but the industrious acuteness of Dodwell, indignant at the evident confusion of Diodorus, has endeavored to ascertain the dates from the mention of the Isthmian festival in the Hellenics of Xenophon, and of the Hyacinthian in the Agesilaus.

**CHAP.  
XXV.** religion, politics, warfare, and manners, of this interesting age.

Ch. 19. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

The time selected for the expedition was that of the Isthmian games ; which, in the Peloponnesian war, we have seen, diffused a temporary peace around them ; insomuch that, amid designs and preparations on both sides avowedly the most hostile, the Athenians could safely trust their persons in the power of the Corinthians, then the most virulent of their enemies. But the same superstition, which at that time insured the observation of the armistice, now provoked to interrupt the sacred season with hostility. Corinth, by fiction of policy being now Argos, Corinthians and Argians indifferently, but all with the name of Argians, presided at the ceremony, and performed the prescribed sacrifice to Neptune. This the Corinthian refugees held to be a portentous pollution. They claimed themselves to be the Corinthian commonwealth, the exclusive privilege and exclusive duty of whose members it was to officiate in that solemnity. The Lacedæmonians approving their claim, Agesilaus led his army directly to the isthmus. The Argians were not prepared against attack, nor even against surprize. They fled on the first alarm ; yet not so timely, but, as they hurried along the road by Cenchrea, they were seen by the Lacedæmonians from the heights above, and might have been overtaken, but Agesilaus would not allow pursuit. So little indeed was the approach of an enemy apprehended, that the victim was left ready slain, and the preparations complete, for the feast which should

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 5.  
s. 2.

have followed. Agesilaus put his Corinthian friends in possession of these, and remained three days, while the sacrifices and games were performed under their presidency. Xenophon mentions, as a circumstance interesting to the Greeks, that after his departure the Argians caused the solemnity to be repeated in all its parts; so that some of the games were twice performed, and the same conquerors in some of them were twice proclaimed.

On the fourth day, Agesilaus led his army to Peiræus. There he found a large force, so strongly posted, with Iphicrates commanding, that in doubt of the success of an assault, he recurred to stratagem. Spreading a report that Corinth was to be betrayed to him, he decamped suddenly and directed his march thither. The Corinthian administration were so little secure of their own people that, in great alarm, they sent for Iphicrates to come and save Corinth; and that active general, ready at the call, with his light targeteers, passed the Lacedæmonian heavy-armed in the night. Agesilaus, informed of this, returned at daybreak to Peiræus, and occupied the commanding heights; upon which the troops remaining there, together with all the men, women, and slaves of the place, took sanctuary in a neighboring temple of Juno, and soon after surrendered themselves to the mercy of Agesilaus. His generosity was not conspicuous upon the occasion: those who were accused as accomplices in the massacre at Corinth were given up to the refugees: the rest, men, women,

SECT.  
IV.

Xen. Hel.  
I. 4. c. 5.  
s. 3.

s. 9.

s. 5.

- CHAP. goods, everything included in the capture, were  
XXV. sold.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 5. s. 6.

The terror of the arms of Agesilaus, probably however not unassisted by some intelligence or some apprehension of the success of Antalcidas in negotiation, brought ministers to the Lacedæmonian camp from several of the hostile states, and particularly the Boeotian, to know upon what terms peace might be expected. These ministers were waiting the king's leisure, while, with designed ostentation, he was reviewing his captives and other booty, when a messenger arrived, with intelligence of a disaster to the Lacedæmonian arms, which unfortunately checked both their desire of peace, and his means to command it.

s. 11.

It was a custom from very early ages, and supposed of divine origin, that the Laconians of the town of Amyclæa, on whatsoever public service employed abroad, should return home to sing the pæan at the Hyacinthian festival. The season being at hand, Agesilaus, in marching for Peiræus, had left all the Amyclæans of the army in Lechæum ; directing the polemarc, who commanded the garrison there, to provide for the security of their return to Laconia. The polemarc, zealous in the execution of what was esteemed a sacred duty, committed the defence of Lechæum to the troops of the allies, while, with a mora of Lacedæmonian infantry, consisting of about six hundred men, and another of cavalry, probably a much smaller number, he marched to escort the Amyclæans. He took the road to Sicyon, not as the direct way to Lacedæmon, but as the

readiest to get beyond danger from the enemy in Corinth, and to have a friendly line of country afterward to traverse, with a fresh escort, if it should be necessary. Having passed Corinth without molestation, and proceeded within four miles of Sicyon, he committed the Amyclæans to the charge of the cavalry, directing the commanding officer<sup>17</sup> to accompany them as far as they should themselves desire, and then press his way back to overtake the infantry in their return to Lechæum. He knew that the force in Corinth was large; but the late successes of the Lacedæmonian arms had inspired confidence, and he thought none would dare to attack a body of Lacedæmonian heavy-armed.

SECT.  
IV.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 5. s. 12.

Unfortunately that very stratagem which gave Agesilaus easy possession of Peiræus, had considerably increased the force in Corinth, and at the same time sent thither a general not likely to miss an opportunity for striking a blow. Iphicrates was there with his targeteers, and Callias son of Hipponicus, chief of the Daduchian family<sup>18</sup>, commanded a body of Athenian heavy-armed. They observed the polemarc returning, without cavalry and without light troops, and they led out their forces. Having preconcerted measures, Callias kept aloof, while the targeteers hung on the flanks and rear of the Lacedæmonian column, directing

<sup>17</sup> His Athenian military title would have been *Hipparc*; but the Lacedæmonian was *Hipparmost*; which assists to prove that *Hermost* may properly be rendered *Commander*, or *Governor*.

<sup>18</sup> See Ch. 22. s. 2. of this Hist.

CHAP. directing their missile weapons at the undefended

XXV.

parts of the heavy-armed soldier's body. The polemarc continued his march under the annoyance, till several were wounded and some fell. He then ordered those within ten years after boyhood, perhaps those under four and twenty, to assault and pursue<sup>19</sup>. This, a common expedient, of the Grecian heavy-armed, when unsupported by cavalry or light troops, had succeeded, as we have seen, once, even against Iphicrates: but to such an officer, every loss was a profitable lesson, and the expedient succeeded no more. His targeteers, superior both in arms and discipline to any before known, evaded the pursuit of the Spartan youth, incumbered with their heavy armour, turned upon them if they scattered, overtook them when they retreated, wounded many, killed some, and compelled the rest to rejoin the main body, upon which then, more daringly than before, they renewed their attacks. The polemarc was thus provoked to order all under thirty to assault. In retreating again, more fell than after the former charge. Already the most active and daring soldiers were mostly killed or wounded, when the horse joined. These were ordered to charge, and the younger men of the infantry with them. The cavalry service appears to have

been

<sup>19</sup> Τὰ δίκαια ἀρ' ἔτη. The exact value of this expression, which occurs more than once in Xenophon, is not satisfactorily ascertained. According to Plutarch, the Lacedæmonian ἔτη, boyhood, seems to have ended at the age of twelve years, after which, to the age of nineteen, the Lacedæmonian youths were called Eirens. Thus the pursuers would have been those only between the ages of nineteen and twenty-two.

been ill-cultivated among the Lacedæmonians. SECT.  
IV. Xenophon blames the conduct of their horse on this day. Instead of pushing the pursuit of the retreating targeteers, they carefully kept even front with their infantry, halted when they halted, and retreated when they retreated. Immediately as they turned the targeteers turned, and horse and foot together suffered from their missile weapons. Another charge was then made; but in the same manner, and with no better success. As their numbers were thus reduced, their efforts slackened, and those of the enemy grew more spirited. Distressed and at a loss, at length, for measures, they halted on a small eminence, about two furlongs from the sea, and two miles from Lechæum. Thence, while suffering from missile weapons, and unable to return a blow, they saw, on one side, boats from Lechæum intended to relieve them, on the other, the Athenian heavy-armed approaching to attack them. Upon this they took to flight. The horse escaped to Lechæum. Of the infantry, who mostly made for the sea, scarcely any survived<sup>20</sup>.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 5. s. 17.

Agesilaus, upon being informed of this disaster, seized his spear, and, not waiting to communicate with the enemy's ministers, who were attending, assembled all his officers. Having given his orders,

<sup>20</sup> Xenophon here says the killed, in all, were about two hundred and fifty. He had before said that the infantry were, in all, six hundred, and that those carried off by the shield-bearers (*ὑπασπιστοί*) before the first assault upon the targeteers, were all that were *really* saved, *μόνοι τῆς μάχης τῷ ἀληθεῖα ἰσαύθησαν*. It looks as if two hundred and fifty were the number admitted by the Lacedæmonians, but that the historian knew the real number to have been greater.

C H A P.

XXV.

orders, he marched immediately, with a chosen body, leaving the rest to follow, after refreshment taken. He had already entered the *vale of Lechæum*, when messengers met him, with information that the bodies of the slain were in the possession of their friends. Upon this he returned to Peiræus, and next day, says the historian, with a simplicity which may excite a smile, he sold the prisoners.

This misfortune, to the Lacedæmonian arms, had an effect approaching that of the capture of Sphacteria, in the Peloponnesian war. It did not indeed give an equal advantage to the enemy, because no prisoners were made. The loss in slain was very inferior even to what many of the little Grecian republics had often suffered; but it

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 5. s. 10.  
Plut. Ages.

made great impression upon the Lacedæmonians, because, says the historian, they were unaccustomed to such blows; and, as Plutarch well remarks, for readers less familiar with the ideâs of the times, it was an unheard-of disaster, and esteemed a portentous event, that heavy-armed should be defeated by targeteers, and Lacedæmonians by mercenaries. A deep grief therefore, as the cotemporary historian proceeds to inform us, pervaded the army: only, according to their great lawgiver's precept, the sons, fathers, and brothers of the slain, as sharers in glory earned through their family misfortune, ostentatiously exhibited a joy, which, among other people, might have been esteemed indecent on the occasion. The reputation accruing to Iphicrates

Corn. Nep.  
v, Iphicr.

was great throughout Greece, and the enemies of

Lacedæmon

Lacedæmon, were not a little encouraged. The SECT.  
IV. Boeotian ministers, attending in the camp of Agesilaus, being sent for to declare the object of their mission, did not even mention peace, but only requested free passage to communicate with their troops in Corinth. Agesilaus knew that what they now wanted was to get information of the amount of the late success. Next day therefore, s. 10. marching toward Corinth, he took them in his train, and allowed them a view of the trophy raised by their friends, which he would not permit his own troops to remove; but if olive, vine, or other valuable tree had escaped former ravage, he ordered it to be destroyed. Having made them spectators of this insult, to show that he could still command the country, he sent them, not into Corinth, but across the sea to Creusis, to relate in Boeotia all they had seen.

Here however ended his exertion. Placing a s. 18. complete mora in Lechæum, and taking with him the small relics of the mora which had suffered, he marched for Lacedæmon. His anxiety to conceal from the friendly towns, in which he was to take quarters by the way, the amount of a loss apparently so little considerable, is remarkable. He was careful to enter them all as late in the evening, and quit them as early in the morning, as with any convenience might be; and, finding the soldiers hurt with expectation that the Mantineians would take a malignant joy in their disaster, tho he moved from Orchomenus at daybreak, and did not reach Mantinea till dark, he would not halt there, but still proceeded to the next town.

Xenophon

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 5. s. 9.

CHAP.

XXV.

Xenophon has not informed us whether this retreat of the army was a measure of Agesilaus, or of the ephors, or what necessity induced it. If not necessary, it appears an imprudent measure. Iphicrates presently took Sidus, Crommyon, and Cœnoë; the two former garrisoned by Praxitas, the latter by Agesilaus himself. Thus all the territory northward and eastward was recovered for the Corinthians of the city, and command of the isthmus no longer remained to the Lacedæmonians. For the rest of the year operations were reduced to excursions for plunder, chiefly by those Corinthians, of the Lacedæmonian party, who had taken refuge in Sicyon. Not daring, since the misfortune of the Lacedæmonian mora, to move far by land, they directed their little expeditions by water, whithersoever, on the territory of their city, they had best hope of seizing, with least danger, any small booty that might contribute to their subsistence.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 5. s. 19.

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## SECTION V.

*Unsteddiness of the Persian Government: War renewed by Lacedæmon against Persia: Thimbron Commander-in-chief. Expedition into Acarnania under Agesilaus; into Argolis under Agesipolis.*

B. C. 392. DURING all this year the great fleet collected by OI. § 6. ¶ 4. Pharnabazus and Conon seems to have remained inactive. Possibly, since the negotiation of Antalcidas, the imprisonment of Conon, and the resolution of Teribazus to apply in person to the court

court of Susa, the Hellespontine satrap may have been cautious of taking a decided part: perhaps he may have been without an officer to whose ability or fidelity he would trust such a command. There was however evidently no steady policy in the Persian councils: nothing of that great design for establishing a commanding influence in Greece, which later writers have fancied in them. Struthas, who, in the absence of Teribazus, was appointed to the Lydian satrapy, instigated by consideration of the injuries the king's territories had borne from the Lacedæmonians (possibly his own property had suffered, or his family had been insulted) warmly favored the confederacy now at war with them.

SECT.  
V.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 17.

The Lacedæmonian administration in consequence, renewed hostilities against Persia; by what good policy prompted it is difficult to discover. The reappointment of Thimbron, to a command in which he had already shown himself deficient, strengthens the probability that the Lacedæmonian councils were at this time ill-directed; and the slighting manner in which Xenophon repeatedly mentions that officer, enough marks that he was not chosen by Agesilaus. Thimbron had some success in plundering the Persian possessions in the rich vale of Mæander; but he did not establish a better reputation for military ability than in his former command. Courage he possessed: but, tho a Spartan, he was a man of pleasure; indulgent to his soldiers, careless of those for whose protection he and his soldiers were sent. Courage may be even mischievous

Xenoph.  
Hel. ut sup.  
& Diodorus,  
l. 14, c. 100.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 3. c. 1.  
s. 8. &  
c. 2. s. 6.  
& l. 4. c. 5.  
s. 22.  
l. 4. c. 8  
s. 17.

c. 8. s. 22.

C H A P.

XXV.

mischievous in a general with deficient abilities. It led Thimbron to extravagant contempt of an enemy not incapable of profiting from his error. Struthas, having observed the hasty and careless manner in which he often led small bodies to action or pursuit, sent a few horse to plunder the Grecian possessions in the neighborhood. Thimbron was sitting at table, with the celebrated musician Thersander, when intelligence came, that the enemy he despised was thus insulting him. Immediately he rose; and Thersander, expert in martial exercises, and an emulator of Spartan prowess, followed him. In his usual manner, without any previous care to have troops in readiness, he hastened, with the first he could collect, to chastize the plunderers. Struthas presently appeared, with a large body of horse in good order: the Greeks were overpowered, and Thimbron and Thersander killed. The rest of the Grecian army, advancing too late to support their improvident general, were then charged and broken. A few saved themselves in the neighboring friendly towns; but the greater part fell by the swords of the conquering Persians.

This serious check stopped, for a time, the apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Asia. Meanwhile, in Europe, some accidental circumstances, and not any great design, led, or rather forced them, to carry their arms beyond Peloponnesus.

Such was the unfortunate implication of interests, in the Grecian political system, that, unable ever or anywhere to give peace, which was its object,

object, that system had a constant tendency to spread the flames of war. Calydon, a principal town of Ætolia, had renounced its connection with the body of the Ætolian people, and made itself a member of the Achaian people, on the other side of the Corinthian gulf. We find here again something like that fiction of policy, by which we have lately observed Corinth become a part of Argos. The Achaians however found the acquisition inconvenient; for, to preserve it, they were obliged to keep a body of forces in Calydon, and sustain a war with the Ætolians.

We have formerly seen the Acarnanians, after a course of successful warfare, generous at the same time and prudent in granting terms of peace to their defeated neighbors. From that period they had passed more than fifty years in so fortunate an obscurity, as to offer, for the historian's notice, neither crime nor misfortune. They were now led again to step forward on the field of fame. The Ætolians, anxious to recover Calydon, and unable with their own force, solicited and obtained the good offices of their allies of Acarnania. The Acarnanians had alliance with the Athenians and Bœotians, who readily contributed assistance against allies of Lacedæmon. Thus the Achaians became so pressed, as to be unable to preserve Calydon, unless they also could obtain assistance. They applied of course to Lacedæmon; but they found the Lacedæmonian administration little disposed to send a force beyond Peloponnesus. Thinking themselves ill-used, they remonstrated warmly.

' Wherever the Lacedæmonians required their

SECT.

V.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 6. s. 1.

Ch. 15. S. 6.  
of this Hist.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 6. s. 2.

**C H A P.** ‘ services,’ they said, ‘ they always marched on the  
**XXV.** ‘ first summons ; and, without reciprocal assist-  
‘ ance in need, they could no longer abide by a  
‘ confederacy, the terms of which were so unequal.  
‘ Instead of any more sending forces to serve in  
‘ the Lacedæmonian armies, they must neces-  
‘ sarily employ their whole strength against their  
‘ own particular enemies, or make a separate  
‘ peace upon the best terms they could obtain.’

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 6. s. 3, 4.

This remonstrance had the desired effect ; and the abilities of Agesilaus were in consequence to be employed in a war, whose object was, that the people of the obscure town of Calydon should be members of that branch of the Greek nation, called Achaians, and no longer of that called Ætolians. He led into Acarnania two moras of Lacedæmonians, with the whole strength of Achaia, and the contingents of all the other allies. No force that the Acarnanians could raise, was able to oppose him in the field. Terms of peace, which he offered, being refused, he made complete destruction of the country, as he went, but he advanced only ten or twelve furlongs a day. The Acarnanians were thus encouraged to bring their cattle, which had been driven far among the mountains, back again toward their best pastures, and to return themselves to the tillage of great part of their lands. Agesilaus obtaining intelligence that almost the whole stock of the country, with numerous attending slaves, was collected on the borders of a lake, about twenty miles from his camp, by a hasty march, came upon it by surprize, and took almost all.

The

The proposed business of the next day was to give rest to his troops, while he sold his captives to the slave-merchants, the common attendants of a Grecian army. Meanwhile the Acarnanians assembled in great numbers, on the heights around his camp. Less practised than the Peloponnesians, in the discipline of the heavy-armed, the Acarnanians were remarkable, through Greece, for their expertness in the use of missile weapons; and they so annoyed the army of Agesilaus, within <sup>s. 11.</sup> its lines, that they compelled him, when evening was already approaching, to move his camp to ground less commanded. After this experience, he was anxious, on the following day, to regain the plain. But he found the heights commanding his way occupied; and the activity of his younger soldiers was in vain exerted to repel or deter the assaults, made or threatened from them. His small body of cavalry was equally inefficient, on ground so hilly and rough. Thus, through the usual deficiency of a Peloponnesian army in light troops, he was in no small danger from an enemy, who, in any number, would not stand the assault of almost the smallest detachment that he could send against them. Fortunately he discovered a better passage, which, tho guarded by the Acarnanian heavy-armed, he resolved to force; and, not without difficulty, principally arising from the annoyance of missile weapons, he succeeded.

Regaining thus, at length, the plain, he extended ravage on all sides. To gratify the Achaians he assaulted some towns, but without success.

**C H A P.** Autumn then advancing, he proposed to quit the country. **XXV.** The Achaians, dissatisfied that not a single town had been gained, either by force or persuasion, urged him to stay, so long at least as to prevent the Acarnanians from sowing their winter grain. Such, in the deficiency of means for the attack of walls, was, yet in that age, among the modes of reducing an enemy to terms. Agesilaus however replied, ‘that they mistook their interest; for he intended to return next summer; and the enemy’s solicitude for peace would be exactly proportioned to their fear of the destruction of a plentiful harvest.’

To regain Peloponnesus then for winter quarters, was a business not without difficulty and danger. The command of the isthmus was lost, as we have seen, by the retreat of Agesilaus himself, in the autumn of the former year, after his success at the Corinthian Peiræus, and the unfortunate action which took place at the same time near Lechæum. An Athenian squadron, commanding the western seas, watched the passage from Calydon to Peloponnesus. No alternative remained but to march through the hostile country of Ætolia; a country so strong by nature, that, says the historian, neither a great nor a small force can traverse it, against the goodwill of the warlike inhabitants. Agesilaus was skilful and fortunate enough to induce them to acquiesce, by holding out the hope of recovering Naupactus, so long held by the Messenians.

B.C. 390. In the following spring the army was reassembled. **OI. 97. ¶** The Acarnanians, informed of this, began

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 6. s. 14.

to consider, says the historian, that as they had no seaports, through which to obtain supplies, the destruction of their harvest would produce all the evils of a blockade of their towns. They sent therefore ministers to Lacedæmon, and a treaty was concluded, which established peace for them with the Achaians; and, with the Lacedæmonians, that kind of alliance, familiar among the Greeks, by which the forces of the inferior people were to march at the command of the superior. The Acarnanians, however, being not likely to be zealous allies, the principal point gained, by success in this little war, was the prevention of the secession of Achaia from the Lacedæmonian confederacy.

This however was the more important, as an enemy already existed, within Peloponnesus, so powerful as to make it dangerous for the Lacedæmonians to send any large proportion of their forces beyond the peninsula: Attica and Bœotia had been secure through their alliance with Argos. It was resolved therefore now to carry an expedition into Argolis itself; and the young king Agesipolis, son of Pausanias, just of age, and highly ambitious of distinction, was appointed to the command.

The army was ready to march, and the border-passing sacrifice had been declared propitious, when a herald arrived from Argos with a proposal of truce. The superstition of the young king, or of his council, was alarmed; insomuch that he went to Olympia, to learn, from the oracle of Jupiter, if he might religiously refuse a truce

SECT.  
V.Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4  
c. 7. s. 1.

**C H A P.** insidiously proposed : for it was notorious that no  
X X V. sincere desire of peace had prompted the Argians, but the mere purpose of averting an invasion, which, with their single strength, they could not oppose, and of which intelligence had reached them too late to call in their allies. The god signified that the truce, iniquitously offered, might be religiously refused. Not even thus satisfied, Agesipolis proceeded to Delphi, and inquired of Apollo, ‘If he was of the same opinion with his ‘father?’ Such, precisely, is the philosopher-historian’s expression. But this transaction, whatever may appear ridiculous in it, shows the value of that union in religion, which obtained through the Greek nation. It was a beneficent superstition, that could occasion but a pause about prosecuting the ravages of war, and generally insure opportunity for treating about peace.

*Xenoph.*  
*Hel. I. 4.*  
*c. 7. s. 3.*

Apollo, however, confirmed the opinion of Jupiter. Agesipolis then hastened to Phlius, where he found his army assembled, and he marched immediately, by the way of Nemea, into the vale of Argos. On the first evening, during the usual libations after supper, an earthquake was felt. The Lacedæmonians, taking it as a favorable omen, sang the pæan to Neptune, the supposed author of earthquakes ; but the allies were alarmed ; and, in justification of their fears, *Ch. 24. s. 2.* they observed that Agis, upon a similar occasion, had withdrawn his army from Eleia. Agesipolis, however, ably refuted their construction of the omen : ‘Had they been but about to enter the ‘enemy’s territory,’ he said, ‘the earthquake ‘would

' would have indicated the god's prohibition of  
 ' the measure : being already entered, it declared  
 ' his approbation.'

SECT.  
V.

The terrors of the army being thus quieted, a sacrifice was performed to Neptune, and then ravage was carried to the very gates of Argos ; which the Argians feared to open even to admit a body of Bœotian horse coming to their assistance ; who would have been destroyed, as they stuck, in the historian's phrase, like bats under the battlements, had not the Cretan bowmen of the Lacedæmonian army been accidentally absent. After plunder and destruction widely spred, the symptoms in a sacrifice deterred the proposed fortifying of a post in the country, and Agesipolis, returning home with his booty, dismissed his army.

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#### SECTION VI.

*Affairs of Rhodes: Diphridas Commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia; succeeded by Teleutias. An Athenian Fleet sent to Asia under Thrasybulus: Asiatic and Thracian Dominion recovered to Athens. Death of Thrasybulus and Conon. Anaxibius Commander-in-chief of the Lacedæmonians in Asia, Iphicrates of the Athenians: Defeat and Death of Anaxibius.*

THE destruction of the army under Thimbron, while the abilities of Agesilaus were confined to the Acarnanian war, had checked the apparently ill-judged exertion of the Lacedæmonians in Asia. Sedition, arising from the incompatibility of interest of the wealthy and the poor, that great mover of Grecian domestic politics, again drew the attention of the government thither, and Asia

SECT.  
VI.

B. C. 391.  
OJ. 97 $\frac{1}{4}$ .

CHAP. was an inviting field for those who could obtain  
XXV. commands.

That civil order, or, in one word of his own close and expressive language, better painting his object, that eunomy, which Strabo admired in the island of Rhodes, when, in common with all surrounding countries, it held its government under patronage of the Roman empire, did not at this time florish there. The rich and the poor could not agree upon a form of government, which might enable them to hold their fine island in independency, tho no foreign power offered them violence. Incapable of coalescing, and each beyond all things decided against submission to the other, each solicited subjection to a foreign authority. After the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, the Many had for some time rested under the government of the Few, everywhere patronized by the conquering people. But, when the Lacedæmonian interest in Asia was suddenly overthrown, when Athens again became a name among the Grecian powers, and an Athenian admiral commanded the seas, whether from ambition of chiefs or sufferings of the people, or both together, civil contest arose; the democratical party forming connection with Athens, obtained the superiority; and all the men of higher rank were expelled. Lacedæmon, of course, became their refuge. The Lacedæmonian administration thought it important to prevent such an accession, as that of all Rhodes, to the Athenian dominion; and so little was apprehended from the fleet lately so formidable under Conon, that eight triremes

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 20.

were

were supposed sufficient for the purpose. But the intelligence, on which this judgement was formed, appears to have been very defective; for the Rhodians themselves possessed twice the number of ships of war; so that the Lacedæmonian squadron, having reached the port of Cnidus, in want of an object to which its strength was equal, remained mostly there.

When it was resolved, at Lacedæmon, to keep a squadron on the Asiatic station, it was resolved also to send an officer to take the command by land in Asia Minor, who might collect the broken relics of Thimbron's army, preserve the towns yet disposed to the Lacedæmonian interest, and prosecute war against Struthas. This command was committed to Diphridas; who, tho unsupported by any force from Peloponnesus, yet by his activity in business, civil and military, with assistance from the pleasantness of his manners, restored, in a considerable degree, the Lacedæmonian affairs in Asia. In several towns the Lacedæmonian interest was revived or confirmed, and a fortunate incident gave means for raising an efficient military force: Tigranes, with his wife, the daughter of Struthas, was made prisoner; and a large sum being raised by their ransom, Diphridas used it to raise a body of mercenaries, which he found means also to maintain.

In the following year, the Lacedæmonian administration, earnest to recover Rhodes, ordered Teleutias,

\* This and the preceding are Dodwell's dates, made out from circumstances in Xenophon's narrative.

SECT.  
VI.

B.C. 391.  
OL. 97. ½.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 8. s. 21.

s. 22.

B.C. 390<sup>20</sup>.  
OL. 37. ½.

C H A P.

XXV.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 4. c. 6.  
a. 23.

Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus, to pass, with his squadron, from the Corinthian gulph to Asia, and take the command-in-chief. Thus reinforced, the Asiatic fleet consisted of twenty-seven ships, with which Teleutias was proceeding from the station at Cnidus to Rhodes, when he fell in with an Athenian squadron of ten, and took all. Xenophon remarks an inconsistency in the measures of both parties on this occasion. The Athenians, in actual alliance with Persia, or, at least, with the western satraps, had sent that squadron to assist Evagoras king of Cyprus, against Persia; and the Lacedæmonians, at actual war with Persia, intercepted that squadron going to fight against their enemies. But what seems principally to deserve notice, is the evidence afforded of the weakness and distraction of the Persian councils, in consequence of which that vast empire submitted to insults, on all sides, from the little Grecian republics. If they sought its alliance, they sought it through insults and injuries; and, in the actual enjoyment of great advantages from its alliance obtained, still they did not refrain from insults and injuries.

The usual activity of the Athenians was excited by the loss of their ships, and by the apprehension that the Lacedæmonians might recover the dominion of the sea. A fleet of forty triremes was committed to the orders of Thrasybulus. That able and experienced officer, pressing his way to Rhodes, found Teleutias there. The Rhodian refugees held a post in the island, which he had fortified for them. With some assistance from him they had ventured a battle, but were defeated, and the

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 25.

the democratical party commanded the country. Thrasybulus therefore, finding them thus able to support themselves, and having tried in vain to bring Teleutias to action, proceeded to the Hellespont. Hostilities had arisen between Amadocus, or Medocus <sup>21</sup>, paramount sovereign of the Odrysian Thracians, and Seuthes, the prince restored, through the assistance of the Cyreian Greeks, to the command of the country bordering on the Propontis. He effected a reconciliation between them, and, by forming an alliance with both for the Athenian commonwealth, he added considerably to the importance of the Athenian patronage for the Grecian towns on the Thracian coast. He proceeded then to Byzantium, and restored the collection of the toll, formerly imposed by the Athenians, of a tenth of the value of the cargo of all vessels passing the Bosphorus <sup>22</sup>. Seemingly this should not have been a measure very agreeable to the Byzantines, who might naturally enough think themselves best intitled to such a tax collected there; but, among the Greeks, when

party-

<sup>21</sup> In the Hellenics we find the name written Amadocus, in the Anabasis always Medocus, which is the orthography that Diodorus has followed, l. 4. c. 95.

<sup>22</sup> Αὐτὸς τὰς δικάτην τῷς ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλεόντων.—Decumam, e Ponto navigantibus impositam, publicanis vendit.—Decimas eorum quae e Ponto veherentur, ἀνίδολο, locavit, scilicet, publicanis. Hesychius: ἀνίδολο, ικδίδωκε. Εκδίδονται, autem, apud Herodotum, idem quod μισθῶσαν. Tho I have not on all occasions perfect faith in Hesychius, for explanations relating to the age of Xenophon, yet I believe these may be nearly right. I should however have been glad of more explanation on the subject from Xenophon himself. He indeed mentions the thing again in other words, rather confirming these interpretations, presently after.—ἢ δικάτην τῷς ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου πλεόντων ἵνα εἰς Βυζαντίον ἵνα Αθηναῖον. s. 31.—venditam ab Atheniensibus esse rerum e Ponto vectorum decumam.

SECT.  
VI.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
e. 8. s. 27.

CHAP.  
XXV.

party-views interfered, the general interest of the commonwealth was little considered. Thrasybulus abolished the oligarchical government, established in Byzantium by the Lacedæmonians, and restored democracy. With the democratical party, therefore, thus become the ruling party, the Athenian name was highly popular ; and in the first moments of joy, anything was borne from their benefactors. If indeed a general judgement is to be formed from the accounts given even by Xenophon, the friend and admirer of Lacedæmon, of the conduct of some of the Lacedæmonian governors upon some occasions, it was not wonderful that popularity should attach in the moment to any change<sup>23</sup>. Thrasybulus had similar success at Chalcedon. The other Grecian towns, on the Asiatic shore, were alreddy in the interest of Athens, as the ally of Persia, or of the satrap in whose province they lay, excepting only Abydus, where at present nothing invited his endeavors.

His next attention therefore was given to the large and rich island of Lesbos ; large among the islands of the Ægean, but scanty to form a state sufficing for its own protection. The Lesbians nevertheless had no notion of coälescing under one government. Four, five, or six towns, affected each its separate sovereignty. Mitylenë, the most populous and powerful, was attached to the Athenian interest ; all the others to the Lacedæmonian ; and in Methymnë, the next in power to

Mitylenë,

<sup>23</sup> Plutarch mentions it as a popular saying in Greece, (viz. Agesil. v. 2. p. 1107.) that the Lacedæmonians collectively, (*δημοσίς*) were the better men, but the Athenians individually (*ἰδιαῖς*). It was with individuals in command that the colonies had mostly to do.

Mitylenë, a Lacedæmonian harmost resided. But refugees from all were unceasingly watching opportunities for restoring themselves. On these circumstances Thrasybulus founded the project of bringing the whole island into the interest, and, in effect, under the dominion of Athens. He was well received in Mitylenë; and, by holding out the hope that all Lesbos might be reduced under their dominion, he engaged the Mitylenæans to march with him against Methymnë. The refugees from the other towns were induced to join him, by the hope, otherwise desperate, of restoration to their country. The Lacedæmonian governor, venturing an action with him, was defeated and killed. Some of the towns then surrendered, and the plunder of the lands of the rest served for present pay to the victorious army.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 8. s. 30.

The dominion, or the influence, which Athens formerly held over that large part of the Greek nation which was settled in the islands, on the Asiatic coast, and on the Hellespontine shores as far as the Euxine, was now in great proportion recovered. Abydus, yet held by Dercyllidas, and the few Ionian towns that Diphridas had been able to preserve to the Lacedæmonian interest, were the principal exceptions. After these important services done, it remained still for Thrasybulus to accomplish what was the particular object of his instructions, in leading the armament from Athens. Having therefore passed the winter in Lesbos<sup>44</sup>, he was anxious in spring to get to Rhodes

B.C. 389.  
Ol. 97. 4.

<sup>44</sup> We find Xenophon still deficient in marking dates; but the laborious ingenuity of Dodwell has again here, I think, been

*CHAP. Rhodes as early as possible, but to get there  
XXV. prepared in the most effectual manner to meet*

*such a commander as Teleutias. Money, which  
the treasury of his republic could not supply, must  
be obtained to support his armament. On that  
curious subject, the collection of tax or tribute  
from those numerous self-governed towns, over  
which the patronage of Athens extended, or the  
fear of its arms operated, tho it frequently occurs  
to mention, we do not find, among antient writers,*

Xen. Hel. l. 4. c. 8.  
Diod. l. 14. c. 100. *the explanation that might be wished. Thrasy-  
bulus, after receiving money from many other  
towns, proceeded to Aspendus on the river Eury-  
medon, the scene of the celebrated double victory  
of Cimon over the Persians. The Aspendians had  
already paid a contribution, when some irregu-  
larities, committed by the troops, so exasperated  
them, that they attacked the Athenian naval camp  
by night, and Thrasybulus was killed in his tent.*

Such was the end of a man of no common merit, tried on various occasions; in seditions among fellowcitizens, in commands against common enemies, and proved, in them all, for honesty and true patriotism, at least after Aristeides and Cimon, the most unequivocal character among the numerous superior men that Athens had to that time produced. But, in Athens, no character could escape the licentious calumny of those who made accusation a trade; and, among the remaining orations of Lysias, we find Thrasybulus involved

been successful. Contrary to Diodorus, he has assigned the departure of Thrasybulus from Athens to about midsummer of the year B. C. 390; his departure from Lesbos, in which he agrees with Diodorus, to spring B. C. 389.

*involved in a charge of peculation. Certainly the mode used by the Athenians, of extorting revenue with an armed force, gave the tax-gathering generals great opportunity for sinister practices : but then it opened unbounded opportunity for calumnious imputation, difficult for the clearest probity to refute ; because, to prove honesty, a negative must be proved.* Xenophon appears to have had no partiality for Thrasybulus : in party indeed they were rather opposite ; but, in relating his death, he speaks his panegyric : ‘ Such,’ he says, ‘ was the end of Thrasybulus, a man of the ‘ highest estimation’ ; a concise, yet perhaps a completer eulogy than, in all his remaining works, we find bestowed upon any other political character, excepting only his particular friend and patron Agesilaus.

To the loss of this great man was added that of Conon, of whose fate we have nothing certain after his imprisonment by Teribazus ; but it seems most probable that he escaped from confinement, reached the island of Cyprus, where he had large property, and died there<sup>15</sup>.

Isoc. Paneg.  
p. 270. t. 1.  
Lys. pro  
bon. Aris-  
tophanes,  
p. 155, vel  
638.

As

<sup>15</sup> So I think the import of the Greek phrase may most fairly be given in our language,—μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἄγαθὸς οὐται— which the Latin translator has rendered perhaps as nearly as the Latin language would admit,—maximā virtute viri. Cornelius Nepos’s eulogy of Thrasybulus seems the same expression amplified in translation : Si per se virtus sine fortuna ponderanda sit, dubito an hunc (Thrasybulum) primum omnium ponam. Illi sine dubio, neminem præfero ; tide, constantia, magnitudine animi, in patriam amore.

<sup>16</sup> The biographer Nepos says that, according to some reports, Conon was carried into the king’s presence, and was put to death, or died, in Upper Asia ; but that, according to the historian Dinon, in his opinion the best authority for Persian.

CHAP.  
XXV.

As no others perhaps could have raised Athens, from ruin, to that degree of strength and splendor, which she had already recovered, so none possessed the means of Thrasybulus and Conon, whether by abilities and experience, or by interest and influence among Grecian states and foreign powers, still to promote her progress to empire.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 31.

s. 32.

The Lacedæmonians nevertheless were alarmed at what had been alreddy done, and especially at the recovery of the command of the Bosporus, and of the toll collected there. Dercyllidas, who had remained in his government of Abydus, without a force sufficient for effectual operation against Thrasybulus, was, perhaps, while the affairs of Greece required the presence of Agesilaus, the fittest man that Sparta could furnish for the Asiatic command. But the interest

of

Persian affairs, he escaped from confinement. It is something remarkable, that none of the extant cotemporary writers mention the death of so illustrious a man. Xenophon relates his imprisonment, and there leaves him. A licentious Latin translation seems to have led some to quote Isocrates as asserting that he was put to death by the Persians—Κόνωνα μή—ιετο θάνατον, συλλαβεῖν, ιτέλημπταρ—(Paneg. p. 268. t. 1.) which, apparently for the sake of a rounder period than an exact version would reddily have allowed, is rendered by Auger, *Cononem comprehensum interficere ausi sunt.* The meaning appears to me to be no more than that they seized him with the purpose of putting him to death; and as the completion of the purpose is not expressed, it seems implied that it did not follow. From Lysias we learn that the large property of Conon in Cyprus was disposed of, after his death, in conformity to a written will which he left, (Lys. pro bon. Aristoph. p. 155. vel 638.) and it seems in some degree implied, in the same passage, that he died there. The omission of all mention of his death, after noticing his imprisonment, seems to mark that Xenophon knew nothing of his having been put to death by the Persians, and it is not likely that he would have remained uninformed of such a circumstance.

of Anaxibius prevailed with the ephors. He sailed with only three triremes and no troops, but he was furnished with levy money for a thousand men.

To supply the lost abilities of Thrasybulus and Conon, Iphicrates now stood foremost among the Athenian officers. It is an important, tho, for the modern reader, an over concise passage of Xenophon, in which he mentions that Iphicrates, while commanding in Peloponnesus, put to death some Corinthians, for their zeal for the connection with Argos; a violence of which the united republics took no farther notice than to dismiss him and his troops, with the pretence of having no farther need of them.

The appointment of a new commander from Lacedæmon, with an increased force, to act in the Hellespont, induced the Athenians to send Iphicrates thither, with eight triremes and twelve hundred targeteers. Desultory expeditions, for the collection of booty, for some time employed both generals. A proposal to revolt at length coming to Anaxibius from a party in Antandrus, he led thither the greater part of his force, consisting of Ahydenes, mercenaries, and the Lacedæmonian governors, with their followers, who had taken refuge in Abydus with Dercyllidas. Iphicrates, informed of this movement, crossed the Hellespont in the night, landed on the Asiatic shore, and, directing his march toward Cremastë, on the highlands of Ida, where, says Xenophon, were the goldmines of the Antandrians, he took a station commodious for intercepting the Lacedæmonians on their return. His squadron hastened

SECT.  
VI.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 4.  
c. 8. s. 33.

s. 34

s. 37.

CHAP. hastened back to Sestus, and, at daybreak, according to orders given, moved up the Hellespont toward the Propontis. It was seen; from the Asiatic shore, holding that course, and the feint completely deceived Anaxibius; who, in the persuasion that Iphicrates was gone on some expedition to the northward, marched in full security.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 4.  
c. 8. s. 38.

*He no sooner saw the Athenian infantry, so well was the ambuscade planned, than he saw his own defeat inevitable.* With the ready and firm conciseness of a Spartan, addressing his people, he said, ‘It will be proper for me to die here: ‘hasten you to save yourselves, before the enemy is upon you.’ Taking then his shield from his shield-bearer, and, being joined by twelve of the expelled Lacedæmonian governors, they fought on the spot till all were killed. This testimony, to the remaining vigor of the institutions of Lycurgus, is the more remarkable, as Xenophon, in doing justice to the bravery of Anaxibius, appears to have been very far from having had either personal regard for him, or esteem for his character<sup>27</sup>. The rest of the army, flying, was pursued, with considerable slaughter, to the very walls of Abydus.

<sup>27</sup> Dercyllidas appears to have been much the friend of Xenophon, who seems to have thought him ill used by the appointment of Anaxibius to supersede him. By Anaxibius himself, when he had before the command in the Hellespont, Xenophon had been, as we have seen, extremely ill-treated. It is observable, that he mentions the impiety of Anaxibius, shown in his contempt of augury, as among the causes of his catastrophe.

## SECTION VII.

*Freebooting war of the Æginetans against Attica: Siege of Ægina. Lacedæmonian Public Revenue. Connection of Athens with Cyprus. Teleutias Commander on the Grecian coast: Antalcidas Commander in Asia, and again Ambassador from Lacedæmon to the Satrap of Lydia. Able conduct of Antalcidas, in military command and in negotiation. Treaty concluded between Lacedæmon and Persia, and Peace dictated to Greece by the Lacedæmonian Government, in the King of Persia's name, commonly called The Peace of Antalcidas.*

WHILE Athens was recovering empire beyond the Sect. VII. B.C. 387.  
Ol. 97. 4. Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 5.  
c. 1. s. 1. Ægean, she was suffering at home those evils of predatory war, to which, in the scantiness of their territories, the most powerful of the Grecian republics were always liable. Hitherto commercial intercourse between Athens and Ægina, tho Ægina was of the Lacedæmonian alliance, had not been interrupted; the Lacedæmonians themselves, in the desire of finding opportunity to divide the formidable confederacy that opposed them, having been cautious of carrying hostility directly against Attica. But since a naval war was begun, in which the Athenians of course took the lead, such caution was laid aside; the Æginetans were encouraged to infest the Attic trade and pillage the coast, and Ægina became again 'the eyesore of Peiræus.'

Distressed by this annoyance, the Athenians sent Pamphilus, with ten triremes and a body of heavy-armed, to besiege Ægina. Teleutias happened to be in the neighborhood, collecting tribute among the islands. For notwithstanding their

C H A P.

XXV.

professions of total disinterestedness during the Peloponnesian war, the Lacedæmonians had now avowedly, and indeed not without necessity, abandoned that system, and followed the example of Athens in raising a public revenue. According

Diod. I. 14.  
p. 400.

to Diodorus, after the Peloponnesian war, they collected a thousand talents, perhaps near two hundred and fifty thousand pounds, yearly, which he seems to have considered as a great exaction. On the approach of the Lacedæmonian fleet the Athenian squadron retired, but the siege of Ægina by land was still continued. The season of the annual change of commanders occurring soon after,

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
e. 1. s. 3.

Hierax, the successor of Teleutias in the command-in-chief, led the greater part of the fleet to Rhodes, leaving only twelve triremes under Gorgopas, who, with that small force, so blockaded the Athenian troops, that they suffered and risked more than the Æginetans, whom they were besieging. An exertion of the Athenian government relieved them, by reconveying them to Attica: But, immediately as the Æginetans were thus set at liberty, depredation was renewed on the Attic shores, with increased sedulity and vigor. A squadron of thirteen triremes was therefore appointed, under the command of Eunomus, to guard the coast. By a surprize in the night, ably conducted, Gorgopas took four, and compelled the rest to seek shelter in the harbour of Peiræus.

s. 5.

s. 8, 9.

We cannot refuse our admiration to the activity and spirit of enterprize of the Athenian government, which, amid these distresses at home, could direct its attention to the eastern end of the Mediterranean,

Mediterranean, and, while Attica was so pressed, could resolve to send succours to a distant ally, a meritorious ally indeed, Evagoras, tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus. We find, among antient and modern writers (tho the cotemporary historian is not in the number) lofty eulogy on the mutual friendship, the magnanimous friendship, of the Athenian people and Evagoras; uninterrupted in various fortune, and in a length of years. Declamation, rather than reason, seems to have been thought fittest to give credit to such mutual sentiments, tho the connection certainly subsisted, between a despot and a multitude. But political connections have commonly their real source in mutual wants; and we are not wholly without information of those which produced, and maintained, the friendship between the Athenian democracy and the tyrant of Salamis<sup>28</sup>. Athens had a population which the scanty produce of its own barren and narrow territory with cultivation committed of late years, almost intirely to slaves, could not feed. Its nearest resource was Eubœa; its greatest the shores of the Euxine. But, in wars so frequent and almost continual among the Greeks, the hazard for heavy trading-ships, of threading

<sup>28</sup> Valuable information no doubt may be gathered from that oration of Isocrates, intitled The Encomium of Evagoras, which is said to have been written for the funeral of the Salaminian prince. It is however not by taking ingenious panegyric in the lump, but by sifting it, by comparing it with information remaining from other, especially cotemporary, writers, by observing its connection with the course of events, and its consistency with known facts, and with the temper of mankind and of the age, that the truly valuable is to be discovered and ascertained.

<sup>Andoc. de  
reditu.  
Ch 22. s. 2.  
of this Hist.</sup> CHAP. threading the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, and then winding their way among the islands of the Ægean, was so great, that supplies from that plentiful country would be precarious, and other resources desirable. From Cyprus the navigation to Athens might be open, when that from the Euxine was precluded ; and a cotemporary orator informs us of one occasion, when Athens, pressed by dearth and apprehension of famine, looked principally to Cyprus for relief. Probably the service to the Athenian people, which procured Evagoras the honor of being admitted to the freedom of the city, consisted in supplying them with corn, in the last years of the Peloponnesian war. Such a benefit would be likely to make impression on the Many ; to win their favor, and ingage their attachment, even to a tyrant; while their leaders, more particularly connected with him, would know how to esteem the connection which inabled them to minister to the wants of the Many, their tools and masters. On the other hand, for Salamis, Athens was a valuable market ; and to Evagoras, pressed by the control of Persia, at the discretion of its satraps, sometimes threatening his safety, always checking his ambition, every alliance, founded on mutual interest, and especially that of a maritime power like Athens, would be highly valuable.

<sup>Athen. Hel.  
L. 5. c. 1.  
§ 10—13.</sup> Induced by such considerations, with perhaps others less indicated by antient writers, the Athenian government resolved that a considerable force should pass to Cyprus, and the advantageous choice was made of Chabrias, one of the first military

military characters of his active age, for the command. But that Attica might be safe while a large part of its force was on distant service, the armament was directed first to the repression of the annoyance suffered from Ægina. Chabrias landed on that island; an action ensued; Gorgopas was killed, and such slaughter was made of his troops and seamen, that, for some time, the Attic coast and navigation, in the cotemporary historian's expression, were unmolested as in peace.

SECT.  
VII.

The Lacedæmonian revenue, notwithstanding the tribute collected, was evidently scanty for the expence of a naval war; a deficiency to which, apparently in a great degree, must be attributed the narrow and desultory exertion by land. After the blow in Ægina, the surviving crews refused to obey the orders of Eteonicus, who succeeded Gorgopas in the command, because he had no pay for them. The resource of the Lacedæmonian government was in the personal character of Teleutias. Not raised to fame by any achievement of extraordinary splendor, Teleutias had the merit of attaching, in a singular degree, the affection and esteem of those who served under him. On his arrival to take the command from Eteonicus, joy pervaded the armament. Assembling the soldiers and seamen, 'I bring no pay with me,' he said, 'but, God willing, and you assisting, I will endeavor that you shall not want. You know that, when I commanded before, my door was always open to any who desired to speak with me, and so it shall be now. When you have plenty, you shall find me well supplied;

Xenoph.  
H. L. 3.  
c. 1. s. 13.

CHAP.

XXV.

‘ plied ; but when you see me bearing cold and  
 ‘ heat and watching, you must expect in these  
 ‘ also to have your share. You have, I know,  
 ‘ deserved the reputation of brave men. It will  
 ‘ be your business now to increase that reputation.  
 ‘ We must labor together, that we may injoy  
 ‘ together ; and what is more gratifying than to  
 ‘ procure our subsistence by our arms, without  
 ‘ flattering any man, Greek or barbarian, for  
 ‘ pay ? Plenty at the enemy’s expence is at the  
 ‘ same time wealth and glory.’ He was answered  
 with a universal shout, ‘ Command, and we will  
 ‘ obey !’

Xen. Hell.  
 l. 5. c. 1.  
 s. 16, 17,  
 & 18.

Teleutias resolved immediately to use this ready zeal. He ordered all aboard in the evening, with one day’s provision ; and crossing the gulph, to within a mile of the harbour of Peiraean, waited for daybreak. With his small squadron, only twelve triremes, he then pushed into the port. A force more than sufficient to overwhelm him was there, but not a ship in a state for action. The surprize was as complete as he had foreseen or could wish. Such triremes as fell readily within his reach he rendered unserviceable ; many laden merchant-ships he towed away ; and some of his crews, leaping ashore, surrounded some seafaring and mercantile men, and forced them aboard, prisoners. Alarm spred rapidly among the inhabitants : those within doors ran out to inquire what the disturbance was ; those without, as where defence (not the business meerly of a garrison) was the near interest of all, hastened in for their arms ; while some ran to the city to communicate the

the intelligence; and shortly all Athens, horse and foot came down, in the apprehension that the port was already in the enemy's possession.

Meanwhile Teleutias, sending away his prizes, under convoy of four triremes for Ægina, with the rest of his squadron coasted Attica southward. Numerous fishing vessels, with some passage-boats, from the islands, concluding that a squadron from Peiræus must be Athenian, fell into his hands, without attempting flight. At Sunium he captured several trading ships, some laden with corn, some with other merchandize. Directing then his course to Ægina, and there selling his prizes, he gave his crews a month's pay in advance, and quickly his complements, which he had found deficient, were filled with volunteers; and he had a squadron as zealous in the service and orderly as it had lately been backward and mutinous.

But when a naval force, without which their own territory must always be insecure, could not be maintained and brought into action without the singular ability and popularity, and perhaps too the good fortune, of a Teleutias; when, after great victories by land, they had scarcely advanced a step against their enemies, even in Europe; and, in Asia and the islands, the extensive command which devolved to them by the extinction of the empire of Athens, was nearly passed away; the Lacedæmonians were aware that their resources were unequal to break a league of half Greece against them, assisted with money from Persia: they found that a war to pull down the once widely dreaded power of Athens, and a war to

SECT.  
VII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 1. 2. 20.

CHAP.  
XXV.

maintain their own power, now become little less invidious, were very differently considered by those whose support was necessary to them ; and that, after recalling their able and successful commander from Asia, not only their authority among the Grecian states of their alliance, but even the safety of their own territory, was precarious.

*Under this pressure, looking around for means of relief, there were circumstances affording hope that negotiation with Persia might be attempted with advantage, and the resolution was taken to make the trial. Teribazus, who had shown a disposition so friendly to them, was returned to the chief command in Asia Minor; and the hostile Pharnabazus, honored with the gift of the king's daughter in marriage, was gone from his satrapy to the capital. At the same time, in consequence of successful negotiation at Syracuse and among the Italian states, a powerful reinforcement to the fleet was expected; which might enable Lacedæmon to treat upon more equal terms, than if excluded from the seas, and sinking under her enemies arms. Antalcidas, who had successfully conducted the former negotiation with Teribazus,*

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. i. s. 25.

s. 6 & 22.  
B.C. 388.  
Ol. 87 2.

*was the person who stood forward for the management of the business, or whom the administration, and apparently the public voice, called for. Beside his interest in Lacedæmon, which appears to have been powerful, not only the favor he had acquired with Teribazus, but his connection of hospitality with Ariobarzanes, who governed the Hellespontine satrapy in the absence of Pharnabazus, strongly recommended him; and he was appointed,*

appointed, at the same time, commander-in-chief in Asia, and ambassador to the Persian government.

SECT.  
VII.

Arriving at Ephesus in autumn, Antalcidas sent the fleet, consisting of twenty-five triremes, under his vice-admiral Nicolochus, to oppose Iphicrates in the Hellespont. He went himself immediately to wait upon Teribazus, whom he found not only disposed, to Lacedæmon and to himself, in the same friendly manner as before, but furnished with authority from his court to ingage in even offensive alliance, for the purpose of compelling the confederated republics to accede to terms of peace, which had been settled in the Persian cabinet<sup>29</sup>. Returning then to Ephesus, the satrap accompanied him<sup>30</sup>. There intelligence came to them that Iphicrates, having collected all the scattered naval force of the Athenians in the neighborhood of the Hellespont, to the number of thirty-two triremes, blockaded Nicolochus in the harbour of Abydas; and it was to be feared that the squadron, daily expected from Syracuse and Italy to assist the Lacedæmonians, would be intercepted. Upon this Antalcidas hastened by land

<sup>29</sup> - - - - ξυμμαχοῦ βασιλία, εἰ μὴ εἴθεσται Αθηναῖος καὶ διξύμμαχοι χρῆσθαι τὴν εἰρήνην αὐτος ἔλιγον. Upon a comparison of this passage with that where Teribazus was last before mentioned, the meaning of the historian appears I think clearly that given in the text: but the incomplete connection and deficient explanation in many parts of the Grecian annals, show that the work never had the author's finishing hand.

<sup>30</sup> Ο δὲ Ανταλκίδας κατέβη μὲν μᾶλα Τηρίβαζον. The historian has omitted to mention whether Antalcidas went to wait upon Teribazus. The Latin translator seems to have understood it to be in Upper Asia; but I rather think the word κατέβη means no more than that Teribazus came down to the coast with Antalcidas, probably from Sardis.

B.C. 388  
Ol. 98. 1.  
Xen. Hell.  
1.5. c. 1.  
s. 6 & 22.

s. 7 & 22.

**CHAP.****XXV.**

land to Abydus. By a stratagem he took eight triremes, coming from the Thracian coast to reinforce Iphicrates. He was soon after joined by twenty from Sicily and Italy. Collecting then the naval force of all the Ionian towns, over which the influence of Teribazus extended, and, through the friendship of Ariobarzanes, receiving some even from the Æolian, which would rather have gone to reinforce the enemy, had Pharnabazus remained in the satrapy, he was at the head of a fleet of above eighty triremes. The Athenians were utterly unable to contend with this force: the Lacedæmonians commanded the seas; and the Athenian authority, trade, and revenue, in the Hellespontine countries, ceased.

Antalcidas, possessing means thus for conquest, persevered nevertheless in his purpose of making peace; and the temper of the principal belligerent republics, which had felt severely the pressure of war, at this time favored his purpose. The Athenians, seeing the command of the sea decidedly gone from them, and the king, from theirs, become the enemy's ally, fearing a second siege of Athens itself, and in the meantime unable to protect their territory against the ravage even of Æginetan privateers, were earnest for peace. Even the Lacedæmonians, employed, in some towns, in guarding against the danger of foreign assault, in others in the more irksome service of obviating sedition and preventing revolt; a whole mora in Lechæum and another in Orchomenus, while Corinth was a constant and most harassing object of contest; tired of continual calls to these

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
e. 1. s. 26.

and

and similar duties, were little allured by the prospect of conquest beyond the Ægean. Still more the Argians, distressed by repeated ravage of their rich territory, more exposed than any others of the confederacy to a repetition of the evil, and without a fleet to revenge, or transmarine possessions whence to supply themselves, had more than others occasion for peace. The Boeotians only remained, less solicitous to put an end to a war, from which latterly they had less suffered, but which they could not support alone.

The proposal however for peace was not made in a manner the most creditable to Lacedæmon, or likely to be very gratifying to the Greek nation.

It came from Teribazus, in the form of a requisition, for a congress of ministers from all the belligerent republics, which might be disposed to accede to terms of peace, to be offered by the king. Nevertheless all sent their ministers. The congress being opened, Teribazus produced a rescript from the king, showed the royal signet, and then read thus : ‘ Artaxerxes the king holds it just, That all cities on the continent of Asia belong to his dominion, together with the islands of Clazomenæ and Cyprus ; and that all other Grecian cities, little and great, be independent, except that the islands of Lemnus, Imbrus, and Scirus, remain, as of old, under the dominion of Athens. If any refuse these terms, against such I will join in war with those who accept them, and

Xenoph.  
Hell. l. 5.  
c. 1. s. 27.

B.C. 386.<sup>31</sup>  
Ol. 93. 2.  
Spring.

Xenoph.  
Hell. l. 5.  
c. 1. s. 28.

<sup>31</sup> Polybius (l. 1. p. 7.) and Strabo (l. 6. p. 287.) say, that the peace of Antalcidas was made in the 19th year after the battle of Aigospotami; and this has been the canon to which Dodwell has accommodated his dates.

**CHAP.** ‘ and give my assistance, by land and by sea, with  
**XXV.** ‘ ships and with money<sup>32</sup>.’

However strange this dictatorial address, from a Persian governor to the Greek nation, may appear to those whose ideas of the Grecian spirit of independency have been drawn from declaimers under the Roman empire, yet, from cotemporary writers, it does not seem that the general mind was greatly shocked by it. Evidently however the Greeks had no reason to fear, and did not fear, the Persian military power. Persia was incomparably weaker than in the reign of Xerxes, and Greece united would have been stronger. Perhaps indeed there never existed, at any period, a nation so superior in military force to the rest of the world, as that assemblage of little military commonwealths at this time was, could they have been firmly united. But, tho incapable of steddy union, they had felt severely the inconveniences of discord, and of that unfailing source of discord, the separate independency of every city. Nothing but the fear of greater, and indeed of the greatest evils, could have produced the submissive attachment of the smaller republics to Athens or Lacedæmon; while even those commanding cities found perpetual uneasiness, from an authority which they could neither quietly hold nor safely abdicate. When the military power of Persia then ceased to be feared; when, on the contrary,

the

<sup>32</sup> The change from the third to the first person here copied from the Greek, has probably been preserved from the Persian.

Clazomenæ was separated by so very narrow a strait, that it was generally considered as a city of the Ionic main: it has been specified here apparently to obviate cavilling.

the Grecian military were sought by the Persian satraps, and employment in the Persian service became familiar to Grecian troops; when friendly intercourse and the pledge of hospitality became common between Greeks of rank and the Persian great; but especially after the high favor with which Cyrus had distinguished the Greeks, and when the event of his expedition had so clearly shown, that the Persian king was to be feared only on account of his wealth, which inabled Greeks to subdue Greeks, but no longer inabled Persia, without Grecian assistance, to be formidable to Greece, the Persian king might be considered as no unnatural mediator in the destructive quarrels of the Greeks among themselves. Accustomed to the authority of men nearer their own level, officers of the Lacedæmonian or Athenian governments, they little felt the indignity of submission to the mandate of the great potentate of Asia.

Thus prepared then, all the belligerent republics, upon being applied to by their respective ministers at the congress, immediately acceded to the terms proposed. Even the Thebans did not, as far as appears, profess to make any difficulty. Their great object was, not the freedom of Greece, but the establishment of their own power over all the Bœotian towns. They required, therefore, that the oath of the Theban ministers should be taken as the complete representatives of Bœotia. A remarkable controversy insued. Agesilaus, says the historian his friend, declared he would not accept their oath, unless made in exact conformity

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 1. s. 29.

**C H A P.** conformity to the king's rescript, which required  
**XXV.** the independency of every Grecian city, little and great. The Theban ministers said 'that no such ' requisition had been received at Thebes.' ' Go ' then,' said Agesilaus, 'and ask. But at the ' same time tell your employers that, unless they ' comply, Thebes will be excluded from the ' benefit of the peace.' The ministers went accordingly: but Agesilaus, in his animosity against the Thebans, would immediately employ coercive measures, and his influence decided the ephors. Orders were issued for the army to assemble, Lacedæmonians and allies, at Tegea; and the king himself, after a propitious border-passing sacrifice, hastened thither. Before he was ready to march, however, the Theban ministers returned, with a declaration of the acquiescence of their commonwealth; and accordingly Thebes was admitted to the general terms of peace, and the Bœotian towns were restored to independency.

s. 51.

The Corinthians and Argians, after having separately sworn to the peace<sup>33</sup>, were still for preserving the union of the two republics; but this could not be done, so powerful still was the adverse party in Corinth, without keeping a body of Argian troops there. Agesilaus threatened immediate hostility, against both Corinth and Argos, if these were not withdrawn. A reluctant obedience was paid to his requisition thus enforced. Upon the departure of the Argians, all those Corinthians,

<sup>33</sup> This is not directly said, but seems clearly enough implied in the concise expression of Xenophon.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 1. s. 30.

Corinthians, who, since the Argian connection, had been living in banishment, returned to their country; those who had been most active in promoting that connection, together with the more notorious of those who had been concerned in the massacre which preceded it, aware that Corinth was no longer a place of safety for them, emigrated; and Corinth and Argos became as formerly, distinct republics. Thus peace was established throughout Greece; armies were dismissed, fleets laid up; and friendly and commercial intercourse became open, among all the republics of the nation; at least as far as the political circumstances of the country would allow, numerous citizens of every republic, being in exile, and faction yet remaining within all.

Agesilaus, it is evident, approved the treaty of Antalcidas; and, in one of the most studied of the political tracts of Isocrates, in which he has most urgently contended for the general freedom of Greece, we find it not only approved, as a proper measure at the time, but recommended as a model for following occasions. ‘Nothing,’ he says, ‘can be juster, nothing more advantageous for Athens<sup>34</sup>.’ On another occasion indeed, when stimulation against Lacedæmon was among his objects, he has taken the abandoning of the

*Isocr. de  
Pace,  
p. 172, t. 2.  
ed. Auger.*

*Isocr.  
Panathen.  
p. 496. t. 2.*

Asian

<sup>34</sup> Plutarch, in his life of Agesilaus (p. 1111.) says that Antalcidas was the political enemy of Agesilaus; but the contrary appears sufficiently evident from Xenophon, and, were confirmation wanting, we have it, from Plutarch himself; for, according even to his account, Agesilaus justified the treaty in argument, and supported it by deed; p. 1112. ed. H. Steph. In his life of Artaxerxes he is very futile on the subject of this treaty.

CHAP. Asian Greeks, to subjection under Persia, as  
XXV. ground for vehement invective. And indeed  
*throughout Greece, wherever there was a disposition adverse to Lacedæmon, or the purpose of exciting such,* this appears to have been a favorite topic for reproach; whence perhaps Xenophon, who, in his general history, has given an account of the peace of Antalcidas as if he concurred in sentiment with his patron Agesilaus about it, in his panegyric of Agesilaus has wholly avoided the subject. That concession was indeed a surrender of the proudest and fairest claim of glory that Lacedæmon perhaps ever acquired. Yet it seems not justly to be imputed as a peculiar crime or dishonor to Antalcidas. A similar, or rather a more disgraceful dereliction of the cause of the Asian Greeks, occurred on the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war. They had been found under the protection (so half Greece would have termed it, but at worst under the dominion) of a Grecian people; they were left to the mercy of barbarians, in subjection to the Persian empire. But, on the present occasion, the Lacedæmonians had to alledge, that not they, but their enemies, had betrayed the common cause of the nation, by producing the necessity for recalling Agesilaus from his glorious exertions, which had rescued the Asian Greeks from foreign dominion, and given them independency<sup>15</sup>.

A deep

<sup>15</sup> One cannot but smile at the grave assertion of Diodorus, that the abandoning of the Asian Greeks was what hurt the Athenians and Thebans on this occassion. Diod. l. 14, c. 111. The Asian, like the European, Greeks were divided between the aristocratical party and the democratical. Perhaps both would

A deep policy has, by some writers, without any apparent foundation, been attributed to the *Persian court in this transaction*. Considering the interest of Lacedæmon as distinct from the common interest of Greece, Antalcidas certainly served his country very ably. Simple and concise as the terms of the peace are, not only they appear directly calculated to promote the interest of Lacedæmon, but (except as far as dominion in Asia may have been an object of ambition) they answered the principal purposes of Lacedæmon completely. To break the growing power of Thebes, by emancipating the Boeotian towns, and to divide Corinth from Argos, had been the great objects of the war, and were the immediate effects of the peace; for the more ready and quiet production of which Athens was bribed with permission, contrary to the general spirit of the treaty, to retain the dominion of its three islands. Accordingly it is observed by Xenophon, that the Lacedæmonians established their credit and influence in Greece much more completely, and put their commonwealth altogether in a much more splendid situation, by the peace which had its name from Antalcidas, than by that which had concluded the Peloponnesian war; and it is remarkable that he attributes the advantage to their having presided in the business (modern language will scarcely render his expression more exactly) under a commission

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1. 5.  
c. 1. s. 53.

would do as well under Persian as Lacedæmonian supremacy. The aristocratical would have been sure to suffer under Theban or Athenian.

CHAP. a commission from the Persian king<sup>36</sup>. So much'

XXV. however, if we may trust Plutarch for the anec-

Plut. Agesil. t. 2. p. 1112. dote, was Agesilaus persuaded that the interest

of Lacedæmon was well considered in the treaty,

that, when somebody, reviling the peace of Antalcidas, said that Lacedæmon was gone over

to the Persian interest; ‘ Rather,’ he answered,

‘ Persia to the Lacedæmonian;’ and so, in truth,

it seems to have been.

<sup>36</sup> - - - - - οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολὺ ἐπικυρέσθησαν τὸ γένος τῆς  
ἰπὲ Αιταλίδεω εἰρήνης καλουμένης· προσάται γὰρ γενόμενοι τῆς ὑπὲ<sup>β</sup>  
βασιλίως καταπιμφθείσης εἰρήνης, κ. τ. s.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

Affairs of GREECE, from the PEACE of ANTALCI-DAS till the Depression of the LACEDÆMONIAN POWER, and the Elevation of THEBES to Supremacy among the GRECIAN REPUBLICS. by the Battle of LEUCTRA.

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## SECTION I.

*Despotism of Lacedæmon: Punishment of Mantinea: Restoration of Phliasian Exiles.*

THE real disgrace of the peace of Antalcidas, and apparently too the clamor against it, arose principally from the insuing conduct of the Lacedæmonians. Trouble and misfortune had not yet taught them moderation. No thought was entertained of attaching the Greek nation by a just and generous conduct; by any fair communication of rights and privileges; by any establishment, pervading all the republics, that might insure justice to the subordinate against the imperial state, or to the subjects of each against their respective administrations. A maxim of Agesilaus is mentioned by Xenophon, that Lacedæmon always would be powerful enough if the Greeks were prudent; that is, if they duly regarded their own interest<sup>1</sup>. Perhaps the maxims might

SECT.  
L

<sup>1</sup> - - - ισχυρὰς δὲ τέτι, ὅταν ὁ "Ελλῆνες συφρονῶσιν. Xen. Agesil. c. 7. s. 3.

**C H A P.** be inverted: Greece might have been powerful  
**XXVI.** had Lacedæmon been prudent. But the very

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 1.

B.C. 386.  
Ol. 98. 3.

first measure of its government, remarkable enough to claim the notice of history, was even impudently arbitrary. Having inforced the acceptance of peace, among all the republics of the nation, according to their own construction of the king of Persia's rescript, they proceeded to take into consideration the state of their confederacy. Some of those called their allies had been held to their engagements by fear only: it was well known that their wishes were rather for the success of the enemy. These, after deliberation on the subject, it was resolved to punish, and, by strong measures of coërcion, to prevent future defection.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 2.

Diodorus.  
I. 15. c. 5.

They began then with showing, in the instance of Mantinea, that it might sometimes be safer to be the enemy than the ally of Lacedæmon. It was imputed to the Mantineians, that, during the war, they had sent supplies of corn to the Argians; that, on pretence of a truce, they had sometimes omitted to send their proportion of troops to the army; that their troops, when with the army, served ill; that, in short, it was well known the Mantineians always repined at the success, and rejoiced in the misfortunes of the Lacedæmonian arms. On all these accounts it was required that the Mantineians should themselves destroy the fortifications of their city; and declaration was formally made to them, that nothing less would be accepted, in proof that the various acts of treason, in the war, were not acts of the commonwealth; with admonition added, that, in the current

current year, the Thirty years truce, between Mantinea and Lacedæmon, would expire. The value of this admonition we can only gather from what we find scattered, among the early Greek writers, concerning Grecian ideas of natural justice ; by which we learn that the condition of the Ecspundi, those to whom we are bound by no express compact, if they were the weaker party, was indeed terrible.

SECT.  
I.Ch. 15. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

The Mantineians refusing obedience to the despotic injunction, war was immediately denounced against them. But Agesilaus, tho' unable apparently to prevent the measure, was so little satisfied with, it, that on pretence of his personal obligation to the Mantineians, for services done to the king his father, Archidamus, in the Messenian rebellion, he requested of the general assembly<sup>2</sup> to excuse him from the command. Those services to the king must have been equally services to the commonwealth ; but, while the excuse was admitted, the resolution against Mantinea was prosecuted. Agesipolis also was not without cause of forbearance toward Mantinea, for services to his father, Pausanias ; who was still living there, and indebted particularly to the chiefs of the democratical party, which now governed the city, for his best comforts in banishment. It was probably some confidence in their interest with the reigning kings of Lacedæmon, that impelled the Mantineians to resist the mandates of those whom Thebes and Argos had

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 2. s. 3.

not

<sup>2</sup> Ἐδεήθη τῆς πόλεως.

**CHAP.** not dared to resist. Agesipolis, however, obeyed  
**XXVI.** the decree, which directed him to take the command of the expedition against them.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 4.

The usual ravage of Grecian armies was spread over the Mantineian territory, without producing the obedience required. Agesipolis therefore proceeded to encompass the town with a contravallation. The work was already far advanced, when he was informed that the town was so provided, through the uncommon abundance of the preceding harvest, that there could be no hope of quickly reducing it by famine. Fearing therefore the various inconveniences, both to Lacedæmon and the allies, of a protracted blockade, he recurred to a mode of siege, for which the peculiar circumstances of the place offered opportunity. A very plentiful stream, the Ophis, flowed through it. Stopping the current below, he flooded the town; and the foundations, not of the houses only, but of the fortifications also, formed of unburnt bricks, were shortly sapped. Every effort of the Mantineians was ineffectual to check the threatened ruin. They proposed to capitulate, but the offer to demolish their already tottering fortifications was not now accepted. It was required that the city should be abandoned, and that the people should separate to their several boroughs, whence their forefathers had assembled, to make Mantinea the common capital of their little territory. The expected horrors of a storm, or of the lot, so dreadful among the Greeks, of prisoners at discretion, enforced the acceptance of this severe condition.

Xen. ibid.  
& Pausan.  
I. 8. c. 8.

Ch. 4. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

The chiefs of the democratical party, and especially those whose disposition to the Argian connection was most notorious, dreading the sanguinary animosity of their fellowcitizens of the opposite party, still more than the vengeance of the Lacedæmonians, were apprehensive that the sanctity of the capitulation, inforced only by sacrifice and oath, would be but a weak protection for them; and the historian has evidently thought their fear not unfounded. The influence, however, of the banished king, Pausanias, was so exerted with his son, that the desired tho wretched resource of exile was secured to them. In taking possession of the town, the Lacedæmonian troops lined the street leading to the gate, while sixty of the most obnoxious passed out: ‘and tho,’ says the historian, ‘they had spears in their hands and enmity enough in their hearts, yet they were restrained from offering injury, much more easily than the best of the Mantineians:’ meaning the nobility, or oligarchal leaders: ‘a great instance of subordination,’ he continues, ‘and which ought not to pass unnoticed.’ When Xenophon could speak so, it is evident that the Greeks were as incapable of coâlescing in a just and well-regulated free government, as the French at the time of their revolution.

Not the fortifications only, but the houses of Mantinea were then demolished. The removal was at first very grievous to the people, as most were under the necessity of building new habitations. Those, however, who had any landed property, soon became satisfied with the change: finding,

SECT.  
I.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 6.

CHAP.

XXVI.

as Xenophon observes, convenience in living near their estates, and being delivered, by the establishment of aristocracy, from the vexation of demagogues. The Mantineian commonwealth became thus, under the name of alliance, completely a province to Lacedæmon. The men of property, depending upon Lacedæmonian protection, both for their authority and for the best security to their possessions, were of course attached to the Lacedæmonian cause; while the lower people, the power of intriguing orators to direct their passions in one overbearing current, being checked by their separation, and their minds being in consequence less occupied by politics, obeyed more readily and cheerfully the requisitions of the Lacedæmonian officers, whenever their military service was required.

Xen. Hell.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 8. 9, 10.

The affairs of Mantinea being so settled, those of Phlius were taken into consideration. A petition had been presented, from the exiles of that little republic, who seem to have had a fair claim to attention and protection from the Lacedæmonian government. A representation was accordingly sent to Phlius, stating, that the exiles were not only friends of Lacedæmon, but guiltless toward their own commonwealth; and it was therefore hoped that coërcive measures would be needless, to procure their restoration. Those who ruled Phlius were strongly disposed to resist; but the numerous friends of the exiles, together with some men (such, says Xenophon, as are found in most cities) ready for any change, deterred them. It was therefore decreed, ‘ That the exiles should  
‘ be

' be re-admitted ; that their property should be SECT.  
 ' restored to them ; that those who had bought I.  
 ' any part of it, from the public, should be B.C. 385.  
Ol. 98. 3.  
 ' reimbursed by the public ; that any dispute  
 ' arising, about anything claimed, should be  
 ' decided by due course of law.'

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## SECTION II.

*Uncommon Tranquility in Greece. New Political Phenomenon in Greece : Inconvenience of the Grecian Political System : Growing Power of Olynthus : War resolved against Olynthus by the Congress of the Lacedæmonian Confederacy.*

AFTER the dispersion of the Mantineians, and the SECT.  
 composure of the affairs of Phlius, there followed II.  
 an uncommon suspension of crimes and calamities B.C. 382<sup>3</sup>.  
Ol. 99. 2.  
 in Greece ; insomuch that, during more than two Spring.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 11.  
 years, nothing occurred for the historian's notice. This quiet was at length interrupted by the arrival of ministers, at Lacedæmon, from the Grecian towns of Acanthus and Apollonia in Thrace ; whose business the ephors deemed so important, as to require that a congress of the confederacy should be summoned.

The circumstances were indeed new in Grecian politics. That territory on the Thracian coast which acquired the name of the Chalcidic, had been settled in very early times, as we have formerly seen, by colonies from Greece ; invited perhaps

<sup>3</sup> This is Dodwell's date. But he seems to have crowded too many transactions into the latter part of this year B.C. 382. Apparently the embassy from Thrace must have taken place very early in 382, if not rather before the close of 383.

**CHAP.** perhaps not more by the fertility of the soil and  
**XXVI.** the ease with which they could possess themselves  
 of it, than by the extent of maritime situation,  
 which its three peninsulas afforded within a narrow  
 compass, whence they could readily support each  
 other by sea, and were less open to assault from  
 any overbearing power by land.

Of the numerous commercial towns, which arose in this region, each, in the Grecian manner, a separate republic, Olynthus was the most considerable. By what fortunate circumstances led, or by what superior politicians guided, we are uninformed, the Olynthians had adopted the unusual policy of associating the citizens of some small neighboring towns in all their civil and political rights. The advantage of this wise and liberal system being soon experienced by all parties, some of the larger towns were led to the same association. With strength and credit, ambition grew in Olynthus ; and it was proposed to draw the Macedonian cities from allegiance to their king Amyntas. In the weakness and instability of the Macedonian government, worn by a long series of civil broils, and now pressed in war by the Illyrians, some of the nearer were quickly gained ; example induced others, more distant, to accede ; and, when the Acanthians set out on their mission, Pella, the largest town of Macedonia, had joined the growing commonwealth, and Amyntas was nearly expelled from his kingdom.

In the whole course of Grecian history, with exception for the apparent good principle of the governments of the heroic ages, nothing in politics had

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 2. s. 11.  
Diodorus,  
l. 14. c. 93.

had occurred so worthy of imitation throughout SECT  
I. Greece, as the Olynthian system. What precisely was the form of the Olynthian government, we have no information. From circumstances however we gather that it was a mixed republic; constituted on a more liberal plan, and better balanced, than any other noticed by antient writers. Throughout the Grecian states, an excessive jealousy, prevailing for centuries, had produced a strange alienation of Greeks from Greeks. In Homer's age, intermarriage was common, from one end of the country to the other. But the narrow distrustful spirit, equally of oligarchy and democracy, which had supersceded the tempered monarchies of elder times, had by degrees insulated almost every township; insomuch that each was a distinct little nation, separated from all others by legal interdictions, not common among great nations, even of different race and different language. Intermarriage was forbidden, and none were allowed to possess lands within the territory of another state. Thus, excepting some communion in religious rites, the same formalities of hospitality, which might bind a Greek with a barbarian, almost alone could connect him with Greeks of the next town or village.

Xenoph.  
Hel. ut ant.  
p. 301.

But such is the force of habit and prejudice, that, among the Greeks, there was a prevailing partiality for this sullen, unsocial, illiberal, unprofitable independency; originating from the low passions of jealousy and fear, yet rendered in some degree perhaps necessary, by the moral impossibility

CHAP. impossibility of uniting, in an unmixed constitution, strength of government with security for freedom. The liberal and beneficial policy of the Olynthians, associating numerous townships into one republic, and allowing intermarriage and intermixed possessions, was mentioned by the Acanthians, and considered by the Lacedæmonians, as a portentous innovation<sup>4</sup>. Unfortunately the Lacedæmonians, by those very institutions which had made them great, were denied the advantage of the liberal policy of Olynthus. They must give up what had most contributed to make their state the most powerful in Greece, and their name one of the most glorious in the world, or remain for ever distinct from all other people. This, if anything, must be their excuse for the apparent exclusion of every idœa of a liberal and extended policy, in their conduct after the peace of Antalcidas. The professed basis of that peace was the independency of every Grecian state ; yet the separate treaty of alliance between Lacedæmon and every city of its confederacy overthrew that independency ; for the antient compact, that the allies should follow in arms wherever the Lacedæmonians might lead, was required of all. The narrow policy of holding the body of the people in subjection, by supporting everywhere a favored party, source of immoderate tyranny and innumerable crimes, was followed with regard to all. Of the larger commonwealths, Thebes, Argos, and Athens, which were not easily to be so held in subjection, suspicion and jealousy were endless

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 3. s. 5.

\* Πρᾶγμα φυόμενον ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι. Xen. Hel. l. 5. c. 2. s. 12.

endless and little disguised ; and as, with them, in the actual state of things, no connection truly friendly could exist, so none was thought of.

SECT.  
II.

Under these circumstances, the people of those larger commonwealths considered the restored, and increased, preponderancy of Lacedæmon with dissatisfaction and apprehension, from which, of course, it would be their endeavor to relieve themselves. Accordingly, the new power of the Olynthian commonwealth attracting their attention, as its government was in some degree congenial with theirs, the speculation of their politicians was directed to draw it to their party. With this view the Athenians and Bœotians had sent ministers to Olynthus; and, before the Acanthian ministers left Thrace, a decree of the Olynthian people was already passed for sending ministers to Thebes and Athens.

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 5.  
c. 2. v. 12.

Circumstances were thus in train for constituting a confederacy formidable to Lacedæmon. But, prosperity commonly exciting arrogance, the conduct of the Olynthians, in general ably directed, may nevertheless not always have been kept within the bounds of a wise and just moderation. While they were still prosecuting their views in Macedonia, they invited the Apolloniats and Acanthians to join their confederacy ; but they added a threat of war, in case of refusal. It is however possible that, while the known inclination of the body of the Apolloniat and Acanthian people to their cause invited to this measure, the hostile disposition of the oligarchical, which was the ruling party, may have provoked to it ; so that it may have been

C H A P.  
XXVI.

*Xenoph.*  
*Hel. l. 5.*  
*c. 2. s. 12.*

been neither unjust, unwise, or unnecessary, tho'  
it was unfortunate. It drove the men in power,  
in Acanthus and Apollonia, to make that appli-  
cation to Lacedæmon, which has been mentioned;  
foreseeing that, unless they could obtain support,  
such as Lacedæmon alone, among the Grecian  
states likely to befriend them, could give, it would  
be impossible for them to hold their power. Their  
ministers were therefore instructed to show, that  
Lacedæmon was nearly interested in the pre-  
servation of the independency of their cities. ‘It  
‘is a great point with you,’ they said to the  
congress of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, ‘that  
‘the Bœotians should not coälesce into one state.  
‘It cannot therefore be indifferent to you, that a  
‘much more powerful state than Bœotia is  
‘forming. Beside a large force of heavy-armed<sup>5</sup>,  
‘and targeteers yet more numerous, the cavalry  
‘of the Olynthians, should we join them, would  
‘be more than a thousand. They are masters of  
‘Potidæa, which commands Pallenë; so that the  
‘whole

<sup>5</sup> According to our copies, the text of Xenophon states the Olynthian heavy-armed at eight hundred only; and editors and commentators, as far as I have seen, mention no suspicion of error in transcription. It will however be evident to any who will consider the circumstances, that eight hundred cannot have been the number intended by the author. The manner in which he speaks in general terms of the power of the Olynthians, compared with other Grecian people, particularly the Bœotians, (Hel. l. 5. c. 2. s. 12.) might alone prove so much. But we find (s. 17.) that two thousand Lacedæmonians, with the added people of Potidæa, could wage war against them, according to the historian's expression, only as an inferior force against a superior; and afterward (s. 27 & seq.) that the Olynthians could oppose in the field ten thousand Peloponnesians, with perhaps a larger number of their allies. It appears therefore scarcely to be doubted but that for ὀκταχοσίων, should be read ὀκταχισχιλίων.

whole force of that rich and populous peninsula must shortly fall under their power. The independent Thracians of their neighborhood already court them, and, if completely brought under their authority, will add not a little to their strength. They have then but to stretch their hands, and the goldmines of mount Pangæus will be theirs. The fruitfulness of their territory nourishes a great and increasing population; timber abounds in it; their ports are numerous, and their flourishing commerce already furnishes a considerable revenue; so that nothing is wanting for the creation of a powerful marine. It is with this state then that the Athenians and Thebans are going to form alliance. Nevertheless its strength, great as it already is, may yet easily be broken: because some of the towns, unwilling associates, will readily revolt when they see support ready. But when intermarriages and intermixt possessions, allowed by decrees already passed, shall have confirmed the connection between the various parts, and all have not only learned to confide in their united strength, but experienced its advantages, it may then indeed be difficult to dissolve this formidable coalition.'

The Acanthian minister having thus stated the circumstances, the Lacedæmonians paid the compliment to the deputies of the allies, to desire that they would first give their opinions, what, in the existing emergency, the welfare of Peloponnesus and of the confederacy required. A majority, instigated by those who sought favor with the Lacedæmonian

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 2. s. 13.

C H A P.

XXVI.

Xenoph.

Hel. I. 5.

c. 2. s. 14.

Lacedæmonian administration, declared for sending an army into Thrace. Accordingly ten thousand men were voted. It was then proposed and carried, that any state of the confederacy might compound for the personal service of its citizens, at the rate of an Æginetan triobolus (nearly a groat sterling) daily for every heavy-armed foot-soldier, and four times that sum for every trooper; and that if any state of the confederacy refused or neglected to send troops or money, according to its apportionment, it should be lawful for the Lacedæmonians to levy on it a fine, to the amount of a stater (a pound sterling) daily, for every man deficient. We have seen the use of mercenary troops, or, in the modern phrase, standing armies, gradually gaining among the Greeks. This is the first mention we meet with of a regular composition for personal service, so extensively and so formally allowed. But, whether for raising troops or money, a power of coercion, however in itself necessary, committed to the discretion of the Lacedæmonian government, without control, shows a strange deficiency in the political connection of the republics, composing the confederacy over which Lacedæmon presided, and strongly marks how much some better order of things, such as the Olynthians seem to have been endeavoring to establish, was wanted throughout Greece.

s. 15.

These matters however being so decided, the Acanthians declared their opinion, that the force proposed would be equal to the object: but, as the assembling of the contingents of the allies, and

and the levies of mercenaries, required time, it would tend much, they said, to forward the purpose of the confederacy, if a Lacedæmonian general were immediately sent, with such troops as might march with the least delay. The fear of a connection between Athens, Thebes, and Olynthus, seems to have instigated the Lacedæmonian administration, and Eudamidas was ordered immediately to proceed for Thrace, with two thousand Laconians; while his brother, Phœbidas, remained to collect and conduct the troops which were to follow. The arrival of Eudamidas indeed was critical. Tho in the field he could not face the enemy, yet the small force he brought, and the credit of the Lacedæmonian name, enabled him so to support the party adverse to the Olynthian connection, that he preserved several towns, upon the point of acceding to the growing republic; and Potidæa, which immediately opened its gates to him, was a very important acquisition.

SECT.  
II.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 2.  
s. 16.

## SECTION III.

*Sedition of Thebes: Prevalence of the Lacedæmonian Party, and Subjection of Thebes to Lacedæmon. Trial of Ismenias, Polemarch of Thebes. Teleutias Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Defeat and Death of Teleutias.*

WHILE EUDAMIDAS, by his successful activity in the duty imposed upon him by his country, began the ruin of a political project which all Greece should have emulated, Phœbidas, with mistaken zeal, quitting the line of his instructions, gave

SECT.  
III.

B.C. 382.  
Ol. 99. 2.

## C H A P.

XXVI.

Xenoph.

Hel. l. 5.

v. 2. s. 17.

s. 13.

fire to a train of evils, of a length and complicity beyond human foresight then to discover or imagine. In his march northward, he incamped under the walls of Thebes. The Theban military had been, for some time, advancing toward a perfection that might vie with the Lacedæmonian; but the civil government was still as ill constituted as most in Greece. Faction was violent; and the parties so nearly balanced, that Ismenias and Leontiades, contending chiefs, were together in the office of polemarc, the principal magistracy. Ismenias, vehement in aversion to the Lacedæmonians, avoided communication with Phœbidas. On the contrary Leontiades, whose party, long oppressed, emerging only since the peace, and still hopeless of superiority but through connection with Lacedæmon, was assiduously attentive to him. Some advantage was expected, some influence on the minds of the people, from the neighborhood of the Peloponnesian army: but the party of Ismenias still so swayed the general assembly, that a decree was carried, forbidding any Theban to ingage in the expedition against the Olynthians.

In struggles of faction, among the Grecian republics, the precise line of conduct for virtue to hold, and the precise time at which to stop, were often difficult to determine; because, as we have seen among the French republicans of the present day, civil justice was little to be hoped for but through the possession of political power; self-defence was seldom complete till the opposing party was prostrate. So unfortunately situated, the

the Grecian party-leaders may often demand our pity, while they incur our blame. Leontiades was in danger of losing, with his own power, all security of person and property for his adherents; the banishment of many was the least among the evils to be apprehended. Under this pressure, he proposed to Phœbidas to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the Cadmeia, the citadel of Thebes. Thus his party might be in able to overbear their opponents, and Phœbidas might command what proportion of the Theban forces should march with him into Thrace.

Phœbidas was a man of ardent temper and weak understanding. The acquisition of Thebes appeared an object so much greater than that for which, with such solicitude, the Lacedæmonian administration had intrusted him with so great a command, that he was dazzled by the traitorous proposal; and, for the imagined importance of the end, he overlooked the iniquity of the means. Measures being concerted, he broke up his camp, and began his march northward. It was the season of one of the festivals of Ceres, in which, according to antient custom, the Cadmeia was given up to the women, for the celebration of the ceremony called Thesmophoria, and the council sat in the portico of the agora. In the noontide heat, when, in summer, the streets were most unfrequented, having seen that everything favored his purpose, Leontiades urged his horse's speed to overtake Phœbidas, and conducting him, with a select body, directly into the citadel, put the key into his hands. Going then himself to the council,

**C H A P.** ‘The Lacedæmonians,’ he said, ‘were in pos-

XXVI.

‘session of the citadel, but no alarm need be

Xenoph.

Hel. I. 5.

c. 2. s. 21.

‘taken, for they disavowed all intention of hos-  
tility.’ His own office of polemarc, however,  
authorizing him to apprehend all persons suspected  
of treason, he commanded the attending guards  
to take Ismenias into custody.

s. 22. A sufficient number of counsellors of the party  
of Leontiades were present, the guard was picked  
for the purpose, and the surprize was complete.  
Some of the opposite party, fearing immediate  
death, instantly quitted the city: some ventured  
home to prepare for departure. But, when it was  
known that Ismenias was actually imprisoned in  
the Cadmeia, four hundred fled for Athens<sup>6</sup>.

All

\* My valuable guide, Dodwell, with whom I am always sorry to differ, has been induced to dispute Xenophon's accuracy in marking the season of this remarkable event. Θέρους δὲ ὥστε καὶ μισθωφορίας, φλεύην τὴν ἴημιαν οὐ ταῦς ὥδοῖς. This expression, as Dodwell justly observes, marks midsummer; but, he continues, the Thesinophoria, mentioned just before, mark midwinter, or, however, a season not earlier than the beginning of November; and Plutarch, in his life of Pelopidas, bears testimony to the coincidence of the seizure of the Cadmeia with the Thesmophoria. Therefore he concludes, ‘De viaruni in meridie solitudinem, propter æstatem, vel interpretatione aliqua leniendus est, Xenophon *vel plane non credendus*. Fieri potest ut alia aliqua causa viæ fuerint, infrequentes, quam ille de Σίπι, intellexerit.’

Many parts of the Hellenics bear marks of hasty writing, of having wanted the finishing hand of the author; but no deficiency appears in the narrative of this transaction, in which the honor of his friend Agesilaus, and his own quiet and safety, became implicated. Here only he has related it: in his panegyric of that prince, all mention of it has been studiously omitted. For myself therefore I cannot in compliment to Diodorus and Plutarch, or in respect for the possibly mistaken season of the Thesmophoria, suppose that Xenophon has mistated the season of a transaction in which he was so much interested, and which passed almost under his

All power in Thebes thus devolving to the party of Leontiades, a new polemarc was chosen in the room of Ismenias, and then Leontiades hastened to Lacedæmon. He found there the ephors and people indignant at the presumption of Phœbidas, in taking a measure of such importance beyond the line of his commission : but he found a friend to Phœbidas and to his own cause in Agesilaus, whose magnanimity and probity, seen on this occasion, to have been in some degree overborne by his hatred toward the democratical party in Thebes. ‘If the conduct of your ‘general,’ said the king, ‘has been injurious to ‘the commonwealth, let him be punished ; but, ‘if beneficial, it will stand justified by the prin-‘ciples of your constitution, and by all former ‘practice, which warrant, for men in such a com-‘mand, the exercise of a discretionary power.’

The way being thus advantageously prepared <sup>s. 24.</sup> for him, Leontiades addressed the assembled Lacedæmonian people<sup>7</sup>. He touched upon various circumstances, marking the inveterate enmity which the democratical party in Thebes bore toward

his eye. The sequel of the narrative moreover is perfectly consistent with what he has said about the season, and utterly inconsistent with Dodwell’s supposition. For various important transactions passed, after the seizure of the Cadmeia, before Teleutias marched for Thrace : the historian expressly says that Teleutias did not hurry his march ; and yet he arrived time enough to execute many military operations, before, in the historian’s phrase, the summer was over ; the summer, according to Dodwell himself, of the same year in which the Cadmeia was seized.

<sup>7</sup> Τοὺς ἴκκλητους. Consilii publici cœtum. Probably it should be, as we find it in other places, ἴκκλητοι, those who formed the ἴκκλησις.

SECT.  
III.

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 23.

**CHAP.** toward Lacedæmon, and concluded with the alliance  
XXVI lately made with the Olynthians, at the moment when it was known the Lacedæmonians were marching against them. He mentioned the solicitude with which the Lacedæmonians had always observed, and endeavored to thwart, the measures of Thebes for holding Bœotia in subjection; ‘and in regard to this,’ he said, ‘your business is now done for you: Thebes need no longer be an object of your jealousy. Give that attention only to our interest, which we shall give to yours, and a small scytalë will suffice to insure obedience to all your commands.’

Xen. Hell.  
I. 5. c. 2.  
s. 25.

This allurement was too powerful for Lacedæmonian virtue. It was decreed, that the Theban citadel should continue to be held by a Lacedæmonian garrison, and that, not Phœbidas, but Ismenias should be brought to trial. Three judges appointed by Lacedæmon, and one by every other city of the confederacy, formed the partial tribunal. Ismenias was accused of ‘seeking foreign connections; pledging himself, with views injurious to Greece, in hospitality to the Persian king; being a principal author of the late troubles in Greece.’ And to these general charges was added one of a specific nature, ‘that he had partaken of the money sent by the Persian king.’ He refuted all; but being nevertheless unable, says Xenophon, to persuade his judges that he had not entertained great and pernicious designs, he was condemned and executed<sup>8</sup>.

That

<sup>8</sup> Ο δὲ ἀπειλούσι τὸ μὲν πρὸς τάντα οὐ μέντοι ἐπιθετοῦ τὸ μὴ οὐ παγαλωπράγυμα τε καὶ κακοπράγυμα εἶναι. Purgabat ille quidem se de his omnibus, verum persuadere non poterat ut non res arduas

That Xenophon, as an honest man, altogether disapproved these proceedings, is evident. In his panegyric of Agesilaus, he has avoided all mention of them. In his Grecian Annals, while he has clearly felt for the honor of his friend and patron, the impartiality of his concise narrative is highly creditable to himself. Yet if we compare this revolution with others, innumerable among the Grecian republics, we shall find in it the merit at least of being remarkably bloodless. Its disgrace was, that it gave Lacedæmon influence, amounting to dominion, over Thebes, tho scarcely dominion so absolute as the Theban people had before exercised over the other Boeotians, or as France, early in its revolutionary course, exercised over the Dutch; who, with a French general commanding a French army in Amsterdam, amuse themselves with the names of republic and liberty. Even in the trial of Ismenias there seems to have been more attention to preserve the appearance of a regard for justice, and a respect for the Grecian people, than was always observed upon similar occasions. It is our familiarity with

the

arduas et perniciosas tentasse existimaretur. The Latin *purgabat* is perhaps stronger than the phrase in the original, standing singly, would justify; but the context seems to warrant it.

Plutarch says (vit. Pelopid.) that not contented with this formal murder of Ismenias, the Lacedæmonians ridded themselves of another chief of the same party by assassination. Plutarch is seldom anxious for consistency, and it seems not likely that the same administration should, at the same time, have proceeded against one chief with so much formality, and against the other with so little, when apparently they might equally have chosen their method against either. But Xenophon's account, which appears candid throughout, virtually contradicts the fact, and Grecian history is but too full of crimes related on less questionable authority.

C H A P.  
XXVI.

the peculiar advantages of the law and the practice of our own country, that makes deficiencies, elsewhere ordinary, appear to us strange irregularities. If we compare the law of treason in England, when most severe, or the whole of the law for the security of person and property, when, under the Plantagenet reigns, our constitution was least defined, with what we learn of the same law in those called the best times of Greece, the difference will appear truly prodigious. It will seem as if, like philosophy and the fine arts in one country, equal law and wholesome polity were of indigenous growth in the other, healthy and vigorous without cultivation, and flourishing among all sorts of weeds, in spite of tempests and adverse seasons.

Thebes then being reduced to a state of complete dependency, nothing seemed wanting to the lasting firmness of the Lacedæmonian supremacy over Greece, but to crush the growing commonwealth of Olynthus; and to this point, now with increased earnestness, the administration directed its attention. It might possibly be in contemplation next, to resume the prosecution of that plan of conquest in Asia, which had been interrupted principally by the measures of the party in Thebes, of which Ismenias had been chief. Xenophon has not expressly said that the conduct of Agesilaus was influenced by such a view; but he mentions, as to his honor, that his enmity to Persia was maintained through life, and that he refused with disdain the philanthropic connection of hospitality, offered him, apparently through a proxy,

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 27.

Ages.

c. 7. s. 7.  
c. 8. s. 3.

proxy, by the Persian king. What were the measures which he directed, what those to which he simply consented, and what, if any, those which he could not prevent, we are not precisely informed; but the tenor of Xenophon's narrative, as well as a variety of the circumstances reported, mark that he had large influence at this time in the Lacedæmonian councils. His brother Teleutias, was appointed to the command-in-chief in Thrace. The slowness and negligence of the allies in obeying the requisition for troops for the Thracian war, tho inforced by a vote of the congress of the confederacy, may have given the Lacedæmonians to apprehend the decay of their authority, and thus may have contributed to instigate the unjust measures taken in the Theban business. Several cities had not yet sent the full number assessed upon them. The popular name of Teleutias assisted the exertions of the ephors, whose scytalës were sent around; and the new Theban administration, zealous in showing their respect to the brother of Agesilaus, were diligent in preparing their apportionment, horse and foot.

The precaution of Teleutias indicates the strength of the Olynthian commonwealth. Tho the season was far advanced, he would not hasten his march; less anxious to arrive early than with an army the most powerful that could be collected. Meanwhile he sent to Amyntas king of Macedonia, and Derdas prince of Elymia; urging the former, if he would recover his kingdom, to raise mercenary troops and subsidize neighboring princes; and admonishing the latter, that the

S E C T.  
III.

Xen. Ages.  
c. 8. s. 28.  
B. C. 382.  
Ol. 99. 3.  
Autumn.

same

**CHAP.** same growing power, which had nearly overwhemed the greater Macedonian realm, would not long leave the smaller in peace and independency, if measures were not taken to check its ambition. His care and diligence thus seconding his influence, he assembled in Potidæa a very powerful army, which he led directly to Olynthus.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 29.

s. 30.

Without conquest, without a battle noticed in history, the Olynthians, by the wisdom and liberality of their policy, had formed a commonwealth so powerful, that they did not fear to meet in the field the greatest army ever sent by the Peloponnesian confederacy so far from their peninsula, reinfforced by troops, still much more numerous, of the most warlike nations of the continent north of Greece. The only cavalry, which Teleutias appears to have led from the southern provinces, were Laconian and Bœotian. In his order of battle he placed these, together with some received from Amyntas, in the right wing of his army. Derdas brought him a body of only four hundred, but of superior reputation in the northern countries. Teleutias seems to have proposed a compliment to that prince in placing his cavalry alone in the left wing, of which he took himself the immediate command.

s. 31.

A battle quickly insued; and the cavalry of the right wing being first charged by the Olynthians, the Lacedæmonian commander was presently dismounted and severely wounded, numbers killed, and at length the whole body put to flight. The confusion spred among the nearest infantry, and

and there was imminent danger that a complete SECT.  
defeat would have followed, when Derdas, III.  
arriving with his cavalry, encouraged the dismayed  
phalanx to stand. Teleutias at the same time  
making a movement with the Peloponnesian  
infantry to support him, the Olynthians, in  
danger of being surrounded, retired in haste, and Xenoph.  
suffered in their retreat. Their infantry then also Hel. I. 5.  
c. 2. s. 32.  
withdrew within their walls. Teleutias erected  
his trophy, for a victory just sufficing to deter the s. 33.

CHAP.

XXVI.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 3. s. 3.

s. 4.

s. 5 & 7.

s. 5.

s. 6.

ment, or would best forward the effect of a blockade of their towns. While, with these views, he lay incamped near the walls of Olynthus, he observed a body of cavalry, from the town, crossing the river which ran by it, and very leisurely approaching his camp. Indignant at their boldness, he ordered his targeteers to attack them. The horse, turning, very quietly repassed the river : the targeteers followed confidently, as if pursuing a broken enemy. The horse, when so many only had crossed the river as they might readily overpower, turned, charged and routed them, and killed, among many others, Tlemonidas, the general commanding.

Teleutias, with manners so popular, and generally so amiable, was nevertheless of a temper too hasty to preserve, on all occasions, the cool recollection so important in military command. Irritated by what he saw, he seized his spear, put himself at the head of his heavy-armed, and, with some passion, ordered the targeteers and the cavalry to pursue the enemy without remission. The incautious order was zealously obeyed. The Olynthians retiring within their walls, the Peloponnesians did not stop, till, from the towers, they received a shower of missile weapons. In the necessity of warding off these with their shields, as they hastily retreated, confusion arose. The able leaders of the Olynthians used the critical moment. Their horse again rushed out of the gates ; the targeteers and then the heavy-armed followed. The impression was such, that the Peloponnesian phalanx was already

already in disorder when it was attacked. Teleutias himself was killed; those about him then gave way, and presently the whole army fled. Pursued, as they divided, toward Potidæa, Spar-tolus, Acanthus, Apollonia, a large proportion, and almost the whole effective force of so great an army, was destroyed<sup>9</sup>.

SECT.  
III.

## SECTION IV.

*Agesipolis Commander-in-chief against Olynthus. Rebellion in Phlius against Lacedæmon: Agesilaus Commander against Phlius: Delphion demagogue of Phlius: Surrender of Phlius. Death of Agesipolis: Polybiades Commander-in-chief against Olynthus: Reduction of Olynthus.*

It now seemed as if the political phenomenon, arising on the frontiers of Thrace and Macedonia, might, by the terror of arms, have spred political wisdom over the southern provinces of Greece. Had the Lacedæmonian government in the least yielded under the severe blow it had received, had it been without able men to promote energy and direct exertion, the consequence of its unfitness to coälesce with other states might have been a rapid downfall, and perhaps complete ruin. But the necessity for exertion was seen by the administration, and able men were not wanting to direct it. The command-in-chief was committed to the king, Agesipolis; a youth, of little experience, but of great expectation. Thirty Spartans were appointed to attend him, as formerly Agesilaus in Asia. The character of Agesipolis being popular, many volunteers offered.

SECT.  
IV.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 3. s. 8.

We

<sup>9</sup> τι πιεσθίλος ή τοῦ τοιέντα γράπτιματος.

CHAP.

XXVI.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 3. s. 9.

s. 10.

We gather from Xenophon, that, in this age, the few remaining families, distinguished by the name of Spartans, went on foreign service only in the rank of officers. The volunteers, he mentions to have been of three descriptions ; the Laconian towns furnished some, and they were of the best families of those towns ; some were bastards of Spartan families, educated in the best discipline of the city, and these were remarked for their fine figures : the rest were strangers, or men not acknowledged among either Spartans or Laconians, yet distinguished by a name which seems to imply that they were maintained by the public <sup>10</sup>. Volunteers from the allies moreover were numerous, and the Thessalian cavalry, ambitious of being known to the Spartan king, were particularly forward in their zeal. The rank of the new commander-in-chief also, warranting the earnestness of the Lacedæmonian government in the cause, inspirited the exertions of the Macedonian princes. It is not mentioned that any troops were furnished by the cities of the confederacy, to supply the loss in the battle of Olynthus ; but it is implied that most, if not all of them, paid compositions in money ; and that the new levies were entirely of volunteers. Phlius received the thanks of Agesipolis for the largeness and readiness of its contribution.

The

<sup>10</sup> Τῶν ἀριστέων καλοὶ κάγαθοί, καὶ ξένοι τῶν Τερφίμων καλούμενοι, καὶ νέθοι τῶν Σπαρτιατῶν, μάλα εὐεδεῖς τι καὶ τῶν οὐ τῷ σόλοι καλῶν οὐκ ἄπειροι.

In the scarceness of our information concerning the political economy of Lacedæmon, we must glean as we can. I am unable to give any better explanation of this remarkable passage than that ventured in the text.

The apparent zeal however of those who ruled Phlius was found to have a sinister motive. They proposed to earn the connivance of Lacedæmon at gross injustice toward their fellowcitizens. All the anecdotes of Plutarch, who red and speculated when Trajan ruled half a hemisphere, do not paint the internal state of divided and independent Greece, like a few small touches, from the life, by the cotemporary historians. With the view therefore to acquire a just ideâ of it, the affairs of Phlius will deserve that we should interrupt, for a moment, the narrative of the war in Thrace.

The tyranny of that superintending power, which the Greeks had imagined the best resource for holding together a confederacy of republics, too small to subsist each by its own strength, we have seen remarkably exhibited in the affair of Thebes. Phlius affords an instance, not less remarkable, of oppression from a republican government to its own citizens, in defiance of the superintending power. The Phliasian exiles, restored, as we have seen, at the requisition of Lacedæmon, and intitled by a decree of their own general assembly, to recover all their property, in vain sought justice from Phliasian tribunals; for the Phliasian tribunals were composed of persons holding that property, or connected with those who held it. Among the Grecian republics it was not unusual to refer a case of such a kind to the tribunal of some neighboring republic; but the Phliasian government would listen to no proposal for an impartial decision.

SECT.  
IV.

Sect. 1. of  
this Ch p.

This

CHAP.

XXVI.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 11.

B.C. 381.

OI. 99. 4.  
Autumn.

This imprudent iniquity impelled the injured persons to seek redress from Lacedæmon. But there were circumstances which encouraged those who ruled in Phlius to disregard this. It was contrary to all known practice for both kings to be at once absent from Sparta. Agesipolis was now far advanced on his march toward Thrace; and, in the confidence that Agesilaus would not move, and of course no vigorous measures would be taken, the Phliasian chiefs resolved that, to those from whom they differed in party, it was unnecessary to be just. Instead therefore of being disposed to yield to Lacedæmonian interference, they procured a decree, imposing the penalty of a fine on all who, without warrant from the Phliasian government, had made application to Lacedæmon.

We should admire the spirit of this decree, if it was not so immediately connected with gross injustice: we should approve its wisdom, had it been founded upon any practicable plan of liberal policy. But it appears to have been the result only of daring profligacy, illiberal and improvident. The hope even that Lacedæmon would not instantly interfere with vigor, was ill-conceived. The ephors resolved, that the injurious insolence of the Phliasians should be restrained by arms; and Agesilaus undertook the command. Among those who had recurred to Lacedæmon for redress, were two families which had particular claim to his protection; that of the venerable Podanemus, who had been connected in hospitality with the revered king Archidamus, his father, and that of

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 13.

Procles,

Procles, who had the same connection with Agesilaus himself. SECT.  
IV.

No delay was made: the border-passing sacrifice was not likely to be unpropitious; Agesilaus was ready to enter Phliasia, when an embassy met him, deprecating hostilities, and offering money. He answered 'that he was not coming 'to injure any, but only to relieve the injured.' They professed themselves ready to do what ever could be required.' 'Professions,' he told them, 'could find no credit, when deceit had alreddy been practised.' Upon being asked then what pledge he required, he answered, 'the same with which Lacedæmon had formerly been trusted, without injury to Phlius: they must give him possession of their citadel.' This being refused, he prosecuted his march, and without delay surrounded Phlius with a contravallation. Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 3. s. 14.  
B.C. 381.  
Ol. 99. 4.  
Autumn.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 3. s. 15.

All the Lacedæmonians, however, were not satisfied with these measures. It was observed by many, even in the army, that, however those who led Phlius might be tyrannical sovereigns, they had been valuable allies; and, whatever might be the plea of generosity or justice, it was no good policy, for the sake of comparatively a few families, to make Lacedæmon eternally odious to a city, which had five thousand men, able, and, till now, ready, to bear arms in its service. Agesilaus skilfully obviated this growing discontent. The Phliasian refugees were not without friends in the city. Such encouragement was held out for desertion, that, in a short time, those serving in the besieging army were more s. 16.  
s. 17.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

than a thousand, distinguished, among the troops, for being well-armed, able-bodied, exact in subordination, and zealous in service; insomuch that the late murmurs were changed for the observation, that these were such allies as Lacedæmon wanted.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 3. s. 21.

s. 22.

But, in Phlius, a system of order, economy, and forbearance, usual where due military subordination is established, but contrary to all common experience among the turbulence of the Grecian democracies, disappointed the expectation of the besiegers. The blockade had alreddy exceeded the time calculated for the consumption of the provisions in the place. But one of those extraordinary characters, of which Greece was fruitful, and which its political circumstances were peculiarly adapted to bring forward, had at this time the lead among the Phliasians. In the instance of Delphion, says Xenophon, was seen the ascendant which daring courage may obtain over the minds of the multitude. He was a man of high rank in his city, but his dependence was upon about three hundred followers. With these at his devotion, he so awed the whole people, that a clear majority in the general assembly, desirous of capitulating, dared not come to a vote upon it. Under a government called a democracy, he imprisoned at his pleasure, on suspicion, or pretended suspicion, of disaffection to the popular cause. His despotism, however, was not wanton or useless. He alone could inforce a strict military discipline; and, by an unwearied personal activity, he did inforce it. Constantly attending

attending himself, he compelled the citizens to regular attendance in their turn for guard; never failing to go the rounds, he insured watchfulness and fidelity on guard. Nor was he thus daring only toward the multitude, his sovereign; he showed himself worthy of command, by daring against the enemy. In many sallies, at the head of his three hundred, he was successful against the posts of the besiegers. When, notwithstanding the short allowance, which had been established by a vote of the general assembly, famine began to press, his warrant sufficed for searching every house for corn. All resources at length failing, he gave the word, and a herald was sent to Agesilaus, requesting a truce, that ministers might carry to Lacedæmon a decree of the Phliasian people, for surrendering the city to the pleasure of the Lacedæmonian government".

Agesilaus seems to have felt that, by this <sup>s. 24.</sup> message, it was intended to put a slight upon him. He nevertheless immediately granted the truce, and his influence at Lacedæmon sufficed to procure that the Phliasian ministers should be sent back to treat with him, as plenipotentiary for the Lacedæmonian commonwealth. It does not appear that Delphion was a man of great views, or that, from the first, he had any well-founded hope of final success. He seems rather to have been a man fond of action and enterprize, with daring courage and moderate abilities; ready in emergencies, but incapable of extensive conceptions; fitter to command Phlius, and Phlius besieged, than to direct the affairs of a great nation,

SECT.  
IV.

Xenoph.  
Hell. 1. 5.  
c. 3. s. 23.

**C H A P.** or of any but in time of turbulence. For daring  
XXVI. enterprise upon a narrow scale, his talents were extraordinary. After the granting of the truce, the Lacedæmonians strengthened their guards, and kept a stricter watch to prevent egress from the town. Nevertheless, attended by one faithful slave, who had given frequent proof of his courage and address in pilfering the besiegers' arms<sup>11</sup>, Delphion escaped by night.

The conditions which Agesilaus required may seem, in modern times, not mild; but, due regard being had to the manners and circumstances of his age, and to the responsible situation in which he stood, they will be found strongly marked with that spirit of liberality which was generally conspicuous in him. If precedents had been desired, they might have been found, for sending commissioners from Lacedæmon, to decide arbitrarily between the two parties of the Phliasian people; to banish, and even condemn to death at discretion. Agesilaus committed the business to a tribunal composed of a hundred Phliasians; fifty only of those who had been driven into exile, and an equal number friendly to the opposite party, or so far esteemed so that they had remained in the city. After deciding who should suffer death as authors of the late civil war, and who should live to compose the future Phliasian commonwealth, they were to model at their discretion

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 3. s. 25.

<sup>11</sup> Στιγματίας τὶς ἐς πολλὰ ὑφείλησε ὅπλα τῶν πολιορκουμένων. The fact, if related by an author, not a military man, might be doubted; from Xenophon it cannot. The explanation I leave to military men, who have given their attention to the ancient art and practice of war.

discretion the constitution and the laws, by which that commonwealth should be governed. Upon these conditions, in the twentieth month of the blockade, the town was surrendered; and, to enforce order till the new constitution should be settled, a Lacedæmonian garrison was placed in it.

SECT.  
IV.

While Agesilaus was employed in this petty kind of domestic war, within Peloponnesus, Agesipolis had begun to show the vigor and ability expected of him in his foreign command. He wasted the Olynthian territory, he took Toronë by storm; but, in the middle of the summer heats, he was seized with an inflammatory fever, which presently threatened to be fatal. The science of medicine, notwithstanding the deserved fame of Hippocrates, appears not yet to have been generally diffused among the Grecian republics. A little before his illness, Agesipolis had visited the temple of Bacchus, at Aphyteus, famous for the beauty and coolness of its shady bowers and limpid waters. A strong desire seized him to revisit them, in the imagination that they would afford a relief which his medical attendant could not give. He was accordingly conveyed to Aphyteus, but died soon after, without the temple; the superstition, which taught the Greeks to fear the anger of the deity, for permitting the pollution of death within the hallowed building, apparently denying to the suffering prince the repose and shelter which he so much wanted. Neither attention nor expence, however, was spared, after his decease, to honor his memory,

Xen. Hell.  
l. 5. c. 3.  
s. 18—20

HAP. <sup>XVI.</sup> and show respect to his rank. His body, according to the Spartan ceremonial, was preserved in honey, and in that state carried the long and difficult journey to Lacedæmon, there to have the funeral rites performed, which custom had established for the burial of the kings.

Agesipolis seems to have been a real loss to his country. Tho aiming, and with fair prospect of success, to rival Agesilaus in military fame, no jealousy subsisted between them. He treated his elder colleague, on all occasions, with the respect due to superior age and high character. He received in return unfeigned friendship from Agesilaus; whose liberal mind considered him less as a rival, than, in public affairs, a valuable assistant, and in private a desirable companion.

<sup>10ph.</sup>  
<sup>l. 5.</sup>  
<sup>s. 26.</sup>  
<sup>d.</sup>  
<sup>5. c. 23.</sup>

The successor of Agesipolis in the Thracian command, Polybiades, was but too successful in restraining the liberal and beneficent policy of Olynthus within the narrow limits of a single city. In undertaking to withstand the power of Lacedæmon, the Olynthians had depended upon the support of Athens and Bœotia. But the unexpected revolution in Thebes had given the force of Bœotia to their enemies, and deterred the interference of Athens. Possibly, after their great success against Teleutias, their affairs may have been conducted with less prudence than when they were but rising to power. They may have lost some of their ablest leaders; or prosperity, inflating the popular mind, may have given advantage to turbulent demagogues; and interested intrigue or popular caprice may have

overborne wise counsel. Xenophon has left us SECT. IV. no particulars; he has not even named one of their leading men. We hear of no battle fought, no town taken; Polybiades was master of the country; the Olynthians could receive no relief by sea; famine pressed, and they sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon to sue for peace. It was granted B.C. 379.  
G. 100. 1.  
Spring. upon the usual terms of subordinate alliance; that the friends and enemies of Lacedæmon should be respectively such to Olynthus, and that the Olynthians should serve in arms wherever the Lacedæmonians might lead.

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## SECTION V.

*Apparent Confirmation and real Instability of the Lacedæmonian Supremacy in Greece. Conspiracy and Revolution in Thebes.*

THUS Lacedæmon acquired the glory of crushing finally the wisest and noblest project for a republican government, upon a broad foundation, perhaps ever attempted in Greece. Such at least the Olynthian union appears, in the slight sketch, a mere shadow, without a decided outline, which remains to us from Xenophon. Possibly it may have had great defects with which we are not made acquainted; and indeed if a government had ever been seen in Greece, with all the merit which his account, not intended for panegyric, indicates, unbalanced by very gross defects, we should still more wonder at, and still less excuse, the excessive deficiency of the political ideas, transmitted to posterity, in the writings of such men as Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates, and SECT. V.

*CHAP.* Aristotle. *It is indeed remarkable, that the*

XXVI. *celebrated panegyrical oration of Isocrates, in*

Isoc. paneg.  
p. 250. t. 2. *which, while his great object was to persuade the*

*Greeks to peace among themselves, he could propose no means but union in war against Persia, then at peace with them, was spoken or published while the Lacedæmonian arms were employed in the destruction of the Olynthian constitution. Could Lacedæmon have adopted a policy so liberal as, in its general outline, the Olynthian appears to have been, could she have united herself with such a republic, and used her extensive influence to promote the scheme, a state might have been formed, of a firmness to resist all external violence, and capable of dissolution only from that internal corruption, to which the Author of nature has willed that everything human shall be liable. But, as we have alreddy observed, those very institutions, by which Lacedaemon had now florished for centuries, and, for the smallness of her means, was become wonderfully great, those very institutions made it impossible for her to become so great. To coäalesce was beyond her nature : her great lawgiver's system, admirable for its purpose, had no such purpose in view : she could be great, and even safe, only by keeping those around her divided. This was now done. The reviving empire of Athens was broken : Bœotia was split into many states ; Corinth and Argos were separated ; the Olynthian union was dissolved ; the renovation of existence, given to the obscure kingdom of Macedonia, harmonized with the plan of division ; those of the allies*

*who*

who had dared to show an adverse disposition, SECT.  
 had been punished ; and thus, as the cotemporary V.  
 historian has observed, the authority of Lacedæmon, over Greece, seemed more firmly estab- Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 3. s. 27.  
 blished than at any former period.

But the Lacedæmonian authority, over Greece, was not of a nature to be permanent : too weak for command ; too proud for influence. We have seen, in the authentic testimony of Xenophon to what the Cyreian army experienced, the haughty despotism of the Lacedæmonian commanders, at a distance from home. Tho we find such conduct sometimes severely punished, proof that the Lacedæmonian administration was aware of evils likely to arise from it, yet that the restraint was very uncertain, is sufficiently evident. Within Greece the administration was better able to check the indiscreet or interested tyranny of its officers. But it could not equally restrain the chiefs of the Lacedæmonian party in the dependent republics, by whom those republics were held in submission to Lacedæmon. To men so necessary, great indulgence would be indispensable : to support them, without inquiry, or even notoriously against right, might appear sometimes of political necessity. Hence discontent, vehement discontent, was ceaseless, sedition ever working, and revolt ready.

Evident however as it is that the foundation of the Lacedæmonian power was slippery in extreme, still, when we consider the value of the advantage it possessed in the abilities and virtues of Agesilaus, we cannot behold, without astonishment, the minuteness

C H A P.

XXVI.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 4. s. 1.

minuteness of the force, and the trivial character of the circumstances, which began its overthrow, in the very moment, when it appeared most established. Xenophon ascribes all to the just vengeance of the Deity ; honestly declaring the infamy of the conduct of Lacedæmon, tho his friend and patron was implicated, in holding the citadel of Thebes by violence, directly against the most solemn oaths, under the sanction of which, among the articles of confederation, the independency of every Grecian city was warranted. The new government of Thebes was necessarily odious to the great body of the Theban people, and indeed to every honest Theban citizen. But fear, which restrained action, taught also to conceal sentiments ; and thus a government of violence, whether the form of the tyranny be monarchal, oligarchal, or democratical, is always risking to defeat its own purposes.

Among the revolutions of the Theban commonwealth, that part of the constitution seems to have remained unaltered, by which the principal executive power, civil and military together, that power which had formerly been held by hereditary princes, was committed to annual magistrates, intitled polemarcs, chief-warriors. Archias and Philippus held the high office, when Phyllidas, their secretary and confidential minister, was called on some business to Athens. Phyllidas there found a Theban of rank, named Mellon, with whom he had formerly been intimate, living in exile, to which the revolution had driven him. Their past opposition in politics did not prevent Mellon

s. 2.

Mellon and Phyllidas from communicating again as private friends ; and, Mellon's curiosity leading him to inquire about men and things in Thebes, to his surprize he found the secretary highly dissatisfied with the existing government there. More explanation thence taking place, the result was a plot for overthrowing the existing government, and restoring democracy. Phyllidas returning to Thebes, and measures being prepared, Mellon, with only six associates, passed by night from Attica into the Theban territory. Lying concealed during the following day, they approached the city as evening closed, and entered with the last of that crowd of husbandmen, returning from their daily toil, who, in a country politically constituted like the greater part of Greece, dared not inhabit detached cottages or open villages. Proceeding unmolested, they were received in the house of Charon, a party to the plot, where they staid the night, and the following day.

Just preceding the expiration of the annual magistracies was the season, according to antient custom, of a festival of Venus at Thebes. The polemarcs, Archias and Philippus, were men of pleasure. Their secretary, Phyllidas, possibly a warm patriot, was certainly not a man of nice honor or strict honesty. According to report, which Xenophon thought worthy of notice, he was trusted by the polemarcs as a confidential minister to their private pleasures ; and he had undertaken, favored by the licence of the festival, to bring the most beautiful women of the best families of Thebes to their revel. Through his privilege

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 3.  
B.C. 379.  
Ol. 100. 2.  
Nov. or  
Dec.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 4.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.

CHAP.  
XXVI.  
Xen. Hel.  
I. 5. e. 4.  
a. 5. 6.

s. 7.

privilege of unlimited access, when the polemarcs and their company were far gone in intoxication, he introduced the conspirators, three habited as ladies, the others as their female attendants. The dismission of male attendants was procured, on pretence of delicacy toward the ladies. As far, at least, as this story tends to reveal the manners of the age, we may give it credit, as it is told by Xenophon : tho, he says, according to some the conspirators were introduced as ordinary visitors<sup>13</sup>. What we learn with certainty is, that the polemarcs were on that night assassinated.

This important beginning being successfully made, Leontiades, author of the late revolution, was the next object of the conspirators. Phyllidas, in whom Leontiades, as well as the polemarcs, fully confided, conducted them to his house. Pretence of business from the polemarcs gained him immediate admission to 'an inner apartment, whither Leontiades had retired from supper, and where his wife was sitting by him, busied in those works of the distaff or needle, in which the Grecian ladies principally employed themselves. Leontiades was killed upon the spot, and silence was imposed

<sup>13</sup> Concerning a matter in which private history was so much involved with public, and party interest with both, various stories, some true, some false, and some partly true, partly false, were likely to be circulated. Xenophon, who lived at the time, yet long outlived the time, and was in a situation to be better informed than almost any other could be, has related some things with confidence ; others as less certain. Plutarch, who wrote some centuries after, has differed from Xenophon in regard to some particulars, added to him many, declared no authority, except Xenophon's, and expressed no doubt. His purpose was to tell a good story, of which Pelopidas was to be the hero.

imposed upon the lady, with the threat of death to every person in the house, unless, as soon as the assassins went out, the doors were locked, and afterward kept close. SECT.  
V.

The leaders of their opponents being thus dispatched, the conspirators proceeded to the state-prison, where some of their friends were confined. Phyllidas, pretending an order from the polemarcs, obtained admission there also. The keeper was instantly put to death; and the prisoners, being released, were directed where to find arms, and whither to repair with them. Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 8.

The conspirators so confided in the general hatred of the existing government, that, without farther preparation, they caused summons to be proclaimed, for all the citizens, equally the knights, and those inrolled in the heavy-armed, to assemble in arms; adding the information, ‘that the tyrants ‘were no more!’ Diffidence however kept all within during night. Meanwhile messengers were dispatched to the refugees on the Attic borders, and to Athens itself: for it was known that two of the annual generals of Athens were warm in the cause. When day broke, what had passed becoming notorious, the citizens, horse and foot, assembled in arms, and arranged themselves with the conspirators.

The first alarm, which reached the Lacedæmonian governor in the citadel, was from the nightly proclamation. Immediately he sent to Platæa and Thespiae for reinforcement to his scanty garrison. A detachment marched from Platæa; but the Theban horse met and routed it. As the victorious

CHAP.  
XXVI.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 4. s. 11.

s. 12.

victorious cavalry reentered the city, the refugees from the borders, and a body of Athenian auxiliaries, arrived. With this addition of strength, it was resolved, without delay, to assail the citadel. The Lacedæmonians saw the preparation, and heard large reward proclaimed for who should first mount. Thinking then their numbers unequal to resist all Thebes, apparently united and zealous, they proposed to surrender the fortress, upon condition that they might depart in safety, with their arms. To this the Thebans gladly consented, and the capitulation was ratified with libations and oaths. Their march out of the place was watched, with a jealousy justified by preceding circumstances. But when there were seen among them some of those Thebans who had been active in the late government, then the virulence of the Greek sedition broke forth: the victims were dragged from their protection, and none so taken escaped death<sup>14</sup>. But the state of Greece, a kind

<sup>14</sup> Ἐξόπλω μέντοι, σύσους ἐπίγνωσαν τῶν ἐχθρῶν οἴλας συλλαμβάνοντις ἀπίκτειαν. Xenophon has not specified them by any name but that of enemies; but what he mentions afterward of the treatment of their families, were it otherwise dubious, would ascertain that the executed were Thebans, and not Lacedæmonians.

It has been owing apparently to the general irregularity and uncertainty of Grecian criminal law, that the Greek language, so superior to all others in accuracy for most purposes, is so inferior to our own, in words for distinguishing the various degrees of criminality, which may attend the act of putting a man to death. Hence we have sometimes difficulty to gather, from the expressions of historians, what degree of turpitude we should impute to the actions which they relate. *Ἄποκτίσιμον*, the common word for *to kill*, is equally used to express the foulest murder, or putting to death after just trial, in the most legal manner by the hands of the public executioner (as in this chapter of Xenophon, s. 13.) The

kind of hotbed of crimes, gave occasion also for the exercise of virtues. The Athenian auxiliaries, who looked upon the Thebans of the Lacedæmonian interest, not with the rancorous hatred of party opponents, but with the more liberal enmity of forein foes, exerted themselves generously for them ; and by favoring their concealment, saved many. They could not however save some more helpless and innocent objects of the horrid revenge or base fear of the Thebans : the children of those who had been executed were put to death.

Among the revolutions of which Greece was so fruitful, for justness of cause, boldness of undertaking, ability of plot and arrangement, and daring vigor in execution, the delivery of Thebes has been justly celebrated. Perhaps moderation in assassination should be added to its eulogy ; for the execution of those who were at mercy, and the murder of the children, who could have deserved no ill, did not take place till the revolution was completed ; and, we may hope, should be ascribed, not to deliberate design in the leaders, but to the wild fury of popular passion, which they could not restrain. The better-taught judgement, however, of modern times will not, with the philosophic Plutarch, give its unmixed applause to the means employed, and extol the revolution of Thebes as a model, to be justly compared with that effected at Athens, by Thrasybulus,

through

The additions δικαίως, ἀδίκως, βιαιῶς, ἀχείτως, in προσολας, and perhaps others, are sometimes used to mark a distinction, but often omitted. Xenophon's expression on this occasion, συλλαμβάνο τις ἀνίκτυνται, rather, I think, implies that some legal forms were observed ; and yet we have difficulty to reconcile this with the treatment of the sufferers.

CHAP. through open war, unsullied by assassination and perfidy<sup>15</sup>. XXVI. Xenophon, in his Agesilaus, has not ill defined that deception, which may be allowable in politics and war. Agesilaus, he says, held, that

Xen. Ages. ‘ to deceive those who mistrust us is wise ; those  
e. 11. s. 4. ‘ who trust us, wicked<sup>16</sup>.’

<sup>15</sup> He calls the two revolutions of Athens and Thebes, μίμιγας καὶ κάλλιγας τῶν πράξεων. Plut. Pelop. p. 513, 514.

<sup>16</sup> The necessity has frequently occurred, by no means a pleasant necessity, to speak slightly of Plutarch's authority. If any reader, swayed by the merit, altogether, of Plutarch's works, or by the respect in which he has been extensively held, may think I have been extreme in depreciating his judgement or his accuracy as an historian, I should wish that his account of the Theban revolution might be compared with Xenophon's. The life of Pelopidas, as his fellowcountryman, was a favorite subject with Plutarch, and the exploit by which Thebes was delivered from the Lacedæmonian dominion, a very favorite part of it. On this favorite subject, an ill-judging zeal, the zeal of a closet-philosopher, unversed in active life, to make his hero keep the stage with effect, has led him, I must own it appears to me, into strange puerilities. He exhibits Pelopidas babbling publicly, when evidently the most cautious secrecy was requisite. He describes him ingaged in furious combat ; under circumstances tending strongly to confirm Xenophon's account, according to which the business was so much better managed, that nothing more was necessary than to poniard an unarmed man, surprized in the security of domestic privacy. He attributes them to the sage Epameinondas an indiscretion truly wonderful. While, according to his account, the eloquence of Pelopidas incited the exiles, Epameinondas, by an ingenious device, prepared the minds of the citizens, at home, to join in the proposed scheme of revolution. In the places of public exercise, he encouraged the Theban youth to venture upon wrestling and boxing with the Lacedæmonians of the garrison. To their surprize, they found themselves far superior to their antagonists : they were of course elated with unexpected success ; and thence Epameinondas took occasion to reproach them with the baseness of their submission to a people inferior. It might be supposed, from this story, that Epameinondas meant to admonish the Lacedæmonians to strengthen their garrison, and keep stricter watch.

It is among the real merits of Plutarch, which I have before taken occasion to observe, that he not unfrequently names

## SECTION VI.

*Motives, at Lacedæmon, for lenient Conduct toward Thebes.  
Command in War against Thebes, declined by Agesilaus,  
committed to Cleombrotus. Uncommon Storm. Change in  
Athenian Politics, adverse to Thebes.*

IT was incumbent upon the Lacedæmonian government to punish the Theban rebellion and support its authority over Greece, or at once to SECT. VI. resign

names his authors. Now it is remarkable that, in his account of the Theban revolution, the only author he quotes is Xenophon; from whom, indeed, evidently the best part of his account has been taken. As a cotemporary historian, much interested in the political events of the time, Xenophon had his partialities, and they were not in favor of Pelopidas or Epameinondas. On the contrary, the Lacedæmonians were his friends, and very particularly Agesilaus. Nevertheless, his simple concise narrative does far more honor to the authors of the Theban revolution than Plutarch's studied panegyric. Without any mention of secrecy, he shows that extraordinary secrecy was observed. Without any mention of courage or magnanimity, he exhibits, in the conduct of the conspirators, the daring prudence of so many Cæsars or Cromwells. While he thus does justice to those who, as public men, were his enemies, he acknowledges so candidly the faults of his friends, that even Plutarch could accuse them of nothing more. Among the advantages then of Xenophon, in the comparison, the reader of taste will admire that elegant simplicity, that perspicuous conciseness, which modern writers cannot too diligently emulate, but which, even were Xenophon the writer, no modern language could equal.

Plutarch, in his tract intitled, little enough to its purpose, *On the Dæmon or Genius of Socrates*, has enlarged the story of the delivery of Thebes into a kind of novel, giving much dialogue together with the deeds. It is an ingenious and amusing little work, and interesting for the information inter-spersed, concerning the philosophical theology of Plutarch's day; but it bears no symptom of historical authority, beyond the gleanings from Xenophon.

resign that invidious authority, which perhaps could not be resigned with safety. ~~The~~ mid-winter, therefore, it was resolved that an army should immediately march. In the same spirit, severity was exerted against the late governor of the Cadmeia, who suffered death for surrendering his trust.

There is something of mystery in the conduct of Agesilaus toward the Thebans, and not less of the Thebans toward Agesilaus, which the philosopher historian, who acted in the military and political transactions of the time, seems to have left studiously veiled. The gross affront put upon Agesilaus, previously to his sailing for Asia, when sacrificing in the Theban territory, is not accounted for. The cause of that deeplaid scheme of enmity to Lacedæmon, which occasioned the recall of Agesilaus, is equally unexplained. Why Agesilaus, when he had gained a great victory over the Thebans near Coroneia, did not pursue the advantage, but, on the contrary, led his army immediately out of their territory, remains an enigma. After this, that Agesilaus bore a hatred to the Thebans, which he suffered sometimes to sway his political conduct, the candor of Xenophon has led him to avow. The partiality of Plutarch, himself a Bœotian, would countenance an imputation, which seems however to have had no better origin than the ordinary malice of party-spirit in Greece, that Agesilaus instigated the seizing of the Cadmeia. That, however, he supported the measure, when taken, in a manner not creditable to his character,

Xenophon

Xenophon himself has shown. Yet when, in consequence of the revolution which followed, war was denounced against Thebes, and an army was ordered to march, he declined the command.

SECT.  
VI

But much of what historians have not expressly declared, may be gathered from what they have made known. The pointed enmity of Thebes, toward Agesilaus and Lacedæmon, arose from a revolution in that city, by which, soon after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, the power passed from the oligarchical party to the democratical. The new leaders could not hope to hold their power, unless they could ingage their commonwealth to break the Lacedæmonian connection; and a gross affront to a popular king might be very efficacious for their purpose. But, as the other party was still considerable, and the principal landowners were among its members, Agesilaus, after the battle gained on his return from Asia, might withdraw his army from the Theban territory, to favor the lands, not of his enemies, but of his friends; and he might hope that his moderation, after victory, might soften the enmity of one party, while the credit of that victory would promote the influence of the other. If the oligarchy could be quietly restored in Thebes, his purpose would be better answered than by any success in arms; and means might thus, more than by any other measures, be promoted, for his return, with his army, to prosecute his favorite plan of conquest in Asia.

Patriotism upon a narrow scale, or attachment to a particular commonwealth (tho it was oftener

CHAP.  
XXVI.

Xenoph.  
Ages. c. 7.  
l. 4, 5, 6.

Xenoph.  
ut sup. &  
Plut. Ages.

only to a party in that commonwealth) was common among the Greeks; but even the pretension to patriotism including all Greece, was rare<sup>17</sup>. Xenophon ascribes to Agesilaus that nobler patriotism: which seems indeed to have been an inheritance from his father Archidamus, communicated to both the kings his sons; tho the inferior abilities of Agis gave less brilliancy to the fair portion. If we add the Athenian Cimon, it will be difficult to find another Grecian commander who has any clear claim to the eulogy. These however seem intitled to it, and we must therefore confine to the time when Agesilaus reigned, the praise which Xenophon makes peculiarly his. What other general, he asks, has been known to decline taking a town, when he thought the plunder in his power, or to hold it a misfortune to conquer, when Greeks were his enemies? But Agesilaus, when, on his march from Asia, intelligence met him of the great victory obtained near Corinth, where, with the loss of only eight Lacedæmonians, more than ten thousand of the Theban confederacy were slain, instead of showing satisfaction, ‘Unhappy ‘Greece!’ he exclaimed; ‘your children thus ‘destroyed, in quarrels among themselves, were ‘enough to have obtained glorious victory over ‘any number of barbarians.’ When afterward, as he lay near Corinth, the refugees pointed out a plan for easily storming the city, he would not allow the attempt: ‘To chastise a Grecian people,’ he

<sup>17</sup> The Greek term φιλόπατρος was nearly synonymous with φιλωτολογία. To express the more liberal patriotism, extending to the whole nation, the Greeks used the term φιλέλλην.

he said, ‘may be necessary; to extirpate or inslave them cannot<sup>18</sup>.

SECT  
VI.

But the great purpose of Agesilaus, universal peace in Greece, and a union of the whole nation against the barbarians, was singularly thwarted by the prevalence of the democratical party in Thebes; and this consideration, with perhaps some added stimulation from personal affronts, appears so far to have warped the general rectitude of his mind, as to have led him to support the treachery of Phœbidas, in seizing the Theban citadel. When however he observed those Thebans, who, through the insuing revolution, acquired the lead in the government of their city, conducting themselves with no moderation<sup>19</sup>; when, on the contrary, after the counter-revolution effected by Mellon and Pelopidas, the whole Theban people seemed united in the opposite interest, he would no longer stand forward in a cause which he found so odious, and which a considerable party, even in Lacedæmon, reprobated. He avoided taking any part in the debate on measures to be pursued; and, when it was resolved that an army should immediately march, he claimed the privilege of his age for declining the command<sup>20</sup>.

Cleombrotus,

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 13.

<sup>18</sup> Xenophon has himself reported that Agis would not take Elis when in his power. (Xen. Hel. l. 3. c. 2. s. 19, & Ch. 24. s. 2. of this Hist.) Hence it is clear that the peculiarity of the eulogy must be confined to the time when Agesilaus reigned.

<sup>19</sup> Τύπανος is a title which Xenophon more than once gives them. (s. 9. & 13.)

<sup>20</sup> Υπὲρ τισσαράκοντα ἀφ' ἕρης. The uncertain value of this expression has been already noticed. Dodwell (Chron. Xen.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

Cleombrotus, who had succeeded Agesipolis in the throne of the Eurystheneid family, seems, with the ephors, and the whole administration of Lacedæmon, to have imbibed a share of the moderation of Agesilaus. But had no step been taken in favor of the Lacedæmonian, or oligarchical party, in the Bœotian towns, its complete ruin, with the severest sufferings to individuals, to many individuals who deserved highly of Lacedæmon, must have followed. Already, in Thebes, the return of the emigrated, of one party, had been the signal for the leading men, of the other, to seek personal safety, by quitting whatever else

B.C. 378.  
Ol. 100. 2.  
January.  
Dodw.

was most dear to them<sup>21</sup>. Tho midwinter, therefore, and very severe weather, the resolution for the immediate march of an army for Bœotia was persisted in, and Cleombrotus was directed to take the command. The readiest passage of the mountains, north of the isthmus<sup>22</sup>, was occupied by the Athenian general Chabrias, with a body of targeteers. Cleombrotus however found the Platæan road open, by which he passed into the Theban territory, and incamped at Cynoscephalæ.

There

ad ann. A. C. 378. p. 55.) supposes τισσαράκοντα ἐφ' ὅτες fifty-seven or fifty-eight, and that Agesilaus was already sixty-three. At that rate he must have been forty-five at his accession to the throne, when he was, according to Xenophon, (Ages. c. 1. s. 6.) ἔτι μὲν νέος, still a youth. I should rather suppose him under thirty-five at his accession, and between fifty-two and fifty-five when his age excused him from foreign service. The excuse was common to the king and the private soldier.

<sup>21</sup> This familiar circumstance, among the Greeks, it was sufficient for Xenophon to express by the single word οἰκτητικότων.

<sup>22</sup> The way by Eleutheræ; for which Dodwell proposes, apparently with reason, to read Erythræ.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 15.

There he remained sixteen days, and then withdrew to Thespiae. The purpose of the expedition seems to have been merely to give that protection, which the Lacedæmonians owed to the Bœotian towns, against the new government of Thebes ; and, for this, it was thought sufficient now to leave a third of the army, under the command of Sphodrias, with a sum of money for raising a body of mercenaries. Cleombrotus therefore led the rest back toward Peloponnesus ; all, says the historian, while they reflected how carefully every injury to the Theban territory had been avoided, wholly doubting whether it was to be war or peace.

SEC. VI.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 4. s. 16.

In passing the mountain-barrier against the <sup>s. 17.</sup> isthmus, the army was assailed by an uncommon storm. Between the town of Creusis and the Corinthian gulph, its violence was such, that many asses, laden with the baggage, were tumbled down the precipices ; shields were blown into the sea, and, in the impossibility, with their complete armour, to withstand its fury, most of the soldiers resorted to the expedient of depositing their shields among the crags, and loading them with stones. With difficulty, each making his way as he could, <sup>s. 18.</sup> they arrived, in the evening, at Aigostheni in the Megaric territory. Tho this was no ordinary tempest, yet the account of it, given by Xenophon, may assist us to the cause why, in a climate whose summer heats we are apt to suppose more intolerable than the roughness of the waning or early year, winter operations were so generally avoided. Such an event never failed to alarm Grecian superstition. Some thought the displeasure

C H A P.XXVI.

displeasure of the gods announced at the conduct of Lacedæmon towards Thebes: others supposed ill-fortune to the youthful general portended. Following events, with the recollection of the omen, brought, it was imagined, its explanation. As soon as the weather became moderate, the abandoned arms were collected; and, the march being then prosecuted into Peloponnesus, the troops were, as usual, dismissed.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 19.

Altho, in this expedition, so little was done to the vulgar eye, its consequences were important. Those, in Athens, desirous of peace, or averse to the Theban connection, represented with effect to the people, that the Corinthian territory was no longer the seat of war; alreddy they had seen the Peloponnesian army pass by Attica into Bœotia; and before next harvest they might expect the ravage of Attica itself. The ungenerous fear of the tyrannous multitude was so excited, that, of the two generals who had favored the delivery of Thebes from the Lacedæmonian yoke, one was condemned and executed; the other saved his life by flight.

## SECTION VII.

*Motives of the Theban Leaders for persevering in Opposition to Lacedamon : Pelopidas, Epameinondas. Corruption of the Lacedæmonian General Sphodrias : Weak Concession of Agesilaus : Renewal of Alliance between Athens and Thebes. Agesilaus Commander against Thebes. State of the smaller Republics of Greece. The Thebaid ravaged : Winter Campaign. Second Invasion of the Thebaid under Agesilaus : Sedition at Thespiae.*

THE great change which had taken place in the politics of Athens, was highly alarming to the ruling party in Thebes. Unsupported they could not hope long to resist the power of Lacedæmon ; and, whatever indications might have appeared of moderation, and a peaceful disposition, in the Lacedæmonian government, yet no peace with Lacedæmon could come unattended with the ruin of the chiefs of the party, assassins of the late polemarcs, and objects of the revenge of living numbers, whom they had driven into banishment. But among them were men of talents, such as Thebes had not before offered to the world's notice. Of these, Pelopidas and Epameinondas were becoming eminent. Both of distinguished families, both of the democratical party, they contracted an early friendship, tho otherwise their circumstances and their dispositions differed. Pelopidas was rich, Epameinondas poor : Pelopidas delighted to pass his time in action ; war, hunting, and the palæstra : Epameinondas in study

SECT.  
VII.  
B.C. 378.  
Ol. 100.  $\frac{2}{7}$ .

Diod. I. 15.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Epam.  
& Pelop.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelop. &  
Ages.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

study and the schools of the philosophers<sup>23</sup> The warm temper of Pelopidas urged him to put himself forward in public business : Epameinondas thought it a duty to qualify himself for his country's service ; but then claimed indulgence for his inclination to retirement and study, till circumstances might require his exertion. The activity of Pelopidas made it impossible that he could be an indifferent character in any public commotion. When therefore the party of Leontiades, with the assistance of the Lacedæmonian army under Phœbidas, obtained the supreme power in the commonwealth, Pelopidas had been among those who were driven to seek their safety by flight ; while Epameinondas, considered only as a philosopher, remained undisturbed in Thebes. Pelopidas was, according to Plutarch, both in council and in action, foremost among the associates of Mellon, in the insuing revolution : Epameinondas joined in it only with the body of the Theban people. When the revolution was effected, Pelopidas was raised with Mellon and Charon, to the office of Bœotarc ; a title assumed by the first magistrates of Thebes, instead of their antient title of polemarc, or conjointly with it ; in assertion of the claim of the Theban people to a superintending authority over all the cities of Bœotia, which the Lacedæmonians, under the pretence of vindicating the freedom of those cities, but really to insure their own command over them, had always strenuously opposed.

The

<sup>23</sup> Pythagoreus ille Lysis Thebanum Epaminondam (insti-  
tuit) haud scio an summum virum unum omnis Græciæ. Cic.  
de Orat. 3. 34.

The intrigue, which set Athens again at variance with Lacedæmon, was, according to Plutarch, devised and managed by Pelopidas. Xenophon gives it to Theban policy, without specifying the author. Bribery was the inducement, at least suspected, for Sphodrias, the Lacedæmonian general in Thespiae, to take measures not to be otherwise easily accounted for. Marching in the afternoon, he entered Attica by night, with the purpose, or the pretended purpose, to be before dawn at Peiræus, which had then no gates, and to take it by surprize. At Thria day broke <sup>s. 21.</sup> upon him, and he returned; but instead of endeavoring to conceal his hostile intention, he plundered houses and drove off cattle.

Before day intelligence reached Athens, that a large army was approaching. Alarm spread rapidly, and the whole people took arms. Three Lacedæmonian ministers, then in the city, were arrested. Astonished, themselves, at the fact related to them, they however soon convinced the principal Athenians, that, whatever the plot might be, they could be no parties to it; and, declaring their confidence that Sphodrias not only could have no authority for his injurious conduct, but that his high rank and great connections would not screen him from due punishment for it, they were presently released. So far their assertions were soon confirmed, that Sphodrias was summoned home, and a capital prosecution was instituted against him.

Xenophon has labored, not to justify the in- <sup>s. 24—33.</sup> suing conduct of Agesilaus, but to win excuse for it.

S E C T.  
VII.

Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 20.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

it. Cleonymus, son of Sphodrias, a youth of great merit, was the intimate friend of Archidamus son of Agesilaus, a youth also of great merit. Archidamus was distressed by his friend's distress; and Agesilaus, feeling for both of them, allowed his feeling to overbear his judgement. Against his own opinion of what was just and honorable, and against his country's clearest interest, he exerted himself in favor of Sphodrias. It appears that trials of men in high public situations, at Sparta equally as at Athens, were before either the assembled people, or a court nearly as numerous as the ordinary popular assemblies. Of course opportunity was open for intrigue, and interest decided the judgement. Sphodrias nevertheless feared to return home; yet his trial, according to the general practice of Grecian courts, proceeded as if he were present. It was apparently in consequence of the notoriety of his guilt, that his friends chose to rest his defence principally on the plea of his former merits; but the influence of Agesilaus gave such efficacy to this plea that he was acquitted. Xenophon, anxious for the credit of his friend and patron, has nevertheless evinced his superior regard for truth, by avowing that the decision was very generally considered as singularly iniquitous.

The remoter consequences of this disreputable transaction were beyond human foresight; but the strong probability, amounting almost to certain necessity, of what immediately followed, should not have escaped so experienced a politician as Agesilaus. Indignation pervaded the Athenian

people; and it was no longer possible for those leading men in Athens, who desired to maintain the Lacedæmonian connection, to refute the orators of the Bœotian party, who asserted, that the Lacedæmonians not less evidently approved, and had encouraged, the treacherous project against Peiræus, than the not less abominable, but more successful treachery, by which Thebes had been actually subjected to Lacedæmon. After the manner of democracies, not understanding convinced, but passion excited, like the reflux of a strong surf, bore all violently the way contrary to that which it had lately impelled; and a majority of the same rash multitude which, a little before, had condemned its generals to death for promoting the delivery of Thebes from the Lacedæmonian yoke, now, with equally hasty and unreasonable zeal, ingaged in war with Lacedæmon to support the measure. War, defensive and offensive, became the popular care. Peiræus was secured with gates, ships were built, and want of zeal in the Bœotian cause was considered as want of fidelity to the Athenian commonwealth.

Having thus, by partiality for a guilty individual, brought a formidable addition to the before pressing weight of war against his country, Agesilaus could no longer deny himself to the public voice; which loudly called for his known ability and large experience to command the army, in preference to the untried talents of his youthful colleague. Thebes remained the great object of hostility: but, with Athens now adverse, it was no longer easy for an army to pass from

Peloponnesus

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 35.

CHAP. Peloponnesus into Bœotia; and command of the  
XXVI. road over the intervening mountains must by  
some means be secured,

It is only incidentally that we get any information concerning those numerous inferior republics, which composed the far larger portion of the Greek nation: when it occurs, it is of course valuable. To the citizens of Lacedæmon and Athens great objects of ambition offered; and, if numbers suffered in the contest so excited, numbers would participate in the joyful hope, at least, of one time finding large recompence. Meanwhile the body of the Lacedæmonian people might live in security and a dignified ease, after the manner prescribed by the peculiar institutions under which they were bred: and, for the Athenian, all the arts and every science combined to produce gratifications; for the wealthy every kind of gratification, at their own expence, except security of person, property, and character; and, for the poorest, luxuries at the public expence, such as no others enjoyed, with quiet and peace of mind, if not always in their power, yet less liable to disturbance than among those whose private riches might draw popular envy. But, for the bulk of the Greek nation, the citizens of those numerous little republics, to whom the higher rewards of ambition were totally denied, our information hitherto has not represented their lot as generally enviable; and what we proceed to learn will be gratifying, only as it may teach us to bless Providence for our own.

A war,

A war, unconnected with the greater concerns of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, already existed within Bœotia. In that empire, which some of the Grecian republics exercised over others, and the Lacedæmonian, for a long time, over all, we see something of the principle of some despotic governments of modern Europe; allowing the people, as a recompence for deprivation of other liberty, that of assassinating oneanother. The little, almost unheard-of, municipality of the Cleitorians waged war with their neighbors the Orchomenians. Unequal to their enemies in native military force, they had however pecuniary resources which enabled them to supply the deficiency: they took into their pay a body of those troops, the use of which had, as we have seen, long been increasing in Greece; vagabonds from various republics, who made war a trade, and were ready to ingage in any service for the best hire. Thus hostilities went forward, unregarded by any superintending authority, till a particular interest of Lacedæmon required that the broil should stop; and then a mandate from Sparta sufficed to still the storm. Agesilaus saw, prepared by this little war, the means of securing for his army the passage from Peloponnesus, over the mountains, into the Bœotian plain. He demanded the service of the Cleitorian mercenaries for the purpose. The Cleitorians, desirous to gratify the king and people of Lacedæmon, were only anxious that, while their mercenaries were employed in the Lacedæmonian service, their lands, which they were themselves

SECT.  
VII.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 36. 37.

**C H A P.** themselves unable to protect, might not be ravaged.  
**XXVI.** For this Agesilaus undertook to provide; and he did it effectually, by sending his orders to the Orchomenians to abstain from hostility, while Lacedæmon might have occasion for the Cleitorian troops. It seems there was an existing decree of the congress of the confederacy, forbidding war between the confederated republics, while an expedition in the common cause was going forward; and, under the sanction of this decree, Agesilaus threatened the Orchomenians with the first vengeance of the arms of that confederacy, of which their city was a member, if they disobeyed his order. The Orchomenians prudently acquiesced, and the Cleitorian mercenaries occupied the passes.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 38—41.

Bœotia being thus laid open to the Lacedæmonian arms, it remained for those able men, who led the Theban councils, to devise how, with unequal forces, they might best protect the small but rich territory of their city. They fortified the whole frontier; and still their numbers were unequal to the defence always and everywhere. Agesilaus, able and indefatigable, penetrating their lines, plundered, burnt, and wasted to the city-walls. The consummate skill of the Athenian general Chabrias, to whom the Thebans deferred on that occasion, baffled his endeavors to force a general action; but the common object of a Grecian campaign was accomplished. Agesilaus then placed a force in Thespiae, under the command of Phœbidas, to protect the allies of Lacedæmon

Diod. l. 15.  
c. 32, 33.  
p. 474.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Chab.

Lacedæmon in northern Greece, during the winter, and, returning into Peloponnesus, dismissed the rest of his army.

S E C T  
VII.

The patronage of a man distinguished, like Phœbidas, by that treachery which had reduced Thebes under subjection to Lacedæmon, we should not consider as creditable; but we are so little informed of Spartan domestic politics, that ground fails us even for conjecture, how far his appointment was the work of Agesilaus. Phœbidas, however, tho an unprincipled politician, seems to have been an active and able officer. The Thebans, like the Dorian Peloponnesians, descended from the same Æolian stock, valuing themselves upon their heavy-armed phalanx, disdained the missile weapons and desultory action of most of the northern Greeks; whom they considered as, in their warfare, little above barbarians. But the Lacedæmonians, by severe experience in their wars with Athens, had at length learnt the use of light-infantry; and tho the force left under Phœbidas consisted mostly of targeteers, he did not content himself with defensive war, but so harassed the enemy's territory with predatory inroads, that the whole force of Thebes was collected to repress the troublesome and destructive intrusion. The Theban army invaded the Thespian territory. Phœbidas, avoiding general action, gave nevertheless such annoyance by desultory attacks, with his light troops, on the enemy's flanks and rear, that he made both phalanx and cavalry retire in disorderly haste; and so without previous circumspection and decision, that the cavalry were

Xenoph.  
ut ant.  
Diodor.  
l. 15. s. 34

**CHAP.** stopped by a deep glen crossing the way. This  
**XXVI.** however, which, in the ordinary course of events,  
should have been the ruin of the defeated, proved,  
in the chance of war, that of the victorious party.  
The Theban cavalry being forced into action again,  
it happened that, in the first charge, Phœbidas  
was killed; and here, as on former occasions we  
have been led to observe, it appeared of what  
consequence the life of one man might be. The  
mercenaries all fled; the few Lacedæmonians of  
the army were overpowered: approaching night  
prevented great slaughter, but the consequences  
were those of a complete victory. The Thebans  
thenceforward commanded the country: their  
allies and partizans were encouraged, their adver-  
saries dejected: instead of any longer suffering in  
their own territory, they plundered the lands of all  
around them: they were indeed unable to take a  
single town; but the lower people of many de-  
serted to them in numbers; and the Lacedæmo-  
nian party was so weakened, throughout Bœotia,  
that almost everywhere, support was wanting to  
check sedition and prevent revolt. These circum-  
stances being reported at Lacedæmon, a mora was  
sent, under the orders of a polemarc, who took  
his headquarters in Thespiae.

B.C. 377.  
Ol. 100. 3.  
Xen. Hell.  
I. 5. c. 4.  
s. 47—54. The Peloponnesian army was again assembled in spring, reinforced by a body of horse from that distant new member of the confederacy Olynthus, and Agesilaus again took the command. By early precaution he secured the passes of Cithæron, and entered, without opposition, the Boeotian plain. The Thebans remained on the defensive within

their lines ; but even those lines, by movements ably planned and rapidly executed, Agesilaus passed unopposed. Fearful of a battle, the enemy attended his motions, with little effect, while he extended ravage beyond Thebes, as far as the Tanagrœan lands. When all the inimical Bœotian territory had been wasted, returning to Thespiae, he found that little city torn by the common rancor of faction in Greece. One party, claiming to be more eminently the Lacedæmonian party, urged the moderate petition, that their opponents, tho professing themselves friends also of Lacedæmon, yet, for their less ardent zeal in the cause, might be put to death. It could not be easy to bring men, so violent in variance, to live within the same town in cordial friendship. Agesilaus however effected, at least, the semblance of a reconciliation; and, for better security, required solemn oaths from both sides for, what the interest of both strongly demanded, but passion, more imperious, had opposed, the preservation of the peace of their little commonwealth. After this good deed, he returned into Peloponnesus, and the army was dismissed.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 55.

## SECTION VIII.

*Distress and exertions of Thebes: Naval assistance obtained from Athens: Timotheus commander. Pressure upon Lacedæmon, and successes of Thebes. Accommodation and breach again between Lacedæmon and Athens: Siege of Coreyra by the Lacedæmonians: Successes of the Athenians under Iphicrates.*

CHAP. THAT mode of offensive war, which had com-  
 XXVI. pelled the flourishing and formidable common-  
 B. C. 377. wealth of Olynthus to receive laws from Lacedæ-  
 Ol. 100. 4. mon, now began severely to press upon Thebes.  
 Winter. For two successive years neither harvest, nor those  
 Xenoph. fruits which, in the hotter climates, are scarcely  
 Hel. I. 5. c. 4. a. 58. less important than harvest, had been gathered by  
 • the Thebans from their territory; and the sur-  
 rounding states, best able to afford supplies, ac-  
 knowledged the Lacedæmonian empire. Bœotia,  
 tho its extent, from the Eubœan channel to the  
 Corinthian gulph, gave it the advantage of two  
 seas, nevertheless was low in the scale of Grecian  
 maritime power. The supremacy of Thebes was  
 unfavorable to maritime exertion, its proper ter-  
 ritory being wholly inland; yet Thebes, whether  
 through just or usurped dominion, at this time  
 commanded ports and possessed ships of war.  
 In the distress, therefore, arising from the pressure  
 of the Lacedæmonian arms, it was resolved, before  
 any concession should be made, to endeavor to  
 procure supplies by sea.

I. 6. c. 4.  
s. 3.

Two triremes were accordingly appointed to  
 attend commissioners, to whom ten talents, about  
 two

two thousand pounds sterling, were intrusted, to purchase corn at Oreus in Eubœa. The people of Oreus were known to be friendly, but they were restrained by a Lacedæmonian garrison in their citadel. The Theban commissioners therefore went to Pagasæ, on the opposite Thessalian coast; hoping thence to manage their business with the requisite secrecy. The Lacedæmonian governor nevertheless receiving information of their measures, allowed them quietly to complete their purchase, and then, watching their departure, intercepted both ships, at such a distance from shore that none of the crews escaped. The result however was far more beneficial to the Thebans than if their commissioners had met with unchecked success. For the prisoners, being placed in the citadel of Oreus, were so deficiently guarded, that they found opportunity to rise and overpower the garrison. The townspeople, relieved thus from the terror of the commanding fortress, disclaimed subjection to Lacedæmon; and, through the rest of autumn, and all the following winter, Thebes was abundantly supplied from Eubœa.

The disposition to yield, which want had begun B.C. 376.  
to excite among the Thebans, being thus obviated, Ol. 100. 4.  
it remained for the Lacedæmonians, with the Spring.  
returning season, to repeat the invasion of Bœotia.  
An accidental injury to a blood-vessel, ill-treated Xenoph.  
by an unskilful surgeon, had brought upon Age- Hel. I. 5.  
silaus a severe illness, which disabled him for c. 4. s. 58.  
military command. Cleombrotus was therefore again placed at the head of the army. With the

CHAP. usual deficiency of our information, concerning  
XXVI. the domestic politics of Lacedæmon, it remains  
unexplained to us why that inexperienced prince  
profited neither from the advice, nor the example,  
of his able colleague, to secure the passes into  
Bœotia. Not till he arrived at the foot of  
the mountains, he sent forward his targeteers;  
and they were repulsed by the Athenian and  
Theban troops, which had preoccupied the com-  
manding heights. Without another effort he  
returned then into Peloponnesus, and dismissed  
his army.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 60.

1. 61.

Impatience and discontent pervaded the con-  
gress of the confederacy, which soon after met in  
Lacedæmon. It was observed, that the yearly  
calls for forein service bore hard upon the citizens  
of the allied republics, and yet no progress was  
made. Management and exertion were certainly  
deficient, or so great a force would have produced  
greater effects. A proper use of the unemployed  
navy, far superior in strength to the enemy's,  
might have contributed to shorten the duration of  
the evil. Not only troops might have been  
securely transported into Bœotia, and the disgrace  
of an unsuccessful attempt to force the passage  
of the mountains avoided, but Athens, dependent  
upon transmarine supplies for so large a part of  
her subsistence, might have been reduced by  
famine. In consequence of such remonstrances,  
a fleet of sixty triremes was equipped, and,  
under the command of Pollis, took stations at  
Ægina, Ceos, and Andrus. This measure had  
the

the proposed effect. The corn-ships, bound for Athens, commonly made Geræstus in Eubœa. There getting information of the disposition of the enemy's fleet, they dared not proceed ; so that, in Athens, want began to be apprehended.

But the race of great men in Athens was not yet extinct. Chabrias, esteemed the most scientific officer of the age, was placed at the head of the fleet. Near Naxus he met and defeated Pollis, and thus again the seas were open for the Athenian trade. Preparation meanwhile was making for transporting a powerful army, from Peloponnesus across the Corinthian gulph, to carry war into Bœotia, but the consequence of the weak compliance of Agesilaus, in compassion for a deserving son and a guilty friend, the compassion amiable in the individual, but the compliance highly blameable in the public man, fell now severely upon Lacedæmon. Thebes applied to Athens, its ally, for naval protection, and a fleet of sixty triremes was sent, under the command of Timotheus, son of Conon, to circumnavigate Peloponnesus, and alarm the coast. The Peloponnesian forces were in consequence detained at home, for the defence of their respective territories, and the Thebans, on the contrary, had leisure for offensive measures ; whence their able leaders profited so well, that the great object of their party, what might best inable them, in all events to resist Lacedæmon, what, of course, it had been the great purpose of the Lacedæmonians to prevent, was completely accomplished. With the coöperation everywhere of the democratical party,

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 5.  
c. 4. s. 61.  
Diodor.  
l. 15. c. 31.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Chab.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 5. c. 4.  
s. 62, 63.

s. 29, &  
l. 6. c. 2.  
s. 6.

every

C H A P.  
XXVI.

every town of Bœotia was brought, with the name of alliance, under real subjection to Thebes.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 5.  
c. 4. s. 64.

The Athenian fleet, meanwhile, commanding the sea, when it had saved Bœotia from invasion, invaded Corcyra; and, a friendly party there assisting, the whole island was brought over to the Athenian cause. Timotheus however would allow none of the usual severities against the over-powered party; no selling into slavery, no banishment; but, by his liberal conduct, composing differences, he produced a general attachment to himself and to the Athenian name<sup>24</sup>.

s. 65. 66.

The Lacedæmonians always saw with particular jealousy any interference of Athens in the western seas. Immediately therefore they exerted themselves to assert their command there, and a fleet of fifty-five triremes was put under the orders of Nicolochus. More distinguished for daring courage, than for talents or naval experience, Nicolochus scorned, in fleets so numerous, to weigh the difference of five ships. Without waiting for a reinforcement, expected from Ambracia, he hastened to meet Timotheus, and he was defeated. Nevertheless, the Ambraciots soon after joining him, he again proposed action. Timotheus, however, being joined by a squadron from

Corcyra,

<sup>24</sup> The circumstance that Timotheus was a pupil of Isocrates, has led to a short but pithy panegyric of him from Cicero: ‘Isocrates clarissimum virum Timotheum, Cononis, præstantissimi imperatoris, filium, summum ipsum imperatorem, hominemque doctissimum (instituit.)’ M. T. Cic. de Orat. I. 3. s. 34. To the same general purpose Diodorus, (b. I5. c. 36.) Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ταχίνις καὶ ῥᾳδίως ἴτελλεσθ, ποίησεν μὲν διὰ τοῦ λόγου δυνάμεις, νικᾶν δὲ διὸ ἀδρέαν καὶ γενετηγιαν διέπειρ οὐ μόνον παρὰ τοῖς τολμήταις, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις “Ελληστι μηγάλης ἵτεγχανει ἀποδοχῆς.

Corcyra, which made his fleet more than seventy triremes, even the rashness of Nicolochus then avoided to renew the trial of arms.

SECT.  
VIII.

During this unsuccessful exertion of Lacedæmon at sea, new emergencies arose, pressingly requiring new exertion by land. The Thebans, after reducing all Boeotia under their obedience or influence, carried their arms into Phocis; and ministers arrived from that country, representing, that it must be lost to the Lacedæmonian alliance, unless speedily and powerfully relieved. Those who held the sway in Lacedæmon deemed it, and apparently with reason, of great importance not to allow the new power of Thebes thus to spread. It was therefore resolved to send an army, larger than the former, for the protection of the northern allies. But, while the Peloponnesian shores were everywhere threatened, it was judged prudent to avoid requiring the usual proportion of the confederates; whose governments and people would naturally be anxious to keep their utmost force at home, for the protection of their own lands. At the risk of Laconia itself, therefore, it was determined to send a larger proportion of Lacedæmonians; with the hope, by this attention to the wishes and feelings of the allies, and mark of confidence in their bravery and fidelity, to conciliate attachment. Unfortunately Agesilaus was still unable to take the command, which was therefore committed to Cleombrotus. The army, without opposition, crossed the Corinthian gulph, and the Thebans presently evacuated Phocis; but they occupied the strong posts on the border, apparently

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 1. s. 1.

c. 2. s. 1.

**C H A P.** apparently determined to dispute the entrance of  
**XXVI.** the Lacedæmonians into Bœotia.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 2. s. 1.

While things were thus critically situated, the Athenian fleet threatening the whole circuit of the Peloponnesian coast, relief came to Lacedæmon from a quarter whence it was not expected. Dis-satisfaction with their new political connection had spread among the Athenians. While they were consuming their public treasure, burthening themselves with imposts, and suffering depredation from Æginetan corsairs, the Thebans had refused, possibly being little able, to contribute to the expence of that fleet, which had given the great turn in their favor; which had saved Bœotia from invasion, perhaps Thebes from ruin, and afforded the opportunity through which Thebes was now mistress of Bœotia. Those leading men in Athens, who were desirous of peace, took advantage from this turn in the public mind, and ministers were sent to Lacedæmon. No complex interests occurring for discussion, peace was quickly concluded; and orders were sent from Athens, for Timotheus to stop the operations of his victorious fleet, and return home.

Unfortunately a matter, in a great degree accidental, and of which the modern eye with difficulty discovers the importance, presently unsettled all that appeared so happily accommodated. Timotheus, in his way home, put some Zacynthian exiles ashore on their island; of which the Zacynthians in power complained to Lacedæmon, as a gross injury. This concise statement, from the cotemporary historian, will not be wholly unintelligible

unintelligible to those who have thus far followed Grecian history. The Athenians however, conscious of offence or not, so little expected that it would occasion a renewal of hostilities, that they had already laid up their fleet and dismissed their crews, when a vote passed the Lacedæmonian assembly, declaring that the Athenians had acted injuriously, and that reparation should be sought by arms. It seems as if an interchange of character had taken place between the Athenian and Lacedæmonian governments. Great certainly was the merit of those leaders of the Athenian councils, who could make circumspection and moderation distinguish the proceedings of a democracy, while, notwithstanding the general authority and general prudence of Agesilaus, the measures of the elderhood of Sparta were subject to the influence of passion. An earnestness appeared, as if the dearest interests of Lacedæmon were threatened. Requisitions were sent to all the maritime allies; and from Corinth, with its colonies, Leucas and Ambracia, Elis, the Achaian cities, Zacynthus, and the independent Argolic states, Epidaurus, Trezen, Hermionë, and Halieæ, a fleet was collected of sixty triremes. In doubt, still, of the sufficiency of the force to be obtained within Greece, ministers were sent to Dionysius, whose power or influence directed the politics of Syracuse and the greater part of Sicily, representing how incompatible it was with his interest that the Athenians should command Corcyra, and requesting assistance against them.

Here

SECT.  
VIII.

Xen. Hell.  
l. 6. c. 2.  
s. 7, 8.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

Here the cotemporary historian discovers to us a motive for the conduct of the Lacedæmonian government, superior to the meer consideration of the interest of a friendly party in Zacynthus. The means which the connection with Corcyra gave to Athens, for maintaining a fleet and holding a commanding influence in the western seas, always an object of the highest jealousy to Lacedæmon, made any attempt to extend the Athenian interest there, at the expence of the Lacedæmonian, peculiarly offensive and alarming. But, if, in the silence of Xenophon, the probable report of Diodorus may be taken, there was a farther allurement and incentive. The oligarchical party in Corcyra, at a crisis with the democratical, then in power, applied to Lacedæmon for assistance; and the recent transaction of Timotheus in Zacynthus, might seem in some degree to justify the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Corcyra. Measures however were taken with a haste, and in a style of violence, forbidding friendly discussion. Immediately against Athens, indeed, war was not declared, nor any hostility directed; but Mnasippus, appointed to command the fleet, was instructed generally, ‘to take care of the Lacedæmonian interest in the western sea,’ and particularly, ‘to reduce Corcyra.’

We have seen that unfortunate island, toward the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, singularly a scene of bloodshed and desolation, from the rage of its own citizens against oneanother. Taught by their sufferings, the survivors had settled into orderly

Diodor.  
I. 15. c. 146.  
p. 480.

Xen. Hel.  
ut ant.

I. 6. c. 2.  
s. 4.

orderly government; and their experience seems to have been transmitted, by report, as an advantageous inheritance to their children; for Corcyra was at this time remarkable for its high cultivation and the splendor of its country houses; the security of an insular commonwealth allowing and encouraging improvements there, which, on the continent, and in most even of the larger islands, divided into several states, the constant danger of hostile neighbors forbade. While the Corcyraeans were yet unaware of the purpose of Lacedæmon, all the fury of Grecian war was let loose upon their devoted land; for Mnasippus was not of a temper to go beyond the ordinary practice of his age in mercy to an enemy. The cattle in the fields, the numerous slaves employed in husbandry, and, beside the common plunder of the crops, large store of wine in capacious cellars, here appendages of the farms, tho on the continent only found in towns, became the prey of the invaders. The troops, in consequence, mostly mercenaries, elsewhere accustomed to coarse fare, learnt here, says the historian, to be fastidious; insomuch that, for their common drink, they demanded old and flavored wines. Plunder and waste having been extended over the island, Mnasippus formed the blockade of the city, by land and sea.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 2. s. 5.

The Athenian government, in the same spirit of moderation in which it had stopped the course of successful hostilities for the sake of an equitable peace, appears now to have remained calm under provocation, and slow to resent the ill-judged aggression of Lacedæmon. Nothing had been done in consequence

C H A P.  
XXVI.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 2. s. 6.

s. 7.

consequence of the affronting decree of the Lacedæmonian government, and the hostile measures following, when deputies arrived from the besieged Corcyraeans, imploring the Athenian people, with every added argument that could be drawn from their own interest, to relieve their injured, distressed and highly valuable allies. ‘ What a loss,’ they said, ‘ would Coreyra be to the Athenians, ‘ what an acquisition to their enemies! No republic of the confederacy could furnish equal naval force, or equal pecuniary contribution. How important then the situation of Corcyra, for awing the western Greeks, for commanding the Corinthian gulph, for attacking the Laconian shores, and, above all, for interrupting the communication of Peloponnesus with Sicily and Italy, where the Grecian towns had been mostly united by Dionysius, under the leading government of Syracuse, the ally of Lacedæmon!’— These were the considerations which had excited the jealousy of the Lacedæmonians, and given spring to their measures against Coreyra; and, thus seasonably put forward, they now excited the solicitude of the Athenians for its preservation. A body of six hundred targeteers was immediately sent, which, eluding the vigilance of the besiegers, entered the city of Corcyra by night, to reinforce its garrison; and a fleet of sixty triremes was to follow, under the orders of Timotheus, to raise the siege.

But the fleet remained to be manned; and Timotheus, knowing the enemy’s fleet to be of equal or superior force, and already practised in

service, was solicitous for crews of the best seamen. With a squadron therefore he went among the islands to collect them. But the usual impatience of the Athenian people was now excited; the dilatory caution of Timotheus was condemned; and, before he could complete his levies, Iphicrates was appointed to supersede him in the command.

S E C T.

VIII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 2. s. 8.

In compliance with the manifest inclination of an absolute sovereign, no measures could be too strong. Iphicrates profited from circumstances so adapted to the promotion of his immediate object. He acted as the favorite vicegerent of a despot. He pressed men; he was strict in compelling those, the wealthiest of the Athenians, on whom popular sovereignty imposed the burdensome duty of fitting out triremes, to be diligent in their part of the business; he obtained a decree for adding to his force any ships of the republic cruising near the Attic coast<sup>15</sup>, and particularly the sacred ships Paralus and Salaminia. Thus he increased his fleet to seventy triremes, with which he hastened his departure; and, in the passage itself around Peloponnesus, a passage requiring time, with the rowing and coasting navigation of the antients, he found or made opportunity to give <sup>s. 15—17.</sup> the

<sup>15</sup> Μάλα δέκιες τὰς ναῦς ἐπληροῦτο, καὶ τοὺς τριηράρχας ἴνδυκατοι· προσίλαβε δὲ ταχὺ τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ εἴ που τὶς ναῦς ἀπὸ Ἀττικῶν πέπλει. — Celeriter admodum naves complebat, ac triremium praefectos vel invitatos cogebat: præterea sumebat secum naves omnes quæcunque oram Atticæ legebant. I have endeavored to render this passage as nearly as in modern language may be. The Latin translator has, I think, missed the meaning throughout, and particularly of the phrase προσίλαβε δὲ ταχὺ τῶν Ἀθηναίων, &c. T. 1.

**CHAP.** the requisite practice to his crews, and instruct  
**XXVI.** them in whatever was most necessary for action.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 2. s. 9.

The haste of the Athenian people had not been wholly unreasonable; for the Corcyraeans were severely pressed by famine; insomuch that, when Mnasippus had declared, by proclamation, that he would sell for slaves any who in future, on pretence of desertion, should come from the town, still they deserted. Mnasippus caused them to be scourged and sent back again; and many, of servile condition, whom the Corcyraeans would not readmit, perished of hunger.

Whatever public benefits may arise from private vices, it may be doubted if any vice was ever ultimately beneficial to the individual, unless sometimes, among things that happen against all calculation, prodigality; but no vice is equally apt to defeat its own purpose as avarice. When the extreme distress of the besieged became clearly proved to Mnasippus, he considered the public business, intrusted to him, as done, and the season come for putting the finishing stroke to a scheme of private gain. His army was composed, in large proportion, of mercenaries; for the cities of the confederacy, averse to a transmarine service, had mostly paid the compensation for avoiding it. Two months pay was now due, when he dismissed some of his mercenaries unpaid, and still procrastinated settlement with the others<sup>16</sup>. Discontent pervaded

<sup>16</sup> Καὶ τοὺς μέν τιμας αὐτῶν ἀπομίσθους ἴωσισκοι, τοῖς δὲ ὅτει καὶ δυοῖς ἡδὲ μηνοῖς ἀφιει τὸ μισθόν. Quippe nonnullis corum adimebat stipendia, nonnullis, quos secum retinebat, duum mensium stipendum debebat. That the Latin translator has given

pervaded the army: the guards were negligent and disorderly; the soldiers off duty wandered about the country.

The change was observed by the Corcyraeans. They sallied, killed some of the besiegers, and made some prisoners. Mnasippus, alarmed at this new boldness, called all to arms, but was ill obeyed. Illiberal severity, then exercised toward his officers, produced zealous obedience neither among them nor among the soldiers. With his troops, however, at length collected, he drove the Corcyraeans back to their walls: but there they made a stand; while, from the tombs, which Greek as well as Roman custom placed by the road-side without their towns, the light-armed discharged missile weapons with advantage. Meantime, under direction of the able Athenian general Stesicles, more troops, rushing from the town by another gate, advanced toward the besiegers' flank. These attempting an evolution, to form a face of sufficient extent for receiving the new attack, were thrown into confusion by the supervening enemy; and being unable to recover their order, fled. No relief could come from the right, ingaged toward its own front. Progressively therefore from the left, the line joined in the flight; and Mnasippus, among whose vices was no want of Spartan courage, left at last with a very few, was overpowered and killed. The conquerors then pursued; and, but for the apprehension of a military force among the servants,

given the right sense appears not dubious, tho the Greek phrases seem either military of the day, or perhaps corrupted in transcription.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 2.  
s. 10—12.  
Diodor.  
l. 15. c. 47.

CHAP.

XXVI.

Xen. Hell.  
I. 6 c. 2.  
■ 13, 14.

servants, sutlers, and others, whose numbers appeared formidable, the camp might have been taken. Report then arriving of an Athenian armament approaching under Iphicrates, the remainder of the besiegers embarked and withdrew to Leucas; so precipitately, that not only large stores of corn and wine were left to supply the pressing wants of the Corcyraeans, together with numerous slaves, to repair the loss by desertion and famine, but even the sick of the army were abandoned to their mercy.

v. 19.

v. 17, 18.

Iphicrates was yet on the Laconian coast, when report of the fate of Mnasippus met him<sup>7</sup>. According to the common manner of the coasting navigation of the time, when the progress of a fleet of ships of war resembled an army's march, he halted and landed, even on the Laconian shore, for meals. Trading vessels, loftier and deeper, and navigated, in proportion to their burthen, by far fewer hands, could far better keep the open sea. Expecting action immediately on reaching his destination, Iphicrates would not be incumbered with the mainsails<sup>8</sup> of his triremes, but left them in the arsenal at Peiraëus. For practice to his crews, he chose to make his way mostly with oars, the ready use of which was so important in the antient

<sup>7</sup> In that age Messenia was commonly included under the name of Laconia, or the Laconic territory.

<sup>8</sup> Τὰ μεγάλα ἵρια, *vela magna*, which might be the mainsails, in contradistinction to the fore-sails; or larger sails, in contradistinction to smaller, used on the same mast; as now is usual with the lattee-sail vessels of the Mediterranean, and our luggers; and our cutters have their great, middle, and storm jibs. The information remaining to us concerning the antient ships of war, is, in almost every point, very defective.

antient manner of action. With a fair breeze, however, he allowed his crews to rest: in adverse winds, not too violent, he made them row by reliefs. How little indeed the antient triremes were adapted for sailing, may be gathered from the circumstance that, tho large enough to carry from two to three hundred men, the mast was not fixed, but raised only when the sail was to be used. Iphicrates set his masts, while his crews were ashore, for advantage to the look-out of his scouts. In serene weather, instead of lying incamped ashore, which was the common practice, he proceeded by night. Coasting and halting, thus, he made as quick a passage as, with the navigation of the time, was common. His last halt, on the Peloponnesian shore, was in the mouth of the <sup>Xenoph.</sup>  
<sup>Hel. l. 6.</sup>  
<sup>c. 2. s. 20.</sup>  
<sup>s. 19.</sup> Alpheius, where he passed a night. Thence he crossed to Cephallenia; and, getting there satisfactory information of transactions in Corcyra, he remitted somewhat of that fatiguing preparation for action, in which he had hitherto required the exertion of his crews.

His own attention to his country's service, <sup>s. 21—23.</sup> however, was not remitted. The original object of the expedition no longer pressing, he employed his leisure so well, that he brought Cephallenia, divided as we have seen, once, and probably still, between four republics, under obedience to Athens. Then he proceeded to Corcyra, and there he received intelligence of the approach of ten triremes sent by Dionysius of Syracuse, to join the Lacedæmonian fleet. Anxious to intercept these, he

C H A P.  
XXVI.

went himself to examine the heights, where a look-out might be most advantageously kept; and selecting twenty triremes, he gave strict orders for the crews to be ready at a moment's warning. His not requiring them, on such an occasion, to remain aboard, indicates, perhaps beyond anything that has even yet occurred, the deficient accommodation of the antient ships of war. This deficiency seems to have put nine ships of the Syracusan squadron into his hands. Eager for relief, after the long run, as, with the antient navigation, it was reckoned, from Sicily, the Syracusans landed on the first shore they approached. One ship only, commanded by a Rhodian, who, apprehensive of attack, had hastened his people aboard, escaped. The other nine were taken; the vessels on the beach, the crews ashore.

The numerous prisoners, made on this occasion, were ransomed; sureties for payment being found among the Corcyraeans themselves; who, political enemies, as they now were, did not forget their derivation from one common origin, and their long connection, in religious rites, in commercial intercourse, and in hereditary friendship with the Syracusans. This ray of liberality pleasingly livens the gloom which Grecian morals generally cast over Grecian history. But the gleam does not come unmixed; and the cloud to darken the cheerful prospect arises from a quarter whence it should be least expected. Every other prisoner was redeemed at a stipulated price; but for the commander of the squadron, Anippus, so immoderate

derate a sum was demanded, in failure of which he was threatened with sale into slavery<sup>29</sup>, that, in despair, disappointing the avarice which oppressed him, he killed himself.

Xenophon, however, from whom we have the account, thought very highly of Iphicrates, at least as an officer, ‘Among the many occasions,’ he says, ‘on which Iphicrates commanded, I admire not least his conduct in the expedition to Corcyra; and, among other things, for this, that, on his first appointment, he desired, for colleagues, two men of superior talents, not his political friends<sup>30</sup>; Callistratus, the most popular speaker, and Chabrias, the most renowned general of the age. If he had reasonable hope of faithful assistance from such men, there can be no doubt but he did wisely. If, on the contrary, he expected from them the malignity of party opponents, it surely marked a magnanimous confidence in himself, that he could be unfeeted in want neither of courage, nor of ability<sup>31</sup>, nor of diligence.’

### Under

<sup>29</sup> Τοῦτον δέ ιφύλαττον (ὁ Ιφικράτης) ὡς ἦ τραχίμενος πάμπολλα χειρίσαται, ἢ ὡς πολήσων. *Illum enim custodiebat, ut vel ab co-ingentem auri summam exigeret, vel hominem venderet.* The Latin translator, according to the too common method of translators, has very carefully imitated, instead of explaining, all that is dubious in the original. I am inclined to suppose some small error in the copy; yet the context, I think, pretty sufficiently warrants the version I have given.

<sup>30</sup> Οὐ μάλα ἵπιτόδιος ἔοιλα, is Xenophon’s phrase, speaking of Callistratus, which the translator has rendered, I think in complete mistake, *hominem gerendis rebus non admodum idoneum.*

<sup>31</sup> Καταρράθυμα, seems to mark the weakness of the mind, including want of courage with want of ability.

S E C T.  
VIII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 2. s. 27.

C H A P.

XXVI.

Under the Athenian government it was, indeed, difficult to say what conduct would best give security to men in high office, except that flattery to the people and the bribery of public entertainments were always indispensable. The expence of the fleet under Iphicrates was heavy. The force was greater than had been first voted for the service. Whatever might obviate demands upon the treasury would be in his favor. If there is an excuse, or a palliation, for his conduct toward the unfortunate Syracusan, we must find it here. The illiberality of the sovereign people of Athens, the shame of which was lost among the multitude of partakers, would sometimes impose severe duties upon their officers. If then such men as Chabrias and Callistratus could not advise how to carry on the public service, without severity to an individual prisoner, their inability would certainly tell toward the justification of Iphicrates. On the other hand, if they could not but say that he had taken every measure to supply the armament, without calling upon the treasury, such testimony would go far to justify the demand, when it became unavoidable. For the subsistence of his rowers, in the intermission of naval operation, a resource was used, for which he and his

Ch. 40. s. 4.  
of this Hist.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 2. s. 25.

advisers will have credit; tho it is not the first occasion on which we find mention of it in Grecian history: they were employed in husbandry for the Corcyraeans; who were glad of hired labor, to assist their diminished stocks of slaves, in restoring their wasted farms and vineyards.

Meanwhile

Meanwhile Iphicrates used his small force of heavy-armed, with his larger body of targeteers, to put forward the great object of his expedition, the extension of the Athenian command. The peacefulness of past times, in Acarnania, had given way to the political divisions, so prevalent through the rest of Greece. By assisting the friendly party, in those towns where it was pressed by its opponents, and using actual hostilities against one only, Iphicrates confirmed or restored the Athenian interest in that province. Assembling then his fleet again, and adding to it the naval strength of Corcyra, he sailed with ninety triremes; a force that no fleet in the power of the Lacedæmonian confederacy to raise, could resist. His purpose was to direct operations against Peloponnesus itself; not without hope that some cities there, only upon seeing the means he possessed to protect them in revolt, would desert the Lacedæmonian cause; while others, more steady to their engagements, might be forced to submission.

SECT.  
VIII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1. 6.  
c. 2. s. 26

#### S E C T I O N IX.

*Tyranny of Thebes in success: Dissatisfaction of Athens: General Peace negotiated by Athens: Refusal of Thebes to accede to the Terms of the Treaty.*

THE ordinary temper of mankind, it has been of old observed, is more formed to bear adversity with dignity than prosperity with moderation; and it seems not less true, tho seldom said, that power and glory, but especially the sudden change

SECT.  
IX.

C H A P.

XXVI.

M. T. Cic.  
Corn. Nep.  
v. Epam.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.

from humiliation and misery to power and glory, too much for most individuals to support with propriety, still more certainly intoxicates a community. Later writers have celebrated the magnanimous disinterestedness of Pelopidas, and the philosophical selfdenial and clear integrity of Epameinondas. Unfortunately, the able cotemporary historian, intimately connected with their adversaries, and of course not their friend, has been careless of informing us what part they took in the Theban councils. Nevertheless the independent spirit and daring courage of the Theban people, even in his account, we admire; but liberality, moderation, justice, wherever we search, are as little to be found, in their proceedings, as in those of either the Lacedæmonian aristocracy, or the Athenian democracy, when their tyranny has been most complained of by contemporaries, and reprobated by posterity. The supremacy, asserted by the Theban people over all Bœotia, everywhere abhorred by the aristocratical party, carried oppression sometimes to excess even against the democratical, by which it had risen. The whole people of the little states of Platæa and Thespiae were expelled. Numerous as the distressing circumstances unavoidably attending banishment must be, yet, through the division of Greece into parties, if subsistence did not fail, personal security could generally be found somewhere. But the unhappy Platæans and Thespians whither could they go? oppressed by that party to which they had always been among the firmest adherents. Lacedæmon, the enemy of their oppressors,

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 3. s. 1.  
Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 28, t. 2.  
Diodor.

l. 15. c. 46.

oppressors, was their hereditary enemy. With Sect. IX. Athens indeed they had friendly connection; old and inherited connection; but Athens was now allied with Thebes, whence their persecution came. Their best hope nevertheless was in Athens, and thither, as suppliants, they directed their steps<sup>12</sup>.

It is in the nature of democracy to be both tyrannical and ambitious; but, like single despots, democracies will not always approve the tyranny, and still less the ambition, of other democracies. The overbearing haughtiness of Thebes, in her new prosperity, had already disgusted the Athenians. The invasion of Phocis, the antient ally of Athens, they much resented. The excessive violence used toward the Thespians and Platæans, the Platæans among their oldest and most constant confederates, at one time almost incorporated among the Athenian people, gave still more offence. Both Platæans and Thespians, therefore, found at Athens a ready and kind attention. With their situation, that of all Greece was taken into serious consideration by the Athenian government. The conduct of the Lacedæmonians had been provoking: the prospect of success against them, while the Athenian fleet, triumphant, commanded the seas, was alluring: but the very successes of that fleet had tended to raise Thebes to the power, which now was becoming an object of jealousy at Athens, the more, as Thebes was a nearer neighbor than Lacedæmon.

It

<sup>12</sup> Diodorus, in this part of the history, has mentioned several circumstances not noticed by Xenophon: but his narrative is so confused, and so continually marks deficient judgement, that little satisfactory can be gathered from him.

CHAP.XXVI.

It is often extremely difficult to ascertain the real springs of political measures in a free government, because of the variety of jarring interests influencing the individuals who compose the political body, and of the dependency of public measures upon the accidental preponderance of this or that private interest. There is much appearance of a wise moderation in the Athenian government on this occasion ; and indeed it seems unquestionable that the affairs of Athens were at this time generally directed by able men. Among them Iphicrates certainly was eminent ; but Iphicrates did not carry the princely influence of a Pericles. At the head of a triumphant armament, he found his situation uneasy and perilous. When opposition from enemies was nearly overborne, that from fellowcitizens became only more alarming. The conduct of Iphicrates was wise ; but his moderation, his ready concession to the wishes of those who desired to check the progress of his glory, is accounted for by circumstances reported by the cotemporary historian.

A supply of money was becoming indispensable for the maintenance of his fleet ; the application for which, at Athens, when the treasury could not furnish it, was always highly hazardous. If it was granted, which could not be depended upon, oppression of the rich, and discontent, more or less, of all ranks, was liable to follow. This gave opportunity for a strong opposition from interested men, who coveted the leading situations in the commonwealth. It was at the same time known that Lacedæmon was negotiating with Persia, by its

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 3. s. 3.

s. 6.

its able and formerly successful minister Antalcidas. A view to some, at least, among these circumstances, probably had induced Iphicrates, to desire the orator Callistratus for his colleague in command. Callistratus thus became jointly responsible with him for the success of measures. Were the armament in want, it was incumbent upon Callistratus, not less than upon Iphicrates, to provide for its supply. If new emergencies arose, it was incumbent upon Callistratus to devise means of warding the danger insuing. The liberality of Iphicrates then seems to have led Callistratus, before his opponent, to become his partisan. Want of money pressing, Callistratus offered himself for negotiator with the Athenian people; pledging himself, if his colleague would be satisfied with the alternative, either to procure a vote for the money wanted, or to put forward negotiation for a peace, which would obviate the want. Iphicrates approved, and Callistratus went to Athens.

The commander-in-chief of the armament being thus induced to concede to the wish for peace, which at home began to prevail extensively, it was decreed, in an assembly of the people, according to the historian's phrase, 'that peace should be made.' On first view, such a decree must always appear the produce of wildness in the people, or of faction misleading their voice. The inferior party in a war certainly cannot chuse when peace shall be made. But Athens was at this time fortunately in a situation to hold the balance of Greece; and it was therefore wisely

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 3. s. 2.

resolved

CHAP.  
XXVI.

resolved there to open negotiations, for the purpose of producing a peace beneficial to the nation. In the conduct of the business, a just attention to the rights of allies was observed. Ministers were first dispatched to Thebes, to invite a concurrence in negotiation, and then an embassy was sent to Sparta.

Whatever hope was entertained of success, from the pending negotiation with Persia, the Lacedæmonians were, in the moment, too severely pressed, not to be desirous of peace upon any moderate terms. At the requisition of Athens, therefore, ministers from all the belligerent republics were assembled in Lacedæmon. The congress being met, the Athenian ministers first addressed it: ‘No lasting satisfaction,’ they said, ‘no confidence could obtain among the Greeks, ‘if the former terms of alliance with Lacedæmon ‘continued to be required, and if the former ‘measures of its government were still pursued. ‘The pretended object was universal independency; yet it was stipulated, that the citizens ‘of the allied states should march whithersoever ‘the Lacedæmonians should lead; and thus often ‘they were compelled to make war upon their ‘best friends. Nor was this, however inconsistent with independency, the worst circumstance of their lot; for the Lacedæmonians, ‘arbitrarily interfering in the internal government ‘of the republics, committed the supreme power ‘to what hands they thought proper; and, giving ‘it here to a council of ten, there to a council of ‘thirty, it was always evidently their care, less ‘that

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 3. s. 5.

' that these should govern justly, than that they should hold their respective states in the most complete subserviency to Lacedæmon.' ' So that,' said the orator, ' you seem to delight in tyrannies rather than in free governments.'

The existing circumstances gave weight to this remonstrance, and the Lacedæmonians agreed, that universal independency for Grecian cities should be the basis of the treaty to be negotiated. It followed of course that all those Lacedæmonian superintendents or governors, placed in so many cities with the title of harmost, were to be withdrawn. It was then covenanted, that armies should be disbanded and fleets laid up; and that, if any Grecian state acted contrary to these stipulations, it should be lawful for all to assist those on whom any injury fell from the breach of them; but that the universal independency, which formed the fundamental article of the treaty, should not be infringed, by any compulsion to join in hostilities.

The ready accession of the Lacedæmonians, to terms by which they gave up that supremacy, which they had so long, not only affected, but injured, and which had so extensively been allowed as their prescriptive right, seems to have surprized the Theban ministers; and, with the general satisfaction, which it was so well adapted to produce, in some degree forced them into a concurrence, which they had not intended, and which their instructions did not warrant. For the ruling party in Thebes, aware that, not their power only, but perhaps their existence, depended

SECT.  
IX.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 3. s. 7.

on

**C H A P.** on it, were resolved not to forego that command,  
XXVI. which they had acquired over the other cities of Boeotia. borne away, nevertheless, by the torrent of united opinions and wishes, the Theban ministers joined in the sacrifice, and in the solemn oath, which bound all to the treaty.

That breach, however, of their instructions, which, in the moment, perhaps, they were scarcely able to avoid, on the very next day they endeavored to remedy; and a privilege, which the Lacedæmonians, amid their apparent moderation and real concessions, had reserved to themselves, afforded the pretence. The Athenians and their allies, by their respective ministers, had severally sworn to the observance of the treaty; but the Lacedæmonian representatives alone took the oath, expressly for themselves and their allies. No ministers from the allies of Thebes appear to have been present, and the Theban ministers had taken the oath in the name of the Thebans only. They now demanded that, for the Theban name, the Boeotian might be substituted. Agesilaus opposed this: he would allow no such alteration, he said; but if the Thebans desired to be entirely excluded from the treaty, their name might be erased.

In this dispute were involved consequences not to be estimated by human foresight. Xenophon's penetrating and anxious eye however discerned them, tho' indistinctly, as yet under many folds. Unfortunately for so interesting a period of the history, his connection with Agesilaus, and the dependency, in which circumstances had placed him,

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 3. s. 8.

him, upon the Lacedæmonian government, made him unavoidably a party-man : not so far that we find any reason to suppose he has related any untruth, but so as often to give cause for wishing that he had more related the whole truth ; for the accounts of later writers, panegyrists of the illustrious Thebans who opposed Agesilaus, are utterly unsatisfactory. Xenophon has not named the Theban ambassadors at the congress. Dio-  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Epam.  
Diodor.  
l. 15. c. 38.  
Plut. Agesil.  
dorus, Cornelius Nepos, and Plutarch, concur in reporting that Epameinondas was at the head of them, and, by his eloquence, in invective against the Lacedæmonians, shook the attachment of their allies. But it is commonly by private communication, rather than by public harangue, except where negotiation must be managed with a popular assembly, that such points are carried. We may indeed gather, from Xenophon, that the able conductors of the Theban affairs had probable  
Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 4. s. 15.  
ground for depending on a disposition, in some of the republics, so far at least favorable to Thebes, as a jealousy, still entertained, of Lacedæmon might make them so. But in the moment nothing of the kind seems to have appeared openly. The congress declared its approbation of the opinion of Agesilaus ; and, when the Theban ministers, whether hampered by their instructions, or decided by their own party-views, persevered in renunciation of the treaty, unless the alteration of names were admitted, the Athenians, as Xenophon assures us, considered Thebes as undone ; and the Theban ministers, aware of the magnitude

c. 3. s. 9.  
Diodor.  
l. 15. c. 50

magnitude

**C H A P.** magnitude of danger to their country, from its  
**XXVI.** opposition to united Greece, departed in much  
dejection<sup>13</sup>.

## SECTION X.

*Independency of the Boeotian Towns, asserted by the Lacedæmonians, resisted by the Thebans: Battle of Leuctra.*

B.C. 371. In Athens, at this time, the general wish was for  
Ol. 102. 1.  
peace; and, no leading influence of an ambitious demagogue opposing, the conditions of the treaty concluded were readily and even scrupulously executed. Athenian garrisons were everywhere withdrawn: orders were dispatched for the immediate return of Iphicrates, with that fleet which nothing in the Grecian seas could oppose; and whatever had been taken, after the ceremony of swearing to the treaty, was punctually restored. The Lacedæmonians were not less exact in recalling all those superintending officers, who, with the title of harmost, had governed Grecian cities: and they withdrew all their troops from the territories

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 4, §. 1.

<sup>33</sup> Plutarch, when he has a mind to tell the truth, generally gives his authority; when he paints from his own fancy, which seems to have been very frequent with him, he is honest enough not to pretend that he has any name to vouch for the fidelity of his picture. I do not recollect that he has ever quoted authority for any of his numerous and direct contradictions of Xenophon; nor that he ever, on such an occasion, has mentioned the name of Xenophon, whom, on the contrary, on many occasions, he has commended highly. He has painted this embassy in colors apparently quite his own. His style of historical painting has that facility for the painter, that it imposes no necessity for the picture to harmonize with the general course of history; and of this he has abundantly availed himself.

tories of those called their allies, except the army under Cleombrotus in Phocis, which they left without orders. Cleombrotus, fearful of censure, for acting or not acting, sent home for instructions. The Lacedæmonian assembly was convened; and, in result, orders were sent, for the king to prosecute hostilities against Thebes, unless the independency of the Bœotian towns were immediately admitted.

SECT.  
X.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 4. s. 2.

Those who guided the Theban councils had taken their resolution, and they persevered in it. Pelopidas, and still more Epameinondas, who at this time principally directed those councils, were unquestionably superior men; and perhaps it should be imputed to unfortunate necessity, to the circumstances of Thebes, and to the vices in the political system of Greece, if they did not fairly earn the praise of pure political virtue and enlarged patriotism, which their panegyrists, antient and modern, have been fond of attributing to them. *M. T. Cic.*  
*Corn. Nep.*  
*Plut.*

They were ingaged with a party. On the support of that party depended the means for themselves and their friends to exist in Thebes. The subjection of the Bœotian towns was necessary, as we have observed, to the power, and perhaps to the existence of that party; at least to its existence in Bœotia; and possibly the extermination of the unfortunate Platæans and Thespians (a fact uncontradicted, and little palliated, by their panegyrists) may have been necessary to the security of that sovereignty of Thebes over Bœotia, on which the welfare and safety, not of themselves only, but of all their party, so much depended.

CHAP.XXVI.

depended. Evidently, however, not that Greece should be free, but that Thebes should be powerful, and that they should lead in Thebes, and give law to Greece, were the objects to which all their measures directly tended.

Pressed, nevertheless, as they certainly were, by unfortunate necessities, these able men did not ingage their country in the unequal contest, in which the peace made by Lacedæmon with the rest of Greece left it implicated, without reasonable ground of hope that, by diligent exertion of their talents, they might so profit from existing circumstances, as to make the balance equal, or even bring the preponderancy in their favor. Tho, Thebes alone excepted, all the republics of the nation were now in league with Lacedæmon, yet neither the late enemies, nor even the antient allies of that state, they knew, were cordially attached to it. In every city there was a party more or less friendly to the Theban cause, if for no other reason than because it was adverse to the Lacedæmonian. This spirit of party pervaded, to a considerable extent, even the army now upon the point of invading Bœotia. The king, moreover, who commanded that army, they knew was little respected in it. That, in former campains, he had shown no vigor, was notorious ; and, among those under him, most zealous for the prosecution of the measures which he was commissioned to promote, there were some who did not scruple to assert, what the example of former kings of Lacedæmon might render credible, that he treacherously favored the Thebans.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 4. s. 5.

Decided

Decided then by these complex considerations, the Theban leaders held the force of Bœotia together, and occupied the defile by which it was supposed the Lacedæmonian king would propose to enter their country. But, by a conduct apparently able, Cleombrotus rendered their measure vain. Instead of marching eastward, directly for the Bœotian plain, he moved southward; and, by an unfrequented mountain-road, coming unexpectedly upon Creusis, a Bœotian port on the Corinthian gulph, he took the town with twelve triremes lying in the harbour. The passage hence across the mountains being open, he proceeded unopposed into the Thespian territory, and encamped near Leuctra.

SECT.  
X.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 4. 1. 3.

Disappointed thus in the hope of balancing their inferiority of force by advantage of ground for defence, the Thebans had to apprehend all the pressure of war upon their country, which had been experienced in the invasions under Agesilaus. For the fidelity of the Bœotian towns, they knew, was precarious; to prevent the ravage of their fields, any of them would surrender without siege; and the first blockade to be formed would be that <sup>s. 6.</sup> of Thebes itself. With the pressure of want then, which must sooner or later follow, a turn in the disposition even of the Theban people would be to be apprehended: the opponents of the ruling party might regain an overbearing influence; and most of the present leaders, as the cotemporary historian says, having tried the evils of banishment, thought it better to die fighting, than again become fugitives.

CHAP.  
XXVI.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 4. s. 7.

Urged by such motives, Epameinondas and Pelopidas resolved upon the bold measure, which, for ages, had been held among the Greeks as a forlorn hope, to ingage the Lacedæmonians in the field with inferior forces. But, having taken their resolution, they were ingenious and indefatigable in devising and practising whatever might promote its success. That powerful engine, superstition, was not neglected. A saying, whether already popular, or invented for the occasion, was circulated in rumor as antient and oracular, ‘that ‘a Lacedæmonian army should be defeated at the ‘virgins’ tomb;’ a monument near the Theban camp, where, according to old report, some virgins, violated by Lacedæmonians, had destroyed themselves. To increase the effect for the popular mind, the monument was ornamented with ceremonious solemnity. Intelligence was then carried to the army, that all the temple doors in Thebes had opened spontaneously, and that the priestesses had declared the omen to portend victory to the Thebans. This was followed by information, that the arms in the temple of Hercules had disappeared; whence it was affirmed to be evident, that the god would assist the Thebans in the approaching battle.

s. 8.

While the Theban leaders were thus employing all means to animate their people, the deficient activity, or deficient courage, of the Lacedæmonian king, wanted incitement from those under his command. His friends, and those, not all perhaps properly his friends, who were leading

men

men among his party in the army, uneasy at the reports circulating against him, anxiously urged him to refute the calumny by a vigorous conduct, and they advised him immediately to seek and fight the enemy. In no proper season or circumstances, then, the council of war was held, which finally determined on the battle and its order : it was after the midday meal, when the free circulation of wine had excited that animation, which seems to have been otherwise deficient. The ground between the two armies was a plain, and therefore it was resolved to place the cavalry in front of the phalanx. Never of reputation, like the infantry, it was at this time particularly ill-conditioned. The purchase and maintenance of the horses, imposed as a tax upon the wealthy, had been a duty ill-executed ; for the method even invited negligence. Not till the moment of exigency, when the men, whose turn it was for service, were already assembled, the horses were called for. The men least able in body, and least desirous of distinguishing themselves, were generally selected, or procured themselves to be named, for the cavalry ; and such horses, with such arms, accoutrements, and furniture, as were in the moment produced by those required to provide them, they were to take, and immediately proceed on service.

To these defective troops every circumstance invited the Theban generals immediately to oppose their cavalry ; always esteemed superior to most in Greece, and, at this time, not only carefully appointed and highly trained, but of considerable

S E C T.  
X.

July 8.  
Dodw.

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 6.  
c. 4. s. 11.

CHAP.

XXVI.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 4.  
s. 10. 12.

s. 13.

practice in service. Accordingly they, like the Lacedæmonians, placed their cavalry in front of their phalanx. With the cavalry therefore the action began. The Lacedæmonian horse were quickly routed, and in their flight disturbed the order of their own infantry. The Theban phalanx, formed in column fifty deep, then, according to the preconcerted plan, charged the Lacedæmonian line, formed only twelve deep, in that part where the king had his station. The assault was repelled, but Cleombrotus received a mortal wound. He was carried alive out of the action, but died soon after.

The able generals of the Thebans quickly restored order and animation to their troops; the impulse of the column was renewed, and one of the bloodiest actions ever known in Greece followed. Generally those killed in battle, while contest lasted, were few: defensive armour prevented rapid slaughter, till, an impression being made, and flight insuing, the shield and the breastplate lost their efficacy. But here equality of skill, force, and perseverance, made the contest doubtful while numbers fell. On the Lacedæmonian side, Deinon, one of the polemarcs commanding next under the king, Sphodrias, whose corruption had brought the enmity of Athens upon his country, and his worthier son Cleonymus, the friend of Archidamus son of Agesilaus, were killed. Then the whole right wing, unable any longer to withstand the pressure of the Theban column, retired; and shortly, as the Theban generals had foreseen, the left, less pressed,

s. 14.

s. 12.

retired nevertheless also, to avoid attack in flank. Without total loss of order, but not wholly without the carnage incident to flight, both reached their camp, and formed behind its intrenchment.

SECT. X.

This, and the advantage of the situation, a rising ground, stopped the pursuing victors: and then, the Lacedæmonians, resting on their arms, and looking on one another with astonishment, would, many of them, scarcely believe the transaction in which they had been partakers; for, within the reach of tradition, and, as it was believed, since the days of Lycurgus, a Lacedæmonian army had never before been defeated by inferior numbers; insomuch that throughout Greece it was generally reckoned next to impossible. Some therefore insisted that still the enemy should not be permitted to raise their trophy; that no truce should be solicited for the burial of the dead; that the bodies should be recovered arms in hand. But the surviving polemarchs, having learnt that, of seven hundred Spartans, scarcely three hundred remained alive; that, of those Lacedæmonians who had not the honor of the Spartan name, near a thousand had been killed<sup>34</sup>; that the allies, who had suffered less, were

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 6.  
c. 4. s. 15.

<sup>34</sup> It is not, I will own, to me very clear, from the text of Xenophon, whether the four hundred Spartans killed were or were not intended to be included in the expression τέτοιοι συμπάτετοι Λακεδαιμονίων, and I have not been fortunate enough to find any assistance from translators or commentators. The phrase altogether would lead one to suppose they were intended to be included, were not that construction rendered improbable, by the most authentic accounts of the proportion

C H A P. were nevertheless totally averse to fresh action,  
XXVI. and some of them so disaffected, as even to rejoice in the disaster, justly thought the most careful circumspection requisite, and rashness in enterprize to be utterly avoided. They called therefore a council of war ; and upon a deliberate review of circumstances, the necessity of soliciting a truce, for the burial of the slain, was admitted by all. The herald therefore was sent, and the truce was obtained.

Then the Thebans erected their trophy ; a trophy esteemed, under all its circumstances, the most glorious, and likely to be, in its consequences, among the most important, ever won in a battle of Greeks with Greeks. The Lacedæmonian commanders seem to have had no view to anything better than to defend themselves, in their present station, till succour might arrive from home. But the Theban generals, circumspect as enterprizing, would not venture assault upon their numbers and discipline, in a situation giving such advantage against the weapons of antiquity. They looked around to the opportunities, opened by an event

of Spartans to the other Lacedæmonians, on all other occasions, in the Lacedæmonian armies. In the Agesilaus (c. 3. s. 24.) Xenophon seems to assert that the number of Spartans killed at Leuctra was equal to that of the survivors, not in the army only, but all the survivors.

According to Diodorus the Bœotians were only six thousand, and he says they were joined by fifteen hundred foot and five hundred horse from Thessaly. It seems not very consistent with the far more authoritative account of Xenophon, that any such Thessalian force should have been at Leuctra ; but the Bœotian may probably have been greater than Diodorus has stated.

event so out of the expectation of all Greece, as SECT.  
X. that of the late battle. They hoped for extensive success in negotiation, through the credit so commonly following unlooked-for success in arms. They trusted that they might prevent the approach of relief from Peloponnesus; and, by merely intercepting supplies, they thought to compel the Lacedæmonian army to unconditional surrender.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

Affairs of GREECE, from the Elevation of THEBES, by the Battle of LEUCTRA, to the failure of the Attempt to extend the THEBAN SUPREMACY over GREECE, through Support from PERSIA.

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## SECTION I.

*Reception of News of the Battle of Leuctra, at Lacedæmon; at Athcn. Jason of Pheræ in Thessaly; Polydamas of Pharsalus: Jason elected Tagus of Thessaly: Power and great Views of Jason: Mediation of Jason between the Lacedæmonians and Thebans: Magnificent Preparation of Jason for the Pythian Festival: Death and Successors of Jason: Fall of the Thessalian Power.*

CHAP.  
XXVII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 4. s. 16.  
B. C. 371.  
Ol. 102. I.  
10 July.  
Dodw.

INTELLIGENCE of the fatal blow at Leuctra, carried to Lacedæmon, was borne with much réal magnanimity, and with all that affectation of unconcern, which the institutions of Lycurgus commanded. It happened to be the last day of the festival called the Naked Games; and the chorus of men was on the stage, before the assembled people, when the officer charged with the dispatches arrived. The ephors were present, as their official duty required, and to them the dispatches were delivered. Without interrupting the entertainment, they communicated the names of the slain to their relations, with an added admonition, that the women should avoid that

that clamorous lamentation, which was usual, and bear the calamity in silence. On the morrow all the relations of the slain appeared as usual in public, with a deportment of festivity and triumph, while the few kinsmen of the survivors, who showed themselves abroad, carefully marked, in their appearance, humiliation and dejection.

It was a large proportion of the best strength of the commonwealth that, after so great a loss in the battle, remained in a danger not in the moment to be calculated. Every exertion therefore was to be made to save it. Of six moras, Xenoph. Hel. I. 6. c. 4. s. 17. into which, for military purposes, the Lacedæmonian people were divided, the men of four, within thirty years after boyhood (such was the term, meaning perhaps the age of about fourteen<sup>1</sup>) had marched under Cleombrotus; those however being excepted who bore at the time any public office. The ephors now ordered the remaining two moras to march, together with those of the absent moras, to the fortieth year from boyhood, and no longer allowing exception for those in office. The command, Agesilaus being s. 18. not yet sufficiently recovered to take it, was committed to his son Archidamus. Requisitions were at the same time hastened off for the assistance of the allies; and the Lacedæmonian interest, or the interest adverse to the pretensions and apprehended purposes of Thebes, so prevailed in Tegea, Mantinea, Phlius, Corinth, Sicyon, and throughout the Achæan towns, that the contingent of troops,

<sup>1</sup> This expression has been already noticed in Note 19. Ch. 25. Sect. 4. of this History.

CHAP. troops, from all those places, was forwarded with  
XXVII. alacrity.

Meanwhile the leading Thebans, meaning to pay a compliment that might promote their interest in Athens, had hastened thither information of their splendid success. But the impression made by this communication was not favorable to their views: on the contrary, it showed that the jealousy, formerly entertained so generally among the Athenians toward Lacedæmon, was already transferred to Thebes. Thus the incessant quarrels among the Grecian republics, source indeed of lasting glory to some, brought however, with their decision, neither lasting power, nor lasting quiet to any; but, proving ever fertile in new discord, had a constant tendency to weaken the body of the nation. The Grecian statesmen, quick, penetrating, and every way able, but circumscribed in means, and led by circumstances to take a deep interest in petty politics, and give their minds eagerly to narrow views, appear not to have had leisure to look abroad, so as to advert to the ready possibility of some potentate arising, capable of crushing all their divided republics together. The cotemporary historian indeed, in the quiet of his banishment, speculating, not with view confined by little and local interests, nor with the crude ideâs of a closet-politician, but with the extended ken of one who, in the poets phrase, ‘had seen the ‘ cities, and observed the manners and the policy ‘ of many men,’ was aware not only that this might be, but that the formidable phenomenon already existed.

Homer,  
Odyssee,  
init.

Relief

Relief to Lacedæmon, in its pressing danger, came, not from its own exertion, not from the interest which all the Grecian republics had in preventing Thebes from acquiring that overbearing dominion, with which Lacedæmon had oppressed them, but from a power newly risen, or revived, in a corner of the country, whence, for centuries, Greece had not been accustomed to apprehend anything formidable. **JASON**, of Pheræ in Thessaly, was one of those extraordinary men, in whom superior powers of mind and body sometimes meet. He was formed to be a hero, had he lived with Achilles; and, as a politician, he could have contended with Themistocles or Pericles. He had the advantage of being born to eminence in his own city, one of the principal of Thessaly; and he appears to have acquired there a powerful popularity. Little informed however of the early part of his life, we find him mentioned as general of the Pheræans about six years before the battle of Leuctra, and commanding a force sent to assist Neagenes, chief of Histiae in Eubœa. In the contests of faction, in Thessaly, it was become common to employ mercenary troops. Jason excelled in diligence in training such troops, in courage and skill in commanding them, and in the arts by which he attached them to his interest.

Of the state of Thessaly, at this time, altogether, we may form some judgement from what the cotemporary historian has related of Pharsalus, one of its most considerable cities. The leaders of the factions, by which Pharsalus was torn, at length, weary of ruinous contest, came to an

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 1. s. 4.  
Diodor.  
l. 15.

Xen. Anab.  
l. 1. c. 6.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 1. s. 2.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

an extraordinary agreement. Fortunately they had a fellowcitizen, Polydamas, eminent throughout Thessaly for high birth, large possessions, and that splendid hospitality for which the Thessalians were distinguished, but more singularly eminent for integrity. To this man the Pharsalians committed the command of their citadel, and the exclusive management of their public revenue, giving him altogether a princely authority. In so extraordinary and invidious an office, Polydamas had the talents and the good fortune to succeed in everything, except in opposing the ambition of the too politic and powerful Jason. Tyrant, according to one party, chief of the patriots, as the other would call him, in his own city, Pheræ, Jason had proceeded to bring most of the Thessalian cities, some by policy, some by arms, under that kind of subjection, which so commonly in Greece was intitled confederacy. The strength of Pharsalus, directed by the abilities of Polydamas, was exerted to protect them. But Pharsalus itself was threatened, when Jason sent a proposal for a conference with the chief, which was accepted. In this conference the Pheræan avowed his ‘intention to reduce Pharsalus, and the towns dependent upon Pharsalus, to dependency upon himself; but declared that it was his wish to effect this rather by negotiation than by violence, and with benefit to Polydamas, rather than to his injury. It was in the power of Polydamas,’ he said, ‘to persuade the Pharsalians; but, that it was not in his power to defend them, the result of all his recent efforts sufficiently

sufficiently showed. For himself, he was resolved to hold the first situation in Greece; the second he offered to Polydamas. What their advantages would be, if a political union took place, Polydamas as well as himself could estimate. The cavalry of all Thessaly, which would be united under them, was not less than six thousand strong: the heavy-armed infantry exceeded ten thousand; the numerous inhabitants of the surrounding mountains, subjects of the Thessalian cities, were excellent targeteers. In addition to this force then, he had six thousand mercenaries in his pay; a body such as, for choice of men, and perfection of discipline, no commonwealth of Greece possessed. Some estimate might be formed of his means, from his success in bringing under his dominion or patronage the Thessalian cities, of which Phar-salus had been the patronizing power: his military force had been made conspicuous in the reduction of the Maracs, the Dolopians, and the powerful Alectas, chief of Epirus, who all owned subjection to him. The Bœotians, with all the states of their confederacy, were his allies, and ready to admit him for their leader in the war against Lacedæmon, from whose overbearing power they apprehended oppression; and the Athenians, it was well known, were desirous of his alliance. But connection with Athens did not suit his views; for the Athenians affected to be the first maritime power of Greece, and he meant to make Thessaly the first maritime power of Greece; which he thought even easier than to acquire

CHAP. ‘ acquire imperial preëminence on land, which  
XXVII. ‘ was nevertheless his purpose. The three neces-  
‘ saries to naval power were timber, hands, and  
‘ revenue. With the former, Athens was sup-  
‘ plied from Macedonia, which lay much more  
‘ conveniently for the supply of Thessaly. With  
‘ the second, their Penestian subjects were a  
‘ resource, to which Athens had nothing equal.’  
(The Penestians were a conquered people, reduced  
to a kind of vassalage under the Thessalians, for  
whom they performed menial and laborious offices,  
but were not held in a slavery so severe and  
degrading as the Helots of Laconia, for we find  
them admitted to that military service, the cavalry,  
which was generally reckoned, among the Greeks,  
to assort only with rank above the lowest citizens.)  
‘ For revenue then, not only their country was  
‘ incomparably richer, but instead of deriving a  
‘ forein revenue from a few little scattered islands,  
‘ whenever Thessaly was united under one chief,  
‘ all the surrounding tribes of their continent had  
‘ paid them tribute.’

It had been a practice of the Thessalian re-  
publics, always acknowleging some common bonds  
of union, to appoint, for extraordinary occasions,  
a common military commander, a captain-general  
of the Thessalian nation, with the title of Tagus<sup>2</sup>.  
To this high rank and great command Jason  
aspired,

<sup>2</sup> The Thessalian title Tagus seems to have been the same word with the Teutonic *Toga*, *a Leader*; and perhaps the Latin *Dux* has been only another variety of it; whence the verb *dux*, as, in the Greek, *ταγιώτερος* from *ταγός*. *Heretoga*, literally *Armyleader*, was the Anglosaxon word for a *General*, and, in the coarser language of modern Germany, our title of *Duke* is expressed by the word *Hertog*.

Demosth.  
*ταγίωτερος*.  
p. 173, ed.  
Reiske.

aspired, and the approbation of the Pharsalian government, it appears, was necessary. But he was far from so confining his views. Even the command of all Greece did not suffice for his ambition. ‘ That all Greece might be reduced under their dominion,’ he observed to Polydamas, ‘ appeared probable from what he had already stated : but he conceived the conquest of the Persian empire to be a still easier achievement ; the practical proof, afforded by the return of the Cyreian Greeks, and by the great progress made, with a very small force, by Agesilaus, leaving this no longer a matter of meer speculation.’

Polydamas, in reply, admitted the justness of Jason’s reasoning ; but alleged his own connection with Lacedæmon, which he would at no rate betray, as an objection that appeared to him insuperable. Jason, commanding his fidelity to his engagements, freely consented that he should go to Lacedæmon, and state his circumstances ; and if he could not obtain succour which might give him reasonable hope of successful resistance, then he would stand clearly excused, both to his allies and to his fellowcitizens, in accepting the proposal made to him. The communication of this extraordinary transaction, by Polydamas, to the Lacedæmonian government, afforded the cotemporary historian the means of becoming acquainted with it. The Lacedæmonians, pressed at that time by a land war, against which they could scarcely protect their allies, while the hostile fleet of Athens commanded the seas, after three days

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 1. s. 5.

CHAP. debate on the difficult proposition, liberally acknowledging their inability to give certain protection to Polydamas and the Pharsalians against Jason, and therefore left it to them to consult their own interest.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 1. s. 6.

Polydamas, returning then into Thessaly, requested and obtained from Jason, that he should hold, under his own peculiar command, the citadel of Pharsalus, which had been, in a manner so honourable to him, intrusted to his charge. For security of his fidelity to his new engagements, he surrendered his children as hostages. The Pharsalians, persuaded to acquiesce, were admitted to terms of peace and friendship by Jason, who was then elected, without opposition, tagus of Thessaly.

The first object of Jason, in his high office, was to inquire concerning the force which the whole country, now acknowledging him its constitutional military commander, could furnish; and it was found to amount to more than eight thousand horse, full twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, and targeteers enough, in the cotemporary historian's phrase, for war with all the world. His next care was the revenue, which might enable him to give energy to this force. Jason was ambitious, but not avaricious, and he desired to have willing subjects. He required therefore from the dependent states, around Thessaly, only that tribute which had been formerly assessed, under the tagus Scopas.

At the time of the battle of Leuctra, Jason was already this formidable potentate, and he was

Ibid. &  
Diodor.  
I. 15. c. 60.

then in alliance with Thebes. When therefore the Thebans sent to the Athenian people an account of that splendid action, they did not fail to communicate the intelligence also to the tagus of Thessaly ; and they added a request for his co-operation, toward the complete overthrow of the tyranny, so long exercised by the Lacedæmonians, over the Greek nation. The circumstances were altogether such as Jason was not likely to look upon with indifference. Having ordered a fleet to be equipped, he put himself at the head of his mercenaries, who were his standing army, and, taking the cavalry in the moment about him, he began his march. A war then existed between the Thessalians and Phocians, of that extreme enmity, sometimes regularly declared among the Greeks, in which all communication, even by heralds, was interdicted ; and of course no quarter was regularly allowed, nor could any step toward an accommodation easily be taken. Nevertheless, with his escort so hastily assembled, he ventured to traverse their country ; and entering some of the towns before even intelligence of his approach had reached them, and getting far forward before anywhere numbers could be collected capable of opposing him, he reached Boeotia without loss ; showing, as the cotemporary historian observes, how much dispatch may often do more than force.

Jason, the ally of Thebes, was connected, not indeed by political alliance, but by public and hereditary hospitality, with Lacedæmon. Pleased with the humiliation of his hosts, he was not

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 6.  
c. 4. s. 20.

S E C T.

D.

s. 21.

CHAP.

XXVII.

Xen. Hell.

I. 6. c. 4.

s. 22—25.

desirous that his allies should become too powerful. On reaching the Theban camp, therefore, demurring to the proposal of the Theban generals, for an immediate attack upon the Lacedæmonians, he became the counsellor of peace; and, acting as mediator, he quickly succeeded so far as to procure a truce. The Lacedæmonians hastened to use the opportunity for reaching a place of safety. They decamped in the evening; and trusting more, says Xenophon, to concealment and speed, than to Theban faith, for their secure march across the plain, they reached Cithæron before dawn; and, still not free from alarm, in pressing their rugged way across the mountains, they did not halt till they came to Aigostheni in the Megaric territory. There they were joined by Archidamus, with the troops sent from Lacedæmon for their relief. By their safe arrival, however, in a friendly territory, the great object of the expedition being accomplished, Archidamus returned to Corinth, dismissed the allies, and led the Lacedæmonians home<sup>3</sup>.

s. 27.

Jason, after having thus acted as arbiter of Greece, hastened his return to Thessaly. In his way through the hostile province of Phocis, with leisure to excrise his vengeance, for which he had not before wanted strength, he confined it to the little town of Hyampolis, whose suburbs and territory

<sup>3</sup> This simple narrative of Xenophon, certainly not flattering to his friends, would earn credit, without the authority of his name. The account, given by Diodorus, of the junction of the force under Archidamus with the retreating army, and of their separation afterward for shame, is among the stories to be found in his work, beneath serious criticism.

territory he wasted, killing many of the people. SECT  
 The Lacedæmonian colony of Heracleia was then I.  
 to be passed. He had served Lacedæmon at Leuctra, because he thought it for his interest, and he would, without scruple or fear, injure Lacedæmon, in its colony of Heracleia, because the prosperity of that colony would obstruct his views. Heracleia was most critically situated, for commanding the only easily practicable communication between the countries northward and southward. He therefore demolished the fortifications; evidently not fearing, says Xenophon, that, by laying the passage open, he should indanger his own country, but providing that none, by holding the command of the pass, should prevent him from marching into the southern provinces, whenever he might desire it.

Decidedly now the greatest potentate of Greece; Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 4. s. 28. powerful, not by his own strength alone, but by his numerous alliances, while on all sides his alliance was courted, Jason proposed to display his magnificence at the approaching Pythian games. He had commanded all republics, owning the s. 29. authority of the tagus of Thessaly, to feed oxen, sheep, goats, and swine, for the sacrifices; and he proposed the reward of a golden crown for the state which should produce the finest ox, to lead the herd for the god. By a very easy impost on them severally, he collected more than a thousand oxen, and ten thousand smaller cattle. He ap- s. 30. pointed a day, a little before the festival, for assembling the military force of Thessaly; and the expectation in Greece was, that he would

**C H A P. XXVII.** assume to himself the presidency. Apprehension arose that he might seize the treasure of Delphi; insomuch that the Delphians consulted their oracle, for directions from the god for their conduct on the occasion. The answer, according to report, was similar to what had been given to their fore-fathers, when Xerxes invaded Greece, ‘ that the care of the treasure would be the god’s own concern.’

Ch. 8. s. 4.  
of this Hist.

Xen. Hell.  
l. 6. c. 4.  
n. 31, 32.  
Diodor.  
l. 15. c. 60.  
B. C. 370.  
Ol. 102. <sup>2</sup>.  
May.

Before the period for the splendid display arrived, this extraordinary man, after a review of the Pheræan cavalry, sitting to give audience to any who might have occasion to speak to him, was assassinated by seven youths, who approached with the pretence of stating a matter in dispute among them. The attending guards, or friends of the tagus, killed one of them on the spot, and another as he was mounting his horse; but the rest so profited from the confusion of the moment, and the opportunities which circumstances throughout Greece commonly afforded, that they effected their escape. What was the provocation to this murder, or the advantage proposed from it, we are not informed. No symptom appears of any political view: no attempt at a revolution is noticed by the historian; but what he mentions to have followed, marks, at the same time, the popularity of Jason among the Thessalians, and the deficient ideas, equally of morality and true policy, generally prevailing through Greece. The brothers of the deceased, Polydorus and Polyphephon, were appointed jointly to succeed to the dignity of tagus: the assassins could find no refuge

refuge in Thessaly; but in various cities of other parts of Greece they were received with honor: SECT. I.  
 proof, says the cotemporary historian, how vehemently it was apprehended that Jason would succeed in his purpose, of making himself sovereign of the country. Such was the unfortunate state of Greece: in the weakness of its little republics, men were compelled to approve means the most nefarious, where other prospect failed, by which their fears were relieved, and present safety procured. Thus assassination became so generally creditable, or at least so little uncreditable, that hope of safety, through speed in flight, was always afforded to the perpetrators.

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## SECTION II.

*Partiality, among the Peloponnesians, for the Lacedæmonian Supremacy. Congress at Athens: Cessation of Jealousy of Persia: Opposition of Elis to the Proposal for the universal Independency of Grecian Cities. Irritating Conduct of the Democratical Party in Mantinea toward Lacedæmon. Evils resulting from the separate Independency of Cities. Liberal Project of the Tegeans for a Union of the Arcadian Cities illiberally executed: Violent Interference of the Mantineians: Arbitrary assumption of Authority by the Lacedæmonians: Union of Arcadia accomplished, and Megalopolis founded.*

THE event of the battle of Leuctra made a great impression throughout Greece. In many republics joy prevailed, at the glorious success of a rising, lately an oppressed, people, against those who had long been looked upon, by one party, at least through the nation, as common oppressors; SECT. II.

**C H A P.** and many individuals, and some states, before  
**XXVII.** cautious of avowing friendliness to the Theban cause, were now ready to join in war against Lacedæmon. But others, of more circumspection and better foresight, were aware that, under the political circumstances of Greece, in raising a new state to preëminence, they were only raising new oppressors. In Peloponnesus a more general jealousy arose, of the acquisition of imperial sway by a state beyond the peninsula; and wherever the aristocratical interest prevailed, an apprehension of democratical tyranny struck with horror. Under Lacedæmonian supremacy, the Peloponnesian states, collectively, had held a superiority among those of the Grecian name; which must be lost, if Thebes became the leading power of Greece. Communication therefore being held among the Peloponnesian cities, it was resolved, that the supremacy of Lacedæmon should be supported; and that the troops of all the confederated republics should be bound, as formerly, to attend the call of the Lacedæmonian government, and march wherever the Lacedæmonians should lead.

In the contest of Thebes with Lacedæmon, the leaders of the Athenian councils, generally able and moderate men, seem always to have had in view to hold the balance between them, and to avoid a decided connection with either. When, after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans urged the utter overthrow of Lacedæmon, with the pretence that the common welfare of Greece required it, the Athenians, justly jealous of the growing power of

of Thebes, refused to concur; but when advantage was taken of the pause of hostility, which the mediation of Jason procured, to renew, among the Peloponnesian states, that union of military force under Lacedæmonian authority, which would restore to Lacedæmon its former means of oppression, a jealousy no less just, arose, of the revival of Lacedæmonian empire. The Athenian government then resolved upon a measure becoming the dignity of their city, and, as those judging with the ordinary measure of human foresight might not unreasonably suppose, most likely to promote the quiet and welfare of Greece; inviting a congress of deputies, from all the states, which had been parties to the peace of Antalcidas, to assemble in Athens.

We can however scarcely, without some wonder, observe the easy manner in which the able historian of these times repeatedly mentions the peace of Antalcidas, by the description of ‘the peace ‘which the KING prescribed,’ or ‘the terms ‘which the KING commanded<sup>4</sup>.’ Not only he so speaks of it in his own person, but the same description is attributed by him to speakers before the congress of the Grecian states; and it occurs even in a decree of the Athenian people, which he has reported. In vain then shall we look for explanation of this phenomenon from later antient authors. Of whatever concerns the politics of the republican times, the writers under the Roman empire, Greek as well as Latin, have perverted much,

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 3.  
s. 5, 6.

c. 5. s. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Βασιλεὺς προστάτει. Xen. Hel. l. 6. c. 3. s. 5. Βασιλεὺς ἵγεαψε. s. 6. Βασιλεὺς κατίπιμψε. c. 5. s. 1 & 2.

**C H A P.** much, and elucidated very little. A collation  
**XXVII.** however of the extant works of cotemporaries,  
 orators, philosophers, and sometimes the comic  
 poet, with the historian, will often furnish light,  
 and always the surest, wherever any may be  
 wanting, for the generally very perspicuous nar-  
 rative, which Xenophon, writing for those familiar  
 with the circumstances of the times, has, in some  
 few parts, left obscure for late posterity.

It is evident that all dread of the Persian power,  
 any farther than as Persian wealth might inable  
 one party, in a divided nation, to overbear another,  
 had long ceased among the Greeks ; and that,  
 since the return of the Cyreians, but still more,  
 since the expedition of Agesilaus, the hope of con-  
 quering Persia had superseded the fear of conquest  
 from that decaying empire<sup>5</sup>. But the want of a  
 mediator in the endless differences of their num-  
 erous little republics, was constantly and pressingly  
 felt ; and when the king of Persia, who, from his  
 superiority in wealth and extent of dominion,  
 was commonly called the great king, or often  
 simply the king, ceased to repel as an object of  
 terror, none would be so likely to attract as an  
 object of respect. It is remarkable that the peace  
 of Antalcidas, so reprobated by declaimers of  
 aftertimes as the reproach of Greece, the first  
 great symptom of her degeneracy, was received  
 by a large majority of the republics, as a kind of  
 charter of Grecian freedom, and as such is men-  
 tioned by Xenophon ; a charter to secure them  
 against

<sup>5</sup> Μὴ Ἀγταλκίδας ἐλθῃ ἵχωρ χείμαστα παρὰ Βασιλίως—(Xen.  
 Hel. 1. 6. c. 3. s. 6.) was the fear of the opponents of Lase-  
 daenion.

against oppression, not from the Persian king, but SECT.  
II. from their fellowcountrymen<sup>6</sup>. The congress, Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 5. s. 2. desired by the Athenians, met: no officer of the great king's attended: no symptom of Persian influence appeared: but the Athenians proposed, and the congress approved, an oath to be taken by the several deputies, in the name of their respective republics, which remains reported by Xenophon, thus: 'I will abide by the terms of the peace which the king sent, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies; and if any state, partaking in this oath, shall be attacked, I will assist it with all my strength.' This congress seems to have been composed of deputies from nearly every state of Greece; and, among them, the Eleian alone, insisting that Elis should retain its sovereignty over the people of Marganeæ, Scillus, s. 3. and Triphylia, objected to the Athenian proposal: the rest, even the Lacedæmonians, acceded to it, with expression of much satisfaction.

It is obvious that, under that supremacy of Lacedæmon, which a strong party through the Peloponnesian cities was desirous of supporting, Greece could not be truly free. Yet events immediately following the formal abolition of that supremacy, by the treaty of Athens, sufficiently account for the politics of that party, as they evince that, when delivered from the sovereignty of one state over the rest, Greece was still incapable of supporting freedom. The detail, as it is reported by the same able writer from whom we have

<sup>6</sup> In this view of the business we find Isocrates recommending adherence to the συνθήκας γενομένας μὲν πρὸς βασιλία καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους, de Pace, p. 178. t. 2. ed. Aver.

C H A P. have the account of the expedition of Cyrus, if it  
XXVII. should not, like the detail of that expedition, interest the imagination, will however offer political lessons of superior value ; and the circumstances will require the more attention, as they were the immediate causes of that political decrepitude, in which the Grecian republics ceased to have importance among the affairs of nations, long before they fell all an easy prey to a foreign power.

We have seen that, very soon after the conclusion of the treaty called the peace of Antalcidas, or the king's peace, the Lacedæmonians, whose measure that treaty really was, by a violence very contrary to its tenor, compelled the Mantineians to abandon their town, and separate themselves in villages. To those of higher rank, in general, this was not totally disagreeable ; because, whatever inconveniences it might bring, and whatever obstruction to a soaring ambition, it secured them against an odious subjection to the capricious despotism of the assembled multitude, and made that political power, which the Lacedæmonians allowed them, safe in their hands. But, the treaty of Athens again declaring, for every Grecian state, its right of separate independency, and warranting that right, the leaders of the democratical party, among the Mantineians, thought the moment favorable for attempting to regain their former superiority. With this view they proposed the reëstablishment of the capital of their little state, with the restoration of their common assembly ; and they encouraged their adherents, by observing, that the late treaty would secure them against the imperious

imperious interference of Lacedæmon, which was a party to that treaty. The proposal became extensively popular; and, in general assembly, it was decreed, that the families from the old capital should reassemble there, and that the place should be immediately fortified.

SECT.

II.

This gave great uneasiness in Lacedæmon. The party adverse to the Lacedæmonian interest would command in Mantinea; the friends of Lacedæmon would be oppressed; and the measure would appear, in the eyes of all Greece, to be taken in contempt of Lacedæmon: but, by the treaty just concluded, any forcible interference was too directly forbidden, to be, without offence to all Greece, attempted. It happened that Agesilaus had extensive personal interest, and family interest, in Mantinea<sup>8</sup>. Under the existing difficulties, therefore, it appeared the best resource, that the king himself should go to Mantinea, and manage negotiation with its people.

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 6.  
c. 5. §. 4.

For a prince who, at the head of armies, had been the avenger of his country against the Persian empire, had not only secured Europeän Greece, but had extended protection to all the Greeks of Asia, and spred terror among the enemies of the Grecian name, even to the great king upon his distant throne, it must have been a humiliating office to go, as minister from the government of his country, to solicit the people of a little neighboring state, accustomed to receive his commands. Probably, in the existing situation of his country and of Greece, he saw the importance of the object

<sup>8</sup> He was πατρίκης φίλος there, a friend by inheritance,

**CHAP.** object too strongly to desire to avoid the mission;  
**XXVII.** but the expression of the historian, his friend and panegyrist, implies that he was liable to be commanded on it: the Lacedæmonians, says Xenophon, sent Agesilaus as their ambassador to the Mantineians.

The republicans of Greece, like some in modern times, we find were liable to be strangely deceived by the names of liberty and sovereignty. The leaders of that party, calling itself democratical, which now ruled Mantinea, fearing the popularity of Agesilaus, would not allow the people, nominally their sovereign, to receive him in general assembly, and hear his proposals. They compelled him to confine his communication to themselves. Any very satisfactory result he could little expect; but, in the hope of saving appearances for Lacedæmon, without having recourse to arms, he promised that, if the Mantineians would only stop the immediate prosecution of their fortifications, he would ingage for the consent of the Lacedæmonian government to all they desired. Tho they must have seen urgent danger to the commonwealth in the refusal, yet the Mantineian leaders encouraged by support from some neighboring states, and perhaps foreseeing injury to the cause of their party from any concession, gave, for their final answer, ‘ that the decree passed by ‘ The Mantineian people could not be rescinded.’ Already, from some of the Arcadian states, workmen were arrived to assist them, and the Eleians had sent three talents in silver, toward defraying the expence. Completely therefore disappointed of

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 5. s. 5.

of the object of his humiliating mission, Agesilaus left Mantinea : highly irritated, as the historian SECT.  
II. his friend confesses ; but nevertheless holding his opinion, that to resort to arms would be to violate the treaty, so lately concluded, warranting independency to every Grecian state, and must therefore be avoided.

The evils of a general war thus yet but hovered over Greece ; tho, after what had passed, they were little likely to remain long suspended. But, in a country so constituted, the suspension of general war did not bring general tranquillity. On the contrary, the prohibition of external interference, by the late treaty, to which the Lacedaemonian king and government so scrupulously deferred, was as the word for sedition to begin action, within each little republic. It was under the sanction of a general peace, warranting universal independency, that confiscations, expulsions, the ruin of families, and the horrors of assassination and massacre, most abounded. In Argos, Megara, Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, Phialeia, Tegea, the circumstances were remarkable enough to demand the historian's notice. In Tegea principally they became implicated with the thread of Grecian history, which it will be advantageous at present to pursue.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 5. s. 28.

Diod. I. 15.  
c. 40 & 58.

The success of the democratical chiefs of Mantinea, in recovering preponderance to their party and the principal power to themselves, by a measure which had the credit of restoring vigor and importance to their little country, excited the attention

**CHAP.** attention of those of Tegea<sup>9</sup>. But Tegea, under  
**XXVII.** an aristocratical administration, having a single  
 and united government, no proposal of innovation,  
 confined to the narrow bounds of the Tegean  
 dominion, seemed likely to answer their purpose.  
 They put forward therefore the bold project of  
 uniting all Arcadia : ‘Thus alone,’ they said, ‘the  
 ‘ peace of Arcadia could be established, and thus  
 ‘ alone Arcadia could have its just weight and  
 ‘ respect among the Grecian powers.’

This proposal, in itself teeming with public and private benefits, could be objectionable only for the manner of carrying it into execution. But it was the measure of a party ; whose object would be very incompletely attained, if it did not raise the interest of that party upon the ruin of those actually holding the power in Tegea. By these therefore it was opposed ; and Stasiippus, a man of superior character, at the head of them, exerted himself so effectually, that the sovereign assembly rejected the innovation, and determined that the ancient constitution of Arcadia should preserve unaltered.

In the usual violence of Grecian faction, the progress was generally ready from civil controversy to civil war : for the former so commonly involved banishment, and even death, that the step beyond was often thought scarcely a step toward greater danger.

<sup>9</sup> The party is not here specified by Xenophon, but circumstances clearly show it to have been the democratical ; and this is afterward directly indicated :—*ομίσαλθες*, says the historian, speaking of that party, *ει συνίλθεις ο δῆμος πολὺ ἀντώνθης προσῆσαι*. Xen. Hel. 1.6. c. 5. s. 7.

danger. Proxenus, therefore, and Callibius, leaders of the democratical party, did not scruple to resolve upon contest in arms, rather than yield their purpose. Their hope was in force of numbers : the people, they thought, would be with them : and they had moreover confidence, that the democratical party, now ruling Mantinea, would not be scrupulous, like Agesilaus and the Lacedæmonian administration, but would support, against any treaty, a measure in a neighboring state, in which their own party-interest was implicated. In the former hope they were deceived, for being driven, through discovery of their purpose, to take arms prematurely, the adherents, which the liberal administration of Stasippus had conciliated, were found to equal them in numbers ; and, in a conflict which followed, within the town, they had the advantage, and Proxenus was killed. Stasippus according to the honorable testimony of the cotemporary historian, averse to the slaughter of fellow citizens, checked pursuit. What followed unfortunately proved the imprudence of this liberality and humanity ; and would of course prompt, on another such occasion, conduct that would be grossly illiberal and inhuman, where better manners are established, and yet, among the Greeks, was so often necessary to self-preservation, that it might hardly deserve to be called inhuman or even illiberal. The defeated fled to the gate leading toward Mantinea ; and there, finding themselves not pursued as they had expected, they halted, and entered into conference with the victors. Their chiefs, as soon as they

SECT.  
II.  

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Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 6.  
c. 5. s. 7

CHAP.  
XXVII.

had found their measures for taking arms discovered, had sent to Mantinea, only twelve miles off, for assistance, and they now sent again to hasten that assistance. Managing then to prolong the conference, till the Mantineian forces arrived, they opened the gate to receive them.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 5, s. 9.

s. 10.

Stasippus perceived the treachery, in time only to withdraw to the opposite gate ; so closely pursued, that he stopped at a temple of Diana, from whose sacredness he hoped for personal security. His enemies however, disposed to respect neither real nor imaginary duties, mounted on the walls, unroofed the building, and assailed those within with missile weapons. Unable to defend themselves, Stasippus and those with him surrendered at discretion. They were immediately bound, put into waggons, and so carried to Tegea : and, being quickly brought before a tribunal created for the occasion, in which Mantineians of the opposite party were allowed to sit, they were condemned, and presently executed. About eight hundred Tegeans then, thinking themselves unsafe in their own city, fled to Lacedaemon. Such, within a few months after the establishment of a general peace, upon the ground of universal independency, was the inauspicious beginning of a new war, which quickly involved all Greece.

The Mantineian's had now clearly put themselves in the wrong : they had broken the treaty of Athens, by their interference in the affairs of the Tegeans ; and it was not reasonably to be expected of the Lacedaemonians, it would have been neither becoming nor right, to leave the

atrocious crime, by which their friends in Tegea had suffered, unnoticed, and the survivors of those friends, who had taken refuge in Lacedæmon, unassisted. But the precise line of conduct, proper and prudent for Lacedæmon, under the existing circumstances, to hold, was perhaps not easy to determine; and that which the Lacedæmonian government took, seems to have been neither right nor prudent. Unable yet to resolve upon parting with that imperial authority, which they had so long exercised among the Grecian states, they did not make it so much their object to protect and reinstate the oppressed Tegeans, as to use the pretence for revenging themselves on the Mantineians. Apparently a congress of all Greece ought to have been called, such as that lately held in Athens; but they chose rather to take the law into their own hands. Without consulting, as far as appears, any other state, they decreed an expedition, assembled the force of Laconia, and appointed Agesilaus to command.

Meanwhile the democratical Tegean leaders, profiting diligently and ably from their success so nefariously obtained, and warmly supported by Mantinea, had accomplished their great and valuable project for a union of the Arcadian people<sup>10</sup>.

The

<sup>10</sup> According to Pausanias, whom Barthelemy, little, apparently, in the habit of weighing historical evidence, has implicitly followed, Epameinondas was the projector and patron, both of the restoration of Mantinea and of the foundation of Megalopolis. If he was so, it will appear, from the sequel, that his political foresight failed him on those occasions. We may however better take the cotemporary historian's account;

CHAP.  
XXVII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 6.  
c. 5. s. 11.  
Diod. l. 15.  
Pausan. l. 8.  
c. 27. & 33.

The measure became extensively popular. Orchomenus only of the Arcadian cities, instigated by inveterate enmity to Mantinea, and probably fearful of oppression from the influence which Mantinea would acquire, persevered in refusal to accede to it. In most of the others, a preponderant party concurred, with warm zeal, in founding a new city ; to be, with the name of Megalopolis, Great town, the common capital, the place of assembly for the general council, of the Arcadian people.

The Orchomenians, in thus separating themselves from their fellow-countrymen, did not hope to be allowed the quiet enjoyment of that independency, which they claimed as their right, transmitted from earliest times, and especially warranted by the late treaty. To support themselves therefore in the resolution they had taken, they engaged a body of mercenaries, which had been in the service of Corinth. This alarmed the Mantineans, who suspected the purpose of Orchomenus to be no longer defence but attack. While then the force of the rest of the confederated Arcadians assembled at Asea, to protect the country at large against the attack threatened from Lacedæmon, the Mantineans remained at home, for the particular defence of their own territory, against the apprehended malice of the Orchomenians. Such was the uneasy state of jealousy in which the Greeks, in their days of liberty,

who, political opponent as he was to Epameinondas, is really his best panegyrist. Ill-judging or careless zeal will often injure the cause it means to favour.

liberty, mostly lived, even in the short intervals of rest from internal sedition ; every township fearful SECT.  
II. of violence from the next.

This miserable restlessness, being rendered, by the political circumstances of Greece, habitual through the nation, would enhance the difficulty of, what in no circumstances could be easy, bringing a number of states to concur in a wise, liberal, and generally beneficial plan of union. We are little informed of the constitution of united Arcadia ; but we find party-purposes much, and perhaps unavoidably, considered in forming it ; for the union, probably, could not otherwise have been effected at all. The federal congresses, which we have seen already familiar in Greece, offered an example of something approaching that principle of representation, which the merit and fame of the English constitution have brought into universal estimation, among the politicians of modern Europe. But that valuable principle would have ill suited the means, however it might accord with the wishes of those whose support was from a democratical party. Their sovereign assembly therefore (judging, in the deficiency of accounts of it, from its title, which may be translated either the Ten-thousand or the Numberless<sup>"</sup>) was composed of the whole free population  
of

<sup>"</sup> Leunclavius translates the title of the general assembly of united Arcadia, *Decies mille*, Ten thousand. (Xen. Hel. 1. 7. c. 4. s. 2.) Amasæus, whose version of Pausanias Kuhnus has adopted, evidently embarrassed on the occasion, calls the place of its meeting, *Curia infinitæ prope Arcadum multitudini destinata*. Pausan. 1. 8. c. 32. The Greek is *οἱ μέγιοι*.

**CHAP. XXVII.** of Arcadia, or as much of it as could be brought together. The situation chosen for the new capital was not central, to give the greatest facility for meeting from all parts, but on the southern border, where, according to Diodorus, the leading men had the surest interest, and could most readily collect those whom they might influence in the decision of public measures. The facility which its neighborhood to the borders of Messenia and Laconia afforded, for supporting the one and attacking the other, induced the Theban leaders, principal patrons of the undertaking, to favor the choice. Otherwise, being in the vale through which the Alpheius runs, and not far from that river, it may perhaps have united more conveniences than could be readily found elsewhere, in so mountainous a country. The office of this numerous assembly was to direct, in chief, the military and political concerns of all Arcadia; while apparently every town, for its civil government, retained its former separate sovereignty.

## SECTION III.

*Invasion of Arcadia under Agesilaus: Superior Conduct of the Theban Leaders: Invasion of Laconia by the Army of the Theban Confederacy, under Epameinondas: Resolution of the Athenians to support Lacedaemon: Retreat of Epameinondas from Peloponnesus: Restoration of the Messenians: Distress of Sparta.*

**B.C. 370.** IT was already winter when Agesilaus entered  
 Ol. 102. 3. Arcadia with the Lacedæmonian army, reënforced  
 Xen. Hel. I. 6. c. 5. only by the contingents of the little towns of  
 s. 12 & 20. Lepreum

Lepreum and Heræa. The combined forces of Arcadia and Elis avoided a battle with him. Part of the Mantineian territory was plundered; and, in the skirmishing, attempted for its protection, the Lacedæmonian troops had generally the advantage. But Agesilaus in vain endeavored to force the enemy to a general action. Pressed, therefore, by the season, and, in some degree, satisfied with having a little raised the spirits of the Lacedæmonians, by a display of their superiority in the enemy's country, he returned into Laconia, and dismissed his forces.

S E C T.  
III.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 5. s. 21.

The leaders of the Theban councils were politicians, far superior to those who conducted the Lacedæmonian government. They had not neglected opportunities for extending the influence of Thebes among neighboring states: they had made diligent use of that which the interference of Lacedæmon in the affairs of Arcadia, or which the ready means open to them, through the deficiency of communication in Greece, to misrepresent that interference, afforded, for animating the long existing jealousy against Lacedæmon. The Phocians owned subjection to Thebes; a circumstance which the general weakness only of the surrounding states, together with the general violence of party-spirit, could have brought them to endure. Assembling then the Boeotian and Phocian forces by their own authority, they so well managed negotiation as to obtain the willing assistance of the Locrians, of both provinces of the name, of the Acarnanians, the Heracleots, the Malians, and of all the Eubœan towns. Deficient in funds for supplying

CHAP. XXVII. supplying those wants, to which so large an army as they collected, tho consisting of troops accustomed to supply themselves, would be liable in a winter campain, they borrowed from the Eleians ten talents, perhaps something more than two thousand pounds. Epameinondas was appointed to the command-in-chief.

s. 22.

The Lacedæmonian government, it appears, had either no intelligence of these great preparations, or no suspicion that anything important could follow during winter. Even the Arcadians did not expect it. Their forces were kept together only for the purpose of revenge against the little commonwealth of Heræa, whose territory they plundered and wasted. The Elcians alone had had that confidential communication with the Theban leaders, which induced them to wait in arms, in firm reliance on the approach of the Theban army.

s. 37.

Epameinondas did not disappoint their opinion of his activity and perseverance in enterprize. But, in entering Peloponnesus by Corinthia, he showed a want, either of that wise moderation and strict justice, which his general character, as delivered from antiquity, would give us to expect, or perhaps rather of that authority, which a man of such a character would have exerted, had he possessed it, to restrain the wickedness and folly of those committed to his command. The Corinthians, professing neutrality, had conducted themselves with cautious inoffensiveness toward all the belligerent commonwealths; yet, because they would not take arms against Lacedæmon, their

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 5. s. 19.

their antient ally, to support the aggression of Mantinea against Tegea, the army under Epameinondas exerted its power in vengeance: lands wasted, trees felled, and houses burnt, marked its destructive march.

S E C T.  
III.

The Arcadians were still busied in similar exertion against the Heræan territory, when intelligence reached them of the arrival of Epameinondas at Mantinea. Immediately they quitted the business of devastation, and hastened to join him. The Theban leaders, learning that the Lacedæmonian army had evacuated Arcadia, and was dismissed, in the usual way of the Greeks, for the winter, considered the purpose of their own winter-expedition as accomplished. The independency of Mantinea on Lacedæmonian command being secured, the friendly party in Tegea established in power, the disaffection of the little republic of Heraea punished, and the Theban interest in Peloponnesus altogether upon a good footing, they proposed to return home, and allow the usual season of rest also for their forces. But the internal weakness of Lacedæmon, less perceived by the more distant, began already to be justly estimated by the bordering states. The Eleians and Arcadians represented to the Thebans, ' that the sedition of Cinadon, which, without forein assistance, had threatened the overthrow of the Spartan government, was smothered, not extinguished, by his punishment; that, even if all the subjects of Sparta were faithful, still the excellent discipline of the Thebans, with the numbers of their allies, would make their army clearly

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 6.  
c. 5. s. 22.

s. 23. 25.

C H A P.

XXVII.

' clearly superior to any force the Lacedæmonians could bring into the field : but that, in fact, the spirit of revolt in Laconia wanted only promise of protection ; extreme discontent pervaded all under the highest rank of Lacedæmonian subjects ; and, if they marched immediately into the country, the Lacedæmonian government would be unable to collect a force that could attempt opposition to them.'

Diodor.  
l. 15. p. 499.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.  
p. 529. t. 1.  
& Agesil.  
p. 1120. t. 2.  
Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 5.  
a. 24, 25.

The numbers now assembled ready to join in the invasion of Laconia (if late writers may be believed for such a matter, where cotemporaries are silent) were no less than seventy thousand ; of whom, according to Plutarch, forty thousand were heavy-armed. Nevertheless the Theban generals objected the natural strength of the Lacedæmonian border, the principal passes of which they knew were guarded, and the usual advantages of those who fight within their own territory against strangers. They were still hesitating, when deserters successively came in from different parts ; all urging the invasion of their country, offering themselves for conductors, and agreeing in the assertion that, not only a disposition to revolt pervaded Laconia, but a large part of the people had already refused obedience to the summons for military service.

B.C. 369.  
Ol. 102. 3.  
January.  
Dodw.

These representations at length induced the Theban generals to accede to the wishes of their allies. The frontier of Laconia, against Arcadia and Argolis, is of that kind of rugged mountainous country, in which roads can scarcely be formed, but where streams have first found a course, and then,

then, in the line they have taken, gradually softened SECT.  
III. its roughness. The best way from Arcadia was

by Ion, in the district called Skiritis, near one of the sources of the Eurotas: another, but more difficult pass, led to Caryæ, on the brook Cenus, whose waters soon joined that river. It was re-

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 5. s. 26.

solved to penetrate at once by both these ways. The Peloponnesians undertook to force that by Ion, tho known to be guarded by a considerable body, consisting of Lacedæmonian neodamodes and refugee Tegeans, under the command of Ischolaus, a Spartan. The road by Caryæ was assigned to the Thebans; more difficult in itself, but unguarded. The Arcadians were successful against Ischolaus; who, with more courage than judgement, chusing ill his ground for opposing superior numbers, was surrounded, overpowered, and killed, with most of those under him. The Thebans, conducted by some deserters of the country, zealous in revolt, met the Arcadians near Caryæ. Descending then the mountains together, they burnt Sellasia, in the vale of the Eurotas, remarkable as the place where the haughty interdictions of the Lacedæmonian government, in its prosperity, had sometimes met the ministers of other states. The invading army now found nothing to forbid its progress; which it held along the left bank of the river, plundering and burning as it went. On the second day from Caryæ, it arrived at the bridge conducting immediately to Sparta. That city stood at a small distance from the river, on the right bank. The passage was strongly guarded, and the generals avoided the hazardous

s. 27.  
Ch. 20. s. 5.  
of this Ilist.

C H A P.

XXVII.

hazardous attempt to force it. Pillage and flames were spred among the numerous houses on the side where nothing opposed ; to the booty from which Xenophon attributes a value, marking a deviation from the antient Spartan simplicity, the ready consequence of conquests, forein commands, and the circulation of a public revenue.

Nor was it now any longer the time when the Spartan ladies could take and use arms like the men. Among the smaller Grecian states, the sight of an enemy, often recurring, became less terrible through familiarity. But, at Lacedæmon, for centuries, it had almost ceased to be supposed that an enemy could ever be seen there. To the Spartan ladies now, the sight even of the smoke, says the cotemporary historian, from the buildings fired by the invaders, was intolerable. Not only however the consternation of the fearful and inconsiderate, but the reasonable apprehension of the best informed and firmest, was very great. When those distinguished by the name of Spartans, who had arrogated all the powers of government, distrustful of others, endeavored to occupy the most accessible parts of the unwalled city, they found themselves in a manner lost in its extent. Distressed by the defection of some of their subjects, and uncertain of the fidelity of others, they had recourse to their slaves. Proclamation was made that ablebodied Helots, who would take arms, and faithfully exert themselves in defence of the country, should be rewarded with freedom. More than six thousand were inrolled ; and then the administration became fearful of the strength which itself had thus created.

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1. 6.  
c. 5. s. 28.

s. 29.

Soon

Soon however auxiliaries arrived, from Corinth, <sup>SEG. T.</sup> Sicyon, Pellenë, Phlius, Epidaurus, Trœzen; <sup>III.</sup> Hermionë, and Haliæ. The interest which bound these to the Lacedæmonian cause being thought secure, the first vehemence of alarm subsided.

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1. 7.  
c. 2. s. 2.

Meanwhile at Amyclæ, some way below Sparta, <sup>s. 30.</sup> the enemy had crossed the Eurotas, and turned their march toward the city, still marking the way with plunder and devastation. Their cavalry, composed of the united force of Elis, Thebes, Phocis, and Locris, with some Thessalian, powerful for a Grecian army, advanced as far as the hippodrome, or horsecourse, and the temple of Neptune, close to Sparta. The Lacedæmonian <sup>I. 6. c. 5.</sup> horse, advancing against it, were comparatively <sup>s. 31.</sup> so small a force as to appear contemptible: but a body of infantry, which had been concealed in the temple of the Tyndarids, issuing, and showing itself prepared to support the horse, the confederate cavalry retired; and the very superior numbers of the confederate infantry (so far the force of the Lacedæmonian fame prevailed) in some alarm, at the same time retreated. Agesilaus however would not allow pursuit. Ably disposing his troops in commanding situations, which the neighborhood of the city afforded, he always threatened but always avoided action. The confederates withdrew, but to no great distance, and incamped.

It seems implied, in the account of Xenophon, <sup>s. 32.</sup> that reputation, rather than strength, at this time saved Sparta. All accounts indeed mark that the numbers of the invaders far exceeded any ordinary force of Grecian armies. But that flood and

Xen. ut sup.  
& vit. Ages.  
Theopomp.  
apud Plut.  
vit. Ages.

hurricane

**C H A P.** hurricane of war, as another cotemporary autho  
**XXVII.** has called it, which the abilities of Epameinonda  
had been able to excite, and direct to a certain  
point, the abilities even of Epameinondas could no  
always duly command. Among his Bœotians he  
had never allowed any irregularity. He fortifiec  
his camp, and placed his guards and outposts  
always as if in presence of a superior enemy. But  
he could inforce no such order among the Arcadi-  
ans; whose practice was, when they had taken  
their ground, to lodge their arms, and wander  
for pillage. Unable directly to restrain their  
passion for plunder, Epameinondas was reduced to  
endeavor to give it the best direction. In a council  
of war, it was resolved, that to attempt anything  
farther against the city would be too hazard-  
ous. The march was therefore turned again down  
the course of the Eurotas; and, through the whole  
length of the vale to the sea, the unfortified towns  
and villages were pillaged and burnt. The army  
arrived, unresisted, at Gythium, the principal, or  
perhaps only naval arsenal of Lacedæmon, and  
that important place was invested. Numerous  
Laconian revolters, who joined by the way,  
assisted in the assaults which, for three days,  
were repeated against it, but without success.

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1. 6.  
c. 5. s. 35.  
Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 54.

Intelligence of the extreme danger of Lacedæ-  
mon, quickly conveyed to Athens, excited a strong  
sensation there; not from any popular friendship  
for Lacedæmon, but from apprehension for the  
common independency of Athens and of Greece,  
threatened by the growing predominance of Thebes.  
The council deemed the crisis important, and  
summoned

summoned the general assembly. Party-strife seems to have been at this time more than commonly moderate among the Athenians ; and no man had that commanding influence, which could decisively guide the public mind ; in the way of wisdom, like Pericles, or in the way of rashness and folly, like Cleon. Five ministers from Lacedæmon were allowed to speak first. Their purpose being to gain the utmost assistance from Athens, they endeavored to demonstrate, that the friendly connection between Athens and Lacedæmon, which the Lacedæmonians were desirous of cultivating, would produce great advantages to both parties. The Athenians saw the advantages, but they doubted the friendly disposition. A murmur went through the assembly : ‘ In the present pressure of circumstances, professions,’ it was observed, ‘ would of course be fair ; but, in a return of prosperity, the conduct of the Lacedæmonians would be the same as formerly.’ ‘ Yet,’ it was said, on the other side, ‘ at the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, when the Thebans would have subverted Athens, the better disposition of Lacedæmon saved it.’ This urged to recollection by the Lacedæmonian ministers, made a powerful impression ; and jealousy of Thebes went far to supply the want of confidence in Lacedæmon. Nevertheless the assembly was still divided ; some insisting that, ‘ the Mantineians being aggressors, the Athenians could do no otherwise than assist Lacedæmon, if they would not be false to the treaty they had sworn to ; while others, vehement in the democratical

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1. 6.  
c. 5. s. 34.

CHAP. ‘ critical cause, contended, that the interference  
XXVII. ‘ of the Matineians, in support of the democratical party in Tegea, against the oppression of ‘ Stasippus, had been right and just.’

The deficiency, or at least, the uncertainty of political principle, which the disputation, thus reported, without a comment, by so able a contemporary as Xenophon, shows to have been general in Greece<sup>12</sup>, appears, at this day, wonderful. The argument of the friends of the democratical cause, if allowed, would have justified the interference of Lacedæmon, or of Thebes, in every contest of faction, in every republic of Greece, in Athens itself; and the argument of those on the other side seems to have been directed, not to establish the general principle, that no commonwealth had a right to interfere in the internal concerns of another, but only the particular case, that the interference with arms, which the Mantineians had exercised in Tegea, was forbidden by the terms of the late treaty. After much discussion, it was not an Athenian, but the Corinthian and Phliasian ministers, who, by urging a particular fact, which interested the feelings of the Athenian multitude, decided the vote. ‘ Whether the Lacedæmonians or the Mantineians,’ the Corinthian Cleiteles said, ‘ in the instance in question have been aggressors, may be a matter of dispute not easily settled. But that, since the general peace, the Corinthians have committed hostility against no state, is sufficiently known. Nevertheless the Thebans,

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 6.  
c. 5. s. 37.

<sup>12</sup> That it was so, if Xenophon left any doubt about it, is confirmed by Isocrates, in his Archidamus.

' Thebans, in crossing our territory, have plundered and wasted it, as if an enemy's ; carrying off goods and cattle, burning houses, and felling cultivated trees. Can you then, without perjury, refuse us that assistance to which the treaty intitles the injured ?' The assembly became agitated ; murmur was vehement ; but the general voice went, that the observation of Cleiteles was pertinent and just.

S E C T.  
III

The Phliasian minister proceeded to profit from the effect produced by the Corinthian's speech.

' It was obvious,' he said, ' that, if the Thebans could once incapacitate Lacedæmon, Athens would be their next object ; because Athens then alone, of all the Grecian republics, would remain powerful enough to attempt resistance to their ambition, which evidently aspired to the dominion of Greece.' This being urged amid much flattery, adapted to the popular temper, was decisive. The multitude called impatiently for the question, and would hear no other speakers. By the vote which followed, the utmost strength of the commonwealth was to be exerted in assistance of Lacedæmon, and Iphicrates was appointed to the command.

*Xenoph.*  
*Hel. I. 6.*  
*c. 5. s. 38.*

The support, powerful as it promised to be, which was thus preparing for Lacedæmon, might have been too late to be effectual, if disregard of union, and neglect of discipline, growing with success, had not rendered it impossible for the able leader of the confederate army to command the exertion of the allies, or even to calculate the force that he could command. The Arcadians,

. 39.

. 40.

Argians and Eleians, in numbers, went off with unasked leave, to bear home the booty they had taken. Provisions meanwhile became scarce for the troops remaining; the season pressed, and Epameinondas found it adviseable to withdraw hastily out of Laconia.

Iphicrates was already in Arcadia, and opportunity was favorable for reducing the Theban army to great difficulty. But, through some party view, apparently, of which we have no information, he was not zealous in the command which he had undertaken. He had been much blamed for wasting time in Corinth, before he proceeded into Arcadia. Without attempting any annoyance to the Theban army, in its way through that difficult country, he withdrew again to Corinth. It was supposed that his purpose was to dispute the passage of the isthmus, and of the mountains, which he might have made highly hazardous, or perhaps have completely prevented: but his measures rather indicated intention to allow that free way which Epameinondas found. Xenophon, on former occasions the eulogist of Iphicrates, blames his conduct here in strong terms.

This invasion, wasteful but transient, such as Attica had several times suffered from its Peloponnesian enemies, was fatal to the power of Lacedæmon. When the forein foe was gone, rebellion still pervaded the country. A large part of those Laconians, distinguished by the name of Periæcians, and all the Helots, remained in revolt. The able leaders of Thebes took advantage of these circumstances, to imitate and extend the policy

policy of the Athenians, in the Peloponnesian war. They invited, from all parts, the relics of the Messenian race, to return to their former country, and take their place, once more, among the people of Greece. The chief body of them was that which, formerly, under Athenian protection, had held Naupactus in Ætolia, but, after the conquest of Athens, had been expelled by the Lacedæmonians. Some of these had found refuge among their kinsmen of Rhegium in Italy and Messena in Sicily; but the greater part had accepted an invitation from the Grecian colony of the Evesperitans in Africa, then pressed in war by the neighboring barbarians. This long unfortunate race now eagerly obeyed the call of the Thebans to return to the country of their fore-fathers, the fairest acquisition of the Heracleids, the most desirable territory in Peloponnesus, or perhaps in Greece. Epameinondas was patron of the new city of Messena, built at the foot of Mount Ithomë, famous in the antient wars with Lacedæmon, on whose summit was raised the citadel; but it seems probable that the Argian general Epiteles was the commander upon the spot, who protected the works. The returned Messenians did not spurn at association with rebelling Helots, and other slaves; all, or mostly, of Grecian origin, and many of Messenian blood.

Of the particulars, however, of this very interesting restoration, we have little satisfactory; Xenophon, in delicacy, apparently, to his Lacedæmonian friends, having studiously avoided even the mention of them, tho wanted for connection

SECT.  
III.

Strabo,  
1.7. &  
Plut. Ages.  
p.1124.t.2.

Pausan.  
l. 4. c. 26.

c. 28.

and elucidation of the rest of his narrative. . But he could not conceal that Messenia was torn from Lacedæmon ; and, for the rest, his testimony, dropped in a word here and there, confirms the concurring accounts of later writers, that it was restored to the descendants, or those reputed descendants, of the antient Dorian Messenians, with some mixture of other adventurers, for all whom, united, the Messenian name prevailed. The Asinæans and Nauplians, Dorians from Argolis, formerly established, as we have seen, by the Lacedæmonians on the Messenian coast, having been among those subjects of Sparta, who revolted, or favored the revolt, were allowed to retain their settlements, and admitted to political association with the restored people. Pausanias, zealous to prove that the returning emigrants were really Messenians, remarks that even their speech was not altered by their peregrination ; for, still in his time, after more than five hundred years, the Doric dialect was spoken in Messenia, in greater purity than in any other part of Peloponnesus.

Thus the province of Messenia, amounting to half their territory, was finally lost to the Lacedæmonians ; a possession however, of which, while they held it, their institutions seem to have denied them any very profitable use, unless it may be reckoned such to oppose a waste against invasion. But the retreat of the Theban army did not leave them masters even of all Laconia. The district called Skiritis, in that tract of lofty and rugged mountains, among which the Eurotas and the Alpheius, the largest rivers of Peloponnesus,

have

have their sources, continued in rebellion. The important town of Sellasia, at the upper end of the Spartan vale, on the great northern road, by which support might best come from eastern Arcadia and Argos, was held by the revolters. Pallenë<sup>13</sup>, in the western fork of the vale, up which, by the course of the Eurotas, the other principal northern way led, through Skiritis to western Arcadia and Elis, still held for Lacedæmon. But soon after the retreat of the invading army, while perplexity occurred on all sides for the Spartan government, the able general of the Arcadian forces, Lycomedes of Mantinea, returning unexpectedly, carried it by a sudden assault, and put those within to the sword.

SECT.  
III.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 21.

Diodorus.  
I.15. p. 492.

## SECTION IV.

*Bad arrangement of Military Command by the Popular Assembly of Athens: Second Invasion of Peloponnesus by the Thebans under Epameinondas. Lycomedes of Mantinea: Alienation of Arcadia from the Theban interest: Military merit of the Arcadians. Quarrel of Arcadia with Elis.*

IN the existing pressure upon Lacedæmon, and upon the states whose interest yet bound them to the Lacedæmonian cause, it was of great importance for them to hold, and, if possible, improve their connection with Athens. Ministers were therefore sent thither, fully empowered to agree upon

SECT.  
IV.

B.C. 368.  
Ol. 102. 4.  
February.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 1. s. 1.

<sup>13</sup> This Laconian town must be distinguished from the Achaian city of the same name, for which it has, by some modern writers, been mistaken.

upon the system of command, and the plan of operations, for the next campaign. The former alone made any difficulty. The Athenian council, at this time swayed, apparently, by wise and moderate men, had agreed with the Peloponnesians, that it would be, all circumstances considered, most for the interest of the confederacy, and most equitable, that the Athenians should direct operations by sea, and the Lacedæmonians by land. But a party in Athens, with Cephisodotus for their orator, thought to earn popular favor, by opposing this arrangement. When the proposal of the council was laid before the general assembly (for by that tumultuary meeting, in the degenerate state of Solon's constitution, all the measures of executive government were to have their ratification) Cephisodotus persuaded the ill-judging multitude, that they were imposed upon. In the Lacedæmonian squadron, he said, the trierarchs would be Lacedæmonians, and perhaps a few heavy-armed, but the body of the crews would be Helots or mercenaries. Thus the Athenians would command scarcely any but slaves, and the outcast of nations, in the Lacedæmonian navy, whereas, in the Athenian army, the Lacedæmonians would command the best men of Athens. If they would have a partition of military authority really equal, according to the fair interpretation of the terms of the confederacy, the command equally of the sea and of the land forces must be divided. Popular vanity was caught by this futile argument; and the assembly voted, that the command, both by sea and by land, should be alternately five days

days with the Athenians and five with the Lacedæmonians. In this decision of the petulant crowd, singularly adapted to cripple exertion, both by sea and land, the Lacedæmonians, pressed by circumstances, thought it prudent to acquiesce.

SECT.  
IV.

In spring an army was assembled at Corinth, to prevent the passage of the Thebans and their northern allies into Peloponnesus. But the superior abilities of the Theban leaders prevailed. They surprised an outpost. Still they were at a loss to force their way over the rough ground in descending the Oneian mountains. But, from the treachery or the weakness of the Lacedæmonian polemarch commanding, they obtained a truce, under favor of which they safely joined the forces of their Peloponnesian allies, the Arcadians, Argians, and Eleians. This junction being thus happily effected, they found themselves far superior to the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy. Without opposition they punished the attachment of the Epidaurians to the Lacedæmonian interest, by ravage of their lands. They attempted then one of the gates of Corinth; but, the Corinthians submitting themselves to the able direction of the Athenian general Chabrias, who was there with a body of mercenaries, they were repulsed with some slaughter. The abilities of Chabrias however were unequal, against so great a superiority of force, to prevent the ravage of the Corinthian territory. All Peloponnesus seemed open to the Thebans; when the pressure of the Thessalian arms, under the tagus Alexander of Pheræ, upon their northern allies, and apprehension of its

B.C. 368.  
Ol. 103.4.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 1. s. 4.

s. 5, 6.

s. 7, 8.

s. 9, 10, 11.  
Diod. 1. 15.

extending to Boeotia itself, called the Thebans suddenly out of the peninsula, and then all the Peloponnesians of the confederacy parted to their several homes<sup>14</sup>.

The dissolution of the army of the Theban confederacy gave a most fortunate relief to Lacedæmon. All the leisure it afforded seems to have been wanted, for composing the troubles within Laconia. Offensive operations were left to the auxiliaries, sent by Dionysius then ruling in Syracuse; a body remarkable enough, both in itself and for its actions, to deserve notice. The infantry were Gauls and Spaniards; the cavalry, apparently Sicilian Greek, so excellent, that, tho' scarcely exceeding fifty horsemen, they had given more annoyance to the enemy, while wasting the Corinthian lands, than all the rest of the army. After the other troops, on both sides, were withdrawn, this transmarine force alone undertook the invasion of Sicyonia; defeated the Sicyonians in battle, and took a fort in their territory by assault. Gratified then with glory and plunder, they embarked, and, with twenty triremes, their convoy, returned to Syracuse.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 1. s. 12.

Thus far the able leaders of the Theban coun- cils, profiting from the animosity so extensively prevailing against Lacedæmon, had kept their confederacy

<sup>14</sup> Xenophon, in relating the retreat of the Thebans, and the dispersion of the rest of the army, has not at all accounted for it. That the Thessalian war was the principal cause, may however be gathered from a comparison of the accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch, with what Xenophon says in the former book of the Hellenics, (c. 4. s. 35.); and the incidental mention of that war by Polybius, (l. 8. p. 512.) affords valuable confirmation to this deduction from the other writers.

confederacy unanimous and zealous, under the Sect.  
IV. supremacy of Thebes. But it was little likely that so many states could, by any management, be long retained in patient submission to so new a superiority. The long deference of the Grecian republics to Lacedæmonian command, amounting, in many instances, to a zealous, and sometimes extending to a general, loyalty toward the superior people, is a political phenomenon perhaps singular in the history of mankind. But that deference was paid to a superiority, not suddenly obtained, but growing from the extraordinary institutions under which the Lacedæmonians lived; which made them really a superior people, obviously fittest, in the divided and tumultuary state of the Greek nation, to command in war, and to arbitrate in peace: whence, even still in these times, when the political power of Lacedæmon was so declining, the estimation of the Lacedæmonian people, we are told, was yet such, that at the Olympian and other national meetings, a Lacedæmonian was an object of curiosity and admiration for strangers, more even than the conquerors in the games. The superiority of Athens also, tho in few instances, or for a short time only, supported by a loyalty like that which Lacedæmon enjoyed, accruing suddenly indeed, yet resulted from long preparation. Legislation more perfected, talents and manners more cultivated, and an extraordinary succession of able men at the head of affairs, gave to the Athenians an effectual superiority, which the people of other republics saw and felt: But Thebes, without any advantage of antient prejudice

Isocr.  
Archid.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

prejudice in favor of her pretensions, without any public institutions to be admired, recently emerged from political subjection, possessing indeed a large and disciplined population, which might infuse some terror, was however become so suddenly eminent only through the blaze of talents of a few, and principally of one extraordinary man, leading her councils, and commanding her armies. If therefore, in any other state of the confederacy, where military force was not very inferior, a similar blaze of character should occur, that state would presently feel itself equal to Thebes, and be prepared to break a connection involving an admission of her superiority.

Xenoph.

Hel. l. 7.

c. 1. s. 12.

Diodor.

l. 15. p. 492.

Such a character had been, for some time, rising among the Arcadians, in Lycomedes of Mantinea; a man inferior to none of his country in birth, superior to most in property, and who had already distinguished himself, in council, as a principal promoter of the Arcadian union, and in arms, at the head of the Arcadian forces. Lycomedes apparently already saw, what afterward became abundantly notorious, that, if any view to the general good of Greece influenced the Theban councils, it was wholly subordinate to the ambition of making Thebes supreme over the Greek nation. This ambition he resolved to oppose. In the general assembly therefore of the Arcadian states, convened in the new city of Megalopolis, he represented, ‘That Peloponnesus, among all its various present inhabitants, was the proper country of the Arcadians alone; the rest were really strangers. Nor were the Arcadians

S E C T.  
IV.

‘ Arcadians the most antient only, they were the most powerful of the Grecian tribes ; they were the most numerous, and they excelled in strength of body. It was notorious that the troops of no other Grecian people were in equal request. The Lacedæmonians knew their value : they had never invaded Attica without Arcadian auxiliaries ; nor would the Thebans now venture to invade Laconia without them. If therefore the Arcadians knew their own interest, they would no longer obey the Thebans, but insist upon equality in command. They had formerly raised Lacedæmon ; they were now raising Thebes ; and shortly they would find the Thebans but other Lacedæmonians.’

Flattering thus alternately, and stimulating the Arcadian people, Lycomedes obtained the effective command of them ; and the natural consequence of the submission of the multitude’s caprices to an able man’s control resulted : the Arcadians were successful, and their successes were brilliant. The Argians invaded Epidauria. The renowned Athenian general Chabrias, at the head of the Athenian and Corinthian forces, intercepted their retreat. The Arcadians were in alarm for their allies ; an assembly was held ; the interest of Lycomedes decided the choice of commanders, and the Arcadian army, against great disadvantage of ground, brought off the Argians without loss. An expedition was then undertaken into Laconia ; <sup>a. 14.</sup> the territory of Asinè was ravaged, and the Lacedæmonian polemarc Geranor, who commanded there, was defeated and killed. Many predatory incursions,

Xenoph.  
Hell. l. 7.  
c. 1. s. 13.

C H A P. incursions, in the common way of Grecian warfare,  
XXVII. followed; and when any object invited, neither  
night, says the cotemporary historian, nor weather,  
nor distance, nor difficulty of way, deterred; insomuch  
that the Arcadians acquired the reputation  
of being the best soldiers of their time.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 1. s. 15.

Disposed as the Arcadians showed themselves no longer to admit the superiority of Thebes, their strength, their discipline, and their successful activity in arms, tho exerted in the cause of the confederacy, could scarcely fail to excite some jealousy and apprehension in the Theban government. No direct breach insued, but friendship cooled and became precarious. Meanwhile the new energy of the Arcadian government attracted the regard of the humble and oppressed; always an extensive description of men, and sometimes of states, among the Grecian republics. The people of Elis had long claimed, and generally maintained, a sovereignty over the people of several towns of Eleia, and of the whole district called Triphylia, on the border against Messenia. In a

Diod. I. 15. strong situation in Triphylia, called Lasion, to assist in curbing the inhabitants, they had allowed some Arcadian exiles to establish themselves. This, for a time, answered its purpose: but, as the Arcadians of Lasion were, like the Triphylians, only subjects of the Eleians and not fellowcitizens, and as the sovereignty of people over people, seldom unoppressive, cannot fail to be humiliating, they at length made common cause with their neighboring fellowsubjects, particularly the Marganeans and Scilluntines, in opposition to the

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 1. s. 16.

Eleian

Eleian government. For support they turned their view to the new union of Arcadia: they claimed to be Arcadians; and by a petition addressed to the new united government, they desired to be taken under its protection. At the same time the Eleians were pressing for assistance from their allies of Arcadia, to recover their former dominion over the towns, which the Lacedæmonians had restored to independency. The Arcadians slighted this application, and declared, by a public resolution, that the petition of the Triphylians was well founded, and that their kinsmen should be free. Elis became in consequence still more alienated from Arcadia than Arcadia from Thebes.

SECT.  
IV.

#### SECTION V.

*Congress at Delphi, assembled at the instance of a Minister of the Satrap of Bithynia. The Tearless Battle, won by Archidamus son of Agesilaus. Expedition of the Thebans into Thessaly, under Pelopidas. Embassies from the principal Grecian Republics to the Persian Court. Able and successful conduct of Pelopidas, Ambassador from Thebes: Congress at Thebes: Attempt of Thebes to acquire the Supremacy of Greece, through the support of Persia, defeated.]*

THE growing schism, in the opposing confederacy, promised great advantage to Lacedæmon. Meanwhile, tho, through vices in their civil constitution, and ill management in their administration, the Lacedæmonians had lost the best half of their territory, their negotiations abroad still carried weight, and were conducted ably and successfully. It was at the critical time, when the political

SECT.  
V.

CHAP.  
XXVII.

political system in Greece, to which the rise of Thebes had given birth, began to be shaken, and new troubles seemed ready to break out, that Philiscus, a Greek of Abydus, arrived as minister from the satrap of Bithynia, Ariobarzanes; professedly charged to mediate in the king of Persia's name, a general peace among the Grecian republics. Following circumstances proved, and even the cotemporary historian, tho avoiding the direct avowal, has shown, that this new interference of Persia, in Grecian affairs, was produced by Lacedæmonian intrigue. It seems, however, not to have given any considerable umbrage to the Greek nation. Philiscus proposed a congress at Delphi; and deputies from Thebes, and from the states of the Theban confederacy, readily met deputies from Lacedæmon there. No fear of Persia, as the historian, not their friend, testifies, influenced the Thebans: for, Philiscus requiring, as an indispensable article, that Messenia should return under obedience to Lacedæmon, they positively refused peace, but upon condition that Messenia should be free.

This resolution being firmly demonstrated, the negotiation quickly ended, and both sides prepared for war. Philiscus then gave ample proof of his disposition to the Lacedæmonian cause, by employing a large sum of money, intrusted to him by the satrap, in levying mercenaries for the Lacedæmonian service. Meanwhile a body of auxiliaries from Dionysius of Syracuse, chiefly Gauls and Spaniards, as in the former year, had joined the Lacedæmonian army; and, while the

s. 18.

s. 19—22.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 1. s. 17.

Athenians were yet but preparing to march, a battle was fought, under the command of Archidamus son of Agesilaus. The united forces of Argos, Arcadia, and Messenia, were defeated, with slaughter, if Diodorus might be believed, of more than ten thousand men, and, as all the historians report, without the loss of a single Spartan. After a series of calamities, the intelligence of this extraordinary success made such impression at Lacedæmon, that tears of joy, says the cotemporary historian, beginning with Agesilaus himself, fell from the elders and ephors, and finally from the whole people<sup>15</sup>. Among the friends of the Lacedæmonians nevertheless, as no tear of sorrow resulted, this action became celebrated with the title of the Tearless battle.

SECT.  
V.

Diodorus,  
l. 15. p. 495.

The war with Thessaly now pressed upon Thebes. Nevertheless the amount of the power and influence to which that city had arrived, not through any merit of her constitution, as Polybius has observed, but wholly by the uncommon abilities of her leading men, and to which, beyond all expectation of her most promising days, she had been from the most adverse circumstances, so rapidly raised, is strongly marked by the pressure she was not only able to bear, but to retort with efficacy upon her enemies. Still urging Lacedæmon,

Polyb. l. 2.  
p. 197. &  
l. 6. p. 487.

<sup>15</sup> Diodorus, whether from his own invention, or the store of some writer, older, but not wiser, not more a politician or a soldier, than himself, has added much to Xenophon's account of this campaign of Archidamus; dilating indeed more than is consistent with the compressed scheme of his history. It is not likely that either Xenophon's information upon the subject, or his inclination to relate whatever would do honor to the son of Agesilaus, were deficient.

CHAP. XXVII. dæmon, by her confederates and dependents in Peloponnesus, she not only could afford protection

Polyb. I. 8. p. 112. Diodor. I. 15. p. 492. to her northern subjects and allies, against the successor of the most formidable potentate of the age, but she could aim at dominion, or influence, which would answer the purpose of dominion, among the populous and wealthy, but ill-constituted cities of Thessaly. While the rapacity and ambition of the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, occasioned a necessity for measures of protection and defence, the disposition to revolt, which his tyranny had excited among those over whom his authority extended, gave probability to views of aggrandizement. Pelopidas was sent into Thessaly with an army; under a commission to act there at his discretion; for the advantage, not of the Thessalians, who had solicited protection, but of the Bœotian people, who pretended to be common protectors: a kind of commission which it has been usual in all ages, for the barefaced ambition of democracies to avow, while the more decent manners of the most corrupt courts, from which such commissions may have issued, have generally covered them with a veil. Pelopidas penetrated to Larissa; and with the coöperation of its people, expelled the tyrant's garrison. He extended negotiation then into Macedonia; and concluded a treaty with Alexander, king of that country; who desired alliance with Thebes, the better to resist the oppression, which he felt or feared from the naval power and ambitious policy of Athens, continually exerted to extend dominion or influence over every town on every shore of the

the Ægean. His younger brother, Philip, then <sup>SECT.</sup>  
a boy, afterward the great Philip, father of the <sup>V.</sup>  
greater Alexander, is said to have accompanied  
Pelopidas in his return to Thebes; whether for  
advantage of education, and to extend friendly  
connection, or, as later writers have affirmed, as  
a hostage to insure the performance of stipulated  
conditions.

Pelopidas returning to his command in Thessaly, his usual success failed him. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, venturing, as voluntary negotiator for his country, within the power of the profligate tagus, he was seized and imprisoned. But Polybius imputes his misfortune to positive imprudence, and an expression of Demosthenes would imply that he was made prisoner in battle<sup>16</sup>. Nor were the exertions of the Theban government to avenge him fortunate. The Bœotarchs, who had ventured far into Thessaly, with an army said to have been eight thousand foot and six hundred horse, not finding the support expected from the Thessalian people, were reduced to retreat before the greater force of the tagus; and in traversing the Thessalian plain, pursued by a superior cavalry, they suffered severely. It is attributed to the ability of Epameinondas, serving in an inferior station, but called forth, by the voices of the soldiers, to supply the deficiencies of the generals, that the army was not entirely cut off. Negotiation, supported probably by arms, yet not without

Diodor.  
ut ant.  
Plut. v.  
Pelopid.  
Pausan.  
l. 9. c. 15.

<sup>16</sup> Αἰχμαλώτος. Demosth. in Aristocr. p. 660, ed. Reiske.

CHAP. without some concession, procured at length the  
XXVII. release of Pelopidas<sup>17</sup>. The

We have precisely three words only from Xenophon, about the war of Thebes with Thessaly. Deeply interested in the transactions in Peloponnesus, where all passed almost under his eye, his attention seems to have been fixed there; and possibly satisfactory information of affairs in Thessaly may not readily have occurred to him. We are thus reduced to depend upon later writers for the circumstances of that war, which was materially connected with the thread of Grecian history. If Plutarch then should be believed, the force of the Theban arms was exceeded only by the liberality and magnanimity of the Theban policy; the success was so complete, that apparently nothing but the most exalted and uncommon disinterestedness prevented the Thebans from remaining masters of Thessaly; and Pelopidas showed heroism and wisdom equally and uniformly great, except that, rather than admit any inferiority in the Theban arms, the biographer has chosen to mark some rashness, some extravagance of passion, in his hero, on the occasion of his death. But the tale altogether has so much of the romantic, the bombast, and even the puerile, with some contradiction of well authenticated facts, and some stories bearing their own contradiction, that sober judgement, disgusted, might incline to reject all in a lump, and conclude that, as Xenophon has passed all by, there was nothing worth historical notice. It will be the duty of the modern writer of history however to look farther; and we find testimony from an early and very respectable author, that will require attention. It has been incidentally only that Polybius has been led to mention Pelopidas. He gives no particulars, but he speaks of it as a matter well known in his time, ‘that the mismanagement of Pelopidas in Thessaly produced serious ill consequences to Thebes, and, especially, great loss of reputation.’ Εἰσέψει μὲν Θησαύρου μηγάλα, κατέλυσε δὲ τὴν αὐτὸν εργογυγημένην δέξαν. Polyb. I. 8. p. 512. Xenophon’s three words, the less strong, are perfectly consonant to this. They occur in his account of Alexander of Pheræ, who, he says, was χαλιπός Θησαύρου πελάμιος (Hel. I. 6. c. 4. s. 35.) ‘an enemy who altogether pressed hard upon Thebes.’ Fortunately then, for this part of the history, where Xenophon so fails us, and Plutarch, straining at panegyric for his fellowcountrymen the Boeotians, is so extravagant, we find Diodorus rational. Pausanias has also given some circumstances of the transactions of the Thebans in Thessaly: but the account of Diodorus is the only one in which connection has been attempted; and, tho’ inclining to partiality for the Theban heroes, yet, under correction

The troubles in Thessaly engaged the attention of the Athenians, who had old and extensive connections among its cities. Lacedæmon therefore being now greatly relieved by the victory of Archidamus, by the dissension growing in the Theban confederacy, and by the distraction of the Theban arms in the northern war, it was proposed to send, to the support of their Thessalian friends, those forces which, of late, had gone yearly into Peloponnesus. The Lacedæmonian minister, however, represented so strongly the pressure of the rebellion in Laconia, still supported by the most powerful states of the peninsula, and so urgently solicited the continuance of coöperation from the Athenian army, that about a thousand foot and thirty triremes only were sent to Thessaly (the seaforce perhaps no more than ordinarily was stationed there,) and the former assistance to Lacedæmon was not intermitted<sup>18</sup>.

SECT.  
V.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7  
c. 1. s. 17.

The rection of Xenophon and Polybius, apparently it may be trusted.

Diodorus attributes the first expedition of Pelopidas into Thessaly to the third year of the hundred and second olympiad, presently after the invasion of Laconia; the imprisonment of Pelopidas to the first year of the hundred and third olympiad; the unfortunate expedition, in which Epameinondas saved the army, to the same year; and the liberation of Pelopidas to the year following. The first date agrees with Xenophon, the last not.

<sup>18</sup> According to Diodorus the Athenians sent a thousand foot and thirty triremes, under the command of Autocles, to the assistance of the tagus of Thessaly against the Thebans. Tho not usually giving Diodorus credit for great exactness, I nevertheless do not consider this as inconsistent, either with the general assertion of Xenophon, that Alexander was a troublesome enemy to the Athenians, or with his more particular account of the intention, not pursued, to send their principal landforce into Thessaly..

CHAP.  
XXVII.

The cordial support of Athens, the force of mercenaries to be added by Philiscus, the growing aversion, among the Arcadians, to the Theban cause, and the troubles in the northern provinces, with the pressure of the Thessalian arms upon the Theban confederacy, together seemed likely to restore a decisive superiority to Lacedæmon, at least within her peninsula; and then, judging from experience, it was not likely to be confined there. But the able directors of the Theban councils observed, that the first, and perhaps the most powerful efficient of this change in circumstances, had been negotiation with Persia; and they resolved to direct their attention also to Persia, and try if they could not foil the Lacedæmonians by negotiation, still more effectually than by arms. A minister from Lacedæmon, Euthycles, was actually resident at the Persian court. Upon this ground a congress of the confederacy was summoned, and, in pursuance of a common resolution, Pelopidas was sent to Susa, on the part of Thebes, accompanied by ministers from Argos, Elis, and Arcadia. The Athenians, jealous of the measure, sent their ministers also, Timagoras and Leon.

The choice of the Thebans on this occasion was fortunate; that of the Athenians not so. A man at the head of a party, like Pelopidas, will of course be zealous in the interest of that party; it is his own interest. With a man not a leader, a private interest may have more weight than the share he considers as his own in the party-interest. But, among the Grecian commonwealths, the variety

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 1. s. 23.

variety of public interests, and the variety of party interests, was such, that, without the interference of individual interests, which nevertheless always might occur in political negotiation, circumstances the strangest, and apparently most unaccountable, were continually liable to arise. Pelopidas slighted the Arcadian minister, Antiochus; perhaps the more readily to gain the Athenian Timagoras; with whose coöperation he succeeded completely in the great object of his mission.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 1.  
s. 24, 25.

He was treated by the Persian court with distinguishing honor. The slight, even to contempt, which he showed towards the Arcadian minister, sufficed to bring the marked contempt of the court upon that minister and his country<sup>19</sup>. A Persian of rank was appointed to accompany Pelopidas back to Greece, bearing a rescript from the king, in which the terms of his friendship were declared. It required ‘that the Lacedæmonians should allow the independency of Messenia; that the Athenians should lay up their fleet; that war should be made upon them if they refused; and that, if any Grecian city denied its contingent for such war, the first hostilities should be directed against that city: that those who accepted these terms would be considered as friends of the king, those who refused them as enemies.’

If we compare the style and spirit of this rescript, and the manner in which it was offered to united

<sup>19</sup> Antiochus had been victor in the pancratium; (Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 1. s. 23.) so that it should seem men of rank and education, even at this day, engaged in that rough contest for honor; unless we should consider the contempt shown him, by Pelopidas, as in part founded on his low rank and manners.

CHAP. united Greece, with the terms and circumstances  
XXVII. of the peace of Antalcidas, we shall hardly dis-  
cover what has been the ground of distinction  
between them; why one has been so much re-  
probated, while the other, little indeed applauded,  
has in a manner been thrown out of observation,  
by the imposing abundance of panegyric, which  
the consent of antient and modern writers has  
bestowed on the magnanimous patriotism of Pe-  
lopidas, and of his great associate, in politics as  
in arms, Epameinondas. But we may perhaps  
be led to think, that political principle has been  
out of view, both in the panegyric and in the  
reproach; that the merit of individuals has con-  
siderably swayed the general mind; yet that the  
great distinction has rested on party-spirit. If,  
however, leaving the political principles of Pelo-  
pidas in that obscurity, which we seem without  
means very satisfactorily to illuminate, we look to  
his political abilities, we shall see them exhibited  
in their fairest light, in real splendor, not by his  
professed panegyrists, but by the candid contem-  
porary historian, not his friend. They are evident  
in the success of his Persian negotiation, to which  
that historian has borne full testimony; and that  
negotiation must unquestionably have been a  
business abounding with difficulties, and requiring  
much discernment, to conduct, and bring to so  
advantageous a conclusion.

But the Thebans seem to have been too much  
elated by their success, in this extraordinary and  
very important affair, for perfect prudence to hold  
through their political conduct; whether their  
able

able chiefs now erred, or rather popular presumption, in the badness of their constitution, to which Polybius bears testimony, was not to be restrained.

They assumed immediately to be arbiters of Greece. Their summons, for a congress of deputies from the several republics to meet in Thebes, were generally obeyed. The Persian, who had accompanied the return of Pelopidas, attended, with the king's rescript in his hand; which was red and interpreted to the congress, while the king's seal, appendant, was ostentatiously displayed. The Thebans proposed, as the condition of friendship with the king and with Thebes, that the deputies should immediately swear to the acceptance of the terms, in the names of their respective cities. Readily however as the congress had met in Thebes, the deputies did not come so prepared to take the law from Thebes. A majority of them joined in the reply, 'that they were sent to hear propositions, not to swear to whatever might be proposed. If oaths were expected, the Thebans must inform their several governments of the purport.'

The conduct of Pelopidas toward Arcadia and its minister at the Persian court, unaccounted for by Xenophon, had scarcely been the result of mere caprice or resentment, but probably of some political view; whether, as before observed, to gain the Athenian minister, or to obviate some suspicions or prejudices of the Persians. It was however certainly productive of political inconveniences. Antiochus, however deficient in qualifications for minister at a polished court, was

S E C T:  
V.

Polyb.  
l. 6. p. 487.  
Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 1. s. 27.

CHAP. not without some just feeling of the indignity put  
XXVII. upon him: at his departure, he had refused the  
 customary presents from the Persian court; and  
 when, on his return, he gave an account of his  
 embassy, in that assembly of the Arcadian na-  
 tion in Megalopolis, whose very title, the Ten-  
 thousand, or the numberless, marks its tumultuary  
 composition, he made light of the Persian empire  
 and all that it contained: ‘Bakers, cooks, cup-  
 ‘bearers, and porters,’ he said, ‘abounded there:  
 ‘but men fit to fight with the Greeks, tho looking  
 ‘diligently, he could see none. Nor did he be-  
 ‘lieve even in the boasted riches of the empire;  
 ‘for,’ concluding with a joke adapted to impress  
 the multitude he was addressing, ‘the so much  
 ‘celebrated golden plane-tree, he was sure, would  
 ‘not give shelter to a grasshopper.’

This being added to former stimulation, the Arcadian deputies were chosen under an impression not favorable to the Theban cause. The powerful and popular Lycomedes, the first who had stood forward in avowed opposition to the Theban pretensions, was the Mantineian representative. Not simply objecting to the proposed oath, Lycomedes insisted, ‘that Thebes was not ‘the place in which the congress should have ‘been assembled.’ The Thebans exclaiming, with marks of resentment, that he was promoting discord in the confederacy, he declared his resolution to hold his seat in the congress no longer; and, the other Arcadian deputies concurring with him, they all went home together. The result seems to have been, that the congress broke up without coming to any resolution.

Xenopl.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 1. n. 28.

Disappointed

Disappointed and thwarted thus, the Thebans could not yet resolve to abandon their project of arrogating that supremacy over the Greek nation, which Lacedæmon had so long held; long indeed by the voluntary concession of a large majority of it. They sent requisitions separately to every city to accede to the terms proposed; expecting that the fear of incurring the united enmity of Thebes and of the king, says the cotemporary historian, would bring all severally to compliance. The Corinthians however setting the example of a firm refusal, with the added observation, ‘that ‘ they wanted no alliance, no interchange of oaths ‘ with the king,’ it was followed by most of the cities. And thus, continues Xenophon, this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans, to acquire the empire of Greece, finally failed<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> Plutarch, in relating the Persian embassy, has labored, with some ingenuity, to draw attention aside from whatever, in his hero's conduct, was most repugnant to the claim for him of being a Grecian, and not meerly a Theban, patriot. He has however been either honest or idle enough not specifically to contradict any of the particulars reported by Xenophon, which show that the object of Pelopidas was to make Thébes mistress of Greece. He has omitted all mention of the congress of Thebes, and the general opposition to Pelopidas there; an opposition evidently arising from the cause stated by Polybius for the failure of all attempts to unite the Grecian republics: διὰ τὸ μη τῆς κοινῆς ἀλευθερίας ἵπποι, ἀλλὰ τῆς σφιτίρεας δυναστίας χάρει ἵκανοι πουνθωταὶ τὴν σπουδὴν—because the views and exertions of each were directed to promote, not the common freedom, but its own power. Polyb. I. 2. p. 125. Concerning so remarkable a transaction, we should have been glad even of such reports as Diodorus might have preserved, to compare with the account of Xenophon: but, perhaps because he found nothing that would support eulogy to his country, he has omitted all notice of it in its proper place, and has barely mentioned it in a following summary panegyric of Pelopidas.

## CHAPTER XXVIII.

**Affairs of GREECE, from the Failure of the Attempt to establish the SUPREMACY of THEBES over the GRECIAN REPUBLICS, through the Support of PERSIA, till the Depression together of the ARISTOCRATICAL and DEMOCRATICAL Interests, and the Dissolution of the antient System of GRECIAN CONFEDERACY, through the Event of the Battle of MANTINEIA.**

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## SECTION I.

*Difficult Circumstances of the Theban Administration. Affairs of Achaia: Advantageous Constitution of Achaia, and advantageous Character of its People: Ineference of Thebes: Generous Policy of Epameinondas: Impolitic Illiberality of the Theban Confederacy. Miseries, Virtues, and Injoyments of the People of the smaller Republics, exemplified in the History of Phlius.*

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

**I**F we refuse to Thebes the credit of a glory genuine and pure, for her first successful struggle against the tyranny of Lacedæmon, we have Epameinondas himself with us, who would take no part in the revolution, till the buiness of conspiracy, treachery, and assassination were over, and the affair came into the hands of the people at large, ready for leaders, and wanting them. We may have more difficulty to decide upon the merit or demerit of that obstinacy, with which the Thebans afterward persisted in asserting dominion over

over the cities of Bœotia, and thus denying peace to Greece, when proposed upon a condition which might seem, on first view, all that true Grecian patriotism could desire, universal independency. For where was to be found the sanction of that peace? Unfortunately the efficacy of any great interest pervading the country, was overborne and lost in the multitude of narrow, yet pressing interests, of parties and of individuals, dividing every little community. No sooner would the independency of the Bœotian towns have been established, than a revolution would have been made, or attempted, in every one of them. The friends of Thebes once overpowered, and the friends of Lacedæmon prevailing among those towns, how long might Thebes itself have been secure against a second subjection to Lacedæmon, more grievous than the former? As far then as these considerations may apologize for the refusal of accession to the treaty of Athens, so far it may also justify the Persian embassy; tho scarcely the haughtiness, which success in that negotiation seems to have inspired. But what should have been the farther conduct of Thebes to secure her own quiet, without interfering in the affairs of surrounding states, or how to insure quiet among those states, without the possession and the use of power to control them, is not so easy to determine. For the business of the honest statesman, amid the seldom failing contention of factions within, and the ambition of interested neighbors without, is not so easy and obvious as presumptuous ignorance is commonly ready to suppose, and informed knavery

**CHAP.** knavery often, with interested purposes, to affirm.

**XXVIII.** How ill Greece was at this time prepared for internal quiet, what follows will but concur, with what has preceded of its history, to show.

ACHAIA was more divided, and perhaps more equally divided, into little village republics, without a preponderating town, than any other province of Peloponnesus. Hence, if its people were not among themselves quieter and happier, yet their disturbances, less expanding among their neighbors, less attracted the notice of historians. While the Lacedæmonian influence prevailed in Peloponnesus, the little Achaian states were mostly aristocratical republics.

**Chap. 12.  
s. 3. & 5.  
of this Hist.** In the preponderance acquired by Athens, under the successive able and liberal administrations of Themistocles, Aristeides, Cimon, and Pericles, support from that imperial democracy made the democratical the ruling party in Achaia, and brought Achaia into dependence upon Athens. By the conditions, afterward, of the Thirty-years truce, to which the combination of enemies and defection of subjects compelled the Athenians to submit, all interference of Athens being forbidden, aristocracy and the Lacedæ-

**Ch. 14. s. 1.  
of this Hist.** monian interest revived together. They were however not so completely restored, but that, when the Peloponnesian war broke out, Pellenë alone joining the general confederacy of the Peloponnesian states against Athens, the rest of the Achaian towns maintained a neutrality, till the destructive defeat of the Athenians in Sicily gave a decided preponderance to Lacedæmon.

From

From that time Achaia seems to have remained moderately quiet, under aristocratical, or perhaps a mixed government: for there seems ground for supposing that a better connection between the higher and lower ranks of citizens, a truer aristocracy, with less of oligarchy, whether from advantage of law, or of custom and circumstances, was established among the little towns of Achaia, than in most other parts of Greece<sup>1</sup>. The general character of the Achaians, for probity, at the same time, stood singularly high among the Greeks, while their power was invidious to none; insomuch that, after the battle of Leuctra, the Lacedæmonian and Theban governments agreed to refer a matter in dispute (what it was we are uninformed) to their arbitration. In the war between Thebes and Lacedæmon, as far as we have yet traced it, they seem to have maintained an exact neutrality; except that, in the extreme danger of

Sparta

secr.

L

Polyb.  
l. 2. p. 127.

<sup>1</sup> Polybius says that the merit of the Achaian laws, as they stood in his age, was derived from times of great antiquity; (Polyb. Hist. l. 2.) which might be believed on less authority than that of Polybius, because it is not common for a system, totally new, to acquire stability and flourish at once, like the Achaian, in the time of its confederacy. He calls the Achaian governments democratical; meaning probably no more than that they had a mixture of democracy, sufficient to insure isonomy, equal law, to the Many: for Xenophon clearly informs us that by the old constitutions of the Achaian towns, preserved to his time, (Hel. l. 7. c. 1. s. 32.) the wealthier and higher people held the principal share in the government. But it appears evident that Polybius, with certainly the best opportunities of information, could learn little of the history of Achaia; so that what we gain from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, may be considered as everything most material, of what was known to antiquity, till that bright period, which none of those writers lived to see, but which fell directly under the view of Polybius, and of which his detail is of high value.

**CHAP.** Sparta itself, in the invasion of Laconia under  
**XXVIII.** Epameinondas, the Pellenians, always more at-

Xenoph. Hel. I. 6. c. 5. s. 29. Thucyd. I. 2. c. 9.

tached than the rest to the Lacedæmonian interest, gave their mite of assistance to their distressed

friends. But the elevation of a new patron for democracy, preponderant among the powers of Greece, not by sea, as Athens formerly, but by land, and which, as experience had shown, could extend its arm with effect into Peloponnesus, appears to have excited new ambition in the democratical leaders; for even among the Achaians parties existed. The democratical party in Achaia communicated with Thebes; and the Theban leaders, in the dilemma in which their failure in the late congress had left them, received the communication with eager attention. Disappointed, and, in some degree, disgraced, in the eyes of all Greece, here appeared a point to which the exertion of the confederacy might be directed, with the plausible pretence of supporting the democratical cause, and the cause of Grecian independency, by delivering Achaia from subjection to Lacedæmon. In the want of such an object, or in the neglect of it, their influence over the confederacy would risk a rapid decay. The establishment, then, of their influence in Achaia, would form a check, which they greatly desired, upon the new refractoriness of some of their Peloponnesian allies, especially the Arcadians. It was therefore resolved, at Thebes, that the army of the confederacy

Xenoph. Hel. I. 7. c. 1. s. 29. Diodor. I. 15. p. 496. B.C. 366.<sup>1</sup> OI. 103. <sup>¶</sup> Dodw.

should

<sup>1</sup> Dodwell gives the Achaian business to the year 366, and the Phliasian to the preceding year, 367. They seem to have been going forward about the same time, occupying part of both years.

should march into Achaia; and Epameinondas was appointed to the command.

S E C T.

L

On the other side, to prevent this expected invasion of Peloponnesus, the passes of mount Oneion, on the isthmus, were occupied by two bodies of troops; one under a Lacedæmonian, the other under an Athenian officer: but the alliances of Thebes, within the peninsula, afforded opportunities for rendering such precaution vain. In consequence of negligence, at least attributed to both the commanders, the Argian general, Peisias, found means to establish two thousand men on a commanding height, which inabled Epameinondas to enter Peloponnesus without material molestation. He was quickly joined by the Peloponnesian allies, and altogether directed their march toward Achaia.

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1. 7.  
c. 1. s. 30.

Meanwhile the principal men of that country, after deliberation on their critical circumstances, resolved, instead of either attempting a vain resistance, or betaking themselves to the wretched resource of flight, to trust the liberal character of Epameinondas, and meet him with a declaration of their readiness to commit their fortune into his hands. He did not deceive their opinion of him. Exerting his influence, and perhaps stretching his power, he prevented banishment, yet preserved the constitution of every city inviolate; and, only requiring pledges that they would be faithful to the Theban confederacy, and follow in arms wheresoever the Thebans should lead, he conducted his army home<sup>3</sup>.

Pelopidas,

<sup>3</sup> The story is told in the original in these few words: Προσενέπτω, δέ αὐτῷ τῷ βιλτίγῳ, ἵκ τῆς Ἀχαίας, μηδιαριζόμενοι δὲ Επαμεινώνδας.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.Diod. l. 15.  
Plut. vit.  
Pelopid.

Ibid.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 1. s. 31.

Pelopidas, we are told, so held his interest with the Theban people, that, from the expulsion of the Lacedæmonians till his death, he was constantly in the office of Bœotarc, by yearly election. The magnanimity and steady virtue of Epameinondas could not so condescend to popular folly and depravity, as to hold popular favor, or even to avoid sometimes disgrace, at least with that occasional majority of the multitude, which wielded, in the moment, the absolute sovereignty of Thebes. His indulgence toward the principal families of Achaia, highly disappointing to their opponents, who had depended upon succeeding to the honors, and profiting from the estates, of fugitives, was unsatisfactory to the high democratical party, throughout the confederacy. The Arcadians especially, predisposed to blame the measures of Theban councils, joined with the Achaian malcontents in complaining aloud, ‘that the interest of Lacedæmon, rather than of their own confederacy, was considered in the settlement of Achaia.’ Clamor from without so assisting party within Thebes, the interest of Epameinondas did not suffice for the support of his own measure. The Theban people, calling themselves champions of the liberty of Greece, decreed, that regulators should be sent to the Achaian cities. Under the superintendence of the regulators, the Many drove the principal men of

Ἐπαμεινόνδας, ὃς μὴ φυγαδίσσαι τὸν κρατίζοντος μάχης πολιτείαν μιταρτῆσαι· ἀλλὰ τιμὴ λαβεῖν παρὰ τὸν Ἀχαῖον, ἣ μὴ συμμαχούς ιστοθεῖ, καὶ ἀκελουθῆσαι, ὅπῃ ἡ Θηβαῖον ἤγωνται· καὶ εὗτας ἀπῆλθον εἰκαδεῖ. I have endeavored to give a faithful interpretation of this passage in the text. A mere version, without dilating in some parts, could scarcely be made at the same time faithful and intelligible.

of every Achaian town into banishment, and SECT. I. changed the governments to pure democracy.

It soon appeared that the measure of Epameinondas had been a measure of true policy, not less than of justice and humanity; and that the popular measure superseding it was as unprofitable as tyrannical; disadvantageous to Thebes, to the confederacy at large, and, in the end, still more to the Many in the Achaian towns, whose benefit was more particularly its pretended object. The exiles were numerous, and held still some influence in every town. Uniting, and directing their whole force against each separately, they recovered all. No longer then moderate, as before, in their politics, they ingaged warmly in the Lacedæmonian interest. What their domestic adversaries suffered, the historian has not informed us; but he says that considerable inconvenience followed to the Arcadians; annoyed now, on their northern border, by the active and zealous enmity of Achaia, while on the southern they were pressed, or constantly threatened, by the force of Lacedæmon\*.

Under these circumstances the Achaians owed their security principally to the troubles in neighboring states, ingaging the attention of Thebes, and

\* I have been the more desirous that the learned reader should have ready opportunity to judge of the faithfulness of my interpretation of the passage of Xenophon, given in the preceding note, because, I think, that passage, with its sequel, does altogether singular credit both to Xenophon and to Epameinondas; insomuch that, I will own, I doubt if the labored panegyric of Plutarch, were his life of Epameinondas extant, would so strongly paint the real merit of his hero, to the penetrating and judicious, as this simple and compressed narrative from a political enemy.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

and employing the arms of her Peloponnesian allies. The situation of Phlius, bordering on Arcadia and Argolis, and in the road from the Isthmus to Lacedæmon, made the acquisition of that little city much an object for the confederacy. It was not the less so on account of the remarkable fidelity with which, since the last revolution, when Delphion fled, its people had adhered, under all fortunes, to their engagements with Lacedæmon, and of the spirit and success with which, on many trying occasions, they had exerted themselves, as well in support of their allies, as in defence of themselves. Their zealous activity, in the extreme danger of Sparta, when invaded by Epameinondas, was warmly acknowledged by the Lacedæmonians. In revenge, on the other hand, for this, the Argians, in returning from that expedition, directed the usual ravage of Grecian armies particularly against Phliasia. The Phliasians, utterly unequal to meet them in the field, nevertheless, with only sixty horse, pursuing them, so completely routed the rear-guard as to raise their trophy, in sight of the Argian army.

It was the common misfortune of Phlius, as we have heretofore seen, with almost all Grecian republics, and the unavoidable consequence of sedition and revolution, to have emigrant citizens more vehemently inimical than any strangers. The miserable insecurity of those little republics is strongly marked in what the cotemporary historian proceeds to relate. While the Thebans were the second time invading Peloponnesus, the Eleians and Arcadians, marching through Nemea

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 2. s. 3.

s. 4.

s. 1—9.

to

to join them, were persuaded by the Phliasian exiles, that the appearance only of support from the army would enable them to recover their city. The exiles and others, accordingly, to the number of six hundred, prepared with scaling-ladders, arrived, by night, under the very walls of Phlius, undiscovered, and waited there. The march of the supporting army, however, was observed from an outpost at Tricranum, and indicated to those in the city by signals. But in the city were some who held intelligence with the exiles. These hastened to give the concerted token for scaling; and the citadel, ill-guarded, was taken almost without resistance. Alarm rapidly pervaded the town, and the people ran to arms. The exiles, hoping to profit from the first confusion, sallied from the citadel into the town. They were however repulsed, and, as they retreated again into the citadel, the pursuers entered with them. But the Eleian, Arcadian, and Argian forces, had by this time surrounded the town, and proceeded immediately to scale the walls. The threatening horrors of a storm seemed now beyond the strength of those within to avert; but, by a series of exertions, the most spirited, persevering, and well-directed, they at length repulsed the assailants in every direction. Without remission then, applying their whole strength to the recovery of their citadel, they effected it. This was no sooner done, than their cavalry boldly sallied. The enemy, baffled in all points, and probably weak in cavalry, were so fearful of the threatened annoyance to their retreat, that, in their haste, they left their ladders,

their slain, and even some wounded ; mostly those ~~had~~ by leaping from the walls. Extreme danger, ~~was~~ fortunately, quickly, and for the moment ~~completely~~, surmounted, produced emotions, among the Phliasians, stronger than perhaps any known in the more generous warfare of modern ages ; unless where, recently, France has gone beyond all antient example in illiberality and ferocity. The spectacle, it appears, was striking, even in those days ; the men shaking hands while they circulated congratulations ; the women busy with cups, ministering to their refreshment, and shedding tears of joy ; and at length (if it may be allowed so literally to translate the strong expression) all actually seized with a weeping laughter<sup>5</sup>.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 2. s. 10.

In the following year the united forces of Arcadia and Argos invaded Phliasia, to revenge their defeat by ravage of the country, and not without hope of so distressing the town as to reduce it to capitulate. The long and severe pressure of a strong democratical party seems to have urged the aristocratical Phliasians to cultivate the cavalry service ; so that, among the Peloponnesians, they appear to have excelled in it. A small body of Athenian horse had joined the Phliasian ; and together, supported by a small chosen body of foot, they attacked the Argians and Arcadians, broken in crossing a river, and with such success as considerably to check the intended waste of their fields.

But

<sup>5</sup> Πάντας δὲ τοὺς παρόντας τότε γε τῷ ὅπῃ κλαυσίγελως εἶχεν.—Xen. Hel. I. 7. c. 2. s. 9.

But the unfortunate Phliasians, after the Thebans became masters of Achaia, were so surrounded by enemies, that all their energy and all their success could not enable them to procure subsistence from their fields. Yet they still persevered, and still were successful. The Theban commander in Achaia entered their country at the head of his own troops, with the force of Sicyon and Pellenë, strengthened with two thousand mercenaries. The Phliasians, finding opportunity to attack the Sicyonians and Pellenians separately, defeated them with such slaughter, that the expedition was pursued no farther. Xenophon has thought it a matter for particular notice and warm eulogy, that a Pellenian, connected by public hospitality with Phlius, being made prisoner, was released without ransom ; tho the wants and poverty of the Phliasians were at that time pressing. Deprived of the produce of their own lands, they found means to obtain occasional supplies ; sometimes by rapine from their enemies, sometimes by purchase from Corinth ; but both through many difficulties and dangers : with difficulty raising the price for their purchases ; sometimes by collection among themselves, sometimes by borrowing ; and then, on account of the peril of the convoy, with difficulty finding pledges, even for the necessary beasts of burthen.

In extreme distress, at length, they were so fortunate as to obtain the assistance of the Athenian general Chares, commanding a body of mercenaries at Corinth<sup>6</sup>. Beyond the direct line of his commission,

<sup>6</sup>Ξένος, s. 20. and μισθοφόροι, s. 21.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

commission, he joined them in protecting a convoy. With such an auxiliary force, they arrived at Phlius unopposed; and then they requested Chares to give them his farther protection in carrying their useless mouths to Pellenë: for already the revolution in Achaia had taken place, which restored the government of that little city to the party with which the Phlians had old and intimate connection. He consented, and they arrived there also unmolested. The market of a place so friendly, and with which they had not, for a long time, been able to communicate, ingaged their attention. They knew that, if they incumbered themselves with a convoy, they should certainly be attacked in their return. Nevertheless they provided themselves to the utmost that their credit, and the Pellenian stores, would inable them; and, Chares still giving his willing assistance, they fought their way home successfully, and carried in their convoy undiminished. This seems to have been that action of the Nemean glen, in which, as we shall find occasion to observe hereafter, credit was earned by Æschines, an Athenian youth, afterward of so much celebrity as an orator.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 2. s. 19.

\* 20.

The small population of Phlius, or the small number of those whom the ruling party could trust with arms, little allowed reliefs in these arduous duties. But their activity supplied the want of number. They had scarcely taken a few hours rest by daylight, after a night of great fatigue, when they proposed to Chares a new enterprize. To check their convoys in future, equally from Corinth and Pellenë, and to extend

waste over their territory with more safety, more certainty, and more constancy, the enemy were fortifying a post at Thyamia, on the Phliasian border, against Sicyonia. Chares consenting, they moved so as, by a rapid march, to reach the place a little before sunset; and they found equally the workmen and the protecting force, in the cotemporary historian's description, some cooking, some baking, some preparing their beds: all completely surprized, all instantly fled. The Phliasians and their allies then profited from the preparation made. Having stationed their guards, they supped, made libations, as thanks-offerings s. 23. for their success, sang the pæan of victory, and went to rest. Immediately, however, as their success was ascertained, they sent a messenger to Corinth with the news; and the Corinthian administration, not waiting for daylight, hastened, with the most friendly zeal, to press carriages and dispatch them, laden with provisions, to Phlius. Meanwhile the indefatigable Phliasians applied themselves diligently to complete the fortification of Thyamia; and thus made that, intended for their annoyance and destruction, a post for protecting their territory, and securing the communication with Corinth. Convoys passed then daily, and Phlius was abundantly supplied.

The testimony of Xenophon, which he has had evident pleasure in giving, to the merits of the Phliasians, will deserve our credit, tho he was their political partizan; yet the sincerity of history will require our recollection, that a very strong interest, supported by very strong prejudices, and

SECT.

I

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 7.  
c. 2. s. 22.

**CHAP.**  
**XXVIII.**

by the remembrance of past sufferings, bound the Phliasians to the line of conduct by which they earned so much honor, instigated their activity, and in a manner compelled them to firmness. About seven and twenty years had passed since the party, now ruling Phlius, then suffering in exile, vainly petitioned Lacedæmon for assistance toward their restoration. Not till near ten years after, finding a more favorable opportunity, they had succeeded so far as to obtain, through the influence of Lacedæmon, readmission to residence in the city, and a promise of restoration of their property. But that promise was not fulfilled : justice was denied them by their fellowcitizens ; their residence was highly uneasy and precarious ; some were compelled to a second flight ; and it cost Lacedæmon a troublesome war to give them complete reëstablishment. When this was effected, the most active of the democratical party, or those who, with the watchful Delphion, escaped death, took their turn in flight. Under such circumstances, with the Theban confederacy triumphant, there could be no hope of peace for those who held the city, without the condition, that the democratical exiles should be restored ; whence would follow the predominance of the democratical party, under the patronage of a democratical confederacy ; and what would then be the situation of its political opponents is obvious to conjecture. But Xenophon, in the course of his long observation of the troubles of Greece, would have had frequent occasion to see that all men, single or in body, are not capable of that firm perseverance,

**Ch. 25. s. 4.**  
of this Hist.

**Ch. 26. s. 1.**  
of this Hist.  
s. 4.

and active exertion, which their own interest, in difficult and dangerous circumstances, may require ; and that those who faint, in pursuit of their own good, may appear unfaithful to their friends, without intending infidelity. Thus, while they incur our blame, they may also claim our pity. But hence he would justly conclude, that men who, amid the greatest difficulties, and most threatening dangers, are true at the same time to themselves and to their friends ; failing in nothing that their own interest, their engagements to others, or a sense of justice, generosity, and honor demands ; who, in short, in honesty actively pursue the best policy, deserve admiration and applause ; and thus the Phliasians seem to have earned his eulogy, which has perpetuated the renown of their little commonwealth.

SECT.  
I.

## SECTION II.

*Affairs of Arcas, &c.: Euphron Tyrant of Sicyon: Liberal Despotism of Arcas, General of Arcadia: Principles of Grecian Law of Nations and of Theban Civil Jurisprudence, illustrated: Public Honors to the memory of Euphron.*

DURING these transactions of the Phliasians, which, by ingaging the attention of the Theban confederacy, contributed to the quiet of Achaia, the affairs of Sicyon, more urging the attention of the Theban government, had still more powerfully the same effect. Sicyon, a Dorian state, frequently at war with the more powerful Dorian state of Corinth, on its eastern border, contracted

SECT.  
II.

connections

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 1. s. 32.

connections with the Achaian towns, its western neighbors, such as to produce a transfusion of the Achaian institutions into the Sicyonian government. At the time of the battle of Leuctra, the Sicyonian constitution, after the Achaian model, was a balanced aristocracy. While the Lacedaemonians yet held their full influence in Peloponnesus, Euphron, an able but unprincipled man, acting as their agent for the management of their interest in Sicyon, was first in power there : but, in their inability afterward so to extend their views and exertions, Sicyon, yielding to the pressure of circumstances, became connected with the Theban confederacy, and Euphron lost his preëminence. Anxious, beyond all things, to regain it, and careless about the honesty of his means, he represented to the leading men of Argos and Arcadia, that, if the families of property were allowed to hold their rank and influence, Sicyon would, on the first opportunity, become again the ally of Lacedaemon ; but, were democracy established, it would be secured in its present connection ; and, with due support from them, he would ingage that a simple vote of the people should effect the change. The proposal, profligate as it was, from Euphron, involving the ruin of those with whom he had been most connected, nevertheless suiting the views of the Argian and Arcadian leaders, they sent the support desired. Euphron then convened the Sicyonian people ; and, in presence of the Argian and Arcadian auxiliaries, he proposed, and it was at once voted, ‘that the government should be changed to a democracy, with perfect equality

'equality for all citizens.' Election, under awe of the same forein force, placed Euphron, with four others, at the head of the native military, and raised Adreas, son of Euphron, to the command of a body of mercenaries in the republic's service.

These leading points being carried, Euphron proceeded presently to show how much more glaring is the temptation, and how much readier the means, to become a complete tyrant in a democracy, or under democratical patronage, than in any other political circumstances. His mercenary army was to be his principal instrument. He directed his attention, therefore, first to secure its attachment, then to increase its numbers. For both purposes, the indispensable efficient was money. To acquire money therefore he scrupled nothing. With command of money, he trusted, that he could find support in any measure. The public treasury and ordinary revenue of the state being very unequal to his need, he made no difficulty of risking, what generally excited violent popular indignation, to take the sacred treasures from the temples, and convert to his use the revenues appropriated to sacred purposes. These being still insufficient, he had recourse to oppression of individuals. He encouraged accusations of Laconism, as attachment to the Lacedæmonian party was termed, that party of which himself had been chief. Thus the property of many of the wealthiest families, through confiscation, came into his disposal. When, after a short but rapid course of violences, by the attachment of dependents

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 7.  
c. 1. s. 34.

C H A P.  
XXVIII.

dents and the removal of adversaries, he thought himself strong enough, he proceeded to direct his measures against those who might become rivals. Procuring the death of some of his colleagues, and the exile of others, he got all power into his own hands, and became truly tyrant of Sicyon. During these measures within his own little state, he directed his attention ably, upon similar principles, to the republics with which it had political connection; and he obviated interference of the confederacy, partly by money, and partly by the ready and effective service of his troops, whenever and wherever required<sup>7</sup>.

Where a people had not, for a long time, experienced, from a foreign enemy, any severe pressure, or very alarming danger, democratical jealousy would sometimes pervade the military system, and make all democratical; as among the Syracusans at the time of the Athenian invasion of Sicily: but wherever frequent wars have occurred, democratical jealousy itself has soon felt the necessity of remitting its severity, so far as to allow, for military matters, some degree of monarchal authority. The Arcadians, therefore, whose experience of war, while a divided people, was large, and whose union was effected during a war involving nearly all Greece, in forming their united government, committed the military establishment

<sup>7</sup> It were endless to point out all the several circumstances of resemblance in the French, and in the worst times of some of the Greek republics; but almost the whole of this history of Euphron might seem, instead of having been written two thousand three hundred years ago, an account of transactions (at the time of first editing this volume) within the last three years.

blishment of their democratical townships, under the control of their Numberless assembly, to the authority of one commander-in-chief for the nation. Æneas of Stymphalus, being raised to that great office, saw, with a just indignation, the tyranny of Euphron; and, nothing forbidding an arbitrary use of the ill-defined power with which he was vested, he resolved to exert it for a generous purpose. Leading the Arcadian army to Sicyon, where none resisted an ally in his high situation, he marched directly into the citadel. Imitating then the liberal policy of Epameinondas, he called together the principal men in the town, and sent for all who, without a regular sentence, had been forced or frightened into banishment. Apparently the inconveniences, resulting from the reversal of the measures of Epameinondas in Achaia, had brought the narrow policy of his opponents into disrepute, and enabled the Arcadian general, with the concurrence probably of Epameinondas, to follow a more generous system. Euphron, therefore, shrinking before him, had however resources in his abilities, and in his daring profligacy. Withdrawing from the city, he communicated with the Corinthian government, and managed to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the port of Sicyon. On the merit of this service he then founded an endeavor to apologize to the Lacedæmonian government for his past conduct, and to regain its confidence. But the Lacedæmonians, tho ready to profit from his services, were slow to give him the credit he desired; and, in the meantime, new opportunity arose

SECT

II.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 3. s. 1.

s. 2. 5.

**C H A P.** arose to invite the attention of his active and versatile mind, bound by no scruples.

**Xenoph.**  
**Hel. I. 7.**  
**c. 3. s. 4.**

The Arcadian general, apparently little a politician, satisfied with having expelled the tyrant, left the Sicyonians to settle their own affairs ; not however in perfect independency ; for, to secure their fidelity to the confederacy, the command of their citadel (so the Theban authority prevailed in Peloponnesus) was committed to a Theban har-

most. But a cordial and lasting coälition, between the aristocratical and democratical parties, was seldom effected in a Grecian republic, and did not take place in Sicyon. Their differences prevented measures for the recovery of the port. Meanwhile Euphron, versed in the ways of ingaging mercenary troops, procured some from Athens, and then offered his assistance to the democratical faction in Sicyon. That faction, to whom the liberality of Æneas and the leading men of the confederacy, had denied that partial support, to which they thought their democratical merit intitled them, did not scruple to submit themselves again to so unprincipled a leader. Euphron was received into the city, and the force he brought with him sufficed to give his democratical friends, for the moment, a clear superiority over their opponents. But thus, making the Lacedæmonians again his decided enemies, he risked to incur the vengeance also of the Theban confederacy. Intrigue and corruption were his resources. Equally daring and ingenious in his profligacy, with the greatest force of money he could collect, he went himself to Thebes.

Those

Those Sicyonians, who had been recalled from banishment by the generous despotism of the Arcadian general, informed of Euphron's journey, and of the preparation he had made for it, were in high alarm. To obviate the consequences, some of them went directly to Thebes. But their alarm was greatly increased when they saw how well Euphron was received, and to what intimate communication admitted, by some of the Thebans in power. In the vehemence of their fear then, of being again subjected to his tyranny, they were ready to dare anything. In the citadel, while the council was sitting there, and, apparently, without a prospect of making their escape, they assassinated him. They were immediately apprehended, and carried before the council, which was the principal criminal tribunal of Thebes.

It cannot but be matter of just curiosity to know what were the principles and practice of criminal law in Thebes, in the age of Epameinondas, when Thebes, after Athens and Lacedaemon, was aspiring at the supremacy of Greece; and the picture preserved to us, by the masterly hand of the cotemporary historian, is highly curious. A principal magistrate delivered the charge against the assassins, thus :

‘ Citizens, we institute a capital accusation  
 ‘ against these men, for the murder of Euphron.  
 ‘ Unjust and impious deeds, which good men  
 ‘ avoid and abhor, even the wicked perpetrate,  
 ‘ commonly, in some anxiety for concealment;  
 ‘ but the audaciousness and profligacy of these  
 ‘ men

SECT.  
II.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 3. s. 5.

**CHAP.** ‘ men has been such, that, almost in presence of  
**XXVIII.** ‘ us the chief magistrates, and of you, to whom  
‘ it belongs to absolve or condemn, they have  
‘ assumed to themselves to put a man to death.  
‘ If they then escape capital punishment, what  
‘ stranger will hereafter with any confidence enter  
‘ your city? Where is the jurisdiction of your  
‘ state, if any stranger is allowed, at his pleasure,  
‘ to kill another, before it is declared what has  
‘ been the object of either, in coming hither?  
‘ We therefore prosecute these men as offenders,  
‘ in the highest degree, against divine and human  
‘ laws, and singularly guilty of contempt of the  
‘ jurisdiction of the state. It depends upon you,  
‘ after hearing them, to pronounce their doom.’

The Sicyonians denied the charge; except one, who, in taking the whole blame, boldly claimed merit for the deed: ‘ To condemn your jurisdiction, Thebans,’ he said, ‘ for one who knows ‘ he is at your mercy, is impossible. In what ‘ confidence, then, I killed this man, I will declare ‘ to you: It was, first, that I thought it just; ‘ and then, that I trusted you would judge of it ‘ justly. For I knew that yourselves, when you ‘ arrested Archias and Hypates, for crimes similar ‘ to those of Euphron, did not wait for the for- ‘ mality of a trial, but used the means in your ‘ power for inflicting instant punishment; holding, ‘ that men eminently wicked, notoriously traitors, ‘ and usurpers of sovereign authority, are con- ‘ demned to death by the common sentence of ‘ mankind.’

He proceeded then to state the crimes of Euphron against gods and men : stripping the temples of Sicyon, rich in dedicated gold and silver<sup>8</sup> : betraying the Lacedæmonians, betraying the confederacy, tyrannizing over his fellowcitizens, raising slaves to honorable situations, and, as his interest instigated, putting to death, banishing, or ruining by confiscation, the worthiest of the people:

‘ After this,’ continued the accused, ‘ introducing the Athenians, the most determined of your enemies ; with their coöperation opposing your harmost in arms, and unable so to carry his purpose, finally coming here prepared with money.

—Had he come in arms and I had killed him, you would have thanked me. Coming then with money, to procure by corruption your favor<sup>9</sup>, that he might again be master of our city, how, for striking the blow of justice against him, can you justly condemn me? The violence of an open enemy, injurious indeed, is not necessarily unjust ; but bribery is intrinsically unjust, injurious, and disgracing.

‘ If nevertheless, being my enemy, Euphron had been your friend, I would not pretend to justify killing him in your city : but so grossly a traitor as he was to you, how could he be more my enemy than yours? He came hither, it may be said, freely. But if, before he entered your territory, putting him to death would have

been

<sup>8</sup> Ανεθήματα.

<sup>9</sup> This may seem a strong expression, for one in the prisoner’s situation to use, but it certainly does not go beyond the original, “Ος δὲ χρέηματα ἔλθει παρασκευάσαμενος, ὃς τούτοις ὑπάς διαφθείρειν. x. τ. i.”

**C H A P.** ‘ been meritorious, how, when he came with the  
**XXVIII.** ‘ purpose of adding to his former crimes, can it  
‘ be maintained that he has not suffered justly?  
‘ Where, among the Greeks, are not traitors,  
‘ deserters, and tyrants, held as outlaws; rejected  
‘ from divine protection, and out of all compact  
‘ with men <sup>10</sup>?  
‘ You have yourselves decided, by a decree,  
‘ that fugitives may be apprehended, throughout  
‘ the confederacy, and carried to their proper city.  
‘ Can it then be contended, that the exile who  
‘ returns, unauthorized by a common decree of  
‘ the confederate states, may not justly be put to  
‘ death? I affirm that, if you condemn me, you  
‘ will avenge the most injurious of all your ene-  
‘ mies; and, on the contrary, if you determine that  
‘ I have done well, you will clearly participate  
‘ in justice, done to yourselves, and to all your  
‘ allies.’

We have already had too many occasions to observe the familiarity of the Greeks with assassination: a crime which the better policy, scarcely less than the better religion and morality, of modern times, had taught utterly to abhor, till a singularly profligate faction in France, with the impudently arrogated title of philosophers, lately attempted to give new vogue to the atrocious baseness. If palliation can be for such a crime

(for

<sup>10</sup> Ποῦ ἵχω, “Ελλησι σπονδὰς ἀποδίξαι ἡ προδόταις, ἡ πάλιν αὐτομόλοις, ἡ τυράννοις; For fuller explanation of the phrase σπονδὰς ἀποδίξαι, the reader, desirous of it, may see the fourth section of the fifteenth chapter of this History, toward the conclusion; and for confirmation of that explanation, the fifth section of the twenty-third chapter, toward the middle.

(for excuse cannot) it must arise from political circumstances as unfortunate as those of Greece; among whose diminutive states, eternally struggling for an ill-understood civil freedom, and an impossible political independency, political difficulties were always existing, political necessities often arising, which a state of extensive dominion, with large population, cannot know. To those difficulties and necessities, apparently, should be attributed, in a great degree, the striking imperfections of the Grecian administration of justice. Political dangers were forever too closely pressing around, to allow a strict adherence to fixed law and regular proceeding. The little republic was continually in circumstances, in which the senate of more powerful Rome would commit absolute authority to the consuls, by charging them to guard against detriment to the commonwealth. It is obvious how political interests would be likely to interfere with the judgement on the death of Euphron. Epameinondas himself, to support his system of liberal policy toward the states ingaged, or likely to ingage, in the Theban confederacy, might find it necessary to concur, if not in declaring approbation of the murder of Euphron, yet in screening the assassin. Nevertheless we cannot without some wonder observe the extreme deficiency of principle, and confusion of principle; both what could with advantage be applied to the regulation of the conduct of independent states toward each other, and what might direct the dispensation of justice, within any state, to its own people, which are striking in these speeches

SECT.  
II.

**CHAP.** reported by Xenophon; speeches intended by him,  
XXVIII. if not for an exact representation of what was  
 actually said by the persons to whom they are  
 attributed, yet certainly for what was proper, or  
 at least probable, to have been said. Avoiding  
 however, as usual, to give any opinion of his own  
 upon the subject, he proceeds to state the result,  
 ‘ that the Theban council declared Euphron to  
 ‘ have suffered justly.’

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 3. s. 8.

That there should remain, in Sicyon, men dis-  
 posed to do the memory of Euphron honor, those  
 who have been accustomed to observe the ways  
 in which political party-interest is put forward,  
 will not be surprized. It was the business of those,  
 with whom he had been principally connected, to  
 obviate the probable acquisition of ascendancy by  
 the party which opposed him ; and it was with  
 this view that they held out Euphron to the people  
 as the martyr of the popular cause. They sent to  
 Thebes, requesting his body, which was not denied  
 them ; they buried it with public pomp, in the  
 agora ; which was among the highest marks of  
 respect for deceased worth ; the general custom  
 of the Greeks, as of the Romans, forbidding  
 burial within the walls of a town ; and they pro-  
 cured a decree for lasting honors to his memory.  
 What has passed in France, in our own time,  
 will assist to make such transactions more readily  
 and extensively intelligible, and to give means for  
 a just estimate of the value of such public honors.  
 The cotemporary historian, commonly confining  
 himself strictly to statement of fact, makes this  
 reflection here : ‘ Thus,’ he says, ‘ apparently  
 ‘ most

' most men appreciate political merit, by their SECT. II.  
 ' private advantages or sufferings, resulting from II.  
 ' political measures.'

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## SECTION III.

*Affairs of Athens: Athenian Exiles: Progress of change in Grecian Politics adverse to Theban Supremacy: Alliance of Arcadia with Athens: Insecurity of person in Greece: Alienation of Corinth from Athens: New pressure upon Lacedæmon: Magnanimity of Lacedæmon: Uprightness of Corinth: Partial Peace: Injustice of Argos.*

THE affairs of Athens, from the restoration of the democracy, now seven and thirty years<sup>11</sup>, appear to have been administered with general prudence. The rarity of the mention of them, in the cotemporary Athenian historian's general account of Grecian affairs, implies that, compared at least with other Grecian states, regularity and quiet prevailed there. The steady support which the Athenian government gave to the falling power of Lacedæmon, and the steady yet moderate opposition to the new ambition of Thebes, are positive indications that the popular will was wisely guided, against antient prejudice, to the true interest of the commonwealth; and the preservation of peace to the Attic territory, while an enemy on its border threatened the most distant parts of Greece, and the acquisition of new glory to the Athenian arms by supporting the allies of the commonwealth in Peloponnesus against such an enemy, evince

<sup>11</sup> From B. C. 403 to 366.

**C H A P.** evince ability and energy in the administration.  
**XXVIII.** Nevertheless, under the Athenian constitution, with the Athenian system of jurisprudence, the Athenian law of treason, and sycophancy florishing, civil quiet could be but imperfect and precarious. Many Athenians accordingly were at this time suffering in exile; and so familiar, among the Grecian republics, was the flight or banishment of numerous bodies of citizens, that, when unattended with extreme violence, they seem to have been thought scarcely matter for historical notice. Xenophon has mentioned the exiles but incidentally, leaving us wholly uninformed of the time, the cause, and every circumstance of this new schism of the Athenian people. For the modern reader some information on the subject seems wanting, toward a clear understanding of this part of Grecian history; and a collation of the antient writers, from whom we have memorials of the times, will furnish what may be useful.

In the embassy from the principal Grecian states to the Persian court, we have seen the Athenian minister, Timocrates, lending himself to Pelopidas, to put forward the Theban interest. Timocrates, as the stories reported of him by Plutarch indicate, was a vain weak man, dazzled by the splendor of the Persian court, delighted with Asiatic pomp and luxury, and fond of displaying presents, such as it remains yet the custom of Asiatic courts to make, tho at the risk of exciting among his fellowcountrymen, according to their different tempers and degrees of information, suspicion, envy, or contempt. Formed,

Plut. vit.  
Pelop.

however, as he seems to have been, to become the tool of the able Theban, yet it is not likely that, with a colleague protesting against his conduct, he could have been led so to coöperate with the man whom he was particularly commissioned to oppose, if some old party-views had not prepared him, and if the expectation of support from a party did not encourage him. He might, however, very possibly, both wander from the views, and miscalculate the strength, of his party; whence, on his return, Leon accusing him of neglecting and betraying the interests of the commonwealth, he was brought to trial, condemned and executed.

SECT.  
III.Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 7.  
c. 1. s. 26.

There remained yet in Athens, as various passages of Lysias and Isocrates testify, a relic of the old aristocratical party of the Four-hundred. In the actual confusion then of interests, among the Grecian republics, while the Athenian democracy was allied with the aristocratical confederacy of Lacedæmon, against the democratical confederacy of Thebes, if the aristocratical opposition in Athens had communication with the Theban leaders, the complication was not stranger than we have seen, in the course of the Peloponnesian war, during the peace between Athens and Lacedæmon. But that the inherent tyranny of the Athenian democracy pressed severely upon men of property in general, is shown by the most unequivocal testimony of the same great orators, the ablest advocates of the democratical cause. A few leading men, as Isocrates complains, grew rich from the public spoil; while, in

Ch. 21 & 22  
of this Hist.  
Isocr. de  
Pace,  
p. 254. v. 2.

**C H A P. XXVIII.** the impossibility for any to live in ease and security; the city was filled with lamentation and complaint. The indigent multitude, living by the assemblies and the courts of justice, delighted in accusations, prosecutions, and the whole business of sycophancy; encouraged by the men in power, who held their power from that multitude; while men of property were so oppressed with arbitrary orders, sometimes for military service, sometimes for civil office, frequently for contributions to the treasury, and, on any complaint of severity, vexed with demands for exchange of property, that their condition was altogether more uneasy than that of men who never possessed anything.

This sketch of the state of Athens, given to the public in an oration addressed to the Athenian people, between twenty and thirty years after the time of which we are treating, but by one fifty years of age, as it speaks of no new state of things, but rather of inveterate evils, may account for the circumstance, that many Athenian citizens were in exile. Those unfortunate men then combining, made themselves masters of the town and port of Oropus, in Attica, on the border of Bœotia. Those who directed the administration of the commonwealth were greatly alarmed.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 1.  
B.C. 366.  
Ol. 103. <sup>2</sup>.

Fearful probably of disaffection, they did not think it sufficient to assemble the whole force within Attica, to make war upon the refugees, but they sent for Chares, with the troops he commanded in Peloponnesus. This afforded an opportunity for the Sicyonians, which they did not neglect. The force under Chares, and the abilities

abilities and activity of the commander, had been the principal support of the Lacedæmonian cause in the north of Peloponnesus. As soon as these were withdrawn, the Arcadians, no longer fearing for their own country, readily gave assistance requested by the Sicyonians, who thus presently recovered their port. Meanwhile the Athenians, unable to obtain any assistance from their allies, little confident in their own means for attacking a fortified place, within ready reach of support from Thebes, and perhaps yet more fearful of a party within, than of an enemy without, came to terms, which are remarkable; it was agreed, that Oropus should be held by the Thebans, in trust, till the matters in dispute, whether between the Athenians of the city and the exiles, or between the Athenian and Theban governments, should be decided by a fair arbitration<sup>12</sup>.

While the supremacy of Greece was yielded by general consent, to Lacedæmon, or disputed only by Athens, it was scarcely possible for a citizen of any other state to acquire any considerable eminence in the nation. But the depression, successively of Athens and Lacedæmon, made an opening, which Thebes had not so completely filled as to preclude competition. On the con-

trary,

<sup>12</sup> Τοῖς δ' Ἀθηναίοις, οὐδεὶς τῶν συμμάχων ἴσονθετει, ἀλλ' ἀπχώρεισαι, Θηβαῖοις παρακαταθίμειοι τὸν Ορεωπόν, μίχρι δίκης. This passage seems to me to want something. All the translators have agreed to turn it nearly alike, none very intelligibly, and none noticing any difficulty. I have not much doubt of the explanation I have ventured to give; but I want the information, a want I have before had occasion to mention, what the δίκη could be, which might be reasonably trusted for an equitable decision of a matter in dispute between, either two independent states, or two factions of the same state.

try, the sudden and totally unexpected elevation of a new candidate for empire among the republics, appears to have excited emulation. Lycomedes of Mantinea, a man of large and liberal views, attentive to the circumstances of the surrounding states, obtained assurance that dissatisfaction was growing among the Athenians, in consequence of their not finding that ready return of assistance, to which they thought their exertions for their allies intitled them. Tho Athens was still the confederate, and Arcadia the enemy, of Lacedæmon, he conceived it possible that a connection might be formed between Arcadia and Athens, advantageous to both, and perhaps extensively advantageous to Greece. He obtained a decree from the assembly of the Tenthousand, or the Numberless, authorizing negotiation for the purpose, and he resolved to be himself the negotiator. The proposal was received at Athens, not without surprize; and warmly exclaimed against by many, as contrary to the existing engagements with Lacedæmon: but when it was represented how greatly the connection of Arcadia with Athens would tend to obviate the interference of Thebes in Peloponnesus, insomuch that it appeared to promise no less advantage to the Lacedæmonians than to the Athenians themselves, the objections mostly ceased, and a treaty of alliance was concluded. It was stipulated that, if Arcadia should be attacked, Athens should send a body of cavalry to its assistance, but that this auxiliary force should not be bound to march with the Arcadians into Laconia.

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1.7.  
c. 4. s. 6.

Lycomedes,

**Lycomedes**, in returning from Athens, unfortunately landed at a port of Peloponnesus, which happened to be, at that time, full of Arcadian refugees. His death is mentioned, by the contemporary historian, as what, in such circumstances, followed of course. Tho we cease to wonder at this, after observing the circumstances of the death of Euphron, yet it is a remarkable instance, to add to so many before occurring, of the excessive deficiency of provision for personal security in Greece. The treaty with Athens survived; but the views of the able negotiator, how far of a noble patriotism, how far of selfish ambition, his premature death has left uncertain, mostly seem to have perished with him. To judge however from the scanty mention of him, by the historian, his political adversary, Lycomedes, with the best ability and the best inclination, unless exception should be made for Epameinondas, seems to have been by far in the most favorable circumstances for extending peace and good policy in Greece, of any man of his time.

After the death of Lycomedes, Grecian politics continued, for some time, to hold the bent which he had principally given them; but the intuitive eye, watching all points in all the republics, and the ably guiding hand, were wanting. Soon after the accommodation, so unexpectedly effected between Athens and Arcadia, an indiscreet speech in the Athenian assembly alienated Corinth. The situation of Corinth, most advantageous in peace, was most unfortunate whenever war was general in Greece. Its territory, the thorofare between the

SECT.

III.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 1.

**C H A P.** the northern and southern provinces, could not  
**XXVIII.** fail to suffer frequently, and to be in danger always. As the Grecian confederacies now stood, Corinth, cut off from Lacedæmon by the intervention of Arcadia, Eleia, and Argolis, could receive ready and effectual support only from Athens; and thence had been accustomed so to rely upon Athenian auxiliaries, as to have incurred, unawares, the danger of becoming dependent upon Athens. One of those imprudent orators, by whom, in the Grecian democracies, the policy of wiser statesmen would be constantly liable to be frustrated, speaking to the Athenian people, extolled the wisdom of the Arcadian alliance; and then proceeded to advise the sovereign assembly, that its generals should be instructed to hold Corinth also safe for the Athenian people<sup>13</sup>. This expression, reported at Corinth, alarmed the Corinthians. Immediately exerting themselves to furnish sufficient garrisons of their own people, they relieved the Athenian troops in all the stations within their territory. Careful then to obviate just complaint, they assembled them in the city, and proclaimed by the public heralds, that if any Athenian was aggrieved, he should give his name to the proper magistrate, and justice should be done him. In this conjuncture Chares arrived at Cenchreæ with the Athenian fleet; and Xenophon's cautious account may give to suspect, that the Corinthians were not without reason jealous of the purpose. They thanked Chares for his readiness to assist them, but refused to admit his fleet into their port.

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1.7.  
c. 4. s. 5.

Settling

<sup>13</sup> Ὅπως καὶ ἡ Κόρινθος σώσῃ τῷ δῆμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων.

Settling then, with careful punctuality, all accounts with the Athenian troops, they dismissed them. S E C T .  
III.  
Thus the commanding influence, which Athens had for some time held in Corinth, ceased.

In thus guarding however against treachery from an ally, the Corinthians were aware that they were exposing themselves to the common enemy, to whom, on account of the pass it commanded, their country was so great an object. Their first resource was to strengthen their military with a force of mercenaries, horse and foot; and this sufficed, in the moment, not only to secure their own, but to enable them to extend annoyance into the hostile territories adjoining. Still they were aware that, if the force of the Theban confederacy should be collected against them, without support from Athens, upon which they could no longer rely, they must be overpowered. They managed therefore, by private communication, to sound the Theban government, and they had the satisfaction to receive, in direct terms, encouragement to send ministers to Thebes. They requested to be allowed first to communicate with their allies; that those who were desirous of peace might be parties; and to this also the Thebans consented.

Then they sent ministers to Lacedæmon. ‘They  
 ‘were bound,’ they said, ‘by interest, by incli-  
 ‘nation, by old and hereditary friendship, as well  
 ‘as by oaths, to the Lacedæmonian alliance; to  
 ‘which they should anxiously desire to adhere,  
 ‘if the Lacedæmonians themselves could show  
 ‘how they might finally resist the confederacy,  
 ‘which

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 6

**CHAP.** ‘ which had been so long and so severely pressing  
**XXVIII.** ‘ upon them. But if ruin threatened, not Corinth  
‘ only, but Lacedæmon, then their first wish must  
‘ be, that Lacedæmon would join them in making  
‘ peace, upon the best terms that could be ob-  
‘ tained; their second, that they might be released  
‘ from their obligations, so far as to be allowed,  
‘ without offence to gods or men, to make peace  
‘ for themselves; and this they desired, not for  
‘ their own sakes only, but with the consideration  
‘ that their destruction would bring no benefit to  
‘ their allies, whereas, if preserved, they might  
‘ still, on some future occasion, be useful to La-  
‘ cedæmon.’ The determination of the Lacedæ-  
monians, if not prudent, was generous. They not  
only allowed, but advised the Corinthians to make  
peacé; and they declared, ‘ that those of their  
‘ other allies, who were unwilling to continue the  
‘ war, should be released from their engagements  
‘ to them: but, for themselves, leaving the event  
‘ to God, they would persevere in arms, and never  
‘ submit to be deprived of Messenia, their inheri-  
‘ tance received from their fathers.’

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 9.

s. 10.

The Corinthian ministers returning, with this answer, negotiations was immediately opened with Thebes. Alliance defensive and offensive was proposed by the Thebans; but this the Corinthians refused: it would be, they said, but a change of war; their object was a just and permanent peace. Admiring their resolution, says Xenophon, under the dangers which pressed them, to refuse taking a part against their friends and benefactors, the

Thebans

Thebans granted their desire. Peace was made with them, in the name of the confederacy, upon condition that both parties should hold their antient territories, as before the war. These terms were extended to the Phliasians and Epidaurians ; and all parties swore to the treaty, with the usual solemnities. The Phliasians then immediately evacuated Thyamia in Sicyonia, expecting that Tricranum<sup>14</sup>, in their own territory, then held by Phliasian exiles, under the protection of Argos, should be restored to them. But the Argians, having ineffectually solicited the consent of the Phliasian government for the exiles to retain the place, claimed it as a part of Argolis, and placed a garrison of their own troops in it. The Phliasians in vain called for that legal discussion, and judicial decision, of which we often hear between state and state in Greece, without any satisfactory information what it was ; but the Argians persevered in using the power they possessed, to maintain the decision they had themselves already made.

SECT.  
III.

<sup>14</sup> The name is also found written Tricraniun and Tricaranum.

## SECTION IV.

*Considerations on which the conduct of Lacedaemon was founded: Disposition of Athens: narrow views of the Grecian Politicians: Advantage of the measures of Agesilaus: Progress of dissension among the Peloponnesian confederates of Thebes: War of Arcadia and Elis. Danger of Thebes from Sedition; Cruelty of the Thebans. War of Thebes in Thessaly; Death of Pelopidas.*

C H A P.  
XXVIII.

IN thus freely allowing their Peloponnesian allies to seek security by a separate treaty, and at the same time persevering themselves in refusal to surrender Messenia, which was the condition of peace required by the Theban confederacy, the Lacedæmonians were guided by a policy, certainly magnanimous, but perhaps not less wise and truly prudent. In the inability of Lacedæmon to protect, the obligations of sacrifices and oaths would probably not have stood long against the pressure of the Theban arms; and, in the mean time, a forced service, tho it may promote a prosperous, would not be likely to give any very efficacious support to a falling cause. But, for themselves, had the Lacedæmonians yielded to the requisition of Thebes, had they purchased peace by the surrender of half their territory, the relief would have been utterly precarious. The argument, tho we are shocked with it, which Isocrates has attributed to Archidamus, we must allow to be forcible; that the establishment of the Messenians and Helots in freedom, in the neighborhood of Lacedæmon, would be the more dangerous and the more intolerable, as their former

Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 76. v. 2.

former treatment had exceeded in severity that of other slaves. But threatened and distressed as Lacedæmon was, her situation was less desperate than it had been. Peloponnesus had now some experience of the Theban connection. Infinite civil disturbances had arisen; civil order, that might insure domestic quiet, had followed nowhere; and there was evidently nowhere any general satisfaction in any change which it had produced. In Arcadia an avowed jealousy of Thebes prevailed, and symptoms of schism in the confederacy appeared in more than one part. Of all the advantages, likely to result from these circumstances, Lacedæmon would deprive herself, without any fair hope that submission would procure lasting quiet.

Lacedæmon, moreover, was not yet without powerful allies. The younger Dionysius, who had succeeded to his deceased father's situation in Syracuse, was disposed to maintain his father's engagements. In Athens, according to the contemporary Athenian orator, without any general disposition truly friendly to Lacedæmon, there was, what might answer the purpose for the Lacedæmonians, a disposition, in just attention to the interest of Athens, to oppose the advancement of Thebes. The zealous advocate for universal peace among the Greeks, Isocrates, was one of the many Athenians who saw, with anxiety, the avowed ambition of Thebes, supported by growing power, and conducted by consummate talents. His extant oration, in the form of a speech of the prince Archidamus, son of Agesilaus,

S E C T.  
IV.

Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 54 - 60

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 12.

Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 54.

Isocr. de  
Pace, et ad  
Philipp. &  
al.

**CHAP.** to the Lacedæmonian assembly, has been really  
**XXVIII.** a political pamphlet, admirably adapted to its purpose ; which was, at the same time, to encourage the Lacedæmonians in resistance to Thebes, to confirm the Athenians in the Lacedæmonian connection, and to reconcile the Greeks, in general, to the claim of Lacedæmon to the territory of Messenia. In that composition, which has earned the particular commendation of an elegant and judicious critic of the Augustan age, a deficiency, tho frequently obvious among the Greek political writers, is nevertheless striking, and worthy of notice : no principle of extensive welfare, no liberal view to the common good of Greece, is put forward ; but, on the contrary, the Lacedæmonians are encouraged in that narrow patriotism, whose great object was the exclusive power and happiness of their own commonwealth ; recommended however by the observation, that, under the acknowledged supremacy of Lacedæmon, civil order and general happiness had been conspicuous in Peloponnesus, and almost peculiar to it ; whereas anarchy and discord, public evils and private, many and extreme, had followed the change for the patronage of Thebes.

The caution of Xenophon, inforced by his particular circumstances, has left us very scanty information of the state of parties in Lacedæmon, during all that disasterous period which followed the return of Agesilaus from Asia. We gather, however, that Agesilaus could not always direct measures ; and some expressions of Isocrates imply that for some time he did not hold a leading influence.

Dionys.  
Hal.

Isocr.  
Archid.  
p. 76, & 82  
p. 56.

Isocr.  
Archid. sub.  
fine.

influence. The Theban invasion seems to have restored it to him. His ability then defended Sparta, his liberality assisted to feed the auxiliaries, for which the public treasury was unequal ; while the misfortunes of the country were attributed to the mismanagement of others, who had held the ministry ; and the victory, obtained afterward under the command of his son Archidamus, over the Peloponnesian allies of Thebes, would tend powerfully to confirm the renovated power of his party.

Events, soon following, showed the justness of the views, which decided Agesilaus and his friends to advise perseverance in war, rather than submission to humiliating and oppressive terms, for a precarious peace. By the separate treaty, the nominal strength of Lacedæmon was indeed reduced ; but the allies, whose coöperation was lost, were so exposed by situation, and so unequal to their own defence, that it might be questioned if their security, in neutrality, was not more advantageous to Lacedæmon, than their coöperation, under the perpetual want of protection. The need also of assistance from them was lessened, by the dissension growing between the most powerful allies of Thebes, those who, by local circumstances, most pressed upon Lacedæmon. When the season for action came on, the usual succours arrived from Syracuse ; the Lacedæmonians assembled their forces, and no inter- B.C. 365.<sup>1</sup> OI. 103. 4. Xenoph. Hel. I. 7. c. 4. b. 12.

<sup>1</sup> I cannot understand Dodwell's reason for assigning this event, against the order of Xenophon's narrative, to the beginning of the former campaign, B. C. 366.

SECT.  
•IV.  
Xen. Agesil.  
c. 2. s. 24, 25.  
Plut. vit.  
Agesil.

**CHAP. XXVII.** ription occurring from the Theban confederacy, they recovered the important town of Sellasia, which since the Theban invasion had been held by the revolters.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 15.

s. 12.

B.C. 365.  
Ol. 103. 4.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 13.

s. 14.

The first movements of the allies of Thebes, in Peloponnesus, were against one another. In Elis, at this time governed by the aristocratical party, a democratical opposition was patronized by the Arcadians. Irritated anew by this, while anger at the loss of their dependencies in Triphylia, through the violent interference of the Arcadians, was yet fresh, they resolved to recur to arms; and, attacking the Triphylian town of Lasion; formerly theirs, but now a tributary dependence of Arcadia, they made themselves masters of it. When passion urged the Eleian aristocracy to a measure of violence, which appears to have been highly imprudent, we shall less wonder if the Arcadian Numberless assembly, no longer directed by the wisdom of Lycomedes, gave way also to passion; so that all consideration of the great interests, not of Greece only but of the confederacy, was lost under the existing provocation; and it was thought enough, for prudence, that the strength of Arcadia sufficed for revenge. The strength of Arcadia, accordingly without delay collected, invaded Elcia. The Eleians met it, with inferior numbers; and, ill-advisedly coming to action, with disadvantage also of ground, were defeated with considerable slaughter. The towns of the Eleian highlands then, excepting only Thraustus, yielding to the summons of the Arcadian generals, while they directed their march

toward Olympia. No resistance was found there. S.E.C.T.  
IV. A garrison was placed in the precinct of the temple of Saturn, which, with an intrenchment thrown around, commanded the Olympian mountain: the neighboring town of Marganæ was gained, by the voluntary act of the prevailing party among the inhabitants. The Arcadian army proceeded then to Elis, and its advanced guard entered that unfortified town, and penetrated as far as the agora. Being however there charged by the collected Eleian cavalry, supported by infantry, it was driven out again with some slaughter.

The distress of their country, in the usual way Xen. Hell. l. 7. c. 4. of faction, gave joy to the democratical leaders in Elis, who looked to it as the means of power and party-triumph to themselves. Under the encouragement it afforded, they opened a traitorous correspondence with the enemy, and obtaining the terms they desired, with a promise of support, they seized the citadel. The aristocratical party, however, exerting themselves instantly and vigorously, recovered the fortress; and then the leaders of the democratical party, with about four hundred of their followers, fled. Received as friends by the Arcadians, and encouraged by them, they seized Pylus, a town of Eleia under mount Pholoë, less than ten miles from Elis<sup>16</sup>. A settlement thus acquired, and the patronage of a conquering

<sup>16</sup> There were three principal places of the name of Pylus in Peloponnesus; the Eleian here spoken of, the Triphylian, which, according to Strabo, was Nestor's residence, and the Messenian, which became remarkable in the Peloponnesian war.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

conquering army, gave such credit to their cause that numbers quitted the threatened city to join them.

Under these circumstances, the Eleians in possession would probably not have been able long, with their single strength, to support themselves. But the prudent governments of the bordering province of Achaia saw their own danger in the fall of Elis, and the preponderance which Arcadia was acquiring in Peloponnesus. The distraction of the confederacy, and especially the violence of the Arcadians against their allies, operated in favor of the Lacedæmonian interest, and already the little commonwealth of Pellenë, being under aristocratical government, had ventured to renew its antient connection with Lacedæmon<sup>17</sup>. The other Achaian cities, professing a desire to avoid hostility with Arcadia, declared however their purpose to protect Elis, and immediately sent troops to give efficacy to their resolution. The Arcadians, their first vengeance against the Eleians being satisfied, yielded to an argument so well enforced. Desisting from farther attempts against the city, they however ravaged the country, and leaving the democratical Eleians established in Pylus, a measure with which the Achaians did not interfere, they withdrew home. The return of Elis to its antient connection with Lacedæmon, then became matter of course. While

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 4. s. 19.

<sup>17</sup> Ηδη γὰς πάλιν αργοστειχωξύκισαν ὁι Πελληνοῖς εἰς τὴν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων συμμαχίαν. Xen. Hel. l. 7. c. 5. s. 17. Xenophon has, I think, not explained whether the return to the Lacedæmonian confederacy, here spoken of, was after the change occasioned by the march of Epameinondas into Achaia, or after the partial peace, made by the treaty of Thebes, to which the Pellenians may have been parties.

While the able leaders of the Theban councils were perplexed, with regard to their interests, in Peloponnesus, by the violence of the dissensions among their confederates, their attention was called to the circumstances of Thessaly; and, still more urgently, to matters arising in Bœotia, and in Thebes itself. Orchomenus, the second city of Bœotia, in importance, had been the last to acknowledge the sovereignty of Thebes; and the aristocratical, the most powerful party there, bore that sovereignty with extreme reluctance and dissatisfaction. In Thebes itself, where aristocracy had so long predominated, an aristocratical party was still numerous, but the chiefs were in exile. These founded their hope of restoration on the political sentiments prevailing in Orchomenus, and spreading, in a smaller degree, among those of higher rank in other Bœotian towns. Communication was had among them, and a plot was formed for a revolution.

It was the practice of the Theban government occasionally to order reviews of the whole cavalry of Bœotia. The conspirators were mostly of those serving in the cavalry, who in Orchomenus alone were three hundred. The time appointed for a review was chosen for the execution of the plot; but, in the difficulty of due caution, where numbers are to be engaged, some, faithless or disaffected, were let into the secret, who disclosed it to the Bœotarchs. We are without direct information who now guided the Theban councils; but, amid the abominable cruelty of the vengeance taken, that able policy appears, which commonly

Diodor.  
l. 15. p. 498.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

distinguished the measures of the Theban government under Pelopidas and Epameinondas. The conspirators of the smaller towns were pardoned; the Orchomenian cavalry were brought in chains before the assembled Theban people. An inveterate hatred, traced even to the heroic ages, is said to have subsisted between the Thebans and Orchomenians. The death of the guilty cavalry therefore did not satisfy popular animosity. At the same time that capital condemnation was pronounced against these, it was decreed that the town of Orchomenus should be levelled, and the whole people sold to slavery. Force only could carry into execution such a decree. The Thebans marched in arms to Orchomenus, already deprived of its leaders and its cavalry, and, becoming masters of the town, put to death all the men, and sold the women and children<sup>18</sup>.

The danger, which had threatened the existing government of Thebes, being, by this dreadful execution, averted, the leading men had leisure to direct their views around: and, while the distractions among their Peloponnesian allies repelled,

circumstances

<sup>18</sup> According to Pausanias (l. 9. c. 15. p. 740.) this transaction took place while Pelopidas and Epameinondas were absent; the former prisoner in Thessaly, the other marching to his relief. According to Diodorus, it was three years after the release of Pelopidas. Mistakes indeed abound in the chronology of Diodorus; but Diodorus was a chronologer, and meant to be exact. Pausanias was an antiquarian; generally, as Dodwell has well observed, much more accurate than Diodorus, but unversed in politics, ill-versed in history, and inattentive to the course of political events.

Xenophon, intent upon transactions in Peloponnesus, in which he was deeply interested, and where everything passed, in a manner, under his eye, has omitted notice of these transactions in Boeotia and in Thessaly.

circumstances in other quarters invited their interference. The aversion among the Thessalian cities to the tyrant tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, notwithstanding the ill success of the Thebans in that country, kept alive a Theban party there.

SECT.  
IV.  

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Diod. I. 15.  
Plut. &  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Pelop.

New oppression from Alexander had excited new resistance to his authority; but his abilities and activity enabled him to overbear his opponents. In their distress, they applied to Thebes for assistance, and for commander they requested Pelopidas, whose military talents and popular manners, when formerly commanding in their country, had procured him general favor and esteem. The supreme assembly of Bœotia was summoned: it was decreed that the Thessalian cities should be supported; and Pelopidas led an army of seven thousand men through the straits of Thermopylæ. Alexander, with a more numerous army on advantageous ground, awaited his attack, which Pelopidas, perhaps too much trusting in the superiority of the Bœotian heavy-armed, rashly made. Pelopidas himself fell. If Diodorus, Nepos, and Plutarch, might be believed, his army nevertheless obtained a complete victory; but the concise account of Alexander by Xenophon, and the incidental mention of the transactions of Pelopidas in Thessaly by Polybius, imply something so different, that allowance, evidently, must be made for exaggeration, in the panegyric of the biographers, and the report of the later historian. A dubious victory, however, a drawn battle, with a large Bœotian force remaining in the country, may have afforded great relief to the party which had

**CHAP.** had taken arms against the tagus ; and then, **XXVIII.** wherever that party predominated, those honors to the memory of the slain general, which Nepos has reported, statues, and golden crowns, and lands to his family (the estates probably of those whom the party expelled or desired to expel), would follow in the common course of party measures.

Pelopidas appears to have been a man of an active, enterprizing, bold, and generous spirit, very popular manners, and good, but not extraordinary abilities. Scarcely equal to the lead of councils, or perhaps of armies, in the great and arduous circumstances in which his exertion had contributed much to place his country, he was, nevertheless, by his talents and his virtues, a most valuable assistant to Epameinondas ; with whom he seems to have lived in perfect friendship, above envy and jealousy. His death was therefore a great loss, to his friends, to his country, and to those allies who depended upon his country for support<sup>19</sup>.

According

<sup>19</sup> We may apparently trust the positive assertion of Nepos and Plutarch, supported by the less explicit testimony of Diodorus, that Pelopidas was one of the leaders, and he would of course be among the most active of them, in the conspiracy by which Thebes was recovered from the Lacedaemonians ; tho in the detailed account of that remarkable transaction by the cotemporary historian, and even in the account given at some length by Diodorus, the name of Pelopidas never occurs. It is in summing up his praises only, where he relates his death, that Diodorus mentions the universal acceptance of the report, which gave the first merit in that business to Pelopidas ; and even there he does not say what part Pelopidas took in the business, but rather shows that he had no certain information of it : Εν γὰρ τῇ τῷ φυγάδων καταλήψῃ, καθ' ἣν ἀπεκτήσασι τὴν Καδμίαν, ὡμολογημένως ἀπαντεῖς τούτῳ (τῷ Πιστωτίδᾳ) τὸ ἀρχίσπειρον τοῦ κατορθώματος ἀπονομούσι. This is the whole of his testimony. Yet Plutarch, near two centuries after him, and near five after Xenophon, without stating any authority,

According to Diodorus, after the death of <sup>SECT.</sup> Pelopidas, the Thebans gained a second great <sup>IV.</sup> victory in Thessaly, and Plutarch relates that Alexander was completely subdued. Xenophon and Polybius forbid entire credit to this; yet there seems reason for supposing that the affairs of Thebes in Thessaly continued to be ably conducted. The result, as we learn from Xenophon, was a treaty of peace and alliance with the tagus, and an accommodation, under the mediation of Thebes, between the tagus and the Thessalian cities, which appear to have been altogether creditable and advantageous.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 5. s. 4.

## SECTION V.

*Invasion of Eleia by the Arcadians, of Arcadia by the Lacedæmonians: Arcadian Eparites, or select Militia: Liberality in Grecian Law of War. Interference of the Arcadians in the Presidency of the Olympian Festival; Battle of Olympia.*

LACEDÆMON, and the Lacedæmonian cause in <sup>SECT.</sup> Greece, seemed now reviving from threatened dis- <sup>V.</sup> solution. But leisure was still wanted, to repress or compose revolt, and restore civil order, in the antient territory of Sparta, when a new invasion <sup>B.C. 364.</sup> of Eleia by the Arcadians, and a new defeat of <sup>Ol. 101. 7.</sup> the Eleians in battle, compelled attention from the Lacedæmonian government, to the distress and

authority, has not scrupled to describe the single combat, and the complex contests, of Pelopidas, in the course of a series of nocturnal assassinations, as if he had been present as a quiet spectator, in a theater, where they were represented before him.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 19.

CHAP. and danger of its first returning ally. Archidatnus  
XXVIII. was therefore placed at the head of an army, with  
which he invaded Arcadia. He took the town  
of Cromnus, and putting three lochi in garrison  
there, led the rest of his army home.

As far as immediate relief to the Eleians only  
was in view, this measure appears to have been  
well conceived; but the foresight, not of the  
statesman only, but of the general also, should  
have extended farther. The Arcadians, feeling  
all the expected uneasiness at the establishment  
of a hostile post within their country, withdrew  
their troops from Eleia; and, collecting their whole  
force at Cromnus, hastily surrounded it with a  
contravallation and circumvallation. The Lace-  
dæmonians, not till their garrison was already  
blockaded, in much alarm for it, reassembled  
their army, and committed the command again to  
Archidamus. The same deficiency of weapons  
and art of attack, which compelled the Arcadians  
to the slow method of blockade against a weakly  
fortified place with a small garrison, deterred  
Archidamus from assault upon the Arcadian lines.  
His object was to allure or provoke the besiegers  
to quit them; and with this view he carried ravage  
through the rebellious Lacedæmonian province of  
Skiritis, and, as far as he could, into Arcadia.  
But the Arcadian generals were not to be so di-  
verted from their purpose; within their lines they  
kept their army secure, and the blockade close.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 22. Archidamus now saw that, to relieve Cromnus,  
he must force the lines. The circumvallation,  
inclosing part of a hill, was commanded by the  
summit.

summit. If he could possess himself of the summit, he thought the Arcadians could not long hold their situation beneath. With this view, he was winding his march round the hill, when his advanced guard, composed of targeteers and cavalry, seeing the chosen body of Arcadians, called the Eparites, without their lines, attacked them. The Eparites seem to have been an establishment made by those able men who formed the union of Arcadia. They were a select militia, composed of citizens from every republic of the union, who were to be always ready for the general service. The desultory assault of the Lacedæmonians was received, by this well-trained body, without moving. It was renewed upon them, and then they advanced against the assailants. Archidamus turned to support his targeteers, leading his heavy-armed along the carriage-road, in a narrow column of march. In this weak order he was attacked by the Arcadians, formed in phalanx. The Lacedæmonians, who, apparently, should not have swerved from their first object to make this attack, were unable to withstand the firmer order of the Arcadians: Archidamus himself was severely wounded in the thigh: Chilon, his sister's husband, and not less than thirty other Spartans, mostly of the highest rank, were killed. Quickly however the Lacedæmonians reached advantageous ground, on which, notwithstanding the pressure upon them, their ready discipline inabled them to form; and then the Arcadians halted. But it appeared that the transgression of those precepts of their great lawgiver, which forbade lasting war, and frequent

Xenopl.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 34.

s. 23.

s. 24.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

frequent wars with the same enemy, had already been carried too far. Not the Thebans only, but the Arcadians also, began to vie with them in discipline; and that persuasion of their superiority to all mankind, which had assisted formerly to render the Lacedæmonians invincible, was gone by. They were now superior in number, but disheartened by their prince's wound, and the death of those around him; while the Arcadians were encouraged by the consideration, always important, that they had been successful assailants upon a retreating enemy. The action was on the point of being renewed, when one of the Lacedæmonian elders, perhaps aware of deficiency in the commanders, exclaimed, 'To what purpose are we going to fight? Why should not a truce rather here end the contest?' The proposal of a truce, under such circumstances, always implied acknowledgement of defeat; yet it was approved by the other Lacedæmonians. The Arcadians readily consented: withdrawing to the ground where they had made their first assault, they erected their trophy there, and left the Lacedæmonians to perform, at leisure, the funeral obsequies of their slain.

Where battle begun might so be stopped (and it is not from a closet speculator, of some centuries after, that we have these curious particulars, but a cotemporary, versed in the din of war and the crash of armies) it might be not unreasonably supposed that opportunity for any negotiation, and a disposition to any just accommodation, would be ready. Why then was not negotiation instantly

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 25.

stantly begun; first for the surrender of Cromnus, with safety for the garrison; and then for solid peace? Nothing like either, as far as appears, was thought of. Civilization and reflection, amid much practice in war, had led the Greeks, tho not to the generosity of modern European warfare, yet to customs adapted to humanize hostility, in some degree, and lessen its horrors: but the circumstances, altogether, of their political system, and the habits which it superinduced, impressed much the idea that warfare was the natural state of man; to be regulated, not obviated, by policy and humanity<sup>20</sup>. The Lacedæmonians, after due rites to their dead, withdrew in quiet, under cover of the truce; but, soon after, returning by night, attacked the Arcadian lines, and, on one point, forced them. With numbers however, adapted to surprise, but too small to withstand the collected strength of the besieging army, hasty retreat was necessary; and those only of the garrison were relieved, who could instantly rush out and join them: the escape of somewhat more than a hundred was prevented by the besiegers.

Then appeared, in all its extent, the impolicy of a measure so alarming and irritating to the Arcadians, as the establishment of a Lacedæmonian garrison in their country. Their ill disposition toward Thebes, and especially their jealousy of Theban interference in Peloponnesus, which had

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1. 7.  
c. 4. s. 27.

\* This appears, in all the projects, for improving government, of Plato, Aristotle, and others; and in the schemes of Isocrates for obviating the eternal quarrels of the Greeks among themselves, by directing hostility against foreign nations.

**CHAP.** had contributed, perhaps, beyond anything, to the relief of Lacedæmon from passed dangers, and afforded the best ground of hope for its future security and prosperity, now gave way to their anxiety for riddance from so annoying and threatening an inconvenience. The deficiency of the art of attack of the age, when a garrison of a hundred men might defy an army, made all auxiliaries acceptable. For, to prosecute with certain effect the tedious business of a blockade, the force was to be proportioned, not to that within the place attacked, but to that which, from without, might, at any time during the long operation, attack the besiegers. The assistance of all allies was therefore called for, and the guard of the lines was divided between Arcadian, Argian, Theban, and Messenian forces. Farther attempts to relieve the place were thus deterred, and the little garrison was at length starved into a surrender.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 4. s. 26.

The detention of the Arcadian forces, at Cromnus, afforded opportunity for the Eleians to direct their whole strength against their apostate fellow-citizens in Pylus. These, venturing a battle, were defeated, and about two hundred were made prisoners. The Eleian citizens, among them, were all put to death: the rest were sold for slaves. Siege being then laid to Pylus and Marganææ, both were taken.

s. 28.

The season of the festival of the hundred and fourth Olympiad now approached, while an Arcadian garrison commanded Olympia, and the neighboring country, adhering to the Arcadian interest,

interest, remained in what the Eleians esteemed rebellion against them. The Arcadians, having freed themselves from the annoyance of a Lacedæmonian garrison within their country, did not immediately propose any new aggression against the Eleians, but they resolved not to surrender Olympia to them for the purposes of the festival. A shock was thus hazarded to the prejudices, and an interruption to the injourments of the Greek nation, which might have excited extensive enmity; but means for obviating this, to a considerable degree, were found in the disputed title of the Eleians to the presidency, tho they had been uninterruptedly exercising it so many years. The Arcadians would not assume that presidency, in their own name; they affected to restore the sacred right to the Pisæans, who had never ceased to claim it, against what they termed the Eleian usurpation: and thus was obtained the support of some of the most powerful states of Greece; perhaps dissatisfied, as we have seen Lacedæmon formerly, with the manner in which the Eleians may, on some occasions, have exercised the power conceded to them at the Olympian meeting. The Argians sent two thousand heavy-armed to assist in maintaining the presidency of the Pisæans; and even the Athenians, in favour of their new allies of Arcadia, against Elis, the confederate of Lacedæmon, while Lacedæmon was still the confederate of Athens (so the interests of the Grecian republics became complicated) sent five hundred horse, which, among Peloponnesian armies, would be a very considerable body.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

On the other hand, the Eleians, esteeming their right of presidency at the Olympian festival a most valuable inheritance, derived from their forefathers, resolved to spare no exertion in asserting it. They engaged the Achaians in their interest; and, waiting then till the time when the concourse would be formed (for such was the public confidence in the sacred estimation of the place and season, that persons led by curiosity or business had flocked, nearly as usual, from every settlement of the Greek nation) they marched to Olympia.

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 4. n. 30.

s. 29.

The Eleians, tho' engaged in frequent wars, were held in the lowest estimation, among the Greeks, as a military people; looked upon with a degree of contempt, not only by the Arcadians, Argians, and Athenians, but by their own allies the Achaians. The Arcadians, therefore, the more confident in their present strength, on account of their late successes, took no measures for preventing, or even observing the approach of an enemy. They were attending the exhibition of the games, in all leisure; the horserace was over; the pentathlon, or contest of five exercises, was going forward; the athletes, who had already run, were proceeding to wrestle; no longer in the course, says Xenophon, who is likely to have been present, but between the course and the altar; when the alarm was given, that the Eleians were already on the verge of the Altis, the inclosure consecrated to the purposes of the celebrity. The Arcadians then hurried into order of battle, on the bank of the brook Cladæs, which, washing

one

one side of the Altis, presently joins the Alpheius. The Eleians, advancing in good order, on each side of the Cladaüs, broke the Arcadian phalanx with the first shock, and then were equally successful against the Argians, hastening to support it. The disordered troops retreated, and the Eleians pursued among the public and sacred buildings, to the space between the council-hall, the temple of Vesta, and the adjoining theater. There the advantage afforded for defence, and for the use of missile weapons, by those solid and lofty edifices, enabled the defeated to stand, and the victors suffered some loss before they withdrew to their camp.

The Arcadians and their allies, however, <sup>it</sup> appeared, felt themselves very effectually defeated. No longer thinking of opposing the Eleians in the field, they were all night employed in forming defences; the scaffolding and sheds, raised for the accommodation of persons attending the celebrity, furnishing materials for a palisade<sup>\*</sup>. By morning they had so fortified the avenues, and so disposed troops on the temple tops, that the Eleians, on a view of the opposition prepared for them, prudently abstained from farther assault. Xenophon has declared his astonishment at what they had already done. After mentioning the previous disrepute of their military character, he expresses himself thus: ‘On this occasion the

Eleians

<sup>\*</sup> It appears from this circumstance that the spectators and men of business, at the Olympian meeting, did not view this extraordinary contest quite so much at their ease as Diodorus has represented.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 32.

C H A P.  
XXVIII.

‘ Eleians showed themselves soldiers, such as the deity, giving courage by inspiration, might make in a day; but the art of men, employed on those not naturally brave, could not in a long time form.’

But the poverty of the Grecian states, the disproportion of their public revenue to their military force (except when Athens or Lacedæmon received tribute from any subject republics) generally prevented any regular plan of a campaign, and often denied what should have been the immediate fruit of victory. The Eleians, not strong enough to carry Olympia by assault, not rich enough to subsist long from home, at a loss in any way to push the advantage gained, returned to Elis.

## SECTION VI.

*Sacrilegious Robbery of the Olympian Treasury, by the Democratical Administration of Arcadia: Opposition of Mantinea to the Sacrilege: Support solicited from Thebes by the perpetrators: Remonstrance against interference from Thebes by the Arcadian sovereign Assembly: Congress at Tegea: Violence of the Theban Commissioner; supported by Epeorus: Reunion of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, in alliance with Lacedæmon.*

B.C. 364. By the retreat of the victorious Eleians, the Arcadians were left at liberty to chuse their measures. OI. 104. 1. The force of Arcadia might perhaps have sufficed for revenge, but that Arcadia, like Elis, wanted pecuniary resources. The Eparites, none probably so poor as not to possess a slave, could generally

generally subsist from their private means, while the defence of their own country, or a hasty expedition only, into a neighboring province, was required of them. But already they began to be pressed by their detention at Olympia; far from their homes, and yet surrounded by a friendly territory, which put plunder at a distance; uneasy, at the same time, under their late defeat, which would not dispose them to bear, with increased patience, the inconveniences of want. If, to relieve them, Olympia was left without an Arcadian force, the considerable acquisitions made, through the first successes in the war, would be at once lost; and the Pisæans, Triphylians, all those, on pretence of protecting whom the war had been undertaken, must be exposed to the vengeance of the Eleians. These considerations pressed upon the democratical chiefs, now at the head of the Arcadian affairs, while a strong aristocratical opposition still existed in their country. Shame, anger, revenge, interest, ambition, fear, the fear of all those evils, usually, in the Grecian republics, following the loss of popularity and its attendant power, instigated, and the Olympian treasury was before them. The temptation altogether was greater than they could resist. Careless, perhaps, about the punishments which, in vulgar opinion, would certainly follow from the vengeance of the gods, they resolved to brave those, most severely denounced, for the crime of sacrilege, throughout Greece, by the laws of men; trusting to the means, which the crime itself would furnish, for their security. They

CHAP. expected assuredly to gain the Eparites; whose  
XXVIII support would enable them to overbear opposition  
 within their own country; and they had great  
 confidence in the efficacy of the riches, which  
 they should make their own, for negotiation  
 without.

The amount altogether of the plunder, which, under this resolution, may have been committed upon the sacred treasury of Olympia, perhaps was never publicly known; but the source of a pay, established, and regularly issued, for the Eparites, under authority of the administration of a confederacy of democracies, not to be concealed, appears indeed to have been boldly avowed. Powerful however as the means were, which the democratical chiefs had laid their hands upon, for obviating opposition and complaint, they could not prevent the use of the opportunity, which their measure afforded to their political opponents, for exciting honest indignation, and alarming popular superstition. In Mantinea the aristocratical

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 4. s. ss.

appears to have been the prevailing party. There a decided opposition to the measure was presently resolved upon, by those at the head of affairs; and it was conducted with a temperate firmness, which made it formidable. A deputation was sent, in the name of the municipal government of Mantinea, to those who directed the administration of the union, declaring, ‘that the Mantineians, ‘desirous to support, with their best means, the ‘interest of the united Arcadian people, would ‘however avoid implication in the guilt of sacri-‘lege: that they had therefore remitted a sum of ‘money,

' money, collected among themselves, equal to their share of the pay at present wanted for the Eparites ; and against all sacrilegious use of the Olympian treasure they utterly protested.'

S E C T.  
VI.

But the democratical chiefs, who, in considering the different dangers before them, had perhaps thought it safer to commit the crime, than either to abandon the direction of public affairs, or struggle in the management of them, against the difficulties of public penury, were not now disposed to retreat. Supposing their party sure in the Numberless assembly, they cited the leading men of Mantinea<sup>22</sup> before that body, to answer for their conduct, as a treasonable opposition to the authority of the united Arcadian government. This citation, the Mantineians, doubting the independency or the impartiality of a majority in the assembly, avoided to obey. It is indeed a curious complication of tyranny and weakness, of public corruption and private insecurity, that is displayed in the cotemporary historian's account of the measures of that new united government, which had been proposed to the Arcadians as the perfection of democracy. The assembly proceeded to, what was indeed ordinary in Greek jurisprudence, condemnation of the contumacious Mantineians, as if they had been tried and regularly convicted, and a body of Eparites was sent to apprehend them. But the Mantineians, who had resolved to disobey a legal summons, were prepared also to resist force : they shut the gates of

<sup>22</sup> Τοὺς εργάτας αὐτῷ.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

of their town, and refused admittance to those who came with the authority, or at least in the name, of the sovereign assembly of Arcadia.

Civil war thus was, in effect, declared. The opposition of the Mantineians could in truth be justified only by what might justify resistance to any established government. Sound political principle, as we have had frequent occasion to observe, was little found in Greece; but superstition, commonly powerful, operated, perhaps on this occasion, in concurrence with the best political principle, in favor of the Mantineian chiefs. The aristocratical party, throughout Arcadia, would of course be with them. At the same time doubt, shame, fear, began to spread among those inclined to the democratical cause; fear of the divine vengeance, and fear of the reproaches and enmity of all Greece; insomuch that many of them also declared against the obnoxious measure. The dreadful idea of involving themselves and their families, to latest posterity, in guilt with gods and men, had a growing effect, which the bold authors of the crime could not repress; and shortly a majority of the Numberless, or the Ten-thousand, repented, so far as to come to a resolution, ‘that no farther trespass upon the sacred treasury should be allowed.’

This resolution, moderate as it might seem, reduced the authors of the sacrilege, hitherto leaders of the Arcadian politics, at once to a situation of extreme peril, by depriving them of that source of power to which they had looked for safety. They could no longer hold their influence

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 4. s. 34.

over the Eparites ; may of whom were unable, and many others little willing, to serve out of their own country, on their private means. The stoppage of a pay, which was become a public condition of their service, affording a pretence, many went home. By the laws of the union, apparently, the towns for which they had served were to supply their places. Men of principal property had hitherto avoided enrolment among the Eparites. But they had now seen the danger of trusting to those who had little or nothing, what would inable them to take all ; and to avoid, says the cotemporary historian, being subjected by the Eparites, they resolved to be Eparites. This was another blow to the democratical leaders. No prosecution was yet instituted, or, as far as appears, threatened against them ; but, losing thus their influence in the army, after having lost their majority in the sovereign assembly, everything was to be apprehended for those implicated in a crime which, by the laws of all Greece, was capital, and the punishment generally to be inflicted without trial. One resource remained. Thebes, or at least those who now ruled the Theban councils, had a great interest in supporting them ; as their downfall would be, in course, followed by a renewal of the antient connection of Arcadia with Lacedæmon. That proud independency, which the Arcadians had made their glory, and that jealousy of Theban interference, which they had been taught to esteem their essential policy, were no longer considerations for the democratical leaders : they applied urgently and expressly for a Theban army to march into Peloponnesus :

**C H A P. XXVIII.** Peloponnesus : ‘ If it was delayed,’ they said  
**Lacedemonian influence** would quickly agai  
‘ rule Arcadia.’

How far this measure was necessary to their safety, we can only conjecture ; forming our judgement by what we find to have been common in Grecian political contests ; but, that their power was gone, that their views of ambition were frustrated, unless they could obtain support from Thebes, the cotemporary historian has clearly shown. The aristocratical party had so gained ground, that a majority in the multitudinous sovereign assembly of Arcadia went with it ; not in opposition to the sacrilege only, but generally a circumstance in itself speaking not a little in favor of the aristocratical leaders. The application of the democratical chiefs to Thebes, and its favorable reception there, becoming known was taken into consideration. The democratical party seems to have been still too powerful, in the yet but half-formed union of the republics to be effectually restrained by the sovereign assembly ; but, under authority of that assembly ministers were sent to remonstrate, at Thebes against the proposed march of Theban forces into Arcadia, uncalled for by the Arcadian government. This measure being taken, the Eleian war and the circumstances of Olympia became the next subjects for debate. In the discussion of these it was observed, ‘ That the charge and presidency of the temple neither or right belonged to the Arcadians, nor were to be coveted by them ; that the restoration of both

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 4. s. 35.

‘ tc

to the Eleians would be most consonant to justice and religion, and most acceptable to the god; that, in truth, no cause for continuing the war with Elis existed; and thus it was decreed by the assembly. The Eleians gladly consented to a negotiation for peace upon such grounds; a truce was instantly concluded; and deputies from all the Arcadian cities assembling in Tegea, received there, in regular form, ministers from Elis.

In this critical moment, when the fate of Greece, for all futurity, was on the balance, the wisdom, the magnanimity, the enlarged patriotism of a Lycomedes, singularly wanted among the Arcadians, were unfortunately not found; or, if existing anywhere, without his active exertion and commanding influence, they were inefficacious. The efforts of the aristocratical leaders could not prevent the insulting appearance of a Theban at the congress, attended by a body of three hundred Boeotian heavy-armed. Swearing, with sacrifice and solemn ceremony, to the observance of the truce, was the first business of the meeting. In this the Theban readily concurred, and objection was made on no part. Banquets were then prepared, the pæan of peace resounded, a thoughtless joy pervaded all; those leading men excepted, who had been principals in the sacrilege at Olympia. They could not withdraw their consideration from the disappointment of their ambition, by the very measure which gave occasion for the general joy, or from the prosecution, to which they had made themselves legally liable, and the persecuting manner in which, too commonly in the Grecian republics,

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 4. s. 36.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

republics, measures were carried against a defeated party. The Theban came commissioned to give them such support as circumstances might allow. Communicating with him, they found him full of that patriotism, which could throw a veil over honor, revile justice, and contemn oaths, when the interest of his country, or of his party in it, required. Some of the Eparites were yet devoted to them. Supported by these, and by the Bœotians, they shut the town-gates, and sent parties around, to seize, in the midst of the general festivity, the leading men of every Arcadian city. The number thus apprehended, was such, that, the public prison not holding all, the townhouse was also filled with them. Many, nevertheless, escaped ; some over the town-walls; some by favor of those who guarded the gates : for, in this business, says the cotemporary historian, the animosity, usual in Grecian sedition, actuated none but those who feared capital prosecution ; and among those who fled were most of the principal Mantineians, whom it had been particularly the object of the conspirators to secure.

Intelligence of this transaction quickly reaching Mantinea, distant only twelve miles, was thence hastened over Arcadia, with admonition added for all the towns to be upon their guard against what might follow. Heralds were then sent to Tegea, bearing a requisition for the liberty of the Mantineians detained there, accompanied by a remonstrance, insisting that no Arcadian should be executed, or even imprisoned, without trial, in due course of law ; and offering, if any were accused of

of treason against the union, security from the Mantineian state for their appearance before the great assembly of the nation. It might seem as if something of the spirit of Lycomedes, some idea of just government and true civil freedom, and of the proper manner of asserting them, existed still in Mantinea, and only there.

S E C T.  
VI.

The Theban, to whose authority, it appears, the Arcadian conspirators deferred, seems to have been disconcerted by the spirited prudence of the Mantineians. Fearful of the consequences of the violence to which he had been persuaded, he set all his prisoners at liberty ; and, next day, assembling as many Arcadians of the different towns as were at hand, and would come at his invitation, he apologized for what he had done ; misled, as he pretended, by false intelligence of a plot for delivering Tegea to the Lacedæmonians, and of a Lacedæmonian army approaching. The excuse found little credit, but the apology was accepted, so far that he was allowed to depart quietly. The matter however was then taken into serious consideration, by those who directed the Arcadian councils ; and the result seems to have been not precisely what prudence would have dictated, to those whose object was to preserve the peace and independency of Arcadia, which had been so indangered, without being yet materially injured : they sent ministers to Thebes, to accuse the author of the late violence, and to insist that his crime should be punished with death.

Epameinondas was then in the high office <sup>s. 40</sup> of general, commander-in-chief; which, in the Theban

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 4. s. 39.

CHAP.  
XXVIII. Theban as in the Athenian democracy, seems to have conferred, for its period, a kingly power; far less regularly controlled, by any constitutional checks, than the authority of the Lacedæmonian kings; and, when an overbearing party in the tumultuary sovereign assembly favored, it was, like the power of an Asiatic vizier, the favorite of his despot, uncontrolled. To the general the Arcadians were to address themselves. We do not find Xenophon often vouching for words, spoken by his cotemporaries, with that unqualified assurance, with which some, who wrote four or five hundred years after him, have undertaken to give them. On this occasion, the only one on which any censure upon his political enemy, Epameinondas, appears even implied, he relates what that great man said; but his caution in so doing deserves notice. Affirming nothing from himself, he states the report, which the Arcadian ministers, on their return, made to their government: ‘Epameinondas told them,’ they said, ‘that the Theban commissioner, at Tegea, had done far better when he seized the principal Arcadians, than when he released them: for, the Thebans having ingaged in the war only to serve Arcadia, any negotiation for peace, without communication with Thebes, was treason against the confederacy. Be assured therefore,’ he added, ‘we will march into Arcadia; and, with our numerous friends there, who have been faithful to the common cause, we will prosecute the war.’<sup>22</sup> The

<sup>22</sup> Diodorus has given a strange inconsistent account of the affairs of Arcadia and Elis, which led to the fourth expedition of

The communication of this report put Peloponnesus in a ferment. All the independent interests, if an apposite modern phrase may be allowed, were indignant, yet at the same time alarmed, at the presumption of Thebes, to command war for them, within their own peninsula, when they desired peace ; and to march an army into their country, to inforce such commands. The governments of Arcadia, Elis, and Achaia, united in these sentiments. They sent, in common, to Athens, still connected in that alliance with Arcadia which was the last political work of Lycomedes, in some confidence that the Athenians would feel themselves bound by interest, not less than by treaty, to prevent the Thebans from becoming masters of Peloponnesus ; and they were not disappointed. They sent with not less confidence to Lacedæmon, tho hitherto the enemy of Arcadia,

of Epameinondas into Peloponnesus. Not the leading men of the united administration of Arcadia, according to him, but the Mantineian chiefs alone purloined the sacred treasure of Olympia ; for no public purpose, but for private lucre ; and it was they who, to prevent leisure for inquiry into their conduct, fomented the Eleian war. That the chiefs of the united administration had the Olympian treasury in their power, appears from his own narrative ; but how the Mantineians separately could command it, he neither informs us, nor seems to have stopped to consider ; and he appears totally to have forgotten, what he had just before related, that it was through the previous existence of war with Elis, that any of them could lay their hands upon the Olympian treasury. Possibly he had not ready opportunity to consult Xenophon's clear detail, when he enriched his book with this string of absurdities ; which seems too gross to have had vogue when the facts were recent, but may have been recommended afterward, by the vehemence of party dispute, to some author (perhaps Dionysiodorus or Anaxis, Boëtian writers of Grecian history, mentioned at the close of his fifteenth book) whose work may have fallen too temptingly in his way.

Arcadia, but already reorganized anew in friendly connection with Achaea and Elis. The humiliation of Lacedæmon is strongly marked by what followed. A proposal which, in the early days of Agesilaus, would have been scorned and resented, was now, tho far from adapted to promote the common object, readily accepted. It was agreed that the combined troops, when within the territory of any state of this new confederacy, should be commanded in chief by the general of that state, under direction of its government.

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## SECTION VII.

*Principles of Grecian Politics. Fourth Expedition of the Thebans, under Epameinondas, into Peloponnesus: Second Invasion of Laconia; Battle of Mantinea.*

WE may, perhaps, on first view, rather wonder at the former submission of the Grecian republics to the Lacedæmonian supremacy, than at the assertion now of the right of equality. But it will readily occur that this right of equality, however justly claimed, could not be exercised, when a powerful enemy pressed, without risking great inconvenience to the common cause. Republics, therefore, like individuals, when fear, revenge, or ambition instigated, often conceded their equality for the advantage of military subordination. Hence arose temptation and opportunities for leading and ambitious men, which prevented the possibility of lasting peace in Greece, and must prevent it wherever a democracy may exist,

strong

strong enough to contend with neighboring powers. Where gradation of rank is established, and means of rising are open, ambition, undoubtedly for wise purposes, implanted in the mind of man, has some opportunity for gratification, even in a settled government in peace; but a democracy, in peace is, for the ambitious man, a blank: war or civil disturbance are necessary to him; and, when war or sedition are once afloat, no government so teems with opportunities, none offers so wide a field for ambition as democracy. Hence the most ambitious men are commonly zealous for democracy: by far the largest portion of successful usurpers have begun their career as favorites of the multitude: and hence the perpetual wars of Greece, and the perpetual seditions. We have seen what insecurity, public and private, what continual apprehension, what almost continual violences resulted. In a country so constituted, should any commonwealth, acquiring strength to control others, exercise it so as to check mischievous ambition, and enforce any tolerable civil order, popularity would of course accrue to it, as far as such benefits were extended. Thus, at the time of the Persian invasions, the attachment of the greater part of Greece to Lacedæmon was like that of a clan to an individual chief, or a nation to its hereditary king, to the admitted right of succession in whose family it had owed ages of internal peace. At the same time the rest of Greece, as all the older writers testify, looked to subjection even under the Persian monarch, as likely to avert more evils than

CHAP. it would bring. When the superintending power  
XXVIII. then of Lacedæmon, through abuse, became intol-  
erable, still the other republics felt the necessity  
of a head. Thus Athens rose; and, when the  
power abused by Athens became also intolerable,  
it only reverted to Lacedæmon, to be again  
abused. Nevertheless so was the necessity of a  
superintending authority felt, among the jarring  
republics, that, when a few extraordinary men  
had raised Thebes, from bondage under Lacedæ-  
mon, to dominion over Bœotia, her new power of  
giving protection was no sooner observed, than it  
drew the regard of neighboring states; and Thebes  
appears to have been, in considerable extent, in-  
vited to aspire to the empire of Greece. But,  
tho the smaller republics, in general, saw such a  
rising power with more hope than jealousy, yet  
the larger, which themselves aspired at supremacy,  
viewed it threw a different medium. Since the  
battle of Cnidus and the return of Conon, Athens  
had been alternately advancing and losing ground,  
but altogether gradually advancing, in strength  
and in dominion. No aristocracy, oligarchy, or  
monarchy, would so in all points meet and thwart  
her interest as an imperial democracy. It was  
thus the same principle which formerly animated  
Syracuse against Athens, that now determined  
the Athenians to persevere, in alliance with Lacedæmon,  
for the purpose of opposing the ambition  
and the growing power of Thebes.

It is however remarkable that, in this war, in  
which Athens and Thebes were ingaged on oppo-  
site sides, we hear of no ravage of the Attic fields  
by

by the powerful armies of Boeotia, nor of any attempt against Boeotia in the occasional absence of its forces. Both states sent troops to act against each other, at a distance from the territories of both, in Peloponnesus; both remaining quiet at home, as if by compact: perhaps compact, if not formally expressed, yet really understood, and upheld by a mutual sense of its convenience. The fact has been noticed by Demosthenes, that, during the Theban war, the Attic territory enjoyed perfect peace<sup>24</sup>. But the genius of Epameinondas, intent upon raising his city, and reckoning the depression of the formerly overbearing landforce of Lacedæmon the first thing necessary, would avoid needless implication with Athens by land, while nevertheless, conceiving the bold project of making Thebes a maritime power, he would contest with Athens the command of the sea. That empire, to which, while the strength of Lacedæmon was so fully employed in the war with Thebes, Athens had been silently rising again, the Athenian democracy again exercised tyrannically; and the discontent among those called its allies, especially the rich islands of Rhodes and Chios, and the important town of Byzantium, invited the attention of Epameinondas. He collected a naval force so unexpectedly, and conducted it so ably, that Laches, who commanded the Athenian fleet on the Asiatic station, tho' an officer of reputation, was unable to make head against him; and the states

*I loc. or. ad  
Philipp.*

B.C. 363.  
*OI. 104. 2.*

<sup>24</sup> I think in the oration on the crown.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

states of Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, renouncing the Athenian confederacy, ingaged in alliance with Thebes. But, successful as he thus was in one expedition, well timed and rapidly executed, yet he could not maintain the advantage. Within the same year, according to Diodorus, Timotheus, commander-in-chief of the sea and land forces of Athens, relieved Cyzicus in the Propontis, when besieged, if not by Epameinondas in person, yet by the armament which had been acting under him, and took the important towns of Toronë and Potidæa on the Thracian coast; nor do we hear of any farther naval enterprize of the Thebans.

Antiquity has so consented in unqualified eulogy of Epameinondas, that it might be hazardous, for a modern, to question the integrity of his views and the propriety of his conduct, if the passions which, evidently and confessedly, in some degree instigated him, ambition and the love of glory, were not themselves somewhat differently estimated in the antient and in the modern moral balance, and if political right and wrong were not also, in antient and in modern times, distinguished by different criteria. The violence of his interference in the affairs of Arcadia, against the established government of the country, in support of a faction disgraced by a profligate act, seems not to be justified upon any principle that will now be admitted. Motives however, of considerable weight, for his resolution to march into Peloponnesus evidently existed. It appears clearly enough, tho not directly said by Xenophon, that

Lacedæmonian

Lacedæmonian intrigue had contributed to the revolution in Arcadia ; beginning with Mantinea, and finally pervading the united government. Nevertheless this, apparently, should have been opposed by negotiation, and would hardly justify hostile invasion : Thebes was not attacked, nor any regular ally of Thebes. But the Messenians, whom the Thebans had undertaken to protect in their recovered country, were, through the reviving influence of Lacedæmon in Peloponnesus, certainly in great danger. If then Epameinondas can be vindicated from the appearance of some wantonness of ambition, the right, if such it was, and the duty, which he had created for himself, of protecting the Messenians, are what may most obviously be alleged for him. But another, at least probable motive for his famous and fatal expedition, may deserve notice. That inherent restlessness in the Grecian political system, which made it incapable of lasting peace, is acknowledged by all the ablest writers of the republican times. Thebes was the head of a great military confederacy ; and Epameinondas, at the head of the affairs of Thebes, was not in an easy situation. Very probably he was reduced to make a virtue, as he could, of necessity, by undertaking the direction of the effervescence, which he could not still<sup>25</sup>.

## The

<sup>25</sup> Barthelemy has done little, and even attempted little, toward any illustration of the politics, or political history, of Greece. In his abundant reading he has given his attention much to the panegyrists of Epameinondas, and it has been a favorite purpose of his own to panegyrize Epameinondas. Nevertheless he describes him as a mere Theban patriot ; not even

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 5, s. 4.

The force that he was able to assemble, zealous to serve under him, might alone have inflamed the ambition of an ordinary man. The Eubœan towns were now united in that confederacy with Thebes, which bound their men of military age to march at the order of the imperial people. Numerous Thessalian auxiliaries came; from the tagus, Alexander of Pheræ, and from the cities which had opposed the tagus; for they were now at peace with one another, and equally in alliance with Thebes. Locris was completely subject to Thebes<sup>26</sup>. Phocis, boldly asserting independency, refused obedience to the requisition for its troops: ‘The terms of our alliance,’ said the Phocians, ‘require us to assist the Thebans, if attacked, but ‘not to march with them to attack others.’

s. 6.

Leaving this contumacy for future consideration, Epameinondas, to prevent opportunity for checking his way to his great object, hastened to pass the isthmus. At Nemea he halted; hoping thence to intercept the force expected from Athens, to join the army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy; but, after some stay, finding himself disappointed by the foresight of the Athenian

government, even attempting to show that his views extended to the general freedom and well-being of Greece. He uses the licence, which the plan of his work affords, for omitting all notice of the very remarkable circumstances which led to the last Theban invasion of Peloponnesus: and, taking up his *bœuf* already with his army in the heart of Arcadia, he avows, without reserve or apology, that the purpose of the expedition was to decide, ‘*si c'étoit au Thebains ou aux Lacedæmoniens de donner des loix aux autres peuples.*’ Anacharsis, ch. 13, p. 264. t. 2. ed. oct.

\* Of this we are informed by Xenophon on a former occasion, and therefore perhaps he has omitted to name Locris here.

government, who sent their troops by sea to the Laconian coast, he proceeded to Tegea. Here his Peloponnesian allies met him. Argos, commonly zealous in opposition to Lacedæmon, was at this time free enough from sedition to send forth its strength. The revived state of Messenia was of course warm in the Théban interest; and scarcely less so those Arcadian states which, by rebellion against the united government of their nation, had embraced it. These were principally Tegea, Megalopolis, Asea, and Palantium, with some interspersed village-republics, through weakness and situation, dependent on these. The army, altogether, according to Diodorus, consisted of more than thirty thousand infantry, and about three thousand horse. The army of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, considerably inferior, assembled about the same time in Mantinea. Arcadia was divided, but the greater part joined in the Lacedæmonian alliance; so that the troops of Arcadia, Achaia, and Elis, formed its principal force. The Lacedæmonians sent their cavalry and a body of mercenaries, with a small body only of their native infantry, keeping the greater part for emergencies, at home.

Epameinondas remained some time, with his whole army, inactive within the walls of Tegea<sup>27</sup>;

a measure

<sup>27</sup> Τὸς σπατόπεδος ἐν τῷ τείχῳ τῶν Τεγεατῶν, ἵποισθετο. The word *σπατόπεδος*, commonly translated, and indeed commonly meaning, *a camp*, was however not confined to that sense, but was used sometimes for what we call *quarters*. This is fully shown by an expression of Xenophon soon following: καλαργαθητούσαμενος ἀθέλεις τείχους, ἐν ταῖς σικίαις. Xen. Hel. l. 7, c. 5. §. 15.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 7. c. 5.  
§. 1 & 9.

**CHAP. XXVIII.** a measure of which Xenophon declares his probation, in terms which seem to mark that, in its day, it had not escaped censure. In the want indeed of a cotemporary historian the friend of the Theban general, tho with later authors he has been a favorite object of panegyric, yet we find his candid enemy, Xenophon, really his best eulogist. ‘ That this expedition was fortunate,’ says that writer, ‘ I would not affirm; but, for what human prudence and courage might accomplish, in my opinion Epameinondas failed in nothing. I commend him for keeping his army within the walls of Tegea. He deprived the enemy thus, not only of opportunity to attack him, but of opportunity to observe what might indicate his purposes. Means of preparation nevertheless for himself were readier; and the enemy’s motions were open to his observation, equally as if he were incamped without. I commend him also, because, tho commanding the stronger army, he refrained from attack, while the enemy held advantage of ground.’ The inactivity however, which Xenophon thus approves, could be advantageous only for a limited time. The influence arising from the general confidence in the ability and spirit of Epameinondas, would indeed enable him to persevere in it longer than a commander of inferior name; but, in rest and confinement, discontent would grow, even among his troops, collected from various states; his reputation would suffer, and then his command would become precarious. Meanwhile of some advantages, which he had been

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 5. s. 8.

s. 9.

been expecting, he found himself disappointed: none of the hostile or neutral states would be induced, through any terror of his superiority, or any hope for advantage from the change, to join the Theban cause.

SECT.  
VII.

Apparently the wisest conduct, of the Lacedæmonian confederacy, would have been to persevere in precisely that disposition of their force, which had principally occasioned the Theban general's inactivity. The Lacedæmonian heavy-armed remaining at home, for the security of their own country, the army assembled at Mantinea had taken a position near that town, so strong as to deter attack, and so advantageous, for covering the Mantinean territory, that Epameinondas, with the very superior force he commanded, had thought it prudent to abstain from the usual work of ravage. But, in such circumstances, rest itself begets uneasiness. The allies feared only the more destructive explosion from the unexpected quiescence of so great a force, under so renowned a commander. They could not be satisfied to have the Lacedæmonians remain at home, for the protection of their own country, less immediately threatened, while they, with unequal numbers, should bear the brunt of a war so much more than commonly formidable. They were in consequence so urgent in petition and remonstrance, that the Lacedæmonian government thought it necessary to concede, and all the best remaining strength of the state marched under the orders of Agesilaus.

This

CHAP. This measure relieved Epameinondas. Intelligence no sooner reached him, that Agesilaus had left Sparta, and was already at Pellenë, than he formed his plan and proceeded instantly to the execution. Orders were issued for the troops to take their evening meal, and march. The better road to Sparta, and perhaps, from Tegea, the shorter, by Sellasia, was open; and so deficient was the lookout of the Lacedæmonians, that, but for the providential intelligence, so Xenophon calls it<sup>29</sup>, brought to Agesilaus by a Cretan, c. 5. s. 10. Sparta would have been taken, he says, like a bird's nest, destitute of defenders. Agesilaus hastened his return, so that he arrived before Epameinondas. His force, the whole Lacedæmonian cavalry and part of the infantry being at Mantinea, was very scanty for the defence of a loosely-built unfortified town, against the approaching army. But, for the antient art of war, every house was a fortification; every eminence gave great advantage for the antient missile weapons. From a housetop the bowman, slinger, and dartman, himself secure, could aim his strokes at those below with superior effect.

c. 5. s. 11.  
Diodorus,  
l. 15. p. 499.  
Corn. Nep.  
vit. Epam. &  
Ages.  
Plut. vit.  
Ages.

Epameinondas, upon his arrival, disappointed of his hope of surprizing the place, observed the able disposition for defence made by Agesilaus, and determined his plan of attack accordingly. Making no attempt against the more open parts, where immediate assault was expected, he sent a detachment, which, by a circuitous march, seized a height,

<sup>29</sup> Κρὺς Σπιά τινὶ μοίχα προσελθὼν.

a height, commanding the town. ‘ It may be said,’ says Xenophon, ‘ that the deity interfered : it may be said that nothing can withstand the desperate : certainly,’ he proceeds, ‘ it appears extraordinary, that, when Archidamus, with less than a hundred men, advancing over very difficult ground, attacked that height, the Thebans, those men breathing fire, those conquerors of the Lacedæmonians, with advantage of numbers, and with every advantage, did not even wait the assault, but turned ; and some of the prime of their army were slain.’ The Lacedæmonians, s. 13. elated with such success, pursued intemperately, and lost some men : but Archidamus kept possession of the important post he had carried, raised his trophy, and received the enemy’s solicitation for the bodies of the dead, of which he remained master ; which, on account of the usual impression on the soldiers, on both sides, was, in the circumstances in which the Lacedæmonians stood, a very important advantage.

Plutarch has reported an anecdote of this attack upon Sparta, which, tho somewhat apparently extravagant, has been too much noticed to be passed unmentioned. Isadas, son of Phœbidas, a youth of a singularly fine person, just anointed, in the way of the Greeks, after bathing, on alarm sounded, snatching a spear in one hand, a sword in the other, ran out naked, pressed to the foremost rank of the Lacedæmonian troops, and did extraordinary execution among the enemy, without receiving a wound : whether, says the writer, some god preserved him, or the idea that he was

SECT.  
VII.Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 5. s. 12.

more

C H A P.  
XXVIII.

more than human appalled the enemy. For the merit of his deed he was rewarded with the honor of being publicly crowned by the ephors : for the irregularity of it, he was fined a thousand drachmas, about forty pounds sterling. Plutarch seems to attribute this adventure to the engagement in which the trophy was won by Archidamus ; with which it seems utterly inconsistent. With more appearance of probability it might be referred to the assault, not specified by Xenophon, but in which, according to Polybius, the besieging army penetrated as far as the agora of Sparta<sup>29</sup>.

Polyb.  
l. 9. p. 547.

It appears however to have been the success of Archidamus, in carrying the commanding post, that deprived Epameinondas of the hope of rapid progress against the city ; and, unprovided as he was, in a hostile country, hemmed in by mountains,

<sup>29</sup> Isadas, according to the well imagined conjecture of Mr. James Byres, has been intended in that admirable statue in the villa Borghese at Rome, commonly, but enough without reasonable foundation, called the fighting gladiator ; the only work extant, of the first-rate Greek sculpture, in which the human form is represented in strong action ; unless the Laocoön in the Vatican should be arranged in the same class of design, or the Wrestlers, in the tribune of the gallery at Florence, may be admitted into the same class of merit. The character of the countenance of the figure in the villa Borghese is Grecian and heroic. The difference of the features of the dying gladiator, rightly so called, in the Capitol, is striking : the expression is very fine ; the work is altogether admirable, and the more so because it marks precisely the character it has been intended to represent ; not a Greek, for the face is not Grecian ; not a hero, for the expression, tho showing sternness and fortitude, shows the fortitude of a mind depressed by slavery, and without elevation of thought. Such at least is the impression which it readily conveys to those to whom the forms of Grecian sculpture are familiar. Since this note was first published, these statues, I fear, have been removed from the places indicated.

tains, he deemed it inexpedient to wait till the army from Mantinea, already marching to the relief of Lacedæmon, should arrive. Fertile in resources, he founded, on the failure of one stroke, a plan for another. It was the season of harvest; and the Mantineians, who, while he lay in Tarentum, had confined their slaves and cattle within their walls, would endeavor to profit from his absence for getting in their crop. Hastening therefore his return, in expectation to find the produce ready for carrying, with the slaves and cattle in the fields, he proposed to make all the prey of his army.

After a march of thirty miles, over a lofty mountain barrier, he allowed his infantry some rest in Tegea; but he sent his horse immediately forward, into the Mantineian territory. All the laboring slaves, as he foresaw, all the cattle, and many of the Mantineian people, within and beyond the military age, were in the fields. The approach of the Theban cavalry being observed and announced, a general alarm in Mantinea, and throughout its narrow territory. Fortunately a body of Athenian horse was just arrived, but fatigued with a forced march of two days, of extraordinary length, along a mountainous road. They had left Eleusis only the preceding day, rested for the night at the isthmus, and, on the morrow, in fear, apparently, of being intercepted, pressed their way on, by Cleonæ to Mantinea, without halting. They had just taken their quarters, and men and horses were yet without refreshment, when the Mantineians came to them with

Xenoph.  
Hell. I. 7.  
c. 5. s. 15.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

with the most earnest solicitations for assistance and protection, on which they represented their existence as depending. The Athenians, ashamed, says the historian, weary as they were, being present in such circumstances, to be useless, and anxious to maintain their country's glory, instantly remounted, to engage a very superior force of the cavalry of Thebes and Thessaly, the most renowned of Greece. They came quickly to action, and brave men, he proceeds, fell on both sides; but the advantage was wholly with the Athenians: they carried off all their own slain; they restored some of the enemy's, the boasted criterion always of victory, under a solicited truce; and, what was a more essential, and indeed a most important advantage, they gave complete protection to the Mantineians, and enabled them to save all their property<sup>10</sup>.

Difficulties now pressed upon Epameinondas. The confederacy of little military republics, which had put so great a force, the best part of their population, under his command, had no public revenues equal to the maintenance of those numbers in the field, far from home. The term of expeditions, which they might undertake, was limited by necessity of circumstances. Magazines, such as attend the motions of modern armies, were not even thought of. Already the troops under Epameinondas had suffered want, and that want must go on increasing. But the term of his expedition was not left to his discretion,

Xenoph.  
Hel. l. 7.  
c. 5. s. 19.

s. 18.

<sup>10</sup> Xenophon has not named the Athenian commander: Diodorus calls him Hegelochus: a man, he says, before of high reputation among the Athenian military.

cretion, or to be decided by contingencies; it was absolutely limited by the controlling authority, whether of the Theban government, or of a congress of the confederacy, we are uninformed. It was now near expiring, and the troops of the northern states must be led home<sup>31</sup>. Defeated in his attempt upon Sparta, and in that which followed it, upon the Mantineian territory, his reputation could not fail to suffer, notwithstanding the abilities really displayed, if, with an army so superior to the enemy, and so much greater than was commonly seen in Greece, his campaign were marked only by disappointments. He had moreover to consider, that his expedition was the immediate occasion of the union of Athens, Elis, Achaia, and the best part of Arcadia, with Lacedaemon, in opposition to Thebes, or at least of the actual energy of that union. Were he then to withdraw without victory, those Arcadians, whose cause had been the pretence for the Thebans to interfere in arms in Peloponnesus, must be immediately overwhelmed; and the revived state of Messenia, for whose protection Thebes, but especially Epameinondas, was pledged, would be at the enemy's mercy. A victory was perhaps necessary, not only to avert ruin from those whom

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<sup>31</sup> Οὐαῖν μὲν ἡμερῶν ἀσάγειν ἵσσοις ἀπίσταται, διὰ τὸ  
ἰζῆνται, τὴν σεβαστίαν τὸν χρόνον. This is among the passages of Xenophon for which we want assistance, which, it should seem, we might not unreasonably expect from the later ancient writers who have treated of the actions of Epameinondas; but, among many tales, and much panegyric, we find little that deserves the name of history, or that affords any illustration of history. As far as I have ventured explanation, I think I am warranted by what may be gathered from Xenophon himself.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

he had bound himself to protect, but to make his own return to his country, not creditable only but even safe. A battle therefore was indispensable ; and if he fell, says Xenophon, it was a satisfactory reflection to him that his fall would be glorious, in the endeavor to give Thebes the empire of Greece.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 5, s. 19.

‘ That these should be his sentiments,’ proceeds the historian, continuing the eulogy of his enemy, ‘ I think not very wonderful ; they are common to men smitten with the love of glory : but, to have so prepared his troops, collected from various states, that they would decline no fatigue, yield to no danger, in want be patient, and in all circumstances orderly and zealous in duty ; this I think truly worthy of admiration.’ Epameinondas declared, in public orders, his resolution to engage the enemy, and the utmost alacrity was manifested by the army. The cavalry diligently brightened their helmets ; the infantry were seen busy, sharpening their spears and swords, and burnishing their shields ; some of the Arcadian heavy-armed desired to be inrolled in the Theban band of clubmen ; a circumstance which seems singularly to mark the popularity of the Theban name, when Epameinondas commanded. What the band of clubmen was we are not informed : possibly an institution of less utility for the weapon, from which it was denominated, than for the enthusiasm it inspired, in emulation of Hercules, whom the Thebans proudly called at the same time their god and their fellowcountryman.

General zeal thus quickly making preparation complete; Epameinondas, at an early hour of the morning, formed his order of battle, and marched, by his left; not directly toward Mantinea, but to the nearest root of mount Maenalus; the western boundary of the vale, in which both Mantinea and Tegea stood. There, on strong ground, <sup>s. 22.</sup> within sight of the enemy, he extended his phalanx, and grounded arms<sup>32</sup>, as if going to <sup>s. 22.</sup> camp.

According to those terms, to which the pressure of adversity had reduced the Lacedæmonians to submit, the army of their confederacy, being in the Mantineian territory, was to be commanded, in chief, by Mantineian generals, under direction of the Mantineian administration. In the want of the abilities of a Lycomedes, which might have made some amends for the inherent inconveniences of such a regulation, the presence of Agesilaus, tho' not possessing the nominal command-in-chief, might have been advantageous: some deference might have been paid to his rank and long experience, at least when danger pressed. But Epameinondas seems to have derived that advantage from his expedition against Sparta,

that

<sup>32</sup> Εθέτο τὰ ὄπλα. It is not always possible to find terms in modern language for expressing exactly the circumstances of antient warfare. In the Grecian service, what principally loaded the footsoldier of the phalanx was his large shield. To relieve him from the pressure of its weight was of course expedient, whenever it might be safely done. The spear also was weighty, but it might be planted on the ground, and still ready for instant use. To ground the shield required more caution, and seems to have been more particularly implied in the phrase Σισθείας τὰ ὄπλα.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

that Agesilaus, and a large part of the troops, before destined to reinforce the army in Arcadia, were retained to protect Laconia against any new attack. Who commanded now in Arcadia, we are not informed: their deficiencies only are reported to us. Apparently the circumstances which imposed upon Epameinondas the necessity of seeking a battle, should have decided them by all means to avoid it. Nevertheless they were prepared, with a very inferior force, two-thirds only of his numbers, according to Diodorus, to contend with his superior talents. His measures, indicating intention to incamp, completely deceived them. After having formed their order of battle, with a view to meet him, concluding that his purpose was not to fight that day, they allowed that order to be in a great degree dissolved, and the preparation of the soldier's mind for action, highly important in Xenophon's idea, to be relaxed and dissipated.

Epameinondas observed the effect his feint had produced, and proceeded to profit from it: he issued orders to resume arms and march. We have seen it the practice of the Thebans to form their phalanx of extraordinary depth, even to fifty in file; trusting to the effect of breaking the enemy's front, at the risk of suffering themselves in flank. By this method they had formerly gained the battle of Delium against the Athenians, and by this method Epameinondas himself had succeeded, in the glorious day of Leuctra, against the Lacedæmonians. His superiority in numbers enabled him now, in taking the advantage, to

obviate the hazard of that method. Resolving to direct his principal effort against the enemy's right, he formed his line in the ordinary manner of the Greeks. His Theban column of attack was a separate body, which he placed in front of his left wing. Following the same principle in the disposition of his cavalry, he divided it on the flanks of his infantry; but meaning that the cavalry of his left should be the charging body, he gave it a strength that might insure its superiority, leaving the horse on his right comparatively weak. These therefore he directed to some advantageous ground, with orders not to move from it, unless opportunity of evident advantage should offer; and he provided support for them, in case of need, from a body of infantry.

SECT.  
VII.

While, in this advantageous arrangement, Epameinondas led directly toward the enemy, their generals, tho they had allowed order nearly to cease in their army, had not provided for holding it in their choice to avoid a battle. His approach, therefore, produced, with universal alarm, a universal hurry among their forces. Some, says the cotemporary historian, were forming, some running to the ground where they should form, some bridling their horses; some putting on their breast-plates, and all seeming more like men expecting to suffer than preparing to act, Order however was restored before attack could begin upon them: the Arcadians held the right, as the post of honor, which, by treaty, they claimed within their own country; the Lacedæmonians were

Diod. I. 15

posted

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

posted next to them ; the cavalry were divided on the flanks.

Xenoph.  
Hell. 1.7.  
c. 5. s. 23.

The battle began with the cavalry. That of the Lacedæmonian side was without those light-armed foot, practised to act with horse, whose weapons, galling from a distance, prepared for the effect of a charge. The Theban abounded with these ; and being moreover very superior in number, they presently overthrew their opponents. The Theban column of infantry then joined action ; but, tho carefully composed of the best troops, with Epameinondas leading, it found strong resistance from the Lacedæmonian and Arcadian foot. Its persevering force, however, at length broke the opposing ranks, and then the effect was what the able projector expected. That which had the reputation of being the firmest part of the enemy's line being put to flight, the contagion spred among the inferior troops, and all the infantry gave way.

B.C. 362.  
Ol. 100. 4.

It seemed now as if victory must be, on the Theban side, as complete as superior force, directed by superior judgement, could make it. But we have had repeated occasion to observe how much of the fate of multitudes may depend on one man. Leading the charge of his column, just as success appeared decided, tho the Lacedæmonians, with their phalanx broken, were still resisting, Epameinondas received a wound in his breast, and fell. The disaster ingaged the attention of those around ; and, with the information of it, rapidly spreding, confusion and dismay pervaded

pervaded the army. Succession of command seems not to have been duly provided for. The various multitude having no equal confidence in any other officer, authority, extending over the whole, in a great degree ceased ; or, if any proper regulation had been made, it was overborne by the impulse of hesitation and consternation ; which so prevailed, that scarcely an attempt was made to profit from the victory actually gained. The heavy-armed stood on the ground on which they had fought, vindicating the possession of the dead and wounded, but not moving a step in pursuit. The cavalry turned from those they had put to flight; and, without a blow against the enemy's retreating infantry, slipped by them, to rejoin their own phalanx, as if themselves defeated. The light-armed and targeteers, alone presuming on victory, crossed the field toward the left, without expecting attack or looking for support. The Athenian horse, no longer kept in check by the able disposition made for the purpose, charged and put them mostly to the sword. Epameinondas lived to be informed that his army was victorious, but fainted, it is said, on the extraction of the broken end of the weapon, left in the wound, and died soon after<sup>11</sup>.

Under

<sup>11</sup> Xenophon simply mentions that Epameinondas fell in the battle. Diodorus, after a puerile detail of feats like those of Achilles in the Iliad, or rather of Virgil's hero in the Aeneid, is more circumstantial than any other writer about his death. He mentions no authority for those things said and done, between three and four centuries before him, which Nepos, in his own age, and Plutarch and Pausanias, after him, evidently did not quite believe ; yet his story has been generally given as authentic by modern writers. Plutarch,

in

SECT.  
VII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. 1.7.  
c. 5 s. 25.

C H A P.  
XXVIII.

Xenoph.  
Hel. I. 7.  
c. 5. s. 27.  
Diodor.  
L 15. p. 503.

Under these circumstances of the battle, both sides claimed the victory; each army raised its trophy, undisturbed by the other; each remained in possession of some of the enemy's dead; and neither would immediately solicit the bodies.

But the slain of the Lacedæmonian side seem to have been not only more numerous, but of higher rank, cavalry and heavy-armed, whereas those of the Theban side, remaining in the enemy's power, were mostly light-armed, or targeteers. Shortly therefore the Lacedæmonians, yielding to what was esteemed a most serious duty, sent their herald, with the usual solicitation; and, after this acknowledgement, the Thebans also sent their herald to make the same request.

Xen. Hel.  
I. 7. c. 2.  
. 26, 27.

'Universal expectation,' says the cotemporary historian, 'was strangely deceived by this event of so great a battle. Almost all Greece being met in arms, there was nobody who did not suppose that the victors would in future command, and the defeated must obey. But God,' he continues, 'decided otherwise. Each party claimed the victory, and neither gained any advantage: territory, town, or dominion, was acquired by either; but indecision, and trouble, and confusion, more than even before that battle, pervaded Greece.' Tired then with the sad tale

in his Life of Agesilaus, has quoted earlier authors; a circumstance which may, more than any other, excite regret for the loss of his Life of Epameinondas. For those circumstances, reported by Diodorus, which, being probable in themselves, are in any degree confirmed by Nepos and Plutarch, neither of whom has copied him, or which afford probable illustration of the cotemporary historian's concise narrative, reasonable credit will be allowed.

tale of his country's woes, which, in the vain hope of better times, he had now, from early youth to advanced age, been solicitously observing, he concludes his historical narrative: ‘ Thus far,’ he says, ‘ suffice it for me to have related: following events, perhaps, will interest some other writer.’

SECT.  
VII.

### SECTION VIII.

*General Pacification; Lacedæmon excluded: Troubles in Arcadia; Interference of Thebes: Views of Agesilaus. Affairs of the East: War of Evagoras with Persia: Rebellion of the Persian Maritime Provinces. Expedition of Agesilaus to Egypt: Death of Agesilaus: Distraction together of the Aristocratical and Democratical Interests in Greece, and Dissolution of the antient System of Grecian Confederacy.*

IT is a most critical moment at which we lose the invaluable guidance of Xenophon, in the maze of Grecian affairs. According to Diodorus and Plutarch, the fermentation, in which the indecisive battle of Mantinea left things, was presently stilled by a general peace; to the terms of which Lacedæmon alone refused accession. How the adverse republics were brought to a temper for pacification, those writers, little curious about such matters, leave untold; but a collation of the memorials of the times will afford, in a great degree, the information to be desired. We have already learnt from Xenophon, that the term limited for the service of the Theban, and other northern forces, was near expiring, when the battle was fought; and we have had numerous occasions to

SECT.  
VIII.

Diod. l. 19.  
c. 89. p. 504.  
Plut. vit.  
Agesil.

**C H A P.** see how usual it was for the armies of the Grecian confederacies, without a peace, without even a truce, to separate after a battle. It seems then certain that, when the credit and abilities of Epameinondas were gone, the Theban influence instantly sunk, and the bonds which held the Theban confederacy together were so slackened, that it verged rapidly toward dissolution. That fear therefore, of the preponderance of Thebes, which had united the opposing republics, soon dissipated: and, some of them, especially Athens, driven, by the dread of a rival democracy, to connect itself with the opponents of that interest of which it had been formerly the head, became now rather apprehensive of the superiority which might return to Lacedæmon and the aristocratical cause. Under these circumstances, opportunity for negotiation would be obvious. The states of the Theban confederacy persevered then in insisting upon the independency of Messenia. Those of the Lacedæmonian, Lacedæmon itself only excepted, holding themselves no longer interested, as before, to oppose this, some perhaps gladly, and the rest after no long controversy, consented. Thus peace appears to have been concluded; Lacedæmon alone remaining at war, nominally with all the republics of the Theban confederacy.

This relic of war, however, was of no very threatening aspect; if, by the terms of the treaty between the other states of the two confederacies, the armies on both sides were, as Diodorus affirms, to be dissolved, and the troops to return to their several homes. Nevertheless the fear of exciting

exciting united energy anew, among the inimical states, appears to have prevented any immediate effort of the Lacedæmonians against Messenia. The first insuing transactions in Greece, noticed by the compiler whom we must now follow, which he attributes to the year after that of the battle of Mantinea, indicate a prevailing disposition, in the leading republics, to rest under the existing state of things; tho the uneasiness of a large number of unfortunate, and perhaps many injured men, urged them still to seek commotion. On the union of Arcadia, the inhabitants of several villages had been compelled, as we have formerly seen, to quit their residences, and migrate to the new capital, Megalopolis. Dissatisfied with the change, they now claimed, under that article of the treaty of peace, which required the return of all the troops, on both sides, to their respective homes, to go themselves and reoccupy their antient country residences. The leading men in Megalopolis vehemently opposed this. We might be at a loss for the motives of each party, had we not seen a solution of the difficulty in Xenophon's account of the dispersion and re-<sup>assembling</sup> of the Mantineians. Those of the inhabitants of Megalopolis, on whom the violence had been put, or the chief of them, were landed men, accustomed to live independently upon their estates, nearly as the smaller barons in the feudal times of western Europe<sup>34</sup>; of course attached to the

S E C T.  
VIII.

B.C. 462.  
Ol. 104. 3.

Diod. I. 15.  
c. 94. p. 507.

Ch. 26. s. 1.

&

Ch. 27. s. 2.  
of this Hist.

<sup>34</sup> Something of the same kind is said to subsist, with many relics of heroic manners, among the Mainotes, in the Peloponnesian mountains, at this day; whose chiefs, living in

**CHAP.** the aristocratical interest. The uneasiness of such **XXVIII.** men, on being separated from their property, to become members of the multitude in a town, and there observed with jealousy by that multitude, instigated by leaders their political enemies, may be easily conceived. They addressed solicitations to Mantinea, Elis, and all the aristocratical republics, to support them in their construction of the late treaty. Upon this the democratical chiefs applied to Thebes. Energy, with a disposition to pursue the policy of their late illustrious general, so remained in the councils there, that Pammenes, a principal friend of Epameinondas, was sent, at the head of three thousand heavy armed, into Arcadia. None then stirring in favor of the unfortunate country-gentlemen, as we should call them in England, they were compelled to submit to the commands imposed upon them; and the more effectually to obviate a renewal of their attempt to secede from the city, their country residences were destroyed<sup>33</sup>.

In

in castle-fashioned houses, lodge the stranger, hospitably received, as in Homer's time, under the sounding portal, *ιερής αἰθούσης ἐπιδούσης*. Odyss. 1. 3. v. 399.

<sup>33</sup> According to our editions of Diodorus, the application of the Megalopolitans was to Athens, and Pammenes was an Athenian general, and the three thousand heavy-armed under him were Athenians. Wesselink however has expressed a suspicion of this passage: 'Demiror,' he says, 'Demosthenem, "or. de Megalopolit. nihil horum attingere." Thus admonished by Wesselink to look into that oration, it has appeared to me fully implied that, to the time when it was delivered, the Athenian government never had interfered in the affairs of the Megalopolitans. Nor anywhere, but in this passage of Diodorus, do we find the name of Pammenes as an Athenian general. But Pammenes, the Theban general and statesman, is mentioned, not by Diodorus only, as a man of great eminence,

In this state of things, the situation of the aged king of Lacedæmon, Agesilaus, who had begun to reign when Lacedæmon was arbitress of Greece, and had himself gone far to make her arbitress of Asia, could not but be highly uneasy. Plutarch has ineptly enough censured him for not resting on his humiliated throne. Rest, in any security, is little likely to have been in his choice; and Plutarch's apology for him, subjoined to the censure, appears far better founded than the censure itself: 'He thought it,' says the biographer, 'unworthy of him, even at his age, to sit down in Sparta, waiting for death, and doing nothing for the public.' In truth a Spartan king could do little for the public, at home, in peace, unless the public good might require his interference in political intrigue, and his influence might make such interference effectual, to control the ephors. Agesilaus however, notwithstanding the misfortunes of his reign, which adverse circumstances, and extraordinary talents among the enemies of his country

nence, but also by Pausanias and Plutarch, and by Pausanias especially as having held the command-in-chief on an occasion when the affairs of Megalopolis were settled, and the security of that new establishment provided for. Considering then the circumstances of Greece at the time, and in times immediately preceding and following, as far as they are made known to us, there seems no room for doubt but Thebes, rather than Athens, would be the state to which the Megalopolitans would apply for support, and the state most likely to be able and ready to give it. From Thebes indeed it would be almost matter of course, but from Athens little likely to come. Altogether then it appears so indicated that the name Αθηναῖος has crept into this passage of our copies of Diodorus, through the ignorance or carelessness of transcribers, for Εὐελπίος, that I have thought myself warranted, stating thus my grounds, to prefer the reading for which Wesseling has furnished the suggestion.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

Xen. Agesil.  
c. 2. s. 28.

Xen. Agesil.  
Plut. vit.  
Agesil.

country produced; appears to have had extensive estimation in his own and the following age, as a wise man and an able politician<sup>36</sup>. At this time his party was prevalent in Lacedæmon; and, tho approaching his eightieth year, his constitution of body was still vigorous, and his mind still enterprizing. Still therefore himself the life and soul of the Lacedæmonian administration, he directed his views to raise his fallen country. And especially it seems to have been his anxious purpose to recover Messenia. Military strength was not yet so much wanting to Lacedæmon, as revenue to give energy to that strength. Every method, therefore, that the circumstances of the times would allow, was taken for raising money. According to Plutarch, loans from individuals seem to have been the principal resource; and the credit of Agesilaus what chiefly gave this any efficacy. To soothe and reconcile the Perioecians, those Laconians of the provincial towns, whom the tyrannical oligarchy of the Spartans had alienated, would of course be an important object; and it was probably a measure of policy, with this point in view, and not of base resentment, as Plutarch would have it, to grant hereditary honors and privileges to Anticles, a Laconian, who was said to have given Epameinondas his mortal wound. Possibly it may not have been very clearly ascertained by whom, or how, in the tumult of close action, with confusion already begun

<sup>36</sup> Thus Isocrates, when it was his purpose to select, for example, men of the highest reputation for wisdom: Ἀγνοί-λαος ὁ δέξας οὐναι λακεδαιμονίων φρονιμώτατος. Or. ad Philip. p. 364. ed. Auger.

begun in the Lacedæmonian line, that wound was given; but, among the different reports transmitted to us, what Plutarch has preserved deserves notice: ‘The historian Dioscorides,’ he says, ‘relates that the Laconian Anticrates struck Epameinondas with a spear; but the descendants of Anticrates bear still, among the Lacedæmonians, the surname of Mačhairion, from the machaira (a small sword) with which, as they affirm, he gave the fatal blow; and the hereditary exemption from taxes, granted on the occasion, is at this day enjoyed by Callicrates, the head of the family.’

Matters were thus preparing, in Lacedæmon, for the Messenian war, and the great mind of Agesilaus was bent upon wearing out its last energy in that narrow field, to which the pressure of adverse circumstances had reduced and still urged his attention, when events occurred in the East, seeming to offer prospect of a nobler kind. Egypt had been so long in revolt, so far successful against the Persian empire, that the largest part of that rich country, or perhaps the whole, was nearly settled into an independent monarchy. But the Egyptian kings (for so they are called by all the Grecian writers, tho rebels in the contemplation of the Persian court) were watchful of opportunities for advantageous foreign connections, and for means of providing diversion for the Persian arms. Success, in one province, afforded encouragement for those who held command in others, toward the extremities of the empire, to assert independency. Of these none was more invited,

**CHAP. XXVIII.** invited, by situation and circumstances, than the friend of the Athenian people, Evagoras tyrant of Salamis in Cyprus ; whom we have seen acquiring his dominion as a hero, and administering it as a patriot, but still holding it in tributary vassalage under the Persian monarch. The great object of Evagoras was to unite the extensive island of Cyprus under his authority. The people of three principal towns, Amathus, Citium, and Soli, or at least a powerful party in each, opposed this. If they enjoyed liberty in any security, in their municipal governments under Persian protection, their opposition may have been not unreasonable ; for, tho' the administration of Evagoras was just and liberal, and anxiously directed to the cultivation of popularity, yet it was, even according to the cotemporary Athenian rhetorician, his panegyrist, Isocrat. ad Nicoclem. p. 66 & 68. t. 1. completely despotic ; the prince not only chose his counsellors, and appointed all magistrates, but made laws, and exercised judicial powers ; so that he was master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects. Isocrates, if indeed he was author of the oration to Nicocles, has not scrupled to say that this was not only a better government than oligarchy or democracy, but the best of governments. The administration may indeed easily have been preferable to that of many of the Grecian republics ; and thus men of property were induced to migrate from various parts, to live under the benign administration of Evagoras. But the Solians, Citians, and Amathusians, nevertheless considering, that the character of such a government depended upon the life of one man, and

p. 110 &  
112. l. 1.

and the chance of what his successor might be, were unwilling to change existing advantages, under a despotic scepter seldom interfering with them, for the precarious benefits to be derived from the merit of an absolute prince within their island. Evagoras nevertheless persisted in measures, whether by his own arms, or by supporting a party favorable to his views, for bringing those people under his dominion; and the adverse party, otherwise unable to resist, solicited protection from Persia.

The danger of losing the command of Cyprus, so critically situated for intercepting the most important maritime communication of the empire, alarmed the Persian court; and it was resolved to repress the growing power of the Salaminian prince by force, if he refused obedience to commands. Evagoras however had prepared himself, by other means than the scanty resources which Cyprus afforded, for supporting his measures, and prosecuting his views. He had formed a close connection with the wealthy king of Egypt, Acoris; he had great interest among the Asiatic Grecian towns, and he had carried successful intrigue among the Persian provinces bordering on the Mediterranean. Hecatomnus, who is styled, not satrap, but prince or lord of Caria, a powerful vassal of the empire, apparently of Grecian lineage, wishing for opportunity to follow his example, secretly assisted him with money: Cilicia, and great part of Phenicia, were ripe for revolt. Knowing then the usual slowness of the Persian councils, he resolved not to wait till the force of

the

C H A P.

XXVIII.

B. C.

about 381  
or 382.OL. 100.<sup>37</sup>

the empire should be collected to attack him in Cyprus, but endeavor to raise business for its arms that might prevent such attack. His successes at first seemed to justify the boldness of his plan. Cilicia joining him, he carried the war immediately into Phenicia; ravaged and plundered the adverse part of that rich province, and took Tyre by storm.

Whether these actions were really more brilliant than the plan altogether was judicious, whether they did not compel the slothful government of Persia to an exertion of its preponderant force, which by quieter measures might have been avoided, our information is too deficient to enable us fairly to decide. At length, however, an army

*Isoctr. Evag.* to the amount, according to Diodorus, of three p. 310 t. 2. hundred thousand horse and foot, and a fleet of *Diodor.* I. 15. p. 460. three hundred triremes, were collected for the

Cyprian war. Evagoras's fleet, only ninety triremes, of which twenty were Phenician, venturing a battle, was defeated. Driven then to the defence of his island, his landforce was little able to withstand the numbers that, with the sea open, could be poured in upon him. After resistance ably protracted beyond expectation, besieged in Salamis, disappointed in the amount of support received from the king of Egypt, on the verge of utter ruin, he was relieved by intrigue among the Persian officers. Teribazus, the commander-in-chief, accused by Orontas, the general next under him, of misconduct and disaffection, was removed.

Political

<sup>37</sup> This date is thus nearly ascertained by two passages in the panegyrical oration of Isocrates, p. 250 & 274. t. 2.

Political necessity then urged Orontas, advanced to the chief command, to put an early end to a war, which had already cost the Persian court, according to Isocrates, more than ten millions sterling<sup>38</sup>; and, doubting the power of his arms, he proposed a treaty. Evagoras thus, tho compelled to surrender all his acquisitions, preserved the dominion of Salamis; holding it indeed as a dependence of the empire, and paying a specified yearly tribute, but allowed, by compact, the proud privilege to communicate with his sovereign as a king with a king<sup>39</sup>. This dominion and dignity he held till his death, and transmitted as an inheritance to his family. His eldest son, says the cotemporary Athenian orator, was styled king, and the titles of prince and princess distinguished his younger sons and his daughters<sup>40</sup>. It is by three extant tracts of that respectable writer, addressed to Nicocles, eldest son and successor of Evagoras, who seems to have maintained his father's

S E C T.  
VIII.

<sup>38</sup> Πλέον ἡ πεντάκις μύρια τάλαιπα. Isocr. Evag. p. 308. l. 2.

<sup>39</sup> We have observed, in Xenophon's accounts, something very like feudal vassalage, in the tenure of principalities and lordships under the Persian empire. Diodorus's words express the same thing, as nearly perhaps as it could easily be expressed in the words, and according to the ideas, of a people, among whom the thing had not obtained. The terms required of Evagoras by Teribazus were, that, reigning in Salamis only, ταῦθή Περσῶν βασιλεῖ καὶ ἵναυλὸν φόρον ὀφεισμένον, καὶ ποιῆ τὸ ψροστατόμενον, ὡς δυῆλος δισπότη. The terms granted by Orontas, βασιλεὺν τῆς Σαλαμίνος, καὶ τὸν ὀφεισμένον διδόνας φόρον, καὶ ἵναυλὸν, καὶ ὑπακούειν βασιλεὺς βασιλεῖς ψροστάτων.

<sup>40</sup> Τῶις ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενομένων οὐδέποτε καθέλιπτε, ἴδιωτοῖς ὄνόμασι προσαγορευόμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν βασιλεία καλούμενον, τοὺς δὲ ἀνατίας, ταῖς δὲ ἀνάστασις. Isocr. Evag. p. 318. t. 2.

C H A P.  
XXVIII.

father's connection of alliance and citizenship with the Athenian people, that we derive our principal information concerning Evagoras, and the important transactions in which he had so great a share<sup>41</sup>.

Thus Cyprus was preserved to the Persian empire. But, in reducing one rebellion, another, far more extensive and dangerous, was prepared. Gaos, who commanded the fleet, was son-in-law of Teribazus. Apprehensive that he should be involved in his father's ruin, he revolted, and joined Acoris in Egypt. In the deficiency of the Persian government at this time, in proportion as the fidelity of its officers was liable to be ill rewarded, treason and rebellion were little scrupled among them : its frequent weakness in pardoning encouraged offence, while its misdirected severity

Ch. 23. s. 1.  
& 2. &  
Ch. 24. s. 3.  
of this Hist.

took away the just confidence of integrity ; and war allowed, or even encouraged, between the governors of its provinces, was ever ready to be turned against the throne itself. Some years after

Diod. I. 15.  
c. 90. p. 504.  
B. C. 363.  
Ol. 104. 7.

the reduction of Cyprus, according to Diodorus, about the time of the battle of Mantinea, a rebellion of all the western maritime provinces broke out,

<sup>41</sup> Diodorus, according to our copies of him, affirms that Evagoras was assassinated by a eunuch, named Nicocles, who obtained possession of his kingdom : but the annotators have supposed error in the transcription of that passage, tho they would support it, as far as regards the assassination of Evagoras, from a passage in Aristotle's Politics, (b. 5. c. 10.) which possibly some readers may think as doubtful as the passage which it is proposed to correct by it. Indeed the suspicion may appear not wholly unfounded, and the known incorrectnes with which Aristotle's works have been transmitted may tend at least to excuse it, that the true reading stated the eunuch to have been killed by Evagoras, instead of Evagoras by the eunuch.

out, in which Orontas himself ingaged, with several other great officers of the empire. Among the leaders, beside Orontas, who was satrap of Mysia, were Ariobarzanes, satrap of Phrygia, Autophradates, of Lydia, and Mausolus, who had succeeded his father Hecatomnus in the principality of Caria; and the historian names, as people joining in it, the Lycians, Peisidians, Pamphylians, Cilicians, Syrians, Phenicians, and all the Asian Greeks. Matters had been concerted with Tachos, now king of Egypt, who was to give his utmost assistance. But through the faithlessness of the chiefs toward oneanother, what was immediately most formidable in this rebellion quickly subsided. Orontas, elected general of the confederacy, immediately betrayed it; and in consequence, all Lesser Asia again yielded obedience to the Persian king. Reomithres, appointed to command fifty ships, and intrusted with a large sum of money to coöperate with Tachos, purchased his own pardon with a part of the money, all the ships, and the heads of many of his associates. This treachery inabled the king's officers quickly to recover Syria<sup>41</sup>.

Then

<sup>41</sup> That these were not improbable circumstances, tho we have them only from Diodorus, may be gathered from what Xenophon relates of Persian affairs, in his account of the expedition of Cyrus. Nevertheless the omission of all mention of them, in his panegyric of Agesilaus, may excite a doubt if the revolt was quite so extensive, or at least so complete, as the account of Diodorus has represented it. Xenophon however mentions the flight of the king of Egypt, to Sidon, which marks revolt there; and Isocrates shows that a disposition to revolt was extensive among the maritime provinces. We shall, in the sequel, find it also lasting.

SECT. VIII.

Strabo,  
l. 14. p. 656.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

Then Tachos became apprehensive that the concentrated strength of the Persian empire would be exerted against himself. Long before the time of the younger Cyrus, we have seen Grecian mercenary troops in extensive request in the eastern countries ; and the retreat of the Cyreian Greeks, and the successes afterward of Agesilaus in Asia, would tend to increase the opinion of their value. The Athenian general Chabrias, among the first in reputation of this active age, had been at one time ingaged in the service of Acoris, predecessor of Tachos. With Lacedæmon Tachos himself had alliance, not without some claim of gratitude for assistance afforded.

*Xen. Ages.*  
*c. 2. s. 29.* In the general pacification which had followed an extensive and lasting war in Greece, troops of superior value, and commanders of experience,

*c. 2. s. 28.*  
*Diodor.*  
*I. 15. p. 506.* might probably be readily obtained. Tachos applied to Lacedæmon for a general, making large offers to Agesilaus, if he would himself undertake the command-in-chief of his numerous army ; and he ingaged Chabrias to command his fleet, consisting, according to Diodorus, of two hundred triremes. Among the numbers whom the cessation of war in Greece had left without employment and without income, a large body of troops was easily raised.

It may seem, on first view, an extravagant resolution, for a prince of the age of Agesilaus, to undertake the command of forces for a foreign sovereign, at such a distance from his own country : but if we consider the situation of a king of Lacedæmon,

dæmon, in peace, at home, it will not appear so wonderful that, retaining strength and activity, it should be his choice. His views indeed, as they are reported by Xenophon, were extensive, and seem to carry some indication of an intention not to return to Greece; where his part of the divided royalty of Lacedæmon, little inviting for him, might well be administered by his son, Archidamus. Agesilaus, says the philosopher, Xen. Ages. c. 2. c. 29. his friend, was pleased with the proposal from Tachos, because he thought, by the same expedition, he might requite the Egyptians for benefits conferred on Lacedæmon; he might once more rescue the Asian Greeks from the Persian dominion; and he should have the satisfaction of revenge against the Persian king, whose support to the enemies, while he called himself still the ally of Lacedæmon, was the cause of the loss of Messenia. The Lacedæmonian government approved the measure; induced apparently by the prospect, that means to be furnished by the friendship of the king of Egypt, and perhaps increased by the spoil of Persian provinces, might lead to the recovery of Messenia; an inducement possibly still assisted by the hope afforded, to powerful families, of partaking in the spoil; for, according to the practice on former occasions, thirty Spartans were either appointed by the government, or chosen by Agesilaus, for his counsellors and attendants on the expedition, not, probably, without expectation of sharing its rewards.

Plut. vit.  
Ages.

Whether

CHAP.  
XXVIII. Whether the age and infirmities of the king Artaxerxes, or what else impeded the exertions of the Persian government, the measures against Egypt were slow, and little vigorous. Tachos therefore resolved, instead of waiting for invasion, still to prosecute, as far as circumstances would allow, the plan concerted with the discontented in the maritime provinces, and carry the war into Phenicia and Syria. But, with the relief of his fears, a change took place in his disposition toward his supporters. Instead of the command-in-chief of all his forces, by the promise of which he had engaged Agesilaus in his service, he allowed that prince only the subordinate command of the Grecian mercenaries: and committing the fleet to Chabrias, he assumed the nominal command-in-chief himself. What followed, barely touched upon by Xenophon, is variously, and very imperfectly and confusedly, reported by later writers<sup>43</sup>. According to Plutarch, Agesilaus submitted to attend the Egyptian prince into Syria, and, together with Chabrias, bore long, tho impatiently, his ignorance, petulance, and neglect. Notwithstanding however the charges of Grecian writers against him, we may conceive it very possible that some good, and even necessary, policy may in part at least have directed the conduct of Tachos. Nevertheless what very shortly followed marks some great deficiency. While he

was

\* For the circumstances of the Egyptian war, very slightly touched upon by Xenophon, and evidently ill-related by Diodorus, apparently we may best trust Plutarch. His account, the most particular remaining to us, is the most coherent, and most consistent with Xenophon's.

was meditating conquest in Syria, two competitors for his throne arose in Egypt; and presently he was so deserted by his people, that he took refuge in Sidon. Agesilaus and Chabrias then, courted on all sides, made no difficulty of abandoning Tachos. Between the other two claimants, even Xenophon's expression implies that they were decided by the more advantageous offer\*. Nectanabis, a near kinsman of Tachos, had been the first to revolt. But his opponent, if we may judge from the support he received from the Egyptian people, had the fairer pretensions. A hundred thousand men presently attended his standard. Perhaps that very support was his ruin. It led him to hold himself high, and to neglect the Greeks, or treat them with haughtiness. Agesilaus and Chabrias were thus decided to join Nectanabis; a man possessing apparently neither ability nor courage, tho otherwise not without virtue. Little able either to estimate the value of Grecian troops, or to face danger with them, he superinduced great danger by impeding their exertions. The pressure of his opponent's superiority, however, at length, compelled him to yield himself wholly to the guidance of Agesilaus and Chabrias. Grecian valor and discipline and science then prevailed against the irregular multitude of the enemy, and Nectanabis was seated on the Egyptian throne. The reward to the Lacedæmonian king

Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 30.  
Plut. vit.  
Ages.  
p. 1130. t. 2.

" One was, according to Xenophon's phrase, *μοιλλην*, literally a Greekhater; the other *φιλλην*, a Greeklover.

king and the Athenian admiral, from a prince who, by the testimony of the Greek historians, showed himself not wanting in probity or generosity, might perhaps best be estimated by what has been obtained, in modern times, by merit, on parallel occasions, with the princes of Hindostan. Cotemporary and later writers agree that it was large<sup>45</sup>.

Tho Agesilaus was thus finally successful in Egypt, yet all the alluring prospects in Asia, which seem principally to have led him to ingage in that distant expedition, were completely closed by the unforeseen turn which things had taken.

Xen. Ages. c. 11. s. 16.  
Plut. vit. Ages.

His view therefore reverted to Greece; and it became again the great object of his indefatigable mind, to recover yet, before he died, that better half of what had been, for two centuries, the territory of Lacedæmon, and ravished from it since he had been Lacedæmon's king. In mid-winter he sailed; anxious, says Xenophon, that no part of the following summer should be unemployed against the enemies of his country: but, sickening on the voyage, he put into a port

of

<sup>45</sup> It appears difficult to account for the numerous instances in which we find Diodorus differing from Xenophon about the names, as well as the actions, of Xenophon's cotemporaries. According to him, it was Tachos himself that Agesilaus and Chabrias restored to the Egyptian throne, instead of placing his competitor Nectanabis upon it. If we could suppose for a moment, that it was possible Xenophon could be so grossly misinformed, yet Plutarch's account, more detailed than that of Diodorus, would suffice to restore his credit. Books, when Diodorus wrote, were dear, cumbersome, and troublesome to consult; and hence, perhaps, compilers, who consulted many, might sometimes be tempted to trust too much to memory, in giving form to their materials.

of the Cyrenaic territory, and died there<sup>46</sup>. His body, imbalmed in wax, it is said, because honey, according to the established ceremonial for the Lacedæmonian kings, could not be immediately procured, was carried to Sparta, and, with the usual regal honors, there intombed.

SEC T.  
VIII.

Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, whom we have already seen often commanding the armies, succeeded to his father's share of the divided throne of Lacedæmon. That prince had, on many trying occasions, earned the glory of personal valor; but he seems to have possessed with it rather the quiet prudence of Archidamus, his grandfather, than the enterprizing abilities of Agesilaus. Nor was this alone what checked the prosecution of the purposes of the late king. The defection of the Pericætian Laconians, and the encouragement offered for the flight of the numerous slaves, on whose labor Lacedæmon depended for subsistence, had induced the necessity of employing mercenary forces. The connections which Agesilaus had formed in his Asiatic command, furnished means to assist the deficient treasury of the state, in supporting these. We learn incidentally, from Xenophon, that the powerful prince of Caria, Mausolus, secretly an enemy, tho vassal of the Persian king, was among the wealthy friends who afforded him pecuniary support. After his death these means would probably fail. The riches however

Xen. Ages.  
c. 2. s. 27.

<sup>46</sup> According to Plutarch, Agesilaus lived eighty-four years, of which he reigned forty-one. Xenophon, tho personally acquainted with him, does not undertake to be so precise: he says Agesilaus was *about* eighty, *ἀμφὶ τὰ ὅγδοικοντα*, when he went to Egypt.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

however which he left, the fruit apparently of the Egyptian expedition, seem to have been considerable. All the aristocratical republics of Peloponnesus, moreover, Elis, Phlius, the Achaian cities, and some of the Arcadian, were deeply interested in the support of Lacedæmon. But the ruling parties in Argos, and more than half Arcadia, with some smaller states, reckoned their means for existence, in their several countries, to depend on the maintenance of the restored commonwealth of Messenia. Beyond the peninsula, Thebes was ever ready in the same cause, and Athens was a very uncertain ally to Lacedæmon. Under these circumstances, apparently, it behooved the Lacedæmonian government to direct its utmost endeavors toward the preservation of its own peace, and of the general political quiet of Greece ; and, in peace, to direct its views toward the conciliation of the Perioecian Laconians, and the preservation and increase of its diminished stock of slaves, by whom the agriculture was carried on, through which Lacedæmon existed. Thus the Messenian country was finally lost to the Lacedæmonians; and the Messenian state, tho not acknowledged by Lacedæmon, became effectually re-established, as an independent member of the Greek nation.

The preëminence, the empire, as it was often called, which Lacedæmon so long held in Greece, had been, some time since, abolished, by those treaties, to which Lacedæmon was a party, conceding equality with her, in military command, to all the states of her confederacy. It was now,

by the loss of the best half of her territory, and the establishment of a democratical commonwealth, there, effectually destroyed. A great change was thus made in the system of Grecian polities. A leading state no longer existed in Peloponnesus ; a head of the aristocratical interest no longer existed in Greece. With the fall of Thebes, at the same time, whose extraordinary sudden elevation had checked the progress of Athens toward a recovery of empire through a leading influence among the democratical states, the democratical interest remained also divided and without a head. The constitution of Greece at large, before bad, by these changes became worse ; the antient system of confederacy was dissolved, and no new system arose : a jealousy, just as far as it was directed to obviate an overbearing superiority, but, in its extreme, adverse to all system, order, and peace, became the prevailing political passion. Hostilities indeed, upon any considerable scale, were, through general lassitude and weakness, suspended. Thus, tho Lacedæmon gained opportunity to breathe, and recover herself within her remaining narrow territory, yet ‘ indecision, and trouble, and confusion,’ in Xenophon’s phrase, already noticed, ‘ were widely spred over the nation.’

SECT.  
VIII.

## SECTION IX.

*Illustration of the state of Greece: Seditions, in Argos, Phialeia, Corinth, Megara, Sicyon, Phlius, Thessaly: Prosperity, of Megara, Cos, Sicyon, Rhodes, the Asiatic Cities: Circumstances promoting the cultivation of Science, Arts, and Commerce: Prosperity of Athens: Memorials of Xenophon.*

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

IN pursuing history through the most interesting age of the Grecian republics ; that age in which their political importance, among the affairs of nations, was greatest ; while, among themselves, the display of great abilities and great characters innobled often the contest, with small forces, for small objects ; and the perfection of science, art, and fine taste, made them, for all posterity, objects of attention, respect, and admiration ; we have the advantage of the guidance of two cotemporary writers, of very superior abilities, and very superior opportunities of information. Nevertheless, those writers both composing their histories in banishment, suffered from democratical policy, we might fear to be misled by some bias thence arising, if the concurrent voice of antiquity did not speak to the extraordinary impartiality of one ; and if, beside the high character of the other, supported by the internal evidence of his narrative, testimony strongly confirming what, in that narrative, most presses upon his political opponents, did not remain to us from cotemporaries, some adverse to his politics, and some adverse to himself. Occasion has already occurred to observe, that Xenophon, deeply interested in the political events of his

his age, and directing his principal attention to those, which particularly affected either Athens or Lacedæmon, has omitted notice of transactions, among the inferior republics, of some importance toward the modern reader's knowledge of the state of the country at large. Where Xenophon fails us, the account of Diodorus will seldom be quite satisfactory ; yet some details, which he has preserved, will deserve notice, for confirmation of what Xenophon has reported, most adverse to republican principles and practice, whether democratical or oligarchical, and for what they add toward a completion of the general picture of the country.

In the contest for the sovereignty of Greece, when Lacedæmon, by the overbearing confederacy of the democratical interest against her, was humbled ; when Thebes, from oppression and servitude, rose at once to a degree of imperial preëminence ; when, afterward, Arcadia would first contest that preëminence with Thebes, and then assert equality with Lacedæmon ; we may wonder where was the antient pride of Argos, and why her power, formerly so considerable, and her energy in opposition to Lacedæmon, commonly so ready, scarcely has occurred to historical notice. In the silence of Xenophon, on this subject, the information which we find from Diodorus is valuable.

Diodorus refers to the second year of the hundred and second olympiad, a sedition, with executions insuing, such as, he says, were never elsewhere known among the Greeks. The manner, he proceeds, was thus. The form of the Argian government

SECT.

IX.

B. C. 471.  
Diod. I. 15.  
c. 57. p. 487.

CHAP. government being democratical, some ambitious  
XXVIII. men proposed to raise themselves to power, by exciting the multitude against those of principal authority, influence, and estimation, in the commonwealth. These had ruled, hitherto, through popular favor. But the opposition drove them to contrary politics; and, at length, finding their situation uneasy and alarming in extreme, they resolved upon the hazardous expedient of attempting a revolution, and establishing oligarchy. Before, however, they could prepare their plot for execution, suspicion of it arose among the popular party, and the most suspected were seized and put to the torture. The chiefs of the conspiracy then, aware of the hasty, unscrupulous and unmerciful temper of popular sovereignty, to avoid greater misery, instantly destroyed themselves.

The death of these men however, and the insuing confiscation of their property, rather excited than satisfied the cruel jealousy and avarice of the multitude. One of those under the rack having named thirty others, as privy to the conspiracy, the popular assembly, sovereign, judge, and party, without form of trial, sent all to the executioner, and ordered their property to the public treasury. The popular leaders then resolved not to lose any of the advantages, which this temper in the people seemed to offer them. That a conspiracy for subverting the democracy had existed, being now notorious, it followed, at least as a probability, that numbers were more or less implicated in the guilt. To excite suspicion among the people, against almost any, was thus easy: suspicion sufficed

sufficed to procure condemnation; and accusations were extended, till more than twelve hundred of the principal Argian citizens were executed. At length the accusers became alarmed at their own success. The people called for more accusations and more confiscation. The demagogues knew no longer either how to feed or how to still the popular fury. In the prevailing disposition to suspect, their hesitation appeared suspicious. The turn among the multitude was observed, by those who still feared the progress of accusation, and they were diligent in improving the opportunity. The people, habituated to blood, nevertheless the farther they went in fury, became the more fearful of revenge. In this temper they were easily persuaded that the accusers were betraying them; and with the same haste and informality, with which such numbers, at their instigation, had suffered, the demagogues were themselves all condemned and executed. Then, proceeds the historian, little commonly sedulous to account for what he relates most extraordinary, the people became calm, and the former quiet and harmony in the city were restored. A circumstance, however, which he has reported, appears authentically to mark, not only the manner of the popular justice, on this occasion, but also the excess of the popular vengeance. Among the numerous seditions of Argos, this, for its enormity, obtained the distinction of a name; it was called the Scytalism, staff-work or bludgeoning.

Whatever then may have been the harmony which, according to the historian, was so instantly restored

**CHAP.** restored upon the execution of the demagogues ;  
**XXVIII.** yet a government, only liable to such excess of disorder, would be little capable of taking the lead of the affairs of a great confederacy. Still more then, in the weakness superinduced by its destructive political dissensions, it would be likely to yield itself to the guidance of the able directors of the Theban councils, and submit its forces, in common with those of the other commonwealths of the alliance, to be commanded in chief by the great general of the Theban people.

It is a truly curious account, free from inconsistency and the marvellous, that remains to us from Diodorus, of the consequences of that peace, by which independency, under the patronage of Thebes supported by Persia, was assured to all Grecian cities. The most important particulars, unmentioned by Xenophon, sufficiently accord with the tenor of Xenophon's narrative; and the whole deserves notice the more, because contrary to Xenophon, all Diodorus's partiality was for the cause of Thebes and democracy.

*Diod. I. 15.  
c. 40. p. 477.* The establishment of the sovereignty of the people in every city<sup>47</sup>, says the historian, produced great disturbances and numerous seditions; especially in Peloponnesus. For, the people there having been mostly accustomed to oligarchical government, their new democratical authority was exercised with eager but unskilful zeal<sup>48</sup>. Many of the most respectable men, in various cities, were driven into banishment: many through calumnious

<sup>47</sup> Μετὰ τὴν συγχώρησιν τοὺς δῆμοὺς αὐτονομίαν —

<sup>48</sup> Απειραγάθως.

calumnious and interested accusations, were executed; confiscated property, divided among the people, was as a reward held out to incite hasty and unjust condemnation. To obviate these evils, sedition soon grew busy; and, to avoid them, emigration abounded<sup>49</sup>. The pressure fell much upon those who had held the administration of their respective towns under Lacedæmonian patronage. For, as these had generally carried their authority with some haughtiness, the multitude no sooner acquired power, than they exercised it under the instigation of resentment. This passion of course became mutual; and if those, who had been injured and oppressed, recovered power, little contented with justice, they would use it for revenge.

Of this disposition, the first, and a very remarkable instance, occurred in the sedition of the little Arcadian city of Phialeia. A number of its principal people, driven away, whether by sentence of banishment, or whether by fear of a worse condemnation, or perhaps of massacre, seized a strong post within the Phialeian territory. Before any effectual measure was taken to dislodge them, the season of the Dionysia, the festival of Bacchus, occurred. We have already had occasion to observe instances of the attachment  
of

\* This translation of a passage written eighteen hundred years ago, and applying to times four hundred years before, so exactly describes what has just been occurring in France, that it may almost be necessary to desire the reader to look at the original, for proof that it is not a forgery. What follows wants only the change of a name or two to make it apply equally to the French as to the Grecian revolution.

CHAP. of the Greeks, passionate at the same time and  
XXVIII. scrupulous, to those festive ceremonies of what they called religion. The Phialeian people, newly become sovereign, would not be debarred of their sacred joys, or restrained in them. They were collected in the theater, intent upon its amusements, when the exiles entered the town, and carried massacre among them almost unresisted. According to the historian's account, their purpose would appear merely revenge ; but probably they had a view also to plunder. To hold the place, however, when they had mastered it, was totally out of their thought : against the powerful confederacy, of which Thebes was the triumphant head, and the democracy of Phialeia a member, it was too much beyond hope. Little beneficial therefore to themselves, this bloody deed brought great inconvenience upon many of their friends, who had been allowed hitherto a residence in the city. Fearing that revenge, unable to reach the juster objects, might fall upon them if they remained, all fled, with the exiles to Lacedæmon.

Nearly about the same time, among the Corinthians, the democratical was the fugitive party. The new prevalence of the democratical cause, under Theban supremacy, encouraged these to hope, that they might not only revenge themselves on their opponents, but establish themselves in their stead. A number of them, who had taken refuge in the Argolic territory, communicated with some still residing in Corinth, and a plot was concerted for a revolution. To put this forward, many of the exiles returned into the city, hoping

to

to remain unobserved : but, suspicion arising SECT.  
IX. among those who held the government, measures were taken so effectually for preventing their escape, that, in despair, they killed oneanother. Then those evils, which the friends of the Phialcian exiles avoided, by flying with their conquering comrades, fell upon the friends of the Corinthians, who failed in their plot. Accusations were numerous ; many were in consequence executed ; and many, happy to find opportunity for flight, saved themselves only by a miserable emigration.

In the democratical government of Megara, an oligarchal party attempted a revolution. Numerous executions followed the failure, and many more were avoided only by flight. In Phlius it was the democratical party that was compelled to fly. The democratical Phliasians, like the oligarchal Phialeians, seized a strong post within the territory of their city : but, finding no such opportunity against the vigilant aristocracy of Phlius, as the wildness of democratical sovereignty in Phialeia had afforded, they engaged a body of those mercenary troops, which seem now to have been always ready, in Greece, to accept pay, or to earn plunder, in any service. Thus strengthened, they annoyed their adversaries in the city greatly : in one action they killed more than three hundred. But, ere long, they experienced the danger of trusting troops unconnected with them by any certain and permanent interest. Opportunity was found to corrupt their mercenaries. In a following battle they were deserted by them, and in consequence were defeated, with such slaughter,

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

slaughter, that the miserable remnant, unable any longer to hold the post in Phliasia (probably Tricaranum, mentioned by Xenophon to have been occupied by Phliasian exiles) withdrew to Argos.

In a few general words only Diodorus notices the sedition in Sicyon, of which an account has already been given in some detail from Xenophon; and then, concluding his review, ‘such,’ he says, ‘was the calamitous state of Peloponnesus.’

From this account of the consequences of the general peace, which followed the battle of Leuctra, and the embassy of Pelopidas into Persia, we may form some conjecture what were the indecision and trouble and confusion, indicated only in those three words by Xenophon, which, notwithstanding the pacification, followed the battle of Mantinea. After then comparing the pictures remaining to us from the cotemporary historian, deeply interested in the aristocratical cause, with those of the compiler who, between three and four centuries after, adopted the prejudices of the opposite party, and observing how they support oneanother, the sketch of a cotemporary orator, tho intended to serve a political purpose, may appear no unfair summing-up of the state of things in Peloponnesus. ‘The multitude in Peloponnesus,’ says Isocrates, speaking in the name of Archidamus prince of Lacedæmon, ‘and all those whom we distinguish by the name of common people, tho they heedlessly enough ‘engaged in the Theban cause, will I think, in  
‘future,

SECT.  
IX.

future, be more cautious. For nothing, of what they expected, has followed from the revolution, which they have been so eager to promote. Instead of greater freedom, they have acquired only a worse servitude: for, instead of the best of their fellowcitizens, they are now subjected to the worst. Instead of independency, they have established a dreadful lawlessness. Accustomed formerly to march with the Lacedæmonians against others, they now see others marching against them. Seditions, which formerly they only heard of, in distant parts, they now experience almost daily at home. Calamities are so various and extensive, that to decide who suffer most is impossible. Not a city remains uninjured by its neighbors: lands are ravaged, towns plundered, private houses desolated; and those governments are overthrown, and those laws abolished, under which they were formerly the happiest of the Greeks. Mistrust and hatred, hence, are so become popular passions, that no enmity can exceed what exists between fellowcitizens. Where formerly was general plenty, and a concord promoting general injoyment, now the rich would rather throw their wealth into the sea, than give to the numerous poor; while these would be much less delighted in finding a treasure, than in stripping the rich of their property. Holy sacrifice is no longer regarded, but murders are committed even on the altars: and there are more exiles now from single cities, than formerly from all Peloponnesus.'

CHAR.  
XXVIII.

While such was the state of the southern peninsula, which, when united under the supremacy of Lacedæmon, had taken the lead among the political concerns of the nation, so that Peloponnesian was a name of eminence among the Greeks, that northern province, which possessed, in the greatest degree, the natural advantages adapted to give political importance, and which lately, under the guidance of one extraordinary man, had actually acquired a threatening superiority, fell again into no enviable situation. The tyrant tagus of Thessaly, Alexander of Pheræ, after a reign of eleven years, was assassinated, through a plot in which his wife was ingaged. Her eldest brother, Tisophonus, a principal in the conspiracy, succeeded to the supreme executive power, and held it still, when Xenophon put the finishing hand to his Grecian Annals<sup>49</sup>. The delivery of his country from the tyranny of Alexander, tho by a base midnight murder, gave Tisiphonus a gleam of popularity among his fellowcountrymen: for the advantage of the deed they overlooked its foulness. But a country where all conception of what can give stability to law and just government is so wanting, that assassination may find public applause,

<sup>49</sup> Plutarch says that Thebë, wife of Alexander, was daughter of Jason. (Plut. vit. Pelopid. p. 534. t. 1.) Xenophon and Diodorus both mention the wife of Alexander, sister of Tisiphonus, as a principal in the conspiracy; Xenophon with very particular circumstances, and Diodorus by the name of Thebë: (Diod. l. 15. p. 517.) both equally mention Tisiphonus, brother of Thebë, as successor to Alexander in the dignity of tagus, but neither speaks of them as children of Jason. This omission, by the earlier writers, affords strong presumption that Plutarch wrote, as too frequently was his way, carelessly.

Xen. Hel.  
l. 6. c. 4.  
a. 36, 37.

Ibid.  
Diodor.  
l. 15. p. 517.

applause, in the supposition that assassination only can obviate tyranny, will never long be free. Tisiphonus, raised to the dignity of tagus, was allowed to rule, like Alexander and Jason, by an army of mercenaries ; because, with its defective constitution, only so, probably, authority could be carried through Thessaly. In such circumstances, not the virtue only, but the ability of Jason would be requisite to exercise sovereignty, so as either to conciliate or to deserve popularity. Tisiphonus wanted either the ability, or the virtue, or both. Opposition to him, repressed by military power, was punished by numerous executions and banishments ; and still opposition was ready, wherever it might dare to show itself. Some of the towns obeyed the tagus ; some resisted him. Indecision and trouble and confusion seem to have pervaded Thessaly, which had a constitutional chief, not less than Peloponnesus, left without a leading or connecting power : and thus those, whose territorial advantages, as an able cotemporary writer observes, should have made them the most powerful of the Greeks, became abroad insignificant and at home wretched.

*Isoer  
de Pace,  
p. 248. t. 2.*

It may afford some consolation, in contemplating human affairs, that the pressure of evils, in one part of the world, not uncommonly produces a flow of prosperity in others. If, amid extensive confusion, security, in civilized society, can be found anywhere, the favored spot will especially attract those, whose ability to be useful, giving them value, will make them welcome ; and thus

CHAP. thus sometimes, in the wreck of nations, all that  
XXVIII. is most valuable among men becomes concentrated. The spots where, in such circumstances, security will most be found, will generally be among those least favored by nature, for the ordinary purposes of life. Thus, in the middle ages, the marshes of Venice, the mountains of Genoa, and the scarcely accessible cliffs of Amalfi, attracted whatever remained of most worth from the wreck of the Roman empire<sup>"</sup>; and, in those earlier times of which we have been treating, amid  
the

" Venice and Genoa, with their local inconveniences, have local advantages, beyond that of mere security, which have assisted to extend their prosperity through civilized ages; but the local inconveniences of Amalfi are such that they repelled, as soon as the security, derived from inaccessibility, was no longer wanted: 'Oppressed,' in Gibbon's phrase, 'by the arms of the Normans, and sacked by the jealousy of Pisa,' (Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, ch. 56.) Amalfi never recovered from the blow. Describing, with his usual liveliness of manner, the extraordinary prosperity of Amalfi, Gibbon has omitted notice of its local peculiarities, to which it was so much indebted for its prosperity. Only thirty miles from Naples, and seven from Salerno, there is scarcely any intercourse with Amalfi but by sea. In summer the road over the mountains, whose snows supply Naples with the ice, which the habits of the people, of all ranks, have made almost as necessary as bread, is barely practicable for a mule; and in winter generally, it is said, impracticable, or to be attempted only by an able walker. In the town itself winter is scarcely known; no north or east wind can blow upon it: but the reverberated heat of the summer-sun is such, that a particular construction of the dwellings, adapted to exclude the beam and produce a draft of air, is required to enable even the natives to breathe. Since the ruins of Paestum have been pointed out to public notice, the picturesqueness of the coast, forming the northern boundary of the bay of Salerno, a coast which Salvator studied, have engrossed the attention of travellers and students of landscape-painting; and hence Amalfi has become more known, among English travellers, than it was formerly, or perhaps is now, to most Neapolitans.

the complicated troubles of Greece, Megara, situated, like Genoa, on a mountainous coast of the continent, and Cos, a small distant island, flourished singularly. The Megarians, as Isocrates says of them, possessing really neither land nor port, and whose mountains are destitute even of mines, nevertheless through the laborious cultivation of their rocks, and by a diligence in manufacture and commerce, which overbore disadvantages of situation, profiting on the contrary from that situation, to preserve the peace of their narrow territory, amid warring neighbors, had the wealthiest families of Greece<sup>52</sup>. It was in like manner, among the general troubles, and apparently in consequence of them, that the new town of Cos was founded, in the island of the same name, and rapidly became very considerable. The island, scarcely twenty miles long and five wide, fortunate in soil and climate, had the advantage of being united in one republic; but not without experiencing the common bane of the Grecian republics, sedition. It was distracted by parties, when an earthquake overthrew great part of the principal town. Able men, at the head of the party then holding the administration, took advantage of this event for a bold undertaking. Instead of restoring the old town, called Astypalaia, they removed, with all their adherents, to a new one, which they founded on a more advantageous part

SECT.  
IX.

Isocr.  
de Pace,  
p. 248. t. 2.  
Xen. Mem.  
Socr. l. 1.  
c. 7. s. 6.

Diod. l. 15.  
c. 76. p. 496.  
Strabo,  
l. 14. p. 656.

B.C. 366.  
Ol. 105. 3.  
Diodor.

<sup>52</sup> Xenophon informs us that the great source of the wealth of Megara was a manufacture of coarse cloth, Ἐξαμδωνία. The Megarian citizens were master manufacturers; the journeymen were slaves, bought barbarians. Mem. Socr. l. 2. c. 7. s. 6.

CHAP. part of their coast, and to which they would give  
XXVIII. no other name than that of the island<sup>53</sup>. They provided for its security by strong fortifications, raised at great expense; and they improved the advantages, which nature had afforded, for a commodious port. By the opportunities thus furnished for commerce, and by the benefits of a wise administration, a large population was collected, private fortunes grew; public means became considerable; and the new city of Cos, not indeed among the largest, became however one of the most flourishing, and was esteemed the best built and handsomest, of Greece<sup>54</sup>.

Megara and Cos, seemingly the most remarkable, were however by no means the only instances of flourishing communities, among the troubles by which the Greek nation was convulsed, in the course of the half century following the Peloponnesian war. In Peloponnesus itself, Sicyon, notwithstanding

<sup>53</sup> It appears however doubtful whether the name Astypalaia, synonymous with the English Alton, Aldborough, old town, was in use before the founding of the new town.

<sup>54</sup> The Count de Choiseul Gouffier, in his Voyage Pittoresque de la Gréce, describes Cos, in the year 1776, thus: 'The town of Cos is on the shore; its port is commodious: the whole coast is covered with orange and citron trees, which give it a most delightful appearance; the public place is singularly pleasant: a prodigious plane-tree, in the center, with its branches overspreads the whole. Bending under their own weight, these might suffer, without the attention of the inhabitants, who regard the tree with a kind of religious reverence. In these countries everything offers traces of antient grandeur; and so the props, which support the decrepid limbs of this respected tree, are magnificent columns of marble and granite. An abundant fountain adds to the charms of this place, always frequented by the inhabitants, who resort to it to transact their affairs, and to enjoy its shelter against the heat of the climate.'

notwithstanding its passing disturbances, was a school of the fine arts ; and, among the islands, Rhodes appears to have set the advantageous example whence Cos profited. Three principal towns there, Ialysus, Lindus, and Cameira, had, from before Homer's time, held their separate political establishments. Toward the conclusion of the Peloponnesian war, they coalesced into one government ; for the seat of which a new city was founded in a very advantageous situation, upon a fine natural harbour. An Athenian architect, who had gained reputation by his works at Peiræus, was engaged to form the plan, design the walls, gates, and other public buildings, and superintend the execution. To obviate invidious distinctions, no other name was given to the new capital than that of the island itself ; a measure, among others, the example of which was followed by the Coëns. The distraction of the oligarchical and democratical interests, with the insuing depression of the leading republics, tho adverse to the common power of the nation, and its means of opposition to a common enemy, and preventive of all civil quiet, through the greater part of proper Greece, seems however to have been favorable to the peace and prosperity of some of the distant colonies. When neither the higher people could any longer hope for support from Lacedæmon, in the exercise of an oppressive oligarchy, nor the lower were stimulated by Athenian politics to disturb all government not subservient to Athens, the Rhodian constitution settled into a liberal aristocracy. This probably was not instantaneously established, in

SECT.  
IX.Strab. l. 14.  
p. 652-654.  
Diod. l. 13.  
B. C. 408.  
Ol. 98. 1.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

Strabo,  
ut ant.

the full perfection which Strabo ascribes to it, nor was it undisturbed in its growth; but, in the end, the men of higher rank and fortune learnt so to govern, that the lower people, through a constant employment of their industry, a careful attention to their wants, a strict and impartial administration of justice, were happy, quiet, and zealously attached to their country and laws. An extraordinary prosperity followed, and lasted for ages.

For a complete picture of Greece, in this age, if memorials remained to direct the pencil, a considerable extension of bright colors and fair forms, no doubt, should find place among the gloomy tints and horrid shapes, that have been transmitted as the principal constituents. But as in landscape, stormy skies, and rugged mountains, and pathless rocks, and wasteful torrents, every work of nature rude, and every work of man in ruin, most ingage the notice of the painter, and offer the readiest hold for the touches of his art, so in the political world, war, and sedition, and revolution, destruction of armies, massacre of citizens, and wreck of governments, force themselves upon the attention of the annalist, and are carefully reported to posterity; while the growth of commerce, and arts, and science, all that gives splendor to empire, elegance to society, and livelihood to millions, like the extended capital and the boundless champain, illuminated by the sun's midday glare, pleases, dazzles, bewilders, offers a maze of delightful objects, charms rather than fixes the attention, and, giving no prominences, no contrast,

no strongly characterized parts, leaves the writer, as the painter, unable to choose out of an expanse and a variety, whose magnificent whole is far too great for the limited stretch of literary or picturesk design.

SEC<sup>T.</sup>  
IX.

Nevertheless, among the playful sketches and incidental remarks of antient authors, we find testimony to the prosperity of some of the extensive settlements of the Grecian people. The western colonies are objects for separate consideration. Confining our attention here to the eastern, we may observe that Cnidus, on the Carian coast, appears to have shared in the prosperity of [the neighboring island of Cos. The Cnidian Venus, by Praxiteles, which description remaining seems to mark as the model of more than one antient statue preserved to us, tho that known by the name of the Medicean, first in merit, is singular in fame, was through all antiquity esteemed among the most admirable efforts of the art of sculpture<sup>55</sup>. It seems to follow, were other testimony wanting, that the community was florishing, which could adorn its temples with the most finished works of artists the most eminent known to fame. In quiet, under Persian sovereignty, prosperity seems to have been extensive among the Grecian towns on the Asiatic shore. Halicarnassus, the seat of the Carian princes, for its florishing state, might deserve to be

Pliny,  
l. 36. c. 5.  
Lucian  
Amor.

Diod. l. 15.  
p. 404, 405.

<sup>55</sup> A statue of similar design was in the museum in the Capitol, at Rome; larger than the Medicean, and of less winning delicacy, but altogether of very considerable merit. What may have happened to it under French rule I know not.

CHAP. XXVIII. be known better to us; and the Ionian and ~~Aeolic~~ cities, allowed the management of their own affairs in peace, while they paid the settled tribute to the Persian government, and only forbidden war and disturbance, produced philosophers, and artists, and wealthy merchants, tho they offered no statesmen or generals for the notice of history.

The political circumstances of Greece; even the minute division of territory, among all the troubles they produced, had a tendency to promote the cultivation of science and the fine arts. Eloquence was so important in every state, that no study, by which it might be improved, could be indifferent. In democratical governments it was all-powerful; and even in the oligarchical, not only for debate among the Few who ruled, but for persuasion also among the Many, whose obedience was to be insured, and whose willing service often to be ingaged, it was of great moment. Hence perhaps principally arose the habit of study among the Greeks, and the passion for philosophy. The customs then, and the circumstances of the country, required, in every town, at least three public buildings; a temple for religious ceremonies; a theäter, for public amusement; both sometimes used also for public business; and a gymnasium, or place of public exercise, where, in shelter against summer heat and winter storms, the youth, within the confinement of a fortified town, might keep themselves in constant preparation for military service, for which, with the weapons of antient warfare, strength, activity, and

and personal skill, were so important<sup>16</sup>. In the larger towns these buildings, especially the temples, were multiplied; and baths, and the stoā, portico, or shelter for walking and public conversation, were added. The common property of the people, and accommodated to their favorite enjoyments, it was the pride of every little community to have these buildings of a solidity to withstand time, and of a beauty to ingage admiration. When they were to be raised or repaired, no purse was to be shut. The celebrated temple of Diana at Ephesus, one of the most magnificent among the Greek settlements, being destroyed by fire, little after the time of which we have been treating, every fortune was to be pressed, whether by voluntary contribution, or a tax inforced by authority, that it might be restored with superior splendor: even the jewels and golden ornaments of the women's dress were required, or given, to assist the expence.

Hence principally the encouragement to the architect, and to the painter and sculptor, who were to adorn the architecture. The progress, thus, of science, arts, and fine taste, among the troubles of the republican times, of which we have large information, is far less wonderful than their rise in former ages of obscurity. How a Homer was inabled to acquire that judgement, for the correction of his fancy, whence Aristotle has

<sup>16</sup> Γυμνάσια, καὶ θεῶν ναοὺς, καὶ τὸ ἄλλα πάντα πρὸς βίον ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμόνων ὑπομήματα. Diod. I. 5. Diodorus commonly retails ideas of writers of the republican times, and so seems to have been led to give the gymnasium the first place among the requisites of civilized life.

SECT.  
IX.

Strabo.  
I. 14. p 640.

**CHAP.** has pronounced him the model of all eloquence ;  
**XXVIII.** how the simple form of the Doric temple, cleared from Egyptian and Asiatic sophistication, became the source of pure taste for all the architecture of the nation, chastening still the artist's fancy, when in aftertimes he was required to vary forms, for the various purposes of civilized and luxurious life, and to add the richest ornaments ; and how that chastity and greatness of design became endemic, which are striking in some of the medals, of times beyond the oldest historians ; these are objects of wonder among which conjecture is bewildered.

But, on the continent of European Greece, in the height of its troubles, arts, commerce, and science, were not confined to the narrow limits of inferior towns, Megara and Sicyon. A wider field was yet open to them, in which, not only they might expatriate in some security, but find even peculiar advantages. Megara, and Sicyon, and Cos, and Cnidus, bore the characteristics more of civil communities than of political powers. Leaving to others the care of the great interests of the Greek nation, which they could little influence, their administrations gave their attention to preserve the peace of their own little states, as they could, and, in that peace, to cultivate commerce and the arts. Wise, and perhaps necessary, in their political impotence, such dependence upon events would have been, for Athens, a weak policy. The obvious danger, of losing more through acquiescence than would be hazarded by exertion, impelled her to take an active part

part in the common affairs of Greece. Liable thus, unavoidably, to some degree of political turbulence, nevertheless the administration, generally directed by able yet moderate men, preserved peace, as we have seen, within Attica, while the Athenian arms were seldom unemployed abroad; and, notwithstanding the vices of the Athenian civil constitution, yet, in comparison with many other parts of Greece, person and property in Attica might be esteemed secure. To these then being added the advantages of an extent of territory, narrow indeed, yet far superior to that of most Grecian republics; of a powerful navy; and of that very political importance which forbade perfect quiet; Athens became the great resort of science, arts, and commerce. Peiræus, as Isocrates informs us, was the center of the trade of the age: he calls it the center of Greece; and, for maritime communication, it might be not improperly so called. Commodities, he says, scarcely to be obtained elsewhere of one kind in each place, were found in abundance, of every kind, in Peiræus. Eloquence, then, from the nature of the government, and from the manner of administering the law, was cultivated, as a qualification almost necessary to civilized life; and philosophy engrossed earnest attention as a conductor to eloquence. Athens was the place in Greece where means most occurred for the acquisition of wealth, where commerce had most expence, where the government offered most opportunities, where even learning was a road to riches; and, tho' great fortune could hardly be held

*Isoc. Paneg.  
p. 186. l. 2.*

CHAP. held there in quiet and security, yet it might be  
XXVIII. spent with splendor. Wealth and science were attended of course by the arts, to which science assisted to give the embellishment of fine taste. Thus architecture, sculpture, and painting, continued to receive improvements, during all the turbulence which followed the Peloponnesian war ; and it was during that period that Plato wrote and taught, Lysias and Isocrates pleaded, and Aristotle and Demosthenes were studying, in Athens.

It is impossible for the compiler of Grecian history not to feel a particular interest in the fortunes of another Athenian of that age, the soldier-philosopher-author, who has been his conductor, now through a period of nearly half a century, among those transactions in which he was himself an actor ; and the supposition will naturally follow, that the reader will not be wholly unimpressed with a similar sentiment. Fortunately the memorials remaining to us, tho very inadequate to the gratification of a just curiosity, will however, as far as they go, perfectly coïncide with the purpose of Grecian history, affording no unimportant addition to our proposed illustration of the actual state of Greece.

Whether an illustrious man was born in a high or a low situation in society, however otherwise indifferent, cannot be intirely so toward a knowledge of the character, either of the man, or of the times in which he lived ; and especially in Greece, where the opposition between the higher and

lower orders formed the prominent point in the character of the national politics, from times before connected history, till those when the country ceases to be an object for history. But, concerning the ancestry of Xenophon, antient writers have left no farther information, than that he was son of Gryllus, an Athenian of that division of the Attic people, which composed the Erchian or Echrian borough, of the Ægeid ward. Various indications however concur in tendency to denote, that his family was of some consideration, and that he was born rather to affluence than poverty. The scholars of Socrates were mostly of the principal families of Athens; so much Xenophon himself informs us; and he was a scholar of Socrates, bred apparently without a profession. His early intimacy with Proxenus, who appears to have been of an eminent family in Thebes, implies a probability at least that he was of connections not greatly inferior in his own country<sup>57</sup>. The same circumstance, together with his earnestness to leave Athens, just after the restoration of the democracy, as his friend had left Thebes apparently because prospects were not pleasant for him under the prevalence of the democratical party there, marks that his connection with the aristocratical interest, probably inherited, was at least

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

Xen. Anab.  
I. 1. c. 1.  
s. 11. l. 2.  
c. 6. s. 9. &  
l.3. c.1. s. 4.

<sup>57</sup> Proxenus, generally marked by Xenophon only as a Boeotian, is distinguished in one passage of the Anabasis as a Theban. (Anab. I. 2. c. 1. s. 8.) He alone, of the Grecian generals in the service of Cyrus, is styled a friend of the prince, φίλος, (Anab. I. 1. c. 1. s. 11.) one admitted to familiar communication; the others are called ξένοι, guests received at his table.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

least very early formed. The confidence then with which Proxenus promised him introduction to Cyrus, and the attention paid him by that prince; his election, after the loss of both those patrons, to a great military command, from no previous military rank, by those who possessed the best claims of previous rank to that very situation; the respect with which, unprotected by his country, he was treated by Spartan officers in the highest foreign commands, by the king, Agesilaus, and finally by the Lacedæmonian aristocracy; all these circumstances, tho' perhaps each singly might be referred to another cause, seem collectively to afford strong presumptive evidence that he was not originally distinguished for his merit alone, but that his birth and connections had assisted to introduce and give him consideration.

*Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.* Xenophon, we are told, was eminently favored by nature with elegance of countenance and person. He was blest, as we learn from himself, I. 4. with active strength, and a constitution of a firmness fitting him for a soldier's life in any climate. The superior qualifications of his mind had apparently been already observed by Socrates, when meeting him in a narrow way (if we may credit *Diog. Laert. vit. Xen.* Laertius for the story) the philosopher stopped him by putting his stick across, and abruptly asked, ' Whence comes every good to man?' Answer being made to his satisfaction, he asked again, ' How then are men made honest and ' good?' This producing hesitation, Socrates added, ' Follow me then and learn.' When Xenophon

Xenophon was invited by Proxenus to the court of Sardis, then about his six or seven and twentieth year, it is evident, from his own account, that he considered Socrates as his best friend and most valuable adviser. He did not fail therefore to consult him upon that occasion. Both were aware that to ingage in the service of Cyrus, the ally of Lacedaemon, and esteemed the enemy of Athens, or at least of the democracy, would afford opportunity, not unlikely to be used, for exciting popular resentment against him. Socrates, therefore advised, as in a case of both difficulty and importance, to consult the Delphian oracle. What confidence the philosopher really had in oracles, as we have formerly observed, seems difficult to judge: but, as a forbidding response would probably divert his young friend from a hazardous purpose, and an encouraging one would give to that purpose a sanction, which the public religion acknowledged and the law respected, the advice appears to have been unquestionably wise. Both the doubt, however, and the advice given upon it, seem strongly to confirm the supposition, before stated, that Xenophon was rich and of considerable connections. For restrictions upon foreign travel attached only upon those of some eminence; popular jealousy was little to be apprehended by the needy and obscure; and the Delphian oracle seems to have been accessible only to the rich, and favorable almost only to the profuse. Xenophon went to Delphi; but, bent, with all the ardor of youth, upon new and great prospects, and urged, apparently, by uneasiness under the existing

SECT.  
IX.B.C. 402.  
OL. 94  $\frac{2}{3}$ .Xen. Anab.  
I. 3. c. 1.  
a. 4, 5, 6.Xen. Symp.  
c. 1. s. 50.

**C H A P.** existing administration of his country, instead of  
**XXVIII.** asking the oracle, Whether he should go to Sardis? he asked, To which of the gods he should sacrifice and pray for success in his projected journey? The answer favored him with direct information, which he reported to Socrates; who, he says, dissatisfied with the evasion of his advice, but nevertheless considering the response as amounting to a command to go, recommended, ‘to do as the ‘god directed.’

The expence of the journey to Sardis, of residence at a court of much more than the Lydian satrap’s usual splendor, and of accompanying the army afterward on its long march into Upper Asia, Xenophon appears to have borne from his private fortune, unassisted by emolument from any appointment. Nevertheless that he lived upon a high footing, and made even more than common figure, is fully indicated. Without the pretensions of either military rank or civil office, he was in a situation to communicate personally with the Persian prince. This is shown, in the narrative, before he left Sardis, and again, more particularly, on the day of the battle of Cunaxa.

Ch. 23. s. 2.  
of this Hist. When, after the circumvention of the generals, a body of cavalry was to be formed, his horses are mentioned in a manner implying that they were more numerous than those of any officer of the Grecian forces, Clearchus only perhaps excepted. These considerations then may assist to account for his elevation, at his early age, at once to the rank of general, over all the officers holding commands in the body under Proxenus, and by their election. It

It was while Xenophon was in Asia, or about the time of his return, that Socrates, whose loss he has so affectionately lamented, and whose worth he has so ably recorded, was condemned and executed. The administration, we may be assured, was not friendly to Xenophon, under which such an event could have place. A decree of banishment was proposed against him, and carried; at what point of time is not ascertained, but it seems to have been within two years after the death of Socrates. In reporting the arrival of the troops, under his command, in sight of Europeän ground, he takes occasion to mention his own earnestness to return immediately to Athens. We have seen how, first, the request, and afterward the adverse conduct, of the Lacedæmonian commander on the Hellespontine station, Anaxibius, interposed delays; and how, at length, attachment to his ill-used little army, concurring perhaps with some view of private advantage, induced Xenophon to forego his purpose for a time, and, in midwinter, ingage in the service of the Thracian prince Seuthes. In the following spring the opportunity so fortunately occurred, for the troops to ingage in the Lacedæmonian service, for the war then resolved against Persia. On this occasion he again declares his purpose of returning directly to Athens; adding, that the decree of banishinent was not yet passed against him. The earnest request however, he says, of some among his officers whom he most esteemed, that he would retain the command till he had in person delivered them over to

SECT.

IX.

B.C. 401.

or 400.

OL. 94. 4.

or. 95. 1.

Anab. I. 7.

c. 1. s. 3.

Ch. 23. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

B.C. 399.

OL. 95. 4.

Anab. I. 7.

c. 7. s. 33.

C H A P.  
XXVIII.

the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, Thimbron, induced him again to delay his voyage.

It has been evidently among Xenophon's purposes, in his account of the return of the Greeks, to obviate the imputation of having improperly amassed private wealth: an imputation seldom failing to be urged, with or without foundation, in accusations of offences against the commonwealth, at Athens. In relating the entertainment given by Seuthes, immediately on ingaging the service of the Cyreians, Xenophon has taken occasion to mention his poverty. It was usual, it seems, for those received at the table of Thracian princes, to carry presents with them. Timasion of Dardanum, from his store of Asiatic spoil, offered a silver cup and a Persian carpet<sup>58</sup>, the latter valued at forty pounds sterling. Xenophon, who had brought from Asia only one slave-servant, and the meer necessary for his return to Athens, made a gratifying speech, which seems to have been favorably received instead of a present. His stipulated pay, then, of about four guineas monthly, for his short service with Seuthes, would certainly not make him rich. When the Grecian troops passed into the Lacedæmonian service, while it was still his purpose to return to Athens, the Thracian prince repeated his former liberal offer of the lordship of the port of Bisanthë, and a territory around, and stock for its cultivation; with confirmation of the grant, and assurance of support

Anab. I. 7.  
c. 7. s. 29.  
c. 2. s. 20.

<sup>58</sup> Ταῦδες βαρβαρίκας. Spelman has made an apology for his translation, *Persian carpets*, which it seems hardly to have wanted.

support in it, by giving him his daughter in marriage, if he would remain with only a thousand men ; pressing the proposal with the observation, that he would be safer so than in returning to his country. Nor was this what could occasion hesitation as a novelty ; for, under the late empire of Athens, many Athenians had possessed castles and estates in Thrace<sup>59</sup>, and some had married into the families of Thracian princes. Among these the connections and possessions of Miltiades and Alcibiades in the Chersonese, and of Agnon and Thucydides on the Strymon, have been objects for historical notice. Xenophon declares his positive refusal of the proposals of Seuthes, without assigning his reasons ; which perhaps it might have been difficult to state, so as to avoid offence either to the Lacedæmonian or to the Athenian government.

In relating his arrival with the army at Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, he speaks again of his poverty, and then he repeats, for the last time, the mention of his purpose to return home ; whence it seems probable that intelligence of the decree of banishment reached him not long after. His account of these matters is strongly marked with caution, against offence to the two really despotic governments of Athens and Lacedæmon ; on one of which he must be necessarily dependent, and the control of neither could he intirely avoid. It is nevertheless strongly marked with candor. Evidently, in the outset of his

Anab. I. 7.  
c. 8. s. 1.

<sup>59</sup> Καὶ ἡ τῆδε τῇ χώρᾳ ἵστος ἀξιόστοις καὶ τείχη λαμβάνει, μόσχε  
καὶ ἄλλοι τῶν ὑμεῖρων ἐλαῖον, καὶ χύρας. Anab. I. 7. c. 3. s. 9.

C H A P.  
XVIII.

his expedition, he was fond of expense and show : and, after he was elected general, careless of saving, generous rather to profusion, and ambitious of popularity, he considered present expense as opening future means. But the decree, barring his return to his country, probably depriving him of property, certainly cutting off many hopes, made an alteration, necessarily almost total, in his views for his future life. Then it became a matter of urgency to consider, less how he might be great, than how he might subsist. With alteration of his economy, if he retained his military situation, opportunity was apparently before him. His preparation then to account for the acquisition of wealth, by means without moral reproach, in the common estimation of the times, and, not only allowed by the religion, but specially warranted, as he asserts, by the declared favor of the gods of his country, yet for which he seems nevertheless with some anxiety to apologize, will deserve notice.

Anab. I. 7.  
c. 6. s. 1.

At Lampsacus he met a friend whom he had known in Attica, Eucleides ; a Phliasian by birth, and by profession a prophet, whose father, Cleagoras, had earned renown as a painter, by his work called the Dreams, in the Lyceum at Athens<sup>60</sup>. Eucleides could not believe Xenophon's declara-

tion,

<sup>60</sup> Spelman has observed that no notice is found, in any other ancient author, of this painter, or of his works here mentioned ; tho Pausanias has left a description of the Lyceum, and from Pliny we have accounts of earlier paintings. Possibly the works of Eucleides may have been removed to Antioch or to Rome, or, among the misfortunes of Athens, they may have been destroyed, before the age of those writers.

ration, who affirmed with an oath, that one who had been in so great a command, where others, with inferior advantages, as Timasion of Dardanum, and the soothsayer Silanus, had acquired considerable wealth, could be under any necessity to sell his horse for an immediate supply. The present of hospitality however from the Lampsakene state, usually made to those in high public situations, inabled Xenophon to offer sacrifice. Eucleides attended the ceremony; and, after inspecting the entrails of the victims, declared that he had no longer any doubt of the offerer's poverty. 'And I see it probable,' he said, 'that this will continue: for, if opportunities of gain occur, some obstacle will intervene; and, if no other, you will be yourself the obstacle.' Xenophon allowed that this was likely. 'But moreover,' continued Eucleides, 'Jupiter Meilichius is adverse to you. Have you sacrificed to him, as I was accustomed to do with you at Athens?' He replied, that he had not sacrificed to that god since he had left home. 'Then,' said Eucleides, 'do it, and benefit will follow'.

Anab. 1. 7.  
c. 8. s. 2.

On the morrow Xenophon proceeded with the army to Ophrynum; and there, according to the antient Attic rites, he sacrificed, scorching hogs whole, and the symptoms were propitious<sup>52</sup>. On the same day the Lacedæmonian Commissioners came

<sup>52</sup> We want information of the import of many of the titles of the Greek deities. Meilichius seems to have meant the character of the supreme god as the kind father of men, in opposition to that of the avenger of sin.

<sup>53</sup> Spelman has observed that, according to Thucydides, l. 1. c. 126. as explained by his scholiast, these were probably cakes, formed in the shape of hogs.

**C H A P.** came thither to pay the troops. They entertained  
**XXVIII.** Xenophon at their table; and, learning that the  
 horse he sold had been a favorite, they redeemed  
 it for him, and would take no compensation.

**Ch. 23. s. 6.** After this the army proceeded, as already has  
 been related in its place, across the Trojan plain,  
 and over mount Ida, to Antandrus; along the  
 coast of the gulph, then to the plain of Thebē,  
 and by Atramyttium, Certonium, and Atarneus,  
 to Pergamus on the river Caicus. Pergamus,  
 afterward the seat of a kingdom, was at this time  
 the residence of those Grecian families, descended  
 from Demaratus king of Lacedæmon, and  
 Gongylus of Eretria in Eubœa, which have been  
**Ch. 24. s. 1.** already noticed as holding hereditary lordships,  
 derived from the bounty of the Persian mo-  
 narchs<sup>63</sup>. Both had engaged with Cyrus in  
 rebellion against the reigning king, and therefore  
 both would see with joy the prospect of Lacedæ-  
 monian protection. Xenophon was entertained  
 in the house of Hellas, mother of Gorgion and  
 Gongylus, then chiefs of the Eretrian family.  
 From her he had information that Asidates, a  
 wealthy Persian lord of the higher part of the  
 rich vale of the Caicus, was, with his family, in  
 his castle there: three hundred men, she told  
 him, might suffice to make all prisoners, whose  
ransoms,

**Anab.**  
**1. 7. c. 8.**  
**s. 4, 5.**

\* In the Hellenics (b. 3. c. 1. s. 4.) Pergamus, as well as Teuthrania and Alisarnia, otherwise called Elisarne, is men-  
 tioned as the lordship of the family of Demaratus. It ap-  
 pears, in the Anabasis, that the family of Gongylus resided  
 there; perhaps because it was the most considerable town in  
 that part of the country. The fief, if it may be so expressed,  
 of the family of Gongylus, was composed of the townships of  
 Gambrium, Palaigambrium, Grynum, and Myrina.

ransoms, together with the effects to be found, <sup>SECT.</sup>  
would form a very large booty ; and, if he would  
undertake it, a near kinsman, with others of her  
friends, should be his guides. This adventure,  
cursorily heretofore mentioned, as belonging less <sup>IX.</sup>  
to the general history, than to the memorials of  
Xenophon and a representation of the manners  
and character of the age, may deserve more  
detail here.

Ch. 23. s. 6.  
of this Hist.

The proposed measure then appearing, to  
human reason, practicable and promising, how far  
the gods would favor it was to be inquired through  
sacrifice. An Eleian prophet, Agasias, officiated ;

Anab. I. 7.  
c. 8. s. 6.

and the kinsman of Hellas, and another of her  
most confidential friends, Daphnagoras, attended  
with Xenophon. The appearances of the victims  
were highly favorable ; and the priest declared, in  
direct terms, according to Xenophon's expression,  
' that the man might be taken.' The expedition  
accordingly was resolved upon. Xenophon se-  
lected, from his own army, only the lochages  
whom he most desired to favor : the rest of the  
party apparently was composed of the Perga-  
menian lady's people. But, due secrecy not  
having been observed, when they set forward, full  
six hundred obtruded themselves to follow ; dis-  
cipline, when booty was in prospect, being pro-  
bably difficult to inforce. The lochages however,  
supposing the prey certain, and unwilling to have  
so many sharers, pushed on with the guides, so  
that, in the darkness of supervening night, they  
left the greater part of the interlopers at a loss to  
find their way.

About

**C H A P.** • **A B O U T** midnight the party arrived at the castle ;  
**X X V I I I .** • and, depending upon the capture of Asidates  
*Anab. I. 7.* himself, with the riches within, they suffered the  
*c. 8. s. 7.* slaves, with much valuable booty without, to  
*s. 8.* escape. But the castle was stronger than had  
been supposed ; the circuit large, the walls eight  
bricks thick, and lofty, with projecting towers,  
and the defenders numerous and able. By day-  
break however a perforation was completed ; but  
the solid wall above remaining firm, nothing  
resulted but a wound to the foremost of the  
assailants, through the thigh, with a large spit ;  
and soon, as dawn adyanced, the well-directed  
arrows from the parapet and flanking towers, made  
it dangerous even to approach the wall. Mean-  
while firesignals and cries had communicated  
alarm around, and numerous succours approached ;  
some Persian cavalry, some middle-armed foot,  
and some even Grecian heavy-armed in the Per-  
sian king's pay<sup>64</sup>.

*s. 9.* In this, a private adventure, rather than a mili-  
tary expedition, established order seems to have  
been very deficient, till, the multitude of the  
enemy gathering, and danger pressing, fear in-  
forced subordination, and able command became  
acceptable. It was now less an object to carry  
off booty than to retire in safety : but the leaders  
were apprehensive of incouragement to the enemy  
and discouragement to their own people, should  
they, by abandoning the prey, give their retreat  
the character of flight. Forming therefore a  
hollow square, with the oxen, sheep, and slaves  
in

\* Thus I think the *ιπλίται φρουροί* must be understood.

in the middle, in that order they directed their <sup>s i c t .</sup> march homeward. Nevertheless they were so pursued with bowshots and slings, that it was with great difficulty they crossed the Caicus; and, <sup>Ib. I. 7. c. 3.  
s. 10, 11.</sup> before the annoyance ceased, near half their number was wounded. Probably indeed all might have been cut off, but for the support spiritedly led from Pergamus by young Gongylus; who, against his mother's inclination, marched to their relief, while Procles also showed himself, with his troops from Alisarnia and Teuthrания. Thus they brought in about two hundred slaves, with cattle, according to Xenophon's expression, just enough for a sacrifice; meaning apparently a meal for the party and their friends.

With the manner of this privateering, or pirating expedition, Xenophon appears to have been utterly unsatisfied; but he expresses no disapprobation of the object. On the contrary, he resolved upon a second attempt, which should be under his own conduct. On the very next day he was <sup>s. 12.</sup> careful to have the preparatory rites of sacrifice duly performed; and then, moving at night with his whole army, he made a long stretch into Lydia, meaning to deceive the Persian into the supposition that, the hostile force which alone was formidable to him being far off, his caution might be remitted. But Asidates, receiving information that Xenophon had consulted the pleasure of his gods about a second expedition, to be made with his whole strength, hastened to leave the castle, apparently before intelligence could reach him of the Greek army's march; and, directing his way

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

way up the country, he incamped in some villages near Parthenium. The result is related by Xenophon in very few words. Perhaps he made his forced march not more to deceive Asidates, than to avoid a repetition of inconvenient interference from his own troops; and probably he provided for intelligence of all the Persian's motions. With a select party he made the surprize complete. The unfortunate Asidates was taken in his camp, with his wife, children, horses, and all his effects; 'and thus,' says Xenophon, 'the indications in 'the first sacrifice were accomplished.' The army then returned to Pergamus, and great credit appears to have been given to Xenophon for his conduct. According to his own expression, 'he 'had no longer occasion to complain of the god,' apparently meaning Jupiter Meilichius, 'for the 'whole army, generals, lochages, and soldiers, 'and even the Lacedæmonians present, vied in 'selecting horses, cattle, and the best of every- 'thing for his share of the booty; so that, instead 'of wanting assistance, he was thenceforward in 'circumstances to confer benefits.'

With this account of his own acquisition of fortune, Xenophon concludes his narrative of the expedition of Cyrus and its consequences; the arrival of Thimbron, presently after, to take the command-in-chief, putting an end to all separate and independent operations of the Cyreians. In his *Grecian Annals*, in which their service afterward, under the several Lacedæmonian commanders in Lesser Asia, is reported, he makes no mention of himself. But in five or six campaigns, mostly

Anab. I. 7.  
c. 8. s. 13.

mostly successful, in the richest provinces of that rich country, tho under the control, not of the commander-in-chief only, but of a Lacedaemonian officer specially appointed to the Cyreians, who would of course share in all legal plunder before him, yet, even in subordinate command, at the head of that body, the opportunities of adding, and, in the common estimation of the times, creditably adding, to his private wealth, would be large. Had the successes of Agesilaus produced any advantageous arrangement of affairs in Lesser Asia, promising to be lasting, perhaps Xenophon might have chosen to settle there, even were the return to Athens open to him. But the recall of that prince, with the requisition for the Cyreian troops to march into Greece, made a great and anxious change for him. He was rich; but, without a country, he was incumbered with his riches, both those his private property, and those committed to him in trust by the troops he had commanded. It is from the account, which he has been solicitous to give to the public, of the execution of that trust, that we have our chief information concerning his following fortunes, and with it some pictures of the times of singular value.

B.C. 394.  
OL. 96 S.

We have seen that when the prizemoney, acquired by the Cyreian Greeks in Upper Asia, was, in their return, divided at Cerasus, a tenth was set aside for the gods, and committed to the generals for dedication. The deities, selected to be honored on the occasion, were the Delphian Apollo and the Ephesian Artemis, or, in her

Ch. 23. v. 5.  
of this Hist.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.Anab. I. 5.  
c. 3. s. 7.

Latin name, Diana. Tho it has been evidently a principal purpose, of Xenophon's narrative of the expedition of Cyrus, to apologize for himself to his country, yet there we find his free confession, that, being banished, he resolved to follow Agesilaus when he returned to Greece, and risk the dangers of the war against that confederacy, of which Athens was a member. The dedication remained then still to be made; and, in the deficiency of means for remitting large sums, and the hazard of keeping them, especially for one in the employment of a soldier and the condition of an exile, his difficulties are likely to have been considerable.

But the commission for the dedication put him in possession of what was, in the circumstances of the times and in his circumstances, an inestimable advantage: it opened a favorable introduction to the priesthood of the two principal temples of the Greek nation, in Europe and in Asia. None were so rich, and, unless that of Jupiter at Olympia should be excepted, none so extensively venerated, as those of Apollo at Delphi and Diana at Ephesus. On his departure therefore he divided his wealth. Part, as the sum to be consecrated to Apollo, he carried with him; and,

Ch. 25. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

Anab. I. 5.  
c. 3. s. 6.

made the magnificent dedication of the tenth of his Asiatic spoil at Delphi, Xenophon deposited his humbler offering in the treasury of the Athenian people there, inscribing it, as he tells us, with his own name and that of his deceased friend Proxenus. The other part, probably equal, or perhaps

perhaps larger, as the portion of the Ephesian Diana, he committed to the integrity of Megabyzus, sacristan or treasurer of the temple of that goddess at Ephesus. The worship of Artemis or Diana, with the title of the Ephesian, was, it seems, not confined to Ephesus, nor was the dedication to her necessarily to be made there. He therefore enjoined Megabysus to remit the deposit to him in Greece, should he survive the dangers of the expedition he was going upon, but otherwise to dedicate it himself, in whatever way he might judge most acceptable to the goddess.

After the campain in Bœotia, Xenophon is said to have accompanied Agesilaus to Lacedæmon. The victory attended that prince in Greece; yet, as we have seen, his recall from Asia was followed by the almost immediate and intire overthrow of the Lacedæmonian empire there, through loss of command of the intermediate sea. That revenue, by which alone Lacedæmon had been enabled to maintain a large force of mercenaries, and to wage distant war, then ceased; and hence, with the campain in Bœotia, Xenophon's military life seems to have ended.

But Lacedæmon could hardly be made a pleasant residence for a stranger, even by the friendship of a king, and that king Agesilaus. Jealousy of strangers was peculiarly a principle of the constitution; and the kings, liable themselves, even in private life, to severe control always, could never calculate the amount or the kind of new embarrassment to arise for them with every yearly change.

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

Ch. 25. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

**CHAP.** change of the ephors. Protection and patronage,  
**XXVIII.** however, which the spirit of the Lacedæmonian  
 government, denying to strangers within Laconia,  
 prescribed for them everywhere else, were liberally  
 given to Xenophon. Opportunity arose from  
 Ch. 24. s. 2.  
 of this Hist. the circumstances of the province of Triphylia,  
 between the river Alpheius and the border of  
 Messenia; whose people, claimed as subjects by  
 the Eleians, had been restored to a nominal in-  
 dependency by the arms of Lacedæmon. Scillus,  
 Xen. Anab.  
 l. 5. c. 3.  
 s. 11.  
 Pausan.  
 l. 5. c. 6.  
 Diog. Laert.  
 vit Xen.  
 one of its towns, ruined by the Eleians for rebel-  
 lion, was rebuilt and repeopled under Lacedæmo-  
 nian auspices, and, according to Pausanias, given  
 to Xenophon as a kind of lordship, to hold under  
 Lacedæmonian sovereignty. There however he  
 settled, under Lacedæmonian patronage, having  
 already a family. His sons are mentioned by  
 himself: of his wife we learn, from his biographer,  
 only her name, Philesia.

Xenoph.  
 Anab. I. 5.  
 c. 3. s. 8.

Soon after he was established at Scillus, the faithful sacristan of the Ephesian Diana, using the season of the Olympian festival for a visit there, restored the sum committed to his charge. Then Xenophon made an extensive purchase of land, near Scillus, in the name of an estate for the goddess; having previously taken the very remarkable precaution to procure an oracular response from Delphi, pointing out, with the authority of Apollo, the very land that should be purchased for Diana<sup>65</sup>. Of this estate, and his management of it, he has left us the following account.

‘ A brook

<sup>65</sup> Χωρίον ὄντες την Θεῖη, ὅπου ἀνιδεῖ ο Θεός. Xen. Anab.  
 l. 5. c. 3. s. 8.

‘ A brook flows through the estate, of the same name with that which runs near the temple of the Ephesian Diana at Ephesus: both are called Selenus<sup>66</sup>; both abound with fishes, and both have shellfish<sup>67</sup>. But the estate of the goddess near Scillus abounds also with beasts of chace of various kinds. From the sacred stock then Xenophon built a temple and an altar; and he constantly set apart a tenth of the produce of the land for a sacrifice to the goddess, with a festival in which all the towns-people, and the men and women of the neighboring villages, partake. The goddess entertains with meal, bread, wine, confectionary, the meat of victims from the sacred pastures, and the produce of the chace<sup>68</sup>. For the sons of Xenophon, and the youth of the town, with any of the older men who chuse it, make a general hunting for the festival; not only upon the sacred grounds, but extending the chace, across the Alpheius, over the neighboring mountain Pholoë, on the border of Arcadia; and they take wild boars, roes, and deer.

‘ The place<sup>69</sup> lies in the way from Olympia to Lacedæmon, about twenty furlongs from the temple of Jupiter in Olympia. The sacred land<sup>70</sup> has

<sup>66</sup> According to our copies, Xenophon wrote this name Σελληνοῦς, Strabo Σιλινοῦς, Pausanias Σιλινοῦς.

<sup>67</sup> Perhaps crawfish.

<sup>68</sup> Xenophon adds ἄργυρια, a word to which I am unable to assign a probable meaning, and the translators have omitted all notice of it.

<sup>69</sup> Ο τόπος.

<sup>70</sup> Εν δὲ τῷ οὐρῷ τόπῳ. Neither Xenophon nor Pausanias has marked the distance of the sacred-place from the town of Scillus,

SECT. IX.

Xenoph.  
Anab. l. 5.  
c. 3. s. 9.

Strabo,  
l. 8. p. 3.  
Pausan.  
l. 8. c. 24  
Xen. ut ar.

C H A P. ‘ has variety of hill, dale, and woods, with plen-  
XXVIII. ‘ tiful pasture for swine, goats, sheep, and horses ;  
‘ so that the saddle and draft cattle, of those who  
‘ come to the festival, share, in their way, amply  
‘ in the cheor. The temple is surrounded by a  
‘ grove of cultivated trees, furnishing the fruits of  
‘ every season. Its form, comparing small things  
‘ with great, is the same with that at Ephesus ;  
‘ and the image of the goddess also resembles the  
‘ Ephesian, as a statue of cypress-wood may re-  
‘ semble a statue of gold. Near the temple is a  
‘ pillar, inscribed thus : ‘ This is the sacred land  
‘ of Diana. Whoever holds it and gathers from it,  
‘ let him sacrifice the tenth yearly, and, from the  
‘ remainder, maintain the temple. Who fails thus  
‘ to do will incur the deity’s animadversion.’

In this very curious detail, evidently, with much said, the direct mention of much implied, has been prudentially avoided. We have already had frequent occasion to notice, in Xenophon’s writings, respect for the religion of his age, uniformly and zealously expressed ; and we have observed ground for supposing, that much of his esteem for it arose from observation of the means it afforded, to the officer and to the statesman, in the want of other sanction, for inflicting duties, military, civil, and moral. At the same time we have seen instances of both his humanity, and his skill, in directing superstition to purposes the most charitable, and with effect very extensively beneficial. How much some resource was wanting, in the deficiency of

Scillus, which, in all our maps, is, apparently, too near the coast, and too far from Olympia.

of civil establishments among the Grecian republics, for giving security to private property, has also, in no small degree fallen within our observation. In Greece, as Xenophon informs us, land was not esteemed, as with us, the surest foundation of private income, but rather any moveable effects that might have protection within the walls of a town. In Athens then property would be safer than perhaps anywhere else in Greece, unless in Lacedæmon. But how precarious it was in Athens may be gathered from the high rate of usury, in the most flourishing times there. Twelve for the hundred yearly was the lowest usual interest for money; and the cautious lender commonly required monthly payment. Thirty for the hundred was ordinarily given by those who borrowed for commercial adventure; and, on account of the insecurity of contracts, the lender frequently embarked himself, with his money, or the goods bought with it, to be ready to take his principal again with the interest, in the first moment that the borrower should have means of payment. Among commonwealths more subject to foreign oppression, or to sedition breaking out into action, to calculate a rate of interest, at all commensurate with the lender's insecurity, evidently must have been impossible.

In this state of things, with disadvantages increased by his condition of an exile, it behooved Xenophon to find means, if he could, for placing in some safety, for himself and his family, the property he had had the good fortune to amass and preserve. In very early times the temples, among

SECT.  
IX.

Ch. 21. s. 1.  
of this Hist.

CHAP.  
XXVIII.Ch. 3. s. 2.  
& c. 7. s. 2.  
of this Hist.  
Herodot.  
l. 5. c. 36.Thucyd.  
l. 1. c. 96.

c. 112.

the Greeks, and perhaps other nations, had been resorted to for the safe-keeping of treasure ; the common dread of violating their sacredness constituting a considerable protection for all within their precincts. Generally treasure so placed seems to have been in some degree, or at least in some portion, dedicated to the deity ; yet not so as to deny all future use for civil purposes. Probably weaker states, and individuals, were obliged, or might find it expedient, to pay higher for the good offices of the priesthood, while an imperial state might command them. When the Athenians had established their empire over the maritime republics of Greece, so far as to exact a regular tribute from them, the temple of Apollo at Delos was chosen for the common treasury ; but the money was deposited there professedly for profane purposes, and to be drawn out at the pleasure of the Athenian government. When a few years after, the congress of the Peloponnesian confederacy was held at Lacedaemon, to consider of means for maintaining war with Athens, it was proposed to borrow, from the treasuries of Olympia and Delphi, wealth deposited there for no specific and no common purpose. Farther, concerning these sacred depositories of wealth, remaining information scarcely goes, except as Xenophon's account of himself indicates how they might be made useful for purposes of private life. Evidently he used the treasures of Diana at Ephesus, and Apollo at Delphi, as banks. The advantage of having such means ready, equally in Greece and in Ionia, was so peculiarly adapted to

Xenophon's circumstances, that it may countenance the supposition of his having suggested the double dedication which the army voted. For as dedication to Diana was not restricted to Ephesus or Asia, so neither would that to Apollo be limited to Delphi or Europe; and had Xenophon's meditated colony on the Euxine shore been established, or had the successes of Lacedæmon against Persia been less transient, possibly, instead of carrying the worship of the Ephesian Diana into Peloponnesus, he might have extended that of the Delphian Apollo on the eastern side of the Aegean. When Agesilaus left Asia, neither his hopes of conquest, nor perhaps Xenophon's views to settlement there, were immediately abandoned. It was Conon's naval victory off Cnidus that confined the arms of the one, and decided the residence of the other, within the limits of Greece.

Then it became necessary for Xenophon to collect his property, or at least to bring it within ready reach; and, if it might be possible, in his unfortunate condition of an exile, and, in times threatening more than common turbulence in that turbulent country, to provide with it an income of some security, for himself and his family, so that, if he must depend upon a foreign government for protection, still he need not depend upon it for subsistence. To assure then to himself and to his posterity a permanence of landed property, such as, under the civil law alone, was perhaps hardly anywhere in Greece to be hoped for, he recurred to religion for assistance. Using the opportunity afforded

SECT.  
IX.

CHAP. afforded by the commission from the troops he had commanded in Asia, he procured the estimation of sacredness for any extent of land, by making himself and his heirs nominally trustees for the goddess, of what was very effectually their own estate, burdened only with a certain quit-rent and certain services. For, by the conditions expressed in his inscription, they were bound to employ a tenth only of the produce in sacrifice and public festival : and whatever, of the other nine tenths, was more than requisite to maintain the temple and its appendages, would be at their disposal. If then he paid largely to obtain the sacred security; he might probably well afford to do so ; because in the proportion that landed property was otherwise insecure, it would of course be cheap. The oracular response from Apollo, directing the circumstances of the purchase, a very strong matter in itself, tho dropping in a manner incidentally in the report of the transaction, was probably desired for two purposes : it would amount to a declaration of the god's satisfaction with the management of the sum which had been lodged in his treasury, how after disposed of we are uninformed, while it gave the most unquestionable authority for the purchase of lands in Peloponnesus for the Ephesian Diana, the exact propriety of which might otherwise perhaps have been open to dispute. It furnishes, moreover, the clearest indication that Xenophon was upon good terms with the Delphian, as well as with the Ephesian priesthood.

The

The superstition of the middle ages, as much as it has been a subject of indiscriminate invective, nevertheless had its evils not untempered with beneficial effects. When law was unequal to personal protection, the asylum of a monastery, generally open, and in almost all circumstances inviolable, was of high value. But the religious tenets of those days, calculated for the appropriation of temporal advantages exclusively to the clergy, were no way applicable to the security of family-property. Even the baron's chapel, to be safe, must be within his castle-wall. In this point the superstition of Greece was more beneficial : Xenophon's chapel diffused a mystical protection over his castle and his whole estate.

The advantages then of the situation of Scillus, for Xenophon, seem to have been many, and some of them very important. He was there under the immediate protection of the Lacedæmonian government, and yet he was beyond the sphere of its Lycurgian rule, its censorial inspection, and its more importunate jealousy. Separated by lofty mountains from the countries most likely to be the seats of war, and far out of any expected line of march of contending armies, he was yet, by his neighborhood to Olympia, in the way of communication with all parts, with every distant member of the Greek nation. Every fourth year Greece was in a manner assembled in his immediate neighborhood ; and in case of pressing danger, arising from any unforeseen turn in Grecian affairs, the sanctity of the Olympian altars, at hand, might

**C H A P.** might be a valuable refuge. Dependent then as  
XXVIII. he was upon Lacedæmon, yet far removed from  
the great seats of contention of oligarchy and  
democracy, perhaps no man of his time in Greece  
injoyed great fortune with so many of the advan-  
tages of independency. The circumstances of the  
country itself, moreover, seem to have been, for a  
man of his turn, singularly pleasant. According  
to antient accounts, (modern are yet wanting) all  
the various beauties of landscape appear to have  
met in the neighborhood of Scillus. Immediately  
about the town and the adjacent temple, with their  
little river Selenus, inclosed between the hilly  
woodlands, Diana's property, and the barren crags  
of Typæum, whence, according to the Olympian  
law, or report perhaps intended to have the pre-  
ventive effect of law, it is said, women intruding  
at the games were to be precipitated, we may con-  
ceive the finest classical compositions of the  
Poussins. Up the course of the Alpheius and  
its tributary streams, toward Erymanthus and the  
other loftier Arcadian mountains, the sublimest  
wildness of Titian and Salvator could not fail  
to abound; while the Olympian hill, with its  
splendid buildings among its sacred groves, the  
course of the Alpheius downward, the sandy plain,  
stretching toward Pylus, Nestor's antient seat,  
diversified with its pinasters<sup>11</sup>, the sea in distance  
one

Xen. Anab.  
l. 5. c. 12.  
Pausan.  
l. 5. c. 6.

Strabo, l. 8.  
p. 345. 351.  
Pausan.  
l. 5. c. 6.

<sup>11</sup> Πίτυς ἄγριας. Pausan. l. 5. c. 6. The tree commonly  
called Pinaster (for its quick growth and picturesk beauty  
deserving the attention of our planters, tho, like that beautiful  
tree the oriental plane, on account of some unaccommodating  
qualities for their purpose, disliked by our nurserymen) is dis-  
tinguished by our botanists by the name of *Pinus sylvestris*.

one way, and all the Arcadian mountains the other' SECT.  
IX.  
would offer the various beauty, the rich grandeur,  
and the mind-filling expanse of Claud<sup>72</sup>.

In this delightful retreat Xenophon is said to have written most of his works, of which all of principal note remain to us. Here, while he meditated on the past, or viewed, in secure distance, the passing storms, which gave occasion for most of the graver, the immediate circumstances of his own happy situation would at intervals lead to the lighter; those on his amusements, field-sports; the management of horses and agriculture; agriculture only incidentally treated, tho evidently a favorite topic. In most parts of Greece, soil and climate did much for the cultivator; but, among the ravages of war and sedition, frequently occurring, ever threatening, the exertions of art would be hasty and little systematical. The fair lot of the countryman, the loved subject of faithful eulogy for the fortunate poet, under the wide shelter

Plut. de  
Exil.  
p. 1070. &  
1074.  
t. 2. ed.  
H. Steph.  
Vivg. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

72 Chandler visited Olympia in the unhealthy season, in haste and in fear. Like some of the most beautiful and interesting parts of Italy, the wooded hills about the lake of Bolsena, and the rocky coast of Baia, of which otherwise it may be still truly said, in the words of Horace,

Nullus in orbe locus Baiis prælucet amoris,

it seems the western coast of Peloponnesus is at this day, in the autumnal season, proverbially unhealthy. Chandl. Trav. in Greece.

If Mr. Hawkins, who has had far greater opportunities, should be induced to publish an account of his travels, the world will be better informed concerning that interesting country. The Arcadian mountains, and especially their western steeps, remained, when he visited them, still finely wooded. The rest of Greece, where Herodotus and Thucydides mention extensive woods, have been laid nearly bare, like the once wooded borders of England and Scotland.

**CHAP.** shelter of the Roman empire, was hardly a matter even for imagination amid the insecurity of the Grecian republics<sup>73</sup>. It may be worth while to compare, with his enchanting description of plenty poured from the earth, arms remote, and justice reigning, the portraiture which Xenophon has left us of the husbandman's life, not indeed at Scillus, Anab. 1. 6.  
init. but in two separate districts of the largest and most fruitful province of Greece. It occurs in the description of an entertainment given by the officers of the Cyreian army, while encamped near Cotoyora, to the ministers of Corylas, prince of Paphlagonia. Among both Greeks and Barbarians, as among the eastern nations at this day, the meal was commonly succeeded by dances and pantomimes. After a pantomimical dance, performed to the music of the flute, by two Thracians armed, in the manner of their country, as targeteers, some Ænians and Magnetes, people of the southern and northern borders of Thessaly, stepped forward, and, in the full armour of the phalanx<sup>74</sup>, exhibited the dance called the Carpæan. ‘The manner of it,’ says Xenophon, was thus: ‘Flutes playing, and time being observed in all motions, one advances as a husbandman. ‘Grounding his arms, he sows, and drives his oxen, often looking around as if in fear. Another approaches as a robber. The husbandman seeing him, runs to his arms, and a combat insues.

<sup>73</sup> O fortunatus nimium, sua si bona norint,  
Agricolas! quibus ipsa, procul discordibus armis,  
Fundit humo facilem victimum justissima tellus,  
&c. VIRG. Georg. l. 2. v. 460.

<sup>74</sup> Εν τοῖς ὄπλοις.

' insues. The robber prevails, binds the husbandman,  
 ' and drives off the cattle. Then the SECT.  
IX.  
 ' dance is varied ; the husbandman is victorious,  
 ' binds the robber's hands behind him, yokes him  
 ' with the oxen, and drives all off together.'

The Magnetes inhabited the dales of Pelion, Strabo, 1. 7. p. 330.  
 along the Ægean shore, and the northern bank & 1. 8. p. 429.  
 of the Peneius, under the heights of Olympus, p. 427.  
 against Macedonia. The Ænians held the upper  
 part of the valley of the Spercheius, and the p. 427.  
 northern roots of Oeta, to the border of Ætolia.

They boasted the purest blood of Grecian race ;  
 but neither this proud claim, nor their title to  
 support from the Thessalian confederacy, nor the  
 valor and skill in arms of every husbandman  
 among them, exercised in the daily care even of  
 his draft cattle and his seed-corn, nor the strength  
 of their highland fastnesses, in the end availed  
 them. Among the wars of their more powerful p. 427.  
 western neighbors, the Ætolians, Acarnanians,  
 and Epirots, according to the geographer, the  
 Ænians were extirpated. Of their neighbors, on  
 the southern side of the ridge of Oeta, the Dorians,  
 a remnant just sufficed to keep the name from  
 perishing.

In Laconia, Eleia; Attica, and some other parts  
 of Greece, the situation of the husbandman cer-  
 tainly was less unfortunate. To plow in arms  
 was not commonly necessary ; the plowman and  
 his cattle were at least not liable to attack from  
 the solitary robber. Yet, if we consider the state  
 of the country altogether, we shall hardly wonder  
 if

**CHAP.** if what remains, from the Greeks of the republican times, upon agriculture, is not among the most valuable of their writings, and if it affords little instruction for the cultivator under any mild government, long established, only moderately well administered, and able, by its own strength, or its political connections, to keep forein enemies at a distance.

More than twenty years Xenophon seems to have resided at Scillus, personally undisturbed, tho observing often, doubtless with much anxiety, the various turns of the contention betwecn the democratical and aristocratical interests in Greece, excited anew by the injurious haughtiness of Lacedæmon, so soon after her complete triumph over the democratical opposition. But the battle of Leuctra made a great and unfortunate change

B.C.371. for him. Then the Elcians, hitherto repressed by an overbearing power, gave vent to their in-

Ch. 27. s. 2. of this Hist. dignation and their ambition ; and, when a general peace was proposed by the Athenians, upon the terms that all Grecian people should be independent, they alone dissented, with a declaration of their resolution to assert their sovereinty over the Triphylians. Mindful of the gross evils, which can scarcely fail, in the subjection of people to

B.C.368. people, the Triphylians resisted ; and they soli-

Ch. 27. s. 4. of this Hist. cited from Arcadia that protection, which Lacedæmon could no longer with the former certainty

B.C.365. give: War followed between Arcadia and Elis ; violence and confusion superseded law and order, more or less during seven or eight years, in that before

before peaceful and happy part of Greece; and at length, as we have seen, the sacred precinct itself of Olympia became a field of battle.

SECT.  
IX.  
B.C. 364.  
Ch. 28. §. 5.

Disturbance to Xenophon's quiet could not fail among these troubles; in which, however, he seems to have avoided taking a part. According to the biographer, but at what time is not said, he sent his family to Lepreum; he went himself to Elis, apparently to solicit, plead, or negotiate; and finally, with his family, he removed to Corinth. It would be a very advantageous circumstance for him, after the violent contention of the Eleians, that the aristocratical party remained completely masters; and this would be greatly improved by, what presently followed, the renewal of alliance between Elis and Lacedæmon. These facts, authenticated by himself, give probability to the report of his journey to Elis; and both together have a confirming consonance to what is related by Pausanias, that the Eleians recovered Scillus; that, a prosecution being instituted against Xenophon, before the Olympian council, for interference with their dominion under claim of authority from a foreign power, he was either acquitted or pardoned; and that, under protection of the Eleian government, as before of the Lacedæmonian, he was allowed to continue his residence at Scillus, and to preserve his property<sup>75</sup>.

Dio. Lact.  
vit. Xen.

Ch. 28. §. 4.  
of this Hist.

Pausan.  
l. 5. c. 6.

When about two years after the battle of Leuctra, the Athenians, abandoning the Theban alliance,

<sup>75</sup> This seems fully implied in the expressions—τυχόντα δια της Ηλίου συγγένειας, οδινς ἐπ Σκιλλοῦτι σικῆσαι.

CHAP.: alliance, took a decided part with Lacedæmon,  
XXVIII. there remained apparently no political motive to prevent Xenophon's restoration to his country.

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen. Then therefore probably it was that, according to the account preserved by Laertius, the same orator, Eubulus, who, in the vehemence, perhaps, of youthful politics, had proposed the decree for his banishment, with the maturer judgement and softened temper of thirty added years, moved in the Athenian assembly, with equal success, for its reversal. Such a residence however, as Xenophon himself has described Athens, for eminent and wealthy men, we shall not wonder if, after an absence of more than thirty years, at the age of near sixty, he was not very eager to return to it: Corinth was more commodiously situated for communication with his property at Scillus, or negotiation concerning it.

But, tho he avoided needlessly to expose his own elderhood, and the property that was to support his family, to the unbridled intemperance of a misruling multitude<sup>76</sup>, yet he desired that his sons should not omit those duties of Athenian citizens, which, of their age, the Attic law required. Both are said to have fought, in the Athenian cavalry, on the great day of Mantinea, where the elder, Gryllus, earned a glorious death: the younger, Diodorus, survived.

For himself, in his declining age, Corinth, probably might be a residence preferable to Scillus. That his connection with that city, and at least his occasional residence there, were of some duration,

<sup>76</sup> *Civium ardor prava jubentium.* Hor. Od. 3. l. 3.

duration, is implied in an epigram, preserved by Laertius, apparently selected from many relating to him. It runs thus: ‘ Tho, Xenophon, the Athenians banished you, for the friendship with which you were distinguished by Cyrus, yet hospitable Corinth received you. There you were kindly treated; there you found satisfaction; and there finally you resolved to reside<sup>77</sup>.’ Occasionally perhaps visiting his estate in Trifylia, but mostly under the liberal aristocracy of Corinth, he seems to have passed, in a dignified ease, the remainder of a life, by all accounts long, and, according to the report of Lucian, protracted beyond his ninetieth year<sup>78</sup>.

SECT.  
IX.

Lucian de  
Macrob.

The

<sup>77</sup> Εἰ καὶ σε Ξενόφων, Κραταῖς Κίρκοκίς τι πολῖται  
Φεύγεις καλέγων τοῦ φίλου χάρειν Κύρον,  
Ἄλλὰ Κόρινθος ἔδεκτο φιλόξενος, ἥ σὺ φιληθῶν  
Οὔτως ἀρέσκη, καὶθι καὶ μένειν ἔγρας.

<sup>78</sup> I will own myself not inclined to give any credit to the date assigned, in our copies of Diogenes Laertius, as the term of Xenophon's life, namely, the first year of the hundred and fifth olympiad, about two years only after the battle of Mantinea. Barthelemy, in a note to his fifty-ninth chapter of the Travels of Anacharsis, observing that the battle of Mantinea was fought in the year before Christ 362, about which I believe there is no difference, adds that *Xenophon's history*, goes five years farther, to the year before Christ 357. What he has meant by the phrase *Xenophon's history*, he has not explained. Xenophon's narrative in his Grecian Annals ends with the battle of Mantinea. His panegyric of Agesilaus goes farther, including the death of that prince; the time of which is not precisely ascertained, but is generally set (perhaps a year or more too early) within two years after the battle of Mantinea. This however alone I think sufficient to invalidate the date of Xenophon's death, as it stands in our copies of Diogenes. But in the Grecian Annals a fact is stated, the succession of Tisiphonus to the tyranny of Pheræ in Thessaly (Hel. l. 6. c. 4. s. 37.) which according to Diodorus, and to Xenophon too, in Dodwell's reckoning, happened in the fourth year of the hundred and fifth olympiad, the year before

CHAP.  
XXVIII.

The estimation in which, living, as well as afterward, Xenophon was extensively held, is marked by some pleasing testimonies. The death of Gryllus gave occasion to many. Epitaphs and panegyrics upon that young man, as Laertius reports from Aristotle, principally intended as compliments to his father, were numerous. The Mantineian state rewarded his merit with more costly honors : an equestrian statue of him, placed near the theater in Mantinea, remained in the time of Pausanias, who travelled through Greece between four and five hundred years after. Even to that time the fame of Gryllus was cherished among the Mantineian people. They attributed to him the first merit in the great battle in which he fell ; the second to Cephisodorus, who commanded the Athenian cavalry ; and the third only to their own highly respected fellowcitizen Podares. Among the Athenians, already in Xenophon's age, the practice was growing, in paying compliments, and in every thing, to run into extravagance. The Attic cavalry, having been the only victorious part of the army of their confederacy at the battle of Mantinea, had a fair claim to public honor. A picture of the battle was therefore placed in the Cerameicus, which Pausanias mentions as remaining perfect when he visited Athens. In this picture it

before Christ 357, just five years after the battle of Mantinea ; and perhaps Barthélemy has had this obscurely in his mind, unwilling for the trouble of farther looking after it. Xenophon's mention of the succession of Tisiphonus does not imply its recency, but rather the contrary : 'Tisiphonus,' he adds, 'still held the government.' Hence the inference seems reasonable that Xenophon lived a considerable time after the accession of Tisiphonus, in the year before Christ 357.

Diog. Laert.  
vit. Xen.

Pausau. I. 18.  
c. 9. & 11.

it was resolved to honor the memory of *Gryllus*: *SECT.*  
 and, whether with fair picturesk licence may per- *IX.*  
 haps be disputed, but against all authority in  
 history, *Gryllus* was represented giving the mortal  
 wound to *Epameinondas*<sup>79</sup>. Pausanias also found *Pausan.*  
*I. 5.c. 6.*  
 the memory of Xenophon's residence preserved  
 by tradition among the Triphylians, and cherished  
 among the most informed of the Eleians. *Scillus*  
 was then again in ruin; but the temple of Diana  
 remained; and, near it, a monument of marble,  
 which Pausanias knew to be from the quarries of  
 mount Pentelicus in Attica, with a figure, which  
 the neighboring inhabitants asserted to be of  
 Xenophon.

" . . . . Pictoribus atque poetis  
 Quidlibet audendi semper fuit æqua potestas.  
 Hor. de art. poet. v. 10.

According to all accounts of *Gryllus* he fought in the Athenian cavalry. Xenophon, in his narrative of the battle, makes no mention of his son; but he marks clearly that the Athenian cavalry was not ingaged till after *Epameinondas* had received his death-blow.

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END OF THE SIXTH VOLUME.

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